Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.

A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NMickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.netSigned-off-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>