This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load().  Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.

This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded.  KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>