1. 19 12月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation) · fdd99a14
      Singh, Brijesh 提交于
      commit 05d5a48635259e621ea26d01e8316c6feeb34190 upstream.
      
      Errata#1096:
      
      On a nested data page fault when CR.SMAP=1 and the guest data read
      generates a SMAP violation, GuestInstrBytes field of the VMCB on a
      VMEXIT will incorrectly return 0h instead the correct guest
      instruction bytes .
      
      Recommend Workaround:
      
      To determine what instruction the guest was executing the hypervisor
      will have to decode the instruction at the instruction pointer.
      
      The recommended workaround can not be implemented for the SEV
      guest because guest memory is encrypted with the guest specific key,
      and instruction decoder will not be able to decode the instruction
      bytes. If we hit this errata in the SEV guest then log the message
      and request a guest shutdown.
      Reported-by: NVenkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@google.com>
      Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
      Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWANG Siyuan <Siyuan.Wang@amd.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      fdd99a14
  2. 16 9月, 2019 2 次提交
  3. 16 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • W
      KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU · 2bc73d91
      Wanpeng Li 提交于
      commit 17e433b54393a6269acbcb792da97791fe1592d8 upstream.
      
      After commit d73eb57b80b (KVM: Boost vCPUs that are delivering interrupts), a
      five years old bug is exposed. Running ebizzy benchmark in three 80 vCPUs VMs
      on one 80 pCPUs Skylake server, a lot of rcu_sched stall warning splatting
      in the VMs after stress testing:
      
       INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 4 41 57 62 77} (detected by 15, t=60004 jiffies, g=899, c=898, q=15073)
       Call Trace:
         flush_tlb_mm_range+0x68/0x140
         tlb_flush_mmu.part.75+0x37/0xe0
         tlb_finish_mmu+0x55/0x60
         zap_page_range+0x142/0x190
         SyS_madvise+0x3cd/0x9c0
         system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
      
      swait_active() sustains to be true before finish_swait() is called in
      kvm_vcpu_block(), voluntarily preempted vCPUs are taken into account
      by kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop greatly increases the probability condition
      kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu) is checked and can be true, when APICv
      is enabled the yield-candidate vCPU's VMCS RVI field leaks(by
      vmx_sync_pir_to_irr()) into spinning-on-a-taken-lock vCPU's current
      VMCS.
      
      This patch fixes it by checking conservatively a subset of events.
      
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@arm.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 98f4a146 (KVM: add kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() test to kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop)
      Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2bc73d91
  4. 07 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/kvm: Don't call kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup · ba5c072f
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 3901336ed9887b075531bffaeef7742ba614058b ]
      
      After making a change to improve objtool's sibling call detection, it
      started showing the following warning:
      
        arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.o: warning: objtool: .fixup+0x15: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
      
      The problem is the ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macro.  It does a
      fake call by pushing a fake RIP and doing a jump.  That tricks the
      unwinder into printing the function which triggered the exception,
      rather than the .fixup code.
      
      Instead of the hack to make it look like the original function made the
      call, just change the macro so that the original function actually does
      make the call.  This allows removal of the hack, and also makes objtool
      happy.
      
      I triggered a vmx instruction exception and verified that the stack
      trace is still sane:
      
        kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:358!
        invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
        CPU: 28 PID: 4096 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.2.0+ #16
        Hardware name: Lenovo THINKSYSTEM SD530 -[7X2106Z000]-/-[7X2106Z000]-, BIOS -[TEE113Z-1.00]- 07/17/2017
        RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10
        Code: 00 00 00 00 00 8b 44 24 10 89 d2 45 89 c9 48 89 44 24 10 8b 44 24 08 48 89 44 24 08 e9 d4 40 22 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41
        RSP: 0018:ffffbf91c683bd00 EFLAGS: 00010246
        RAX: 000061f040000000 RBX: ffff9e159c77bba0 RCX: ffff9e15a5c87000
        RDX: 0000000665c87000 RSI: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDI: ffff9e159c77bba0
        RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e15a5c87000
        R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fffff8f2d99721c0 R12: ffff9e159c77bba0
        R13: ffffbf91c671d960 R14: ffff9e159c778000 R15: 0000000000000000
        FS:  00007fa341cbe700(0000) GS:ffff9e15b7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
        CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
        CR2: 00007fdd38356804 CR3: 00000006759de003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
        DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
        DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
        PKRU: 55555554
        Call Trace:
         loaded_vmcs_init+0x4f/0xe0
         alloc_loaded_vmcs+0x38/0xd0
         vmx_create_vcpu+0xf7/0x600
         kvm_vm_ioctl+0x5e9/0x980
         ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
         ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
         ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
         ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
         ? free_one_page+0x13f/0x4e0
         do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630
         ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
         do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
        RIP: 0033:0x7fa349b1ee5b
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/64a9b64d127e87b6920a97afde8e96ea76f6524e.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      ba5c072f
  5. 03 4月, 2019 2 次提交
    • S
      KVM: x86: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES on AMD hosts · 3a18eaba
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 0cf9135b773bf32fba9dd8e6699c1b331ee4b749 upstream.
      
      The CPUID flag ARCH_CAPABILITIES is unconditioinally exposed to host
      userspace for all x86 hosts, i.e. KVM advertises ARCH_CAPABILITIES
      regardless of hardware support under the pretense that KVM fully
      emulates MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.  Unfortunately, only VMX hosts
      handle accesses to MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (despite KVM_GET_MSRS
      also reporting MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES for all hosts).
      
      Move the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES handling to common x86 code so
      that it's emulated on AMD hosts.
      
      Fixes: 1eaafe91 ("kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reported-by: NXiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3a18eaba
    • S
      KVM: x86: update %rip after emulating IO · b9733a74
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 45def77ebf79e2e8942b89ed79294d97ce914fa0 upstream.
      
      Most (all?) x86 platforms provide a port IO based reset mechanism, e.g.
      OUT 92h or CF9h.  Userspace may emulate said mechanism, i.e. reset a
      vCPU in response to KVM_EXIT_IO, without explicitly announcing to KVM
      that it is doing a reset, e.g. Qemu jams vCPU state and resumes running.
      
      To avoid corruping %rip after such a reset, commit 0967b7bf ("KVM:
      Skip pio instruction when it is emulated, not executed") changed the
      behavior of PIO handlers, i.e. today's "fast" PIO handling to skip the
      instruction prior to exiting to userspace.  Full emulation doesn't need
      such tricks becase re-emulating the instruction will naturally handle
      %rip being changed to point at the reset vector.
      
      Updating %rip prior to executing to userspace has several drawbacks:
      
        - Userspace sees the wrong %rip on the exit, e.g. if PIO emulation
          fails it will likely yell about the wrong address.
        - Single step exits to userspace for are effectively dropped as
          KVM_EXIT_DEBUG is overwritten with KVM_EXIT_IO.
        - Behavior of PIO emulation is different depending on whether it
          goes down the fast path or the slow path.
      
      Rather than skip the PIO instruction before exiting to userspace,
      snapshot the linear %rip and cancel PIO completion if the current
      value does not match the snapshot.  For a 64-bit vCPU, i.e. the most
      common scenario, the snapshot and comparison has negligible overhead
      as VMCS.GUEST_RIP will be cached regardless, i.e. there is no extra
      VMREAD in this case.
      
      All other alternatives to snapshotting the linear %rip that don't
      rely on an explicit reset announcenment suffer from one corner case
      or another.  For example, canceling PIO completion on any write to
      %rip fails if userspace does a save/restore of %rip, and attempting to
      avoid that issue by canceling PIO only if %rip changed then fails if PIO
      collides with the reset %rip.  Attempting to zero in on the exact reset
      vector won't work for APs, which means adding more hooks such as the
      vCPU's MP_STATE, and so on and so forth.
      
      Checking for a linear %rip match technically suffers from corner cases,
      e.g. userspace could theoretically rewrite the underlying code page and
      expect a different instruction to execute, or the guest hardcodes a PIO
      reset at 0xfffffff0, but those are far, far outside of what can be
      considered normal operation.
      
