ethtool: fix a privilege escalation bug
In dev_ethtool(), the eth command 'ethcmd' is firstly copied from the use-space buffer 'useraddr' and checked to see whether it is ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE. If yes, the sub-command 'sub_cmd' is further copied from the user space. Otherwise, 'sub_cmd' is the same as 'ethcmd'. Next, according to 'sub_cmd', a permission check is enforced through the function ns_capable(). For example, the permission check is required if 'sub_cmd' is ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE, but it is not necessary if 'sub_cmd' is ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE, as suggested in the comment "Allow some commands to be done by anyone". The following execution invokes different handlers according to 'ethcmd'. Specifically, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE, ethtool_set_per_queue() is called. In ethtool_set_per_queue(), the kernel object 'per_queue_opt' is copied again from the user-space buffer 'useraddr' and 'per_queue_opt.sub_command' is used to determine which operation should be performed. Given that the buffer 'useraddr' is in the user space, a malicious user can race to change the sub-command between the two copies. In particular, the attacker can supply ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE and ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to bypass the permission check in dev_ethtool(). Then before ethtool_set_per_queue() is called, the attacker changes ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE. In this way, the attacker can bypass the permission check and execute ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE. This patch enforces a check in ethtool_set_per_queue() after the second copy from 'useraddr'. If the sub-command is different from the one obtained in the first copy in dev_ethtool(), an error code EINVAL will be returned. Fixes: f38d138a ("net/ethtool: support set coalesce per queue") Signed-off-by: NWenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> Reviewed-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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