1. 19 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  2. 16 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      x86: Require exact match for 'noxsave' command line option · 2cd3949f
      Dave Hansen 提交于
      We have some very similarly named command-line options:
      
      arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsave", x86_xsave_setup);
      arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaveopt", x86_xsaveopt_setup);
      arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaves", x86_xsaves_setup);
      
      __setup() is designed to match options that take arguments, like
      "foo=bar" where you would have:
      
      	__setup("foo", x86_foo_func...);
      
      The problem is that "noxsave" actually _matches_ "noxsaves" in
      the same way that "foo" matches "foo=bar".  If you boot an old
      kernel that does not know about "noxsaves" with "noxsaves" on the
      command line, it will interpret the argument as "noxsave", which
      is not what you want at all.
      
      This makes the "noxsave" handler only return success when it finds
      an *exact* match.
      
      [ tglx: We really need to make __setup() more robust. ]
      Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: x86@kernel.org
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141111220133.FE053984@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      2cd3949f
  3. 10 11月, 2014 2 次提交
  4. 06 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 02 11月, 2014 2 次提交
    • J
      x86, kaslr: Prevent .bss from overlaping initrd · e6023367
      Junjie Mao 提交于
      When choosing a random address, the current implementation does not take into
      account the reversed space for .bss and .brk sections. Thus the relocated kernel
      may overlap other components in memory. Here is an example of the overlap from a
      x86_64 kernel in qemu (the ranges of physical addresses are presented):
      
       Physical Address
      
          0x0fe00000                  --+--------------------+  <-- randomized base
                                     /  |  relocated kernel  |
                         vmlinux.bin    | (from vmlinux.bin) |
          0x1336d000    (an ELF file)   +--------------------+--
                                     \  |                    |  \
          0x1376d870                  --+--------------------+   |
                                        |    relocs table    |   |
          0x13c1c2a8                    +--------------------+   .bss and .brk
                                        |                    |   |
          0x13ce6000                    +--------------------+   |
                                        |                    |  /
          0x13f77000                    |       initrd       |--
                                        |                    |
          0x13fef374                    +--------------------+
      
      The initrd image will then be overwritten by the memset during early
      initialization:
      
      [    1.655204] Unpacking initramfs...
      [    1.662831] Initramfs unpacking failed: junk in compressed archive
      
      This patch prevents the above situation by requiring a larger space when looking
      for a random kernel base, so that existing logic can effectively avoids the
      overlap.
      
      [kees: switched to perl to avoid hex translation pain in mawk vs gawk]
      [kees: calculated overlap without relocs table]
      
      Fixes: 82fa9637 ("x86, kaslr: Select random position from e820 maps")
      Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJunjie Mao <eternal.n08@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414762838-13067-1-git-send-email-eternal.n08@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      e6023367
    • B
      x86, microcode, AMD: Fix early ucode loading on 32-bit · 4750a0d1
      Borislav Petkov 提交于
      Konrad triggered the following splat below in a 32-bit guest on an AMD
      box. As it turns out, in save_microcode_in_initrd_amd() we're using the
      *physical* address of the container *after* we have enabled paging and
      thus we #PF in load_microcode_amd() when trying to access the microcode
      container in the ramdisk range.
      
      Because the ramdisk is exactly there:
      
      [    0.000000] RAMDISK: [mem 0x35e04000-0x36ef9fff]
      
      and we fault at 0x35e04304.
      
      And since this guest doesn't relocate the ramdisk, we don't do the
      computation which will give us the correct virtual address and we end up
      with the PA.
      
      So, we should actually be using virtual addresses on 32-bit too by the
      time we're freeing the initrd. Do that then!
      
      Unpacking initramfs...
      BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 35d4e304
      IP: [<c042e905>] load_microcode_amd+0x25/0x4a0
      *pde = 00000000
      Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in:
      CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.17.1-302.fc21.i686 #1
      Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.4.1 10/01/2014
      task: f5098000 ti: f50d0000 task.ti: f50d0000
      EIP: 0060:[<c042e905>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
      EIP is at load_microcode_amd+0x25/0x4a0
      EAX: 00000000 EBX: f6e9ec4c ECX: 00001ec4 EDX: 00000000
      ESI: f5d4e000 EDI: 35d4e2fc EBP: f50d1ed0 ESP: f50d1e94
       DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
      CR0: 8005003b CR2: 35d4e304 CR3: 00e33000 CR4: 000406d0
      Stack:
       00000000 00000000 f50d1ebc f50d1ec4 f5d4e000 c0d7735a f50d1ed0 15a3d17f
       f50d1ec4 00600f20 00001ec4 bfb83203 f6e9ec4c f5d4e000 c0d7735a f50d1ed8
       c0d80861 f50d1ee0 c0d80429 f50d1ef0 c0d889a9 f5d4e000 c0000000 f50d1f04
      Call Trace:
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      save_microcode_in_initrd_amd
      save_microcode_in_initrd
      free_initrd_mem
      populate_rootfs
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      do_one_initcall
      ? unpack_to_rootfs
      ? repair_env_string
      ? proc_mkdir
      kernel_init_freeable
      kernel_init
      ret_from_kernel_thread
      ? rest_init
      Reported-and-tested-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1158204
      Fixes: 75a1ba5b ("x86, microcode, AMD: Unify valid container checks")
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141101100100.GA4462@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      4750a0d1
  6. 01 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      x86_64, entry: Fix out of bounds read on sysenter · 653bc77a
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Rusty noticed a Really Bad Bug (tm) in my NT fix.  The entry code
      reads out of bounds, causing the NT fix to be unreliable.  But, and
      this is much, much worse, if your stack is somehow just below the
      top of the direct map (or a hole), you read out of bounds and crash.
      
      Excerpt from the crash:
      
      [    1.129513] RSP: 0018:ffff88001da4bf88  EFLAGS: 00010296
      
        2b:*    f7 84 24 90 00 00 00     testl  $0x4000,0x90(%rsp)
      
      That read is deterministically above the top of the stack.  I
      thought I even single-stepped through this code when I wrote it to
      check the offset, but I clearly screwed it up.
      
      Fixes: 8c7aa698 ("x86_64, entry: Filter RFLAGS.NT on entry from userspace")
      Reported-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@ozlabs.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      653bc77a
  7. 29 10月, 2014 5 次提交
  8. 28 10月, 2014 5 次提交
  9. 25 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  10. 24 10月, 2014 13 次提交
  11. 23 10月, 2014 7 次提交
  12. 20 10月, 2014 1 次提交