KVM: SVM: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV guest

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.15
commit ff0c437a0e02eb9ecc71f3907ca611ac57fdbcc6
bugzilla: 48167

--------------------------------

commit ccd85d90 upstream.

Don't let KVM load when running as an SEV guest, regardless of what
CPUID says.  Memory is encrypted with a key that is not accessible to
the host (L0), thus it's impossible for L0 to emulate SVM, e.g. it'll
see garbage when reading the VMCB.

Technically, KVM could decrypt all memory that needs to be accessible to
the L0 and use shadow paging so that L0 does not need to shadow NPT, but
exposing such information to L0 largely defeats the purpose of running as
an SEV guest.  This can always be revisited if someone comes up with a
use case for running VMs inside SEV guests.

Note, VMLOAD, VMRUN, etc... will also #GP on GPAs with C-bit set, i.e. KVM
is doomed even if the SEV guest is debuggable and the hypervisor is willing
to decrypt the VMCB.  This may or may not be fixed on CPUs that have the
SVME_ADDR_CHK fix.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202212017.2486595-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

@@ -438,6 +438,11 @@ static int has_svm(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (sev_active()) {
+		pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	return 1;
 }
 

arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c

@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ bool sev_active(void)
 {
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
 
 /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
 bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)