During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.

In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...

memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);

... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.

Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.

Since 1be7f75d ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.

In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.

  [1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller

Fixes: 28fbcfa0 ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
triggering a fault in sock_wake_async() when async IO is requested.

Said program stressed af_unix sockets, but the issue is generic
and should be addressed in core networking stack.

The problem is that by the time sock_wake_async() is called,
we should not access the @flags field of 'struct socket',
as the inode containing this socket might be freed without
further notice, and without RCU grace period.

We already maintain an RCU protected structure, "struct socket_wq"
so moving SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE & SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA into it
is the safe route.

It also reduces number of cache lines needing dirtying, so might
provide a performance improvement anyway.

In followup patches, we might move remaining flags (SOCK_NOSPACE,
SOCK_PASSCRED, SOCK_PASSSEC) to save 8 bytes and let 'struct socket'
being mostly read and let it being shared between cpus.
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch is a cleanup to make following patch easier to
review.

Goal is to move SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA
from (struct socket)->flags to a (struct socket_wq)->flags
to benefit from RCU protection in sock_wake_async()

To ease backports, we rename both constants.

Two new helpers, sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk)
and sk_clear_bit(int net, struct sock *sk) are added so that
following patch can change their implementation.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

vmxnet3_drv does not check dma_addr with dma_mapping_error()
after mapping dma memory. The patch adds the checks and
tries to handle failures.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NShrikrishna Khare <skhare@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The N_X25 line discipline may access the previous line discipline's closed
and already-freed private data on open [1].

The tty->disc_data field _never_ refers to valid data on entry to the
line discipline's open() method. Rather, the ldisc is expected to
initialize that field for its own use for the lifetime of the instance
(ie. from open() to close() only).

[1]
    [  634.336761] ==================================================================
    [  634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
    [  634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
    [  634.340359] =============================================================================
    [  634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    ...
    [  634.405018] Call Trace:
    [  634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
    [  634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
    [  634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
    [  634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
    [  634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
    [  634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
    [  634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
    [  634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
    [  634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
    [  634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
    [  634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
    [  634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Reported-and-tested-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This reverts commit ab450605.

In IPv6, we cannot inherit the dst of the original dst. ndisc packets
are IPv6 packets and may take another route than the original packet.

This patch breaks the following scenario: a packet comes from eth0 and
is forwarded through vxlan1. The encapsulated packet triggers an NS
which cannot be sent because of the wrong route.

CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
generated program that triggers the WARNING at
net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() :

WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
        !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));

His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange,
that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we
lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization.

Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The gianfar driver has recently been enabled on arm64 but fails to build
since it check the return value of platform_get_irq() against NO_IRQ. Fix
this by instead checking for a negative error code.

Even on ARM where this code was previously being built this check was
incorrect since platform_get_irq() returns a negative error code which
may not be exactly the (unsigned int)(-1) that NO_IRQ is defined to be.
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This driver can be built on arm64 but relies on NO_IRQ to check the return
value of irq_of_parse_and_map() which fails to build on arm64 because the
architecture does not provide a NO_IRQ. Fix this to correctly check the
return value of irq_of_parse_and_map().

Even on ARM systems where the driver was previously used the check was
broken since on ARM NO_IRQ is -1 but irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on
error.
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sendpage did not care about credentials at all. This could lead to
situations in which because of fd passing between processes we could
append data to skbs with different scm data. It is illegal to splice those
skbs together. Instead we have to allocate a new skb and if requested
fill out the scm details.

