exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()

While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was
protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed
protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit().
This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set
too.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast
Fixes: 64701dee ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: NBen Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Reported-by: NBrad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fs/exec.c

@@ -1340,10 +1340,15 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 		 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
 		 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
 		 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
-		 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+		 * races from other threads changing the limits. This also
+		 * must be protected from races with prlimit() calls.
 		 */
+		task_lock(current->group_leader);
 		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
 			current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
+		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max > _STK_LIM)
+			current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max = _STK_LIM;
+		task_unlock(current->group_leader);
 	}
 
 	arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);