- 18 10月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
commit 0b3d0ef9840f7be202393ca9116b857f6f793715 upstream. Mark inode for force revalidation if LOOKUP_REVAL flag is set. This tells the client to actually send a QueryInfo request to the server to obtain the latest metadata in case a directory or a file were changed remotely. Only do that if the client doesn't have a lease for the file to avoid unneeded round trips to the server. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
commit c82e5ac7fe3570a269c0929bf7899f62048e7dbc upstream. Currently the client indicates that a dentry is stale when inode numbers or type types between a local inode and a remote file don't match. If this is the case attributes is not being copied from remote to local, so, it is already known that the local copy has stale metadata. That's why the inode needs to be marked for revalidation in order to tell the VFS to lookup the dentry again before openning a file. This prevents unexpected stale errors to be returned to the user space when openning a file. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
commit 30573a82fb179420b8aac30a3a3595aa96a93156 upstream. Currently if the client identifies problems when processing metadata returned in CREATE response, the open handle is being leaked. This causes multiple problems like a file missing a lease break by that client which causes high latencies to other clients accessing the file. Another side-effect of this is that the file can't be deleted. Fix this by closing the file after the client hits an error after the file was opened and the open descriptor wasn't returned to the user space. Also convert -ESTALE to -EOPENSTALE to allow the VFS to revalidate a dentry and retry the open. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Icenowy Zheng 提交于
[ Upstream commit 38fb6d0ea34299d97b031ed64fe994158b6f8eb3 ] The kernel mount_block_root() function expects -EACESS or -EINVAL for a unmountable filesystem when trying to mount the root with different filesystem types. However, in 5.3-rc1 the behavior when F2FS code cannot find valid block changed to return -EFSCORRUPTED(-EUCLEAN), and this error code makes mount_block_root() fail when trying to probe F2FS. When the magic number of the superblock mismatches, it has a high probability that it's just not a F2FS. In this case return -EINVAL seems to be a better result, and this return value can make mount_block_root() probing work again. Return -EINVAL when the superblock has magic mismatch, -EFSCORRUPTED in other cases (the magic matches but the superblock cannot be recognized). Fixes: 10f966bbf521 ("f2fs: use generic EFSBADCRC/EFSCORRUPTED") Signed-off-by: NIcenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io> Reviewed-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 12 10月, 2019 7 次提交
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由 Eric Sandeen 提交于
commit cc3a7bfe62b947b423fcb2cfe89fcba92bf48fa3 upstream. Today, put_compat_statfs64() disallows nearly any field value over 2^32 if f_bsize is only 32 bits, but that makes no sense. compat_statfs64 is there for the explicit purpose of providing 64-bit fields for f_files, f_ffree, etc. And f_bsize is always only 32 bits. As a result, 32-bit userspace gets -EOVERFLOW for i.e. large file counts even with -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 set. In reality, only f_bsize and f_frsize can legitimately overflow (fields like f_type and f_namelen should never be large), so test only those fields. This bug was discussed at length some time ago, and this is the proposal Al suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/6/640. It seemed to get dropped amid the discussion of other related changes, but this part seems obviously correct on its own, so I've picked it up and sent it, for expediency. Fixes: 64d2ab32 ("vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors") Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 zhengbin 提交于
[ Upstream commit 9ad09b1976c562061636ff1e01bfc3a57aebe56b ] If cuse_send_init fails, need to fuse_conn_put cc->fc. cuse_channel_open->fuse_conn_init->refcount_set(&fc->count, 1) ->fuse_dev_alloc->fuse_conn_get ->fuse_dev_free->fuse_conn_put Fixes: cc080e9e ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure") Reported-by: NHulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nzhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
[ Upstream commit 9c47b18cf722184f32148784189fca945a7d0561 ] IF the server rejected our layout return with a state error such as NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, or even a stale inode error, then we do want to clear out all the remaining layout segments and mark that stateid as invalid. Fixes: 1c5bd76d ("pNFS: Enable layoutreturn operation for...") Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Erqi Chen 提交于
[ Upstream commit 71a228bc8d65900179e37ac309e678f8c523f133 ] If client mds session is evicted in CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPENING state, mds won't send session msg to client, and delayed_work skip CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPENING state session, the session hang forever. Allow ceph_con_keepalive to reconnect a session in OPENING to avoid session hang. Also, ensure that we skip sessions in RESTARTING and REJECTED states since those states can't be resurrected by issuing a keepalive. Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/41551 Signed-off-by: Erqi Chen chenerqi@gmail.com Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Luis Henriques 提交于
[ Upstream commit 750670341a24cb714e624e0fd7da30900ad93752 ] When filling an inode with info from the MDS, i_blkbits is being initialized using fl_stripe_unit, which contains the stripe unit in bytes. Unfortunately, this doesn't make sense for directories as they have fl_stripe_unit set to '0'. This means that i_blkbits will be set to 0xff, causing an UBSAN undefined behaviour in i_blocksize(): UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/fs.h:731:12 shift exponent 255 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' Fix this by initializing i_blkbits to CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT if fl_stripe_unit is zero. Signed-off-by: NLuis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Chengguang Xu 提交于
