提交 5d9649b3 编写于 作者: S Sabrina Dubroca 提交者: David S. Miller

macsec: allocate sg and iv on the heap

For the crypto callbacks to work properly, we cannot have sg and iv on
the stack.  Use kmalloc instead, with a single allocation for
aead_request + scatterlist + iv.

Fixes: c09440f7 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
上级 b196c22a
......@@ -605,12 +605,41 @@ static void macsec_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
dev_put(dev);
}
static struct aead_request *macsec_alloc_req(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
unsigned char **iv,
struct scatterlist **sg)
{
size_t size, iv_offset, sg_offset;
struct aead_request *req;
void *tmp;
size = sizeof(struct aead_request) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
iv_offset = size;
size += GCM_AES_IV_LEN;
size = ALIGN(size, __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
sg_offset = size;
size += sizeof(struct scatterlist) * (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1);
tmp = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp)
return NULL;
*iv = (unsigned char *)(tmp + iv_offset);
*sg = (struct scatterlist *)(tmp + sg_offset);
req = tmp;
aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
return req;
}
static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
int ret;
struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1];
unsigned char iv[GCM_AES_IV_LEN];
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned char *iv;
struct ethhdr *eth;
struct macsec_eth_header *hh;
size_t unprotected_len;
......@@ -668,8 +697,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn);
macsec_set_shortlen(hh, unprotected_len - 2 * ETH_ALEN);
macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);
skb_put(skb, secy->icv_len);
if (skb->len - ETH_HLEN > macsec_priv(dev)->real_dev->mtu) {
......@@ -684,13 +711,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
req = aead_request_alloc(tx_sa->key.tfm, GFP_ATOMIC);
req = macsec_alloc_req(tx_sa->key.tfm, &iv, &sg);
if (!req) {
macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa);
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);
sg_init_table(sg, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
......@@ -861,7 +890,6 @@ static void macsec_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
out:
macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa);
dev_put(dev);
return;
}
static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
......@@ -871,8 +899,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct macsec_secy *secy)
{
int ret;
struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1];
unsigned char iv[GCM_AES_IV_LEN];
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned char *iv;
struct aead_request *req;
struct macsec_eth_header *hdr;
u16 icv_len = secy->icv_len;
......@@ -882,7 +910,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
req = aead_request_alloc(rx_sa->key.tfm, GFP_ATOMIC);
req = macsec_alloc_req(rx_sa->key.tfm, &iv, &sg);
if (!req) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
......
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