Fixes: 869e7c62 ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage support")
Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Giuseppe Cavallaro says:

====================
Spare stmmac fixes

These are some fixes for the stmmac d.d. tested on STi platforms.
They are for some part of the PM, STi glue and rx path when test
Jumbo.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The receive skb buffers can be preallocated when the link is opened
according to mtu size.
While testing on a network environment with not standard MTU (e.g. 3000),
a panic occurred if an incoming packet had a length greater than rx skb
buffer size. This is because the HW is programmed to copy, from the DMA,
an Jumbo frame and the Sw must check if the allocated buffer is enough to
store the frame.
Signed-off-by: NAlexandre TORGUE <alexandre.torgue@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When stmmac_mdio_reset, was called from stmmac_resume, it was not
resetting the PHY due to which MAC was not getting reset properly and
hence ethernet interface not was resumed properly.
The issue was currently only reproducible on stih301-b2204.
Signed-off-by: NPankaj Dev <pankaj.dev@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In case of the st,tx-retime-src is missing from device-tree
(it's an optional field) the driver will invoke the strcasecmp to check
which clock has been selected and this is a bug; the else condition
is needed.

In the dwmac_setup, the "rs" variable, passed to the strcasecmp, was not
initialized and the compiler, depending on the options adopted, could
take it in some different part of the stack generating the hang in such
configuration.
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch is to fix the csr clock in case of 300MHz is provided.
Reported-by: NKent Borg <Kent.Borg@csr.com>
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When resume the HW is re-configured but some settings can be lost.
For example, the MAC Address_X High/Low Registers used for VLAN tagging..
So, while resuming, the set_filter callback needs to be invoked to
re-program perfect and hash-table registers.
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Once TX has been enabled on a NIC, it is illegal to access skb,
as this skb might have been freed by another cpu, from TX completion
handler.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Iyappan Subramanian <isubramanian@apm.com>
Acked-by: NIyappan Subramanian <isubramanian@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 9c707762 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller
than l2 header") added validation for the packet size in packet_snd.
This change enforces that every packet needs a header (with at least
hard_header_len bytes) plus a payload with at least one byte. Before
this change the payload was optional.

This fixes PPPoE connections which do not have a "Service" or
"Host-Uniq" configured (which is violating the spec, but is still
widely used in real-world setups). Those are currently failing with the
following message: "pppd: packet size is too short (24 <= 24)"
Signed-off-by: NMartin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, when having map file descriptors pointing to program arrays,
there's still the issue that we unconditionally flush program array
contents via bpf_fd_array_map_clear() in bpf_map_release(). This happens
when such a file descriptor is released and is independent of the map's
refcount.

Having this flush independent of the refcount is for a reason: there
can be arbitrary complex dependency chains among tail calls, also circular
ones (direct or indirect, nesting limit determined during runtime), and
we need to make sure that the map drops all references to eBPF programs
it holds, so that the map's refcount can eventually drop to zero and
initiate its freeing. Btw, a walk of the whole dependency graph would
not be possible for various reasons, one being complexity and another
one inconsistency, i.e. new programs can be added to parts of the graph
at any time, so there's no guaranteed consistent state for the time of
such a walk.

Now, the program array pinning itself works, but the issue is that each
derived file descriptor on close would nevertheless call unconditionally
into bpf_fd_array_map_clear(). Instead, keep track of users and postpone
this flush until the last reference to a user is dropped. As this only
concerns a subset of references (f.e. a prog array could hold a program
that itself has reference on the prog array holding it, etc), we need to
track them separately.

Short analysis on the refcounting: on map creation time usercnt will be
one, so there's no change in behaviour for bpf_map_release(), if unpinned.
If we already fail in map_create(), we are immediately freed, and no
file descriptor has been made public yet. In bpf_obj_pin_user(), we need
to probe for a possible map in bpf_fd_probe_obj() already with a usercnt
reference, so before we drop the reference on the fd with fdput().
Therefore, if actual pinning fails, we need to drop that reference again
in bpf_any_put(), otherwise we keep holding it. When last reference
drops on the inode, the bpf_any_put() in bpf_evict_inode() will take
care of dropping the usercnt again. In the bpf_obj_get_user() case, the
bpf_any_get() will grab a reference on the usercnt, still at a time when
we have the reference on the path. Should we later on fail to grab a new
file descriptor, bpf_any_put() will drop it, otherwise we hold it until
bpf_map_release() time.