[ Upstream commit c87a37ebd40b889178664c2c09cc187334146292 ] Currently on mmap cache policy, we always attach writeback_fid whether mmap type is SHARED or PRIVATE. However, in the use case of kata-container which combines 9p(Guest OS) with overlayfs(Host OS), this behavior will trigger overlayfs' copy-up when excute command inside container. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820100325.10313-1-cgxu519@zoho.com.cnSigned-off-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@zoho.com.cn> Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Jia-Ju Bai 提交于
[ Upstream commit e2751463eaa6f9fec8fea80abbdc62dbc487b3c5 ] In encode_attrs(), there is an if statement on line 1145 to check whether label is NULL: if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL)) When label is NULL, it is used on lines 1178-1181: *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len); p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len); To fix these bugs, label is checked before being used. These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us. Signed-off-by: NJia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 08 10月, 2019 5 次提交
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由 Bharath Vedartham 提交于
commit 962a991c5de18452d6c429d99f3039387cf5cbb0 upstream. v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses->cachetag, if the cachetag is not assigned previously. v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses->cachetag with kmalloc and uses scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag. But if scnprintf fails, v9ses->cachetag is not freed in the current code causing a memory leak. Fix this by freeing v9ses->cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails. This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559 Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NBharath Vedartham <linux.bhar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Changwei Ge 提交于
[ Upstream commit 0a3775e4f883912944481cf2ef36eb6383a9cc74 ] There is a scenario causing ocfs2 umount hang when multiple hosts are rebooting at the same time. NODE1 NODE2 NODE3 send unlock requset to NODE2 dies become recovery master recover NODE2 find NODE2 dead mark resource RECOVERING directly remove lock from grant list calculate usage but RECOVERING marked **miss the window of purging clear RECOVERING To reproduce this issue, crash a host and then umount ocfs2 from another node. To solve this, just let unlock progress wait for recovery done. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550124866-20367-1-git-send-email-gechangwei@live.cnSigned-off-by: NChangwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 OGAWA Hirofumi 提交于
[ Upstream commit 07bfa4415ab607e459b69bd86aa7e7602ce10b4f ] If userspace reads the buffer via blockdev while mounting, sb_getblk()+modify can race with buffer read via blockdev. For example, FS userspace bh = sb_getblk() modify bh->b_data read ll_rw_block(bh) fill bh->b_data by on-disk data /* lost modified data by FS */ set_buffer_uptodate(bh) set_buffer_uptodate(bh) Userspace should not use the blockdev while mounting though, the udev seems to be already doing this. Although I think the udev should try to avoid this, workaround the race by small overhead. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pnk7l3sw.fsf_-_@mail.parknet.co.jpSigned-off-by: NOGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Reported-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Tested-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 zhangyi (F) 提交于
[ Upstream commit 7727ae52975d4f4ef7ff69ed8e6e25f6a4168158 ] Remount process will release system zone which was allocated before if "noblock_validity" is specified. If we mount an ext4 file system to two mountpoints with default mount options, and then remount one of them with "noblock_validity", it may trigger a use after free problem when someone accessing the other one. # mount /dev/sda foo # mount /dev/sda bar User access mountpoint "foo" | Remount mountpoint "bar" | ext4_map_blocks() | ext4_remount() check_block_validity() | ext4_setup_system_zone() ext4_data_block_valid() | ext4_release_system_zone() | free system_blks rb nodes access system_blks rb nodes | trigger use after free | This problem can also be reproduced by one mountpint, At the same time, add_system_zone() can get called during remount as well so there can be racing ext4_data_block_valid() reading the rbtree at the same time. This patch add RCU to protect system zone from releasing or building when doing a remount which inverse current "noblock_validity" mount option. It assign the rbtree after the whole tree was complete and do actual freeing after rcu grace period, avoid any intermediate state. Reported-by: syzbot+1e470567330b7ad711d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Deepa Dinamani 提交于
[ Upstream commit 83b8a3fbe3aa82ac3c253b698ae6a9be2dbdd5e0 ] Leaving granularity at 1ns because it is dependent on the specific attached backing pstore module. ramoops has microsecond resolution. Fix the readback of ramoops fractional timestamp microseconds, which has incorrectly been reporting the value as nanoseconds. Fixes: 3f8f80f0 ("pstore/ram: Read and write to the 'compressed' flag of pstore"). Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: anton@enomsg.org Cc: ccross@android.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 05 10月, 2019 20 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
[ Upstream commit 76e43c8ccaa35c30d5df853013561145a0f750a5 ] When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
