提交 0c2c366e 编写于 作者: Z Zheng Yongjun 提交者: Jakub Kicinski

sctp: sm_statefuns: Fix spelling mistakes

Fix some spelling mistakes in comments:
genereate ==> generate
correclty ==> correctly
boundries ==> boundaries
failes ==> fails
isses ==> issues
assocition ==> association
signe ==> sign
assocaition ==> association
managemement ==> management
restransmissions ==> retransmission
sideffect ==> sideeffect
bomming ==> booming
chukns ==> chunks
SHUDOWN ==> SHUTDOWN
violationg ==> violating
explcitly ==> explicitly
CHunk ==> Chunk
Signed-off-by: NZheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210601020801.3625358-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
上级 379aecbc
......@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
/* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back
* and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being
* backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close().
* backloged to the socket at the same time as the user issues close().
* Since the socket and all its associations are going away, we
* can treat this OOTB
*/
......@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED));
/* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that
* we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO.
/* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that
* we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL());
......@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in
* sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as
* sctp_process_init, set up the association shared keys as
* necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK
*/
error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
......@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
/* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created
* everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions
* during side-effect processing and correclty count established
* during side-effect processing and correctly count established
* associations.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
......@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net,
commands);
/* Reset init error count upon receipt of COOKIE-ACK,
* to avoid problems with the managemement of this
* to avoid problems with the management of this
* counter in stale cookie situations when a transition back
* from the COOKIE-ECHOED state to the COOKIE-WAIT
* state is performed.
......@@ -2950,7 +2950,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(
commands);
/* Since we are not going to really process this INIT, there
* is no point in verifying chunk boundries. Just generate
* is no point in verifying chunk boundaries. Just generate
* the SHUTDOWN ACK.
*/
reply = sctp_make_shutdown_ack(asoc, chunk);
......@@ -3560,7 +3560,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net,
goto nomem_chunk;
/* Do all the commands now (after allocation), so that we
* have consistent state if memory allocation failes
* have consistent state if memory allocation fails
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
......@@ -3747,7 +3747,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent
* potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
* potential boomming attacks from additional bundled chunks.
* This is documented in SCTP Threats ID.
*/
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
......@@ -4257,7 +4257,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn_fast(
}
/*
* SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chukns
* SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chunks
*
* The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC
* Identifier field. If this algorithm was not specified by the
......@@ -4812,7 +4812,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation_ctsn(
/* Handle protocol violation of an invalid chunk bundling. For example,
* when we have an association and we receive bundled INIT-ACK, or
* SHUDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violationg the "MUST NOT bundle"
* SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violating the "MUST NOT bundle"
* statement from the specs. Additionally, there might be an attacker
* on the path and we may not want to continue this communication.
*/
......@@ -5208,7 +5208,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_shutdown(
* Inputs
* (endpoint, asoc)
*
* The RFC does not explcitly address this issue, but is the route through the
* The RFC does not explicitly address this issue, but is the route through the
* state table when someone issues a shutdown while in COOKIE_ECHOED state.
*
* Outputs
......@@ -5932,7 +5932,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t1_cookie_timer_expire(
/* RFC2960 9.2 If the timer expires, the endpoint must re-send the SHUTDOWN
* with the updated last sequential TSN received from its peer.
*
* An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the
* An endpoint should limit the number of retransmission of the
* SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'.
* If this threshold is exceeded the endpoint should destroy the TCB and
* MUST report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and
......@@ -6010,7 +6010,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire(
}
/*
* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF CHunk Procedures
* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures
* If the T4 RTO timer expires the endpoint should do B1 to B5
*/
enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire(
......@@ -6441,7 +6441,7 @@ static int sctp_eat_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
chunk->ecn_ce_done = 1;
if (af->is_ce(sctp_gso_headskb(chunk->skb))) {
/* Do real work as sideffect. */
/* Do real work as side effect. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ECN_CE,
SCTP_U32(tsn));
}
......
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