mm: remove nrexceptional from inode: remove BUG_ON

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.13-rc1
commit 786b3112
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I3ZE5V
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

clear_inode()'s BUG_ON(!mapping_empty(&inode->i_data)) is unsafe: we
know of two ways in which nodes can and do (on rare occasions) get left
behind.  Until those are fixed, do not BUG_ON() nor even WARN_ON().

Yes, this will then leak those nodes (or the next user of the struct
inode may use them); but this has been happening for years, and the new
BUG_ON(!mapping_empty) was only guilty of revealing that.  A proper fix
will follow, but no hurry.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.2104292229380.16080@eggly.anvilsSigned-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLiu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NTong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

fs/inode.c

@@ -530,7 +530,14 @@ void clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	 */
 	xa_lock_irq(&inode->i_data.i_pages);
 	BUG_ON(inode->i_data.nrpages);
-	BUG_ON(!mapping_empty(&inode->i_data));
+	/*
+	 * Almost always, mapping_empty(&inode->i_data) here; but there are
+	 * two known and long-standing ways in which nodes may get left behind
+	 * (when deep radix-tree node allocation failed partway; or when THP
+	 * collapse_file() failed). Until those two known cases are cleaned up,
+	 * or a cleanup function is called here, do not BUG_ON(!mapping_empty),
+	 * nor even WARN_ON(!mapping_empty).
+	 */
 	xa_unlock_irq(&inode->i_data.i_pages);
 	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inode->i_data.private_list));
 	BUG_ON(!(inode->i_state & I_FREEING));