orangefs symlink pathnames, stored in struct orangefs_inode_s.link_target
and therefore contained in the orangefs_inode_cache, need to be copied
to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/orangefs/super.c:
        orangefs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            orangefs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(orangefs_inode_cache, ...);
            ...
            return &orangefs_inode->vfs_inode;

    fs/orangefs/orangefs-utils.c:
        exofs_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = orangefs_inode->link_target;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
orangefs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>