提交 633fb6ac 编写于 作者: K Kees Cook 提交者: Linus Torvalds

exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier

The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files.
Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to
execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late.  This was
fixed in commit 73601ea5 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files
during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already
run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular
files.

Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for
other pathological conditions[1]).  Since there is no need to use
FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test
to MAY_EXEC.

Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of
execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes.

My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

do_open_execat()
    struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
        .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
        .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
        ...
    do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
        path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
            file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
            do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
                may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
		    /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                    inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
                        security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
                vfs_open(path, file)
                    do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
                        /* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
                        security_file_open(f)
                        open()

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
上级 db19c91c
......@@ -141,8 +141,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
/*
* may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
* impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
* and check again at the very end too.
*/
error = -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
goto exit;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
......@@ -908,8 +913,13 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
/*
* may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
* impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
* and check again at the very end too.
*/
err = -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
goto exit;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
......
......@@ -2849,16 +2849,18 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
case S_IFLNK:
return -ELOOP;
case S_IFDIR:
if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
if (acc_mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC))
return -EISDIR;
break;
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
if (!may_open_dev(path))
return -EACCES;
/*FALLTHRU*/
fallthrough;
case S_IFIFO:
case S_IFSOCK:
if (acc_mode & MAY_EXEC)
return -EACCES;
flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
break;
}
......
......@@ -779,12 +779,6 @@ static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
return 0;
}
/* Any file opened for execve()/uselib() has to be a regular file. */
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & FMODE_EXEC && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))) {
error = -EACCES;
goto cleanup_file;
}
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE && !special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
error = get_write_access(inode);
if (unlikely(error))
......
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