ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.110
commit 5a41a3033a9344d7683340e3d83f5435ffb06501
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I57IYD
CVE: CVE-2022-30594

--------------------------------

commit ee1fee90 upstream.

Setting PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is supposed to be a highly privileged
operation because it allows the tracee to completely bypass all seccomp
filters on kernels with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y. It is only supposed to
be settable by a process with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and only if that
process is not subject to any seccomp filters at all.

However, while these permission checks were done on the PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
path, they were missing on the PTRACE_SEIZE path, which also sets
user-specified ptrace flags.

Move the permissions checks out into a helper function and let both
ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() call it.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 13c4a901 ("seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220319010838.1386861-1-jannh@google.comSigned-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLi Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -371,6 +371,26 @@ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	return !err;
 }
 
+static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
+{
+	if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
+		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (seccomp_mode(&current->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+		    current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 			 unsigned long addr,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -382,8 +402,16 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 	if (seize) {
 		if (addr != 0)
 			goto out;
+		/*
+		 * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because
+		 * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically
+		 * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options.
+		 */
 		if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
 			goto out;
+		retval = check_ptrace_options(flags);
+		if (retval)
+			return retval;
 		flags = PT_PTRACED | PT_SEIZED | (flags << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
 	} else {
 		flags = PT_PTRACED;
@@ -656,22 +684,11 @@ int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long ds
 static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
 {
 	unsigned flags;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
-		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
-		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
-
-		if (seccomp_mode(&current->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
-		    current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
-			return -EPERM;
-	}
+	ret = check_ptrace_options(data);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
 	flags = child->ptrace;