stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.90
commit 1cb8444f3114f0bb2f6e3bcadcf09aa4a28425d4
bugzilla: 186168 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4SHY1

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=1cb8444f3114f0bb2f6e3bcadcf09aa4a28425d4

--------------------------------

commit cfd0d84b upstream.

In 4.13, commit 74310e06 ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch,
sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so
the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous
transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size.

Unfortunately, on the "free" side, the accounting of async_free_space
did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of
async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or
less.  These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue
has gone undetected for several years.

The fix is to use "buffer_size" (the allocated buffer size) instead of
"size" (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space
during the free operation. These are the same except for this
corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads < 8 bytes.

Fixes: 74310e06 ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220190150.2107077-1-tkjos@google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>