mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.19-rc8
commit 543ce63b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5I0FP
CVE: CVE-2022-21505

Reference: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2022/q3/57
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b

--------------------------------

The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI.  It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.  One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels.  Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.

If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable.  IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.

To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:

  $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
  $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
  $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel

Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled.  This fixes CVE-2022-21505.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: NEric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>