1. 27 7月, 2017 2 次提交
  2. 21 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 20 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • J
      debug: Fix WARN_ON_ONCE() for modules · 325cdacd
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      Mike Galbraith reported a situation where a WARN_ON_ONCE() call in DRM
      code turned into an oops.  As it turns out, WARN_ON_ONCE() seems to be
      completely broken when called from a module.
      
      The bug was introduced with the following commit:
      
        19d43626 ("debug: Add _ONCE() logic to report_bug()")
      
      That commit changed WARN_ON_ONCE() to move its 'once' logic into the bug
      trap handler.  It requires a writable bug table so that the BUGFLAG_DONE
      bit can be written to the flags to indicate the first warning has
      occurred.
      
      The bug table was made writable for vmlinux, which relies on
      vmlinux.lds.S and vmlinux.lds.h for laying out the sections.  However,
      it wasn't made writable for modules, which rely on the ELF section
      header flags.
      Reported-by: NMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Tested-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: 19d43626 ("debug: Add _ONCE() logic to report_bug()")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a53b04235a65478dd9afc51f5b329fdc65c84364.1500095401.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      325cdacd
    • A
      x86/io: Add "memory" clobber to insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl · 7206f9bf
      Arnd Bergmann 提交于
      The x86 version of insb/insw/insl uses an inline assembly that does
      not have the target buffer listed as an output. This can confuse
      the compiler, leading it to think that a subsequent access of the
      buffer is uninitialized:
      
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c: In function ‘wl3501_mgmt_scan_confirm’:
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:665:9: error: ‘sig.status’ is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:668:12: error: ‘sig.cap_info’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c: In function 'sb1000_rx':
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:775:9: error: 'st[0]' is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:776:10: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:784:11: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
      
      I tried to mark the exact input buffer as an output here, but couldn't
      figure it out. As suggested by Linus, marking all memory as clobbered
      however is good enough too. For the outs operations, I also add the
      memory clobber, to force the input to be written to local variables.
      This is probably already guaranteed by the "asm volatile", but it can't
      hurt to do this for symmetry.
      Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719125310.2487451-5-arnd@arndb.de
      Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/7/12/605Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7206f9bf
  4. 18 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • R
      x86/mm, KVM: Fix warning when !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT · 4c07f904
      Roman Kagan 提交于
      A recent commit:
      
        d6e41f11 ("x86/mm, KVM: Teach KVM's VMX code that CR3 isn't a constant")
      
      introduced a VM_WARN_ON(!in_atomic()) which generates false positives
      on every VM entry on !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT kernels.
      
      Replace it with a test for preemptible(), which appears to match the
      original intent and works across different CONFIG_PREEMPT* variations.
      Signed-off-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
      Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Fixes: d6e41f11 ("x86/mm, KVM: Teach KVM's VMX code that CR3 isn't a constant")
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      4c07f904
  5. 14 7月, 2017 5 次提交
  6. 13 7月, 2017 9 次提交
  7. 11 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • K
      binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE · eab09532
      Kees Cook 提交于
      The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders
      away from ET_EXEC binaries.  (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2
      /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the
      loader had been loaded.)
      
      With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header),
      ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking
      at ET_DYN.  However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the
      top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space
      is unused.
      
      For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are
      loaded above the mmap region.  This means they can be made to collide
      (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with
      pathological stack regions.
      
      Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap
      region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling
      back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e.
      if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load
      instead of falling back to the mmap region).
      
      To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP)
      are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an
      ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by
      the loader.  Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
      which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk
      of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.
      
      For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use
      the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.
      
      Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and
      suggestions on how to implement this solution.
      
      Fixes: d1fd836d ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beastSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
      Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
      Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      eab09532
  8. 07 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 05 7月, 2017 3 次提交
    • C
      x86/boot/e820: Introduce the bootloader provided e820_table_firmware[] table · 12df216c
      Chen Yu 提交于
      Add the real e820_tabel_firmware[] that will not be modified by the kernel
      or the EFI boot stub under any circumstance.
      
      In addition to that modify the code so that e820_table_firmwarep[] is
      exposed via sysfs to represent the real firmware memory layout,
      rather than exposing the e820_table_kexec[] table.
      
      This fixes a hibernation bug/warning, which uses e820_table_kexec[] to check
      RAM layout consistency across hibernation/resume:
      
        The suspend kernel:
        [    0.000000] e820: update [mem 0x76671018-0x76679457] usable ==> usable
      
        The resume kernel:
        [    0.000000] e820: update [mem 0x7666f018-0x76677457] usable ==> usable
        ...
        [   15.752088] PM: Using 3 thread(s) for decompression.
        [   15.752088] PM: Loading and decompressing image data (471870 pages)...
        [   15.764971] Hibernate inconsistent memory map detected!
        [   15.770833] PM: Image mismatch: architecture specific data
      
      Actually it is safe to restore these pages because E820_TYPE_RAM and
      E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN are treated the same during hibernation, so
      the original e820 table provided by the bootloader is used for
      hibernation MD5 fingerprint checking.
      
      The side effect is that, this newly introduced variable might increase the
      kernel size at compile time.
      Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      12df216c
    • C
      x86/boot/e820: Rename the e820_table_firmware to e820_table_kexec · a09bae0f
      Chen Yu 提交于
      Currently the e820_table_firmware[] table is mainly used by the kexec,
      and it is not what it's supposed to be - despite its name it might be
      modified by the kernel.
      
      So change its name to e820_table_kexec[]. In the next patch we will
      introduce the real e820_table_firmware[] table.
      
      No functional change.
      Signed-off-by: NChen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      a09bae0f
    • M
      x86/mm/pat: Don't report PAT on CPUs that don't support it · 99c13b8c
      Mikulas Patocka 提交于
      The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
      where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
      enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.
      
      As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
      caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.
      
      To cure this the following changes are required:
      
        1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
           invoked and successful.
      
        2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
           remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
           code path in pat_init().
      
      Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
      this variable.
      
      Fixes: 9cd25aac ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
      Signed-off-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Bernhard Held <berny156@gmx.de>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
      99c13b8c
  10. 04 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 03 7月, 2017 3 次提交
  12. 01 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • K
      randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs · 8acdf505
      Kees Cook 提交于
      Some function pointer structures are used externally to the kernel, like
      the paravirt structures. These should never be randomized, so mark them
      as such, in preparation for enabling randstruct's automatic selection
      of all-function-pointer structures.
      
      These markings are verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the
      last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
      code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
      reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      8acdf505
    • K
      randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization · 3859a271
      Kees Cook 提交于
      This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
      structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
      contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
      workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
      sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
      code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
      of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
      don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
      
      Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
      and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      3859a271
  13. 29 6月, 2017 2 次提交
  14. 28 6月, 2017 4 次提交
  15. 24 6月, 2017 2 次提交
  16. 23 6月, 2017 1 次提交