      Fixes: 432baf60 ("KVM: VMX: use kvm_fast_pio_in for handling IN I/O")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Reported-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b9733a74
  6. 24 3月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: Call kvm_arch_memslots_updated() before updating memslots · 23ad135a
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 152482580a1b0accb60676063a1ac57b2d12daf6 upstream.
      
      kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is at this point in time an x86-specific
      hook for handling MMIO generation wraparound.  x86 stashes 19 bits of
      the memslots generation number in its MMIO sptes in order to avoid
      full page fault walks for repeat faults on emulated MMIO addresses.
      Because only 19 bits are used, wrapping the MMIO generation number is
      possible, if unlikely.  kvm_arch_memslots_updated() alerts x86 that
      the generation has changed so that it can invalidate all MMIO sptes in
      case the effective MMIO generation has wrapped so as to avoid using a
      stale spte, e.g. a (very) old spte that was created with generation==0.
      
      Given that the purpose of kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is to prevent
      consuming stale entries, it needs to be called before the new generation
      is propagated to memslots.  Invalidating the MMIO sptes after updating
      memslots means that there is a window where a vCPU could dereference
      the new memslots generation, e.g. 0, and incorrectly reuse an old MMIO
      spte that was created with (pre-wrap) generation==0.
      
      Fixes: e59dbe09 ("KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_memslots_updated()")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      23ad135a
  7. 10 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: x86: Use jmp to invoke kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup · edcf33b1
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit e81434995081fd7efb755fd75576b35dbb0850b1 upstream.
      
      ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() provides a generic exception fixup
      handler that is used to cleanly handle faults on VMX/SVM instructions
      during reboot (or at least try to).  If there isn't a reboot in
      progress, ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() treats any exception as
      fatal to KVM and invokes kvm_spurious_fault(), which in turn generates
      a BUG() to get a stack trace and die.
      
      When it was originally added by commit 4ecac3fd ("KVM: Handle
      virtualization instruction #UD faults during reboot"), the "call" to
      kvm_spurious_fault() was handcoded as PUSH+JMP, where the PUSH'd value
      is the RIP of the faulting instructing.
      
      The PUSH+JMP trickery is necessary because the exception fixup handler
      code lies outside of its associated function, e.g. right after the
      function.  An actual CALL from the .fixup code would show a slightly
      bogus stack trace, e.g. an extra "random" function would be inserted
      into the trace, as the return RIP on the stack would point to no known
      function (and the unwinder will likely try to guess who owns the RIP).
      
      Unfortunately, the JMP was replaced with a CALL when the macro was
      reworked to not spin indefinitely during reboot (commit b7c4145b
      "KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot").  This
      causes the aforementioned behavior where a bogus function is inserted
      into the stack trace, e.g. my builds like to blame free_kvm_area().
      
      Revert the CALL back to a JMP.  The changelog for commit b7c4145b
      ("KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot") contains
      nothing that indicates the switch to CALL was deliberate.  This is
      backed up by the fact that the PUSH <insn RIP> was left intact.
      
      Note that an alternative to the PUSH+JMP magic would be to JMP back
      to the "real" code and CALL from there, but that would require adding
      a JMP in the non-faulting path to avoid calling kvm_spurious_fault()
      and would add no value, i.e. the stack trace would be the same.
      
      Using CALL:
      
      ------------[ cut here ]------------
      kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356!
      invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
      CPU: 4 PID: 1057 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75
      Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
      RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm]
      Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41
      RSP: 0018:ffffc900004bbcc8 EFLAGS: 00010046
      RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
      RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
      RBP: ffff888273fd8000 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000371fb0
      R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000026d763cf4 R15: ffff888273fd8000
      FS:  00007f3d69691700(0000) GS:ffff888277800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 000055f89bc56fe0 CR3: 0000000271a5a001 CR4: 0000000000362ee0
      Call Trace:
       free_kvm_area+0x1044/0x43ea [kvm_intel]
       ? vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel]
       ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm]
       ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm]
       ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm]
       ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90
       ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60
       ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490
       ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620
       ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180
       ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
       ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
       ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
       ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc
      ---[ end trace 9775b14b123b1713 ]---
      
