This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:

  https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html

Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.
Signed-off-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NMiguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>