Joint work with Alexei.

Fixes: b2197755 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 35a4a573 ("isdn: clean up debug format string usage") introduced
a safeguard to avoid accidential format string interpolation of data
when calling debugl1 or HiSax_putstatus. This did however not take into
account VHiSax_putstatus (called by HiSax_putstatus) does *not* call
vsprintf if the head parameter is NULL - the format string is treated
as plain text then instead. As a result, the string "%s" is processed
literally, and the actual information is lost. This affects the isdnlog
userspace program which stopped logging information since that commit.

So revert the HiSax_putstatus invocations to the previous state.

Fixes: 35a4a573 ("isdn: clean up debug format string usage")
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket.  The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket.  This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().

Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.

I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.

Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:

  74e98eb0 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")

Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NQuentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

During pre-upstream development, the openvswitch datapath used a custom
hashtable to store vports that could fail on delete due to lack of
memory. However, prior to upstream submission, this code was reworked to
use an hlist based hastable with flexible-array based buckets. As such
the failure condition was eliminated from the vport_del path, rendering
this comment invalid.
Signed-off-by: NAaron Conole <aconole@bytheb.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since (at least) commit b17a7c17 ("[NET]: Do sysfs registration as
part of register_netdevice."), netdev_run_todo() deals only with
unregistration, so we don't need to do the rtnl_unlock/lock cycle to
finish registration when failing pimreg or dvmrp device creation. In
fact that opens a race condition where someone can delete the device
while rtnl is unlocked because it's fully registered. The problem gets
worse when netlink support is introduced as there are more points of entry
that can cause it and it also makes reusing that code correctly impossible.
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: NCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Normally, the transmit phase of a client call is implicitly ack'd by the
reception of the first data packet of the response being received.
However, if a security negotiation happens, the transmit phase, if it is
entirely contained in a single packet, may get an ack packet in response
and then may get aborted due to security negotiation failure.

Because the client has shifted state to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY due
to having transmitted all the data, the code that handles processing of the
received ack packet doesn't note the hard ack the data packet.

The following abort packet in the case of security negotiation failure then
incurs an assertion failure when it tries to drain the Tx queue because the
hard ack state is out of sync (hard ack means the packets have been
processed and can be discarded by the sender; a soft ack means that the
packets are received but could still be discarded and rerequested by the
receiver).

To fix this, we should record the hard ack we received for the ack packet.

The assertion failure looks like:

	RxRPC: Assertion failed
	1 <= 0 is false
	0x1 <= 0x0 is false
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at ../net/rxrpc/ar-ack.c:431!
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa006857b>]  [<ffffffffa006857b>] rxrpc_rotate_tx_window+0xbc/0x131 [af_rxrpc]
	...
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.

To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
addresses.

Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in

  http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/

but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fixing kernel crash when doing ifconfig down and up in a loop,