      Using JMP:
      
      ------------[ cut here ]------------
      kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356!
      invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
      CPU: 6 PID: 1067 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75
      Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
      RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm]
      Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41
      RSP: 0018:ffffc90000497cd0 EFLAGS: 00010046
      RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff
      RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
      RBP: ffff88827058bd40 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000369fb0
      R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000003c8fc6642 R15: ffff88827058bd40
      FS:  00007f3d7219e700(0000) GS:ffff888277900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00007f3d64001000 CR3: 0000000271c6b004 CR4: 0000000000362ee0
      Call Trace:
       vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel]
       ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm]
       ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm]
       ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm]
       ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90
       ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60
       ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490
       ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620
       ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180
       ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
       ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
       ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
       ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc
      ---[ end trace f9daedb85ab3ddba ]---
      
      Fixes: b7c4145b ("KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      edcf33b1
  8. 06 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • L
      KVM: nVMX/nSVM: Fix bug which sets vcpu->arch.tsc_offset to L1 tsc_offset · 76c8476c
      Leonid Shatz 提交于
      commit 326e742533bf0a23f0127d8ea62fb558ba665f08 upstream.
      
      Since commit e79f245d ("X86/KVM: Properly update 'tsc_offset' to
      represent the running guest"), vcpu->arch.tsc_offset meaning was
      changed to always reflect the tsc_offset value set on active VMCS.
      Regardless if vCPU is currently running L1 or L2.
      
      However, above mentioned commit failed to also change
      kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() to set vcpu->arch.tsc_offset correctly.
      This is because vmx_write_tsc_offset() could set the tsc_offset value
      in active VMCS to given offset parameter *plus vmcs12->tsc_offset*.
      However, kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() just sets vcpu->arch.tsc_offset
      to given offset parameter. Without taking into account the possible
      addition of vmcs12->tsc_offset. (Same is true for SVM case).
      
      Fix this issue by changing kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset() to return
      actually set tsc_offset in active VMCS and modify
      kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() to set returned value in
      vcpu->arch.tsc_offset.
      In addition, rename write_tsc_offset() callback to write_l1_tsc_offset()
      to make it clear that it is meant to set L1 TSC offset.
      
      Fixes: e79f245d ("X86/KVM: Properly update 'tsc_offset' to represent the running guest")
      Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLeonid Shatz <leonid.shatz@oracle.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      76c8476c
  9. 14 11月, 2018 1 次提交
    • J
      KVM: nVMX: Clear reserved bits of #DB exit qualification · 3223e557
      Jim Mattson 提交于
      [ Upstream commit cfb634fe ]
      
      According to volume 3 of the SDM, bits 63:15 and 12:4 of the exit
      qualification field for debug exceptions are reserved (cleared to
      0). However, the SDM is incorrect about bit 16 (corresponding to
      DR6.RTM). This bit should be set if a debug exception (#DB) or a
      breakpoint exception (#BP) occurred inside an RTM region while
      advanced debugging of RTM transactional regions was enabled. Note that
      this is the opposite of DR6.RTM, which "indicates (when clear) that a
      debug exception (#DB) or breakpoint exception (#BP) occurred inside an
      RTM region while advanced debugging of RTM transactional regions was
      enabled."
      
      There is still an issue with stale DR6 bits potentially being
      misreported for the current debug exception.  DR6 should not have been
      modified before vectoring the #DB exception, and the "new DR6 bits"
      should be available somewhere, but it was and they aren't.
      
      Fixes: b96fb439 ("KVM: nVMX: fixes to nested virt interrupt injection")
      Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3223e557
  10. 20 9月, 2018 3 次提交
    • D
      KVM: x86: Control guest reads of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO · 6fbbde9a
      Drew Schmitt 提交于
      Add KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO so that userspace can disable guest access
      to reads of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO.
      
