The function net/core/sock.c::__release_sock() runs a tight loop
to move buffers from the socket backlog queue to the receive queue.

As a security measure, sk_backlog.len of the receiving socket
is not set to zero until after the loop is finished, i.e., until
the whole backlog queue has been transferred to the receive queue.
During this transfer, the data that has already been moved is counted
both in the backlog queue and the receive queue, hence giving an
incorrect picture of the available queue space for new arriving buffers.

This leads to unnecessary rejection of buffers by sk_add_backlog(),
which in TIPC leads to unnecessarily broken connections.

In this commit, we compensate for this double accounting by adding
a counter that keeps track of it. The function socket.c::backlog_rcv()
receives buffers one by one from __release_sock(), and adds them to the
socket receive queue. If the transfer is successful, it increases a new
atomic counter 'tipc_sock::dupl_rcvcnt' with 'truesize' of the
transferred buffer. If a new buffer arrives during this transfer and
finds the socket busy (owned), we attempt to add it to the backlog.
However, when sk_add_backlog() is called, we adjust the 'limit'
parameter with the value of the new counter, so that the risk of
inadvertent rejection is eliminated.

It should be noted that this change does not invalidate the original
purpose of zeroing 'sk_backlog.len' after the full transfer. We set an
upper limit for dupl_rcvcnt, so that if a 'wild' sender (i.e., one that
doesn't respect the send window) keeps pumping in buffers to
sk_add_backlog(), he will eventually reach an upper limit,
(2 x TIPC_CONN_OVERLOAD_LIMIT). After that, no messages can be added
to the backlog, and the connection will be broken. Ordinary, well-
behaved senders will never reach this buffer limit at all.
Signed-off-by: NJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Reviewed-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>