[ 124.028237] Call trace:
[ 124.030670] [<ffffffc000367ce0>] memcpy+0x20/0x180
[ 124.035436] [<ffffffc00053c250>] skb_clone+0x3c/0xa8
[ 124.040374] [<ffffffc00053ffa4>] __skb_tstamp_tx+0xc0/0x118
[ 124.045918] [<ffffffc00054000c>] skb_tstamp_tx+0x10/0x1c
[ 124.051203] [<ffffffc00049bc84>] xgene_enet_start_xmit+0x2e4/0x33c
[ 124.057352] [<ffffffc00054fc20>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2e8/0x400
[ 124.063327] [<ffffffc00056cb14>] sch_direct_xmit+0x90/0x1d4
[ 124.068870] [<ffffffc000550100>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28c/0x498
[ 124.074585] [<ffffffc00055031c>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x10/0x1c
[ 124.080216] [<ffffffc0005c3f14>] ip_finish_output2+0x3d0/0x438
[ 124.086017] [<ffffffc0005c5794>] ip_finish_output+0x198/0x1ac
[ 124.091732] [<ffffffc0005c61d4>] ip_output+0xec/0x164
[ 124.096755] [<ffffffc0005c5910>] ip_local_out_sk+0x38/0x48
[ 124.102211] [<ffffffc0005c5d84>] ip_queue_xmit+0x288/0x330
[ 124.107668] [<ffffffc0005da8bc>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x908/0x964
[ 124.113383] [<ffffffc0005dc0d4>] tcp_send_ack+0x128/0x138
[ 124.118753] [<ffffffc0005d1580>] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x5c/0x94
[ 124.124555] [<ffffffc0005d7a0c>] tcp_rcv_established+0x554/0x68c
[ 124.130530] [<ffffffc0005df0d4>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xa4/0x37c
[ 124.135900] [<ffffffc000539430>] release_sock+0xb4/0x150
[ 124.141184] [<ffffffc0005cdf88>] tcp_recvmsg+0x448/0x9e0
[ 124.146468] [<ffffffc0005f2f3c>] inet_recvmsg+0xa0/0xc0
[ 124.151666] [<ffffffc000533660>] sock_recvmsg+0x10/0x1c
[ 124.156863] [<ffffffc0005370d4>] SyS_recvfrom+0xa4/0xf8
[ 124.162061] Code: f2400c84 540001c0 cb040042 36000064 (38401423)
[ 124.168133] ---[ end trace 7ab2550372e8a65b ]---

The fix was to reorder napi_enable, napi_disable, request_irq and
free_irq calls, move register_netdev after dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent.
Signed-off-by: NIyappan Subramanian <isubramanian@apm.com>
Tested-by: NKhuong Dinh <kdinh@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 77b0a099 ("cdc-ncm: use common parser") added a dangerous
new trust in the CDC functional descriptors presented by the device,
unconditionally assuming that any device handled by the driver has
a CDC Union descriptor.

This descriptor is required by the NCM and MBIM specs, but crashing
on non-compliant devices is still unacceptable. Not only will that
allow malicious devices to crash the kernel, but in this case it is
also well known that there are non-compliant real devices on the
market - as shown by the comment accompanying the IAD workaround
in the same function.

The Sierra Wireless EM7305 is an example of such device, having
a CDC header and a CDC MBIM descriptor but no CDC Union:

    Interface Descriptor:
      bLength                 9
      bDescriptorType         4
      bInterfaceNumber       12
      bAlternateSetting       0
      bNumEndpoints           1
      bInterfaceClass         2 Communications
      bInterfaceSubClass     14
      bInterfaceProtocol      0
      iInterface              0
      CDC Header:
        bcdCDC               1.10
      CDC MBIM:
        bcdMBIMVersion       1.00
        wMaxControlMessage   4096
        bNumberFilters       16
        bMaxFilterSize       128
        wMaxSegmentSize      4064
        bmNetworkCapabilities 0x20
          8-byte ntb input size
      Endpoint Descriptor:
	..

The conversion to a common parser also left the local cdc_union
variable untouched.  This caused the IAD workaround code to be applied
to all devices with an IAD descriptor, which was never intended.  Finish
the conversion by testing for hdr.usb_cdc_union_desc instead.

Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Fixes: 77b0a099 ("cdc-ncm: use common parser")
Signed-off-by: NBjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-4.4-20151123' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can

Marc Kleine-Budde says:

====================
pull-request: can 2015-11-23

this is a pull request of three patches for the upcoming v4.4 release.

The first patch is by Mirza Krak, it fixes a problem with the sja1000 driver
after resuming from suspend to disk, by clearing all outstanding interrupts.
Oliver Hartkopp contributes two patches targeting almost all driver, they fix
the assignment of the error location in CAN error messages.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Coverity says:

*** CID 1338065:  Error handling issues  (CHECKED_RETURN)
/net/tipc/udp_media.c: 162 in tipc_udp_send_msg()
156     	struct udp_media_addr *dst = (struct udp_media_addr *)&dest->value;
157     	struct udp_media_addr *src = (struct udp_media_addr *)&b->addr.value;
158     	struct sk_buff *clone;
159     	struct rtable *rt;
160
161     	if (skb_headroom(skb) < UDP_MIN_HEADROOM)
>>>     CID 1338065:  Error handling issues  (CHECKED_RETURN)
>>>     Calling "pskb_expand_head" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 51 out of 56 times).
162     		pskb_expand_head(skb, UDP_MIN_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
163
164     	clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
165     	skb_set_inner_protocol(clone, htons(ETH_P_TIPC));
166     	ub = rcu_dereference_rtnl(b->media_ptr);
167     	if (!ub) {

When expanding buffer headroom over udp tunnel with pskb_expand_head(),
it's unfortunate that we don't check its return value. As a result, if
the function returns an error code due to the lack of memory, it may
cause unpredictable consequence as we unconditionally consider that
it's always successful.

Fixes: e5356794 ("tipc: conditionally expand buffer headroom over udp tunnel")
Reported-by: <scan-admin@coverity.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Even if we drain receive queue thoroughly in tipc_release() after tipc
socket is removed from rhashtable, it is possible that some packets
are in flight because some CPU runs receiver and did rhashtable lookup
before we removed socket. They will achieve receive queue, but nobody
delete them at all. To avoid this leak, we register a private socket
destructor to purge receive queue, meaning releasing packets pending
on receive queue will be delayed until the last reference of tipc
socket will be released.
Signed-off-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
the original). Fix that.

Fixes: fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
Signed-off-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When vrf's ->newlink is called, if register_netdevice() fails then it
does free_netdev(), but that's also done by rtnl_newlink() so a second
free happens and memory gets corrupted, to reproduce execute the
following line a couple of times (1 - 5 usually is enough):
$ for i in `seq 1 5`; do ip link add vrf: type vrf table 1; done;
This works because we fail in register_netdevice() because of the wrong
name "vrf:".

And here's a trace of one crash:
[   28.792157] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   28.792407] kernel BUG at fs/namei.c:246!
[   28.792608] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   28.793240] Modules linked in: vrf nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry
nfs_acl nfs lockd grace sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
crc32c_intel qxl drm_kms_helper ttm drm aesni_intel aes_x86_64 psmouse
glue_helper lrw evdev gf128mul i2c_piix4 ablk_helper cryptd ppdev
parport_pc parport serio_raw pcspkr virtio_balloon virtio_console
i2c_core acpi_cpufreq button 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet fscache ipv6 autofs4
ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 virtio_blk virtio_net sg sr_mod cdrom
ata_generic ehci_pci uhci_hcd ehci_hcd e1000 usbcore usb_common ata_piix
libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod floppy
[   28.796016] CPU: 0 PID: 1148 Comm: ld-linux-x86-64 Not tainted
4.4.0-rc1+ #24
[   28.796016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014
[   28.796016] task: ffff8800352561c0 ti: ffff88003592c000 task.ti:
ffff88003592c000
[   28.796016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812187b3>]  [<ffffffff812187b3>]
putname+0x43/0x60
[   28.796016] RSP: 0018:ffff88003592fe88  EFLAGS: 00010246
[   28.796016] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800352561c0 RCX:
0000000000000001
[   28.796016] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
ffff88003784f000
[   28.796016] RBP: ffff88003592ff08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:
0000000000000000
[   28.796016] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
0000000000000000
[   28.796016] R13: 000000000000047c R14: ffff88003784f000 R15:
ffff8800358c4a00
[   28.796016] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   28.796016] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   28.796016] CR2: 00007ffd583bc2d9 CR3: 0000000035a99000 CR4:
00000000000406f0
[   28.796016] Stack:
[   28.796016]  ffffffff8121045d ffffffff812102d3 ffff8800352561c0
ffff880035a91660
[   28.796016]  ffff8800008a9880 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a49940
00ffffff81218684
[   28.796016]  ffff8800352561c0 000000000000047c 0000000000000000
ffff880035b36d80
[   28.796016] Call Trace:
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff8121045d>] ?
do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x74d/0x930
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff812102d3>] ?
do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x5c3/0x930
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff8121066c>] do_execve+0x2c/0x30
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff810939a0>]
call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xf0/0x140
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff810938b0>] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40
[   28.796016]  [<ffffffff815cb1af>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[   28.796016] Code: 48 8d 47 1c 48 89 e5 53 48 8b 37 48 89 fb 48 39 c6
74 1a 48 8b 3d 7e e9 8f 00 e8 49 fa fc ff 48 89 df e8 f1 01 fd ff 5b 5d
f3 c3 <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 8b 3d 61 e9 8f 00 e8 2c fa fc ff 5b 5d eb e9
[   28.796016] RIP  [<ffffffff812187b3>] putname+0x43/0x60
[   28.796016]  RSP <ffff88003592fe88>

