On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com>
> Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400
>
> > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps
> > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577
> >  /sbin/mingetty
> > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577
> >  /sbin/mingetty
> > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
> >  [heap]
>
> SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP
> just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set
> both executable and writable.
>
> You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since
> because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch,
> the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does.
> You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not.
>
> Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32
> || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with
> this.
>
> In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the
> VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the
> SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to
> go through this process too.

To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just
directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding
whether to enable or disable these checks.   VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't
constant on some architectures but instead depends on
current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly.  So we'll just
use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these
checks.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming.
This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer
cannot be used.  This patch just renames the flag so the generic
initializer can be used.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Change the credentials documentation to make it clear that the RCU read lock
must be explicitly held when accessing credentials pointers in some other task
than current.  Holding a spinlock does not implicitly hold the RCU read lock.
Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Don't #include Ext2 headers into Smack unnecessarily.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Whitespace coding style fixes.
Signed-off-by: NJustin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219

The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without
being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and
its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling
mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private
has no value.

Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it.

Comment from Serge :

  Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue
  paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're
  gonna get a headache.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

As an example IMA emits a warning when it can't find a TPM chip:

"No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!"

This patch prefaces that message with IMA so we know what subsystem is
bypassing the TPM.  Do this for all pr_info and pr_err messages.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

integrity_audit_msg() uses "integrity:" in the audit message.  This
violates the (loosely defined) audit system requirements that everything be
a key=value pair and it doesn't provide additional information.  This can
be obviously gleaned from the message type.  Just drop it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into
audit_log_untrusted_string().  This is going to cause them all to get
quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

IMA policy load parser will reject any policies with a comment.  This patch
will allow the parser to just ignore lines which start with a #.  This is not
very robust.  # can ONLY be used at the very beginning of a line.  Inline
comments are not allowed.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

IMA parser will fail if whitespace is used in any way other than a single
space.  Using a tab or even using 2 spaces in a row will result in a policy
being rejected.  This patch makes the kernel ignore whitespace a bit better.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently the ima policy load code will print what it doesn't understand
but really I think it should reject any policy it doesn't understand.  This
patch makes it so!
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

ima_parse_rule currently sets entry->action = -1 and then later tests
if (entry->action == UNKNOWN).  It is true that UNKNOWN == -1 but actually
setting it to UNKNOWN makes a lot more sense in case things change in the
future.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

IMA will accept rules which specify things twice and will only pay
attention to the last one.  We should reject such rules.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write().  This patch allows IMA to
accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per
write.  \n is used as the delimiter between rules.  IMA will return a short
write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n.

This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA
policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one
write per rule'
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM).  This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace.  This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In the comment of cap_file_mmap(), replace mmap_min_addr to be dac_mmap_min_addr.
Signed-off-by: NZhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Unused hook.  Remove it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix coding style in security/
Signed-off-by: NZhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy
since we don't always call it sksec.  Just rename everything sksec.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a MAINTAINERS record for the key management facility.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  CRED: Fix memory leak in error handling

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joern/logfs:
  [LogFS] Erase new journal segments
  [LogFS] Move reserved segments with journal
  [LogFS] Clear PagePrivate when moving journal
  Simplify and fix pad_wbuf
  Prevent data corruption in logfs_rewrite_block()
  Use deactivate_locked_super
  Fix logfs_get_sb_final error path
  Write out both superblocks on mismatch
  Prevent schedule while atomic in __logfs_readdir
  Plug memory leak in writeseg_end_io
  Limit max_pages for insane devices
  Open segment file before using it

Merge branch 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip

* 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  x86: Do not free zero sized per cpu areas
  x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary
  x86: Make smp_locks end with page alignment

Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds().
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>