      Disabling access to reads of this MSR gives userspace the control to "expose"
      this platform-dependent information to guests in a clear way. As it exists
      today, guests that read this MSR would get unpopulated information if userspace
      hadn't already set it (and prior to this patch series, only the CPUID faulting
      information could have been populated). This existing interface could be
      confusing if guests don't handle the potential for incorrect/incomplete
      information gracefully (e.g. zero reported for base frequency).
      Signed-off-by: NDrew Schmitt <dasch@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      6fbbde9a
    • L
      KVM: nVMX: Wake blocked vCPU in guest-mode if pending interrupt in virtual APICv · e6c67d8c
      Liran Alon 提交于
      In case L1 do not intercept L2 HLT or enter L2 in HLT activity-state,
      it is possible for a vCPU to be blocked while it is in guest-mode.
      
      According to Intel SDM 26.6.5 Interrupt-Window Exiting and
      Virtual-Interrupt Delivery: "These events wake the logical processor
      if it just entered the HLT state because of a VM entry".
      Therefore, if L1 enters L2 in HLT activity-state and L2 has a pending
      deliverable interrupt in vmcs12->guest_intr_status.RVI, then the vCPU
      should be waken from the HLT state and injected with the interrupt.
      
      In addition, if while the vCPU is blocked (while it is in guest-mode),
      it receives a nested posted-interrupt, then the vCPU should also be
      waken and injected with the posted interrupt.
      
      To handle these cases, this patch enhances kvm_vcpu_has_events() to also
      check if there is a pending interrupt in L2 virtual APICv provided by
      L1. That is, it evaluates if there is a pending virtual interrupt for L2
      by checking RVI[7:4] > VPPR[7:4] as specified in Intel SDM 29.2.1
      Evaluation of Pending Interrupts.
      
      Note that this also handles the case of nested posted-interrupt by the
      fact RVI is updated in vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() which is
      called from kvm_vcpu_check_block() -> kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() ->
      kvm_vcpu_running() -> vmx_check_nested_events() ->
      vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt().
      Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDarren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      e6c67d8c
    • S
      KVM: VMX: use preemption timer to force immediate VMExit · d264ee0c
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      A VMX preemption timer value of '0' is guaranteed to cause a VMExit
      prior to the CPU executing any instructions in the guest.  Use the
      preemption timer (if it's supported) to trigger immediate VMExit
      in place of the current method of sending a self-IPI.  This ensures
      that pending VMExit injection to L1 occurs prior to executing any
      instructions in the guest (regardless of nesting level).
      
      When deferring VMExit injection, KVM generates an immediate VMExit
      from the (possibly nested) guest by sending itself an IPI.  Because
      hardware interrupts are blocked prior to VMEnter and are unblocked
      (in hardware) after VMEnter, this results in taking a VMExit(INTR)
      before any guest instruction is executed.  But, as this approach
      relies on the IPI being received before VMEnter executes, it only
      works as intended when KVM is running as L0.  Because there are no
      architectural guarantees regarding when IPIs are delivered, when
      running nested the INTR may "arrive" long after L2 is running e.g.
      L0 KVM doesn't force an immediate switch to L1 to deliver an INTR.
      
      For the most part, this unintended delay is not an issue since the
      events being injected to L1 also do not have architectural guarantees
      regarding their timing.  The notable exception is the VMX preemption
      timer[1], which is architecturally guaranteed to cause a VMExit prior
      to executing any instructions in the guest if the timer value is '0'
      at VMEnter.  Specifically, the delay in injecting the VMExit causes
      the preemption timer KVM unit test to fail when run in a nested guest.
      
      Note: this approach is viable even on CPUs with a broken preemption
      timer, as broken in this context only means the timer counts at the
      wrong rate.  There are no known errata affecting timer value of '0'.
      
