drbd: Fix the data-integrity-alg setting

The last data-integrity-alg fix made data integrity checking work when the
algorithm was changed for an established connection, but the common case of
configuring the algorithm before connecting was still broken.  Fix that.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruen@linbit.com>
Signed-off-by: NPhilipp Reisner <philipp.reisner@linbit.com>
Signed-off-by: NLars Ellenberg <lars.ellenberg@linbit.com>

drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c

@@ -1775,8 +1775,7 @@ int drbd_send_dblock(struct drbd_conf *mdev, struct drbd_request *req)
 
 	sock = &mdev->tconn->data;
 	p = drbd_prepare_command(mdev, sock);
-	dgs = (mdev->tconn->agreed_pro_version >= 87 && mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) ?
-		crypto_hash_digestsize(mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) : 0;
+	dgs = mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm ? crypto_hash_digestsize(mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) : 0;
 
 	if (!p)
 		return -EIO;
@@ -1849,8 +1848,7 @@ int drbd_send_block(struct drbd_conf *mdev, enum drbd_packet cmd,
 	sock = &mdev->tconn->data;
 	p = drbd_prepare_command(mdev, sock);
 
-	dgs = (mdev->tconn->agreed_pro_version >= 87 && mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) ?
-		crypto_hash_digestsize(mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) : 0;
+	dgs = mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm ? crypto_hash_digestsize(mdev->tconn->integrity_tfm) : 0;
 
 	if (!p)
 		return -EIO;

drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c

@@ -1824,8 +1824,6 @@ struct crypto {
 	struct crypto_hash *csums_tfm;
 	struct crypto_hash *cram_hmac_tfm;
 	struct crypto_hash *integrity_tfm;
-	void *int_dig_in;
-	void *int_dig_vv;
 };
 
 static int
@@ -1848,7 +1846,6 @@ alloc_crypto(struct crypto *crypto, struct net_conf *new_conf)
 {
 	char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	enum drbd_ret_code rv;
-	int hash_size;
 
 	rv = alloc_hash(&crypto->csums_tfm, new_conf->csums_alg,
 		       ERR_CSUMS_ALG);
@@ -1869,23 +1866,12 @@ alloc_crypto(struct crypto *crypto, struct net_conf *new_conf)
 		rv = alloc_hash(&crypto->cram_hmac_tfm, hmac_name,
 			       ERR_AUTH_ALG);
 	}
-	if (crypto->integrity_tfm) {
-		hash_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(crypto->integrity_tfm);
-		crypto->int_dig_in = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!crypto->int_dig_in)
-			return ERR_NOMEM;
-		crypto->int_dig_vv = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!crypto->int_dig_vv)
-			return ERR_NOMEM;
-	}
 
 	return rv;
 }
 
 static void free_crypto(struct crypto *crypto)
 {
-	kfree(crypto->int_dig_in);
-	kfree(crypto->int_dig_vv);
 	crypto_free_hash(crypto->cram_hmac_tfm);
 	crypto_free_hash(crypto->integrity_tfm);
 	crypto_free_hash(crypto->csums_tfm);
@@ -1974,10 +1960,6 @@ int drbd_adm_net_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		crypto.verify_tfm = NULL;
 	}
 
-	kfree(tconn->int_dig_in);
-	tconn->int_dig_in = crypto.int_dig_in;
-	kfree(tconn->int_dig_vv);
-	tconn->int_dig_vv = crypto.int_dig_vv;
 	crypto_free_hash(tconn->integrity_tfm);
 	tconn->integrity_tfm = crypto.integrity_tfm;
 	if (tconn->cstate >= C_WF_REPORT_PARAMS && tconn->agreed_pro_version >= 100)
@@ -2094,8 +2076,6 @@ int drbd_adm_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	rcu_assign_pointer(tconn->net_conf, new_conf);
 
 	conn_free_crypto(tconn);
-	tconn->int_dig_in = crypto.int_dig_in;
-	tconn->int_dig_vv = crypto.int_dig_vv;
 	tconn->cram_hmac_tfm = crypto.cram_hmac_tfm;
 	tconn->integrity_tfm = crypto.integrity_tfm;
 	tconn->csums_tfm = crypto.csums_tfm;

drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c

@@ -3024,72 +3024,7 @@ static int receive_protocol(struct drbd_tconn *tconn, struct packet_info *pi)
 		integrity_alg[SHARED_SECRET_MAX - 1] = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (pi->cmd == P_PROTOCOL_UPDATE) {
-		if (integrity_alg[0]) {
-			int hash_size;
-
-			/*
-			 * We can only change the peer data integrity algorithm
-			 * here.  Changing our own data integrity algorithm
-			 * requires that we send a P_PROTOCOL_UPDATE packet at
-			 * the same time; otherwise, the peer has no way to
-			 * tell between which packets the algorithm should
-			 * change.
-			 */
-
-			peer_integrity_tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(integrity_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-			if (!peer_integrity_tfm) {
-				conn_err(tconn, "peer data-integrity-alg %s not supported\n",
-					 integrity_alg);
-				goto disconnect;
-			}
-
-			hash_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(peer_integrity_tfm);
-			int_dig_in = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-			int_dig_vv = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!(int_dig_in && int_dig_vv)) {
-				conn_err(tconn, "Allocation of buffers for data integrity checking failed\n");
-				goto disconnect;
-			}
-		}
-
-		new_net_conf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct net_conf), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!new_net_conf) {
-			conn_err(tconn, "Allocation of new net_conf failed\n");
-			goto disconnect;
-		}
-
-		mutex_lock(&tconn->data.mutex);
-		mutex_lock(&tconn->conf_update);
-		old_net_conf = tconn->net_conf;
-		*new_net_conf = *old_net_conf;
-
-		new_net_conf->wire_protocol = p_proto;
-		new_net_conf->after_sb_0p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_0p);
-		new_net_conf->after_sb_1p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_1p);
-		new_net_conf->after_sb_2p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_2p);
-		new_net_conf->two_primaries = p_two_primaries;
-		strcpy(new_net_conf->integrity_alg, integrity_alg);
-		new_net_conf->integrity_alg_len = strlen(integrity_alg) + 1;
-
-		rcu_assign_pointer(tconn->net_conf, new_net_conf);
-		mutex_unlock(&tconn->conf_update);
-		mutex_unlock(&tconn->data.mutex);
-
-		crypto_free_hash(tconn->peer_integrity_tfm);
-		kfree(tconn->int_dig_in);
-		kfree(tconn->int_dig_vv);
-		tconn->peer_integrity_tfm = peer_integrity_tfm;
-		tconn->int_dig_in = int_dig_in;
-		tconn->int_dig_vv = int_dig_vv;
-
-		if (strcmp(old_net_conf->integrity_alg, integrity_alg))
-			conn_info(tconn, "peer data-integrity-alg: %s\n",
-				  integrity_alg[0] ? integrity_alg : "(none)");
-
-		synchronize_rcu();
-		kfree(old_net_conf);
-	} else {
+	if (pi->cmd != P_PROTOCOL_UPDATE) {
 		clear_bit(CONN_DRY_RUN, &tconn->flags);
 
 		if (cf & CF_DRY_RUN)
@@ -3135,6 +3070,69 @@ static int receive_protocol(struct drbd_tconn *tconn, struct packet_info *pi)
 
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
+
+	if (integrity_alg[0]) {
+		int hash_size;
+
+		/*
+		 * We can only change the peer data integrity algorithm
+		 * here.  Changing our own data integrity algorithm
+		 * requires that we send a P_PROTOCOL_UPDATE packet at
+		 * the same time; otherwise, the peer has no way to
+		 * tell between which packets the algorithm should
+		 * change.
+		 */
+
+		peer_integrity_tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(integrity_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+		if (!peer_integrity_tfm) {
+			conn_err(tconn, "peer data-integrity-alg %s not supported\n",
+				 integrity_alg);
+			goto disconnect;
+		}
+
+		hash_size = crypto_hash_digestsize(peer_integrity_tfm);
+		int_dig_in = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		int_dig_vv = kmalloc(hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!(int_dig_in && int_dig_vv)) {
+			conn_err(tconn, "Allocation of buffers for data integrity checking failed\n");
+			goto disconnect;
+		}
+	}
+
+	new_net_conf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct net_conf), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_net_conf) {
+		conn_err(tconn, "Allocation of new net_conf failed\n");
+		goto disconnect;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&tconn->data.mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&tconn->conf_update);
+	old_net_conf = tconn->net_conf;
+	*new_net_conf = *old_net_conf;
+
+	new_net_conf->wire_protocol = p_proto;
+	new_net_conf->after_sb_0p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_0p);
+	new_net_conf->after_sb_1p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_1p);
+	new_net_conf->after_sb_2p = convert_after_sb(p_after_sb_2p);
+	new_net_conf->two_primaries = p_two_primaries;
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(tconn->net_conf, new_net_conf);
+	mutex_unlock(&tconn->conf_update);
+	mutex_unlock(&tconn->data.mutex);
+
+	crypto_free_hash(tconn->peer_integrity_tfm);
+	kfree(tconn->int_dig_in);
+	kfree(tconn->int_dig_vv);
+	tconn->peer_integrity_tfm = peer_integrity_tfm;
+	tconn->int_dig_in = int_dig_in;
+	tconn->int_dig_vv = int_dig_vv;
+
+	if (strcmp(old_net_conf->integrity_alg, integrity_alg))
+		conn_info(tconn, "peer data-integrity-alg: %s\n",
+			  integrity_alg[0] ? integrity_alg : "(none)");
+
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	kfree(old_net_conf);
 	return 0;
 
 disconnect_rcu_unlock: