Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and
could caused the following issues:

 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames:
    If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still
    had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over
    to the new key.
    Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames
    decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value
    to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay
    detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key.

 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames:
    If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text
    frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the
    driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching
    to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an
    incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames
    we sent later.

 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer:
    An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the
    switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number,
    freezing the connection quite similar to 1).

 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session:
    A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key
    while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the
    new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2).

 5) Clear text leak:
    Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption
    offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not
    stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get
    unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to
    encrypt them.

To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed:
 - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set
   @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0,
 - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace
 - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211
 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey.

For drivers not setting
@NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK
rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not
being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a
warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both
highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers.

The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from:
 - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211
 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall
   back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak
   in between)
 - delete the inactive old key in mac80211
 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key
to:
 - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the
   outgoing key
 - replace the key in hardware with the new one
 - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in
   mac80211 (which also resumes TX)
 - delete the inactive old key in mac80211

With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames
encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211
and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be
accounted against the new key.

For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary.
Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm
to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use
PTK keys with those drivers.

The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to
the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down
to:
The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to
mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been
completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key
for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not
send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key.

Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the
reorder buffer are problematic:
RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could
still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it
switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX
and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key
offloading.
Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get
the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and
(re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves
the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it
should.

When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped.
Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them
without special handling.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
[trim overly long rekey warning]
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>