      [1] I/O SMIs also have guarantees on when they arrive, but I have
          no idea if/how those are emulated in KVM.
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      [Use a hook for SVM instead of leaving the default in x86.c - Paolo]
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      d264ee0c
  11. 08 9月, 2018 1 次提交
    • W
      KVM: LAPIC: Fix pv ipis out-of-bounds access · bdf7ffc8
      Wanpeng Li 提交于
      Dan Carpenter reported that the untrusted data returns from kvm_register_read()
      results in the following static checker warning:
        arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:576 kvm_pv_send_ipi()
        error: buffer underflow 'map->phys_map' 's32min-s32max'
      
      KVM guest can easily trigger this by executing the following assembly sequence
      in Ring0:
      
      mov $10, %rax
      mov $0xFFFFFFFF, %rbx
      mov $0xFFFFFFFF, %rdx
      mov $0, %rsi
      vmcall
      
      As this will cause KVM to execute the following code-path:
      vmx_handle_exit() -> handle_vmcall() -> kvm_emulate_hypercall() -> kvm_pv_send_ipi()
      which will reach out-of-bounds access.
      
      This patch fixes it by adding a check to kvm_pv_send_ipi() against map->max_apic_id,
      ignoring destinations that are not present and delivering the rest. We also check
      whether or not map->phys_map[min + i] is NULL since the max_apic_id is set to the
      max apic id, some phys_map maybe NULL when apic id is sparse, especially kvm
      unconditionally set max_apic_id to 255 to reserve enough space for any xAPIC ID.
      Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
      [Add second "if (min > map->max_apic_id)" to complete the fix. -Radim]
      Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      bdf7ffc8
  12. 07 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  13. 30 8月, 2018 5 次提交
  14. 06 8月, 2018 13 次提交
  15. 05 8月, 2018 2 次提交
    • P
      KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry · 5b76a3cf
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      When nested virtualization is in use, VMENTER operations from the nested
      hypervisor into the nested guest will always be processed by the bare metal
      hypervisor, and KVM's "conditional cache flushes" mode in particular does a
      flush on nested vmentry.  Therefore, include the "skip L1D flush on
      vmentry" bit in KVM's suggested ARCH_CAPABILITIES setting.
      
      Add the relevant Documentation.
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      5b76a3cf
    • N
      x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h · 447ae316
      Nicolai Stange 提交于
      The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
      irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().
      
      Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
      dependencies like
      
        asm/smp.h
          asm/apic.h
            asm/hardirq.h
              linux/irq.h
                linux/topology.h
                  linux/smp.h
                    asm/smp.h
      
      or
      
        linux/gfp.h
          linux/mmzone.h
            asm/mmzone.h
              asm/mmzone_64.h
                asm/smp.h
                  asm/apic.h
                    asm/hardirq.h
                      linux/irq.h
                        linux/irqdesc.h
                          linux/kobject.h
                            linux/sysfs.h
                              linux/kernfs.h
                                linux/idr.h
                                  linux/gfp.h
      
      and others.
      
      This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
      effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
      before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
      anymore.
      
      A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
      into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
      asm/apic.h.
      
      However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
      unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
      asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
      archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
      asm/hardirq.h.
      
      Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.
      
      Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
      files as needed.
      
      Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
      set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
      at all.
      Signed-off-by: NNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      447ae316
  16. 05 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic · c595ceee
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      Add the logic for flushing L1D on VMENTER. The flush depends on the static
      key being enabled and the new l1tf_flush_l1d flag being set.
      
      The flags is set:
       - Always, if the flush module parameter is 'always'
      
       - Conditionally at:
         - Entry to vcpu_run(), i.e. after executing user space
      
         - From the sched_in notifier, i.e. when switching to a vCPU thread.
      
         - From vmexit handlers which are considered unsafe, i.e. where
           sensitive data can be brought into L1D:
      
           - The emulator, which could be a good target for other speculative
             execution-based threats,
      
           - The MMU, which can bring host page tables in the L1 cache.
           
           - External interrupts
      
           - Nested operations that require the MMU (see above). That is
             vmptrld, vmptrst, vmclear,vmwrite,vmread.
      
           - When handling invept,invvpid
      
      [ tglx: Split out from combo patch and reduced to a single flag ]
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      c595ceee
  17. 26 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  18. 17 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  19. 15 5月, 2018 1 次提交