Fixes: 193125db ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

WARN_ON_ONCE() takes a condition, it doesn't take an error message.  I
have converted this to WARN() instead.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.

Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: NRainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The classid of a process is changed either when a process is moved to
or from a cgroup or when the net_cls.classid file is updated.
Previously net_cls only supported propogating these changes to the
cgroup's related sockets when a process was added or removed from the
cgroup. This means it was neccessary to remove and re-add all processes
to a cgroup in order to update its classid. This change introduces
support for doing this dynamically - i.e. when the value is changed in
the net_cls_classid file, this will also trigger an update to the
classid associated with all sockets controlled by the cgroup.
This mimics the behaviour of other cgroup subsystems.
net_prio circumvents this issue by storing an index into a table with
each socket (and so any updates to the table, don't require updating
the value associated with the socket). net_cls, however, passes the
socket the classid directly, and so this additional step is needed.
Signed-off-by: NNina Schiff <ninasc@fb.com>
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Freescale hosts some ARMv8 based SoCs, and a generic convention
ARCH_LAYERSCAPE is used to cover such SoCs. Adding ARCH_LAYERSCAPE
to dependencies of NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE to support networking on those
SoCs.

The ARCH_LAYERSCAPE is introduced by:
commit: 53a5fde0 arm64: Use generic Layerscape SoC family naming
Signed-off-by: NShaohui Xie <Shaohui.Xie@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The assignment 'cf->data[2] |= CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC' used at CAN error message
creation time is obsolete as CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC is zero and cf->data[2] is
initialized with zero in alloc_can_err_skb() anyway.

So we could either assign 'cf->data[2] = CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC' correctly or we
can remove the obsolete OR operation entirely.
Signed-off-by: NOliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>

As Dan Carpenter reported in http://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=144793696016187
the assignment of the error location in CAN error messages had some bit wise
overlaps. Indeed the value to be assigned in data[3] is no bitfield but defines
a single value which points to a location inside the CAN frame on the wire.

This patch fixes the assignments for the error locations in error messages.
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NOliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>

According to SJA1000 data sheet error-warning (EI) interrupt is not
cleared by setting the controller in to reset-mode.

Then if we have the following case:
- system is suspended (echo mem > /sys/power/state) and SJA1000 is left
  in operating state
- A bus error condition occurs which activates EI interrupt, system is
  still suspended which means EI interrupt will be not be handled nor
  cleared.

If the above two events occur, on resume there is no way to return the
SJA1000 to operating state, except to cycle power to it.

By simply reading the IR register on start we will clear any previous
conditions that could be present.
Signed-off-by: NMirza Krak <mirza.krak@hostmobility.com>
Reported-by: NChristian Magnusson <Christian.Magnusson@semcon.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>

Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.

Fixes: 8229efda ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: NCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>