commit a016e2794fc3a245a91946038dd8f34d65e53cc3 upstream. There may be situations when a server negotiates SMB 2.1 protocol version or higher but responds to a CREATE request with an oplock rather than a lease. Currently the client doesn't handle such a case correctly: when another CREATE comes in the server sends an oplock break to the initial CREATE and the client doesn't send an ack back due to a wrong caching level being set (READ instead of RWH). Missing an oplock break ack makes the server wait until the break times out which dramatically increases the latency of the second CREATE. Fix this by properly detecting oplocks when using SMB 2.1 protocol version and higher. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Murphy Zhou 提交于
commit 63d37fb4ce5ae7bf1e58f906d1bf25f036fe79b2 upstream. It should not be larger then the slab max buf size. If user specifies a larger size, it passes this check and goes straightly to SMB2_set_info_init performing an insecure memcpy. Signed-off-by: NMurphy Zhou <jencce.kernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit c1e8220bd316d8ae8e524df39534b8a412a45d5e upstream. If a program attempts to punch a hole on an inline data file, we need to convert it to a normal file first. This was detected using ext4/032 using the adv configuration. Simple reproducer: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdc mount /vdc echo "" > /vdc/testfile xfs_io -c 'truncate 33554432' /vdc/testfile xfs_io -c 'fpunch 0 1048576' /vdc/testfile umount /vdc e2fsck -fy /dev/vdc Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Rakesh Pandit 提交于
commit e3d550c2c4f2f3dba469bc3c4b83d9332b4e99e1 upstream. Really enable warning when CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG is set and fix missing first argument. This was introduced in commit ff95ec22 ("ext4: add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio") and splitting extents inside endio would trigger it. Fixes: ff95ec22 ("ext4: add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio") Signed-off-by: NRakesh Pandit <rakesh@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
commit 13fc1d271a2e3ab8a02071e711add01fab9271f6 upstream. There is a race between setting up a qgroup rescan worker and completing a qgroup rescan worker that can lead to callers of the qgroup rescan wait ioctl to either not wait for the rescan worker to complete or to hang forever due to missing wake ups. The following diagram shows a sequence of steps that illustrates the race. CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3 btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan() btrfs_qgroup_rescan() qgroup_rescan_init() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags |= BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN init_completion( &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) btrfs_init_work() --> starts the worker btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags &= ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) starts transaction, updates qgroup status item, etc btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan() btrfs_qgroup_rescan() qgroup_rescan_init() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags |= BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN init_completion( &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) btrfs_init_work() --> starts another worker mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = false mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) complete_all(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) Before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, if another task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan(), it will get -EINPROGRESS because the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN is set at fs_info->qgroup_flags, which is expected and correct behaviour. However if other task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_wait() before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, it will return immediately without waiting for the new rescan worker to complete, because fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running is set to false by CPU 2. This race is making test case btrfs/171 (from fstests) to fail often: btrfs/171 9s ... - output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad) # --- tests/btrfs/171.out 2018-09-16 21:30:48.505104287 +0100 # +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad 2019-09-19 02:01:36.938486039 +0100 # @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ # QA output created by 171 # +ERROR: quota rescan failed: Operation now in progress # Silence is golden # ... # (Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/171.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad' to see the entire diff) That is because the test calls the btrfs-progs commands "qgroup quota rescan -w", "qgroup assign" and "qgroup remove" in a sequence that makes calls to the rescan start ioctl fail with -EINPROGRESS (note the "btrfs" commands 'qgroup assign' and 'qgroup remove' often call the rescan start ioctl after calling the qgroup assign ioctl, btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_assign()), since previous waits didn't actually wait for a rescan worker to complete. Another problem the race can cause is missing wake ups for waiters, since the call to complete_all() happens outside a critical section and after clearing the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN. In the sequence diagram above, if we have a waiter for the first rescan task (executed by CPU 2), then fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion.wait is not empty, and if after the rescan worker clears BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and before it calls complete_all() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion, the task at CPU 3 calls init_completion() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion which re-initilizes its wait queue to an empty queue, therefore causing the rescan worker at CPU 2 to call complete_all() against an empty queue, never waking up the task waiting for that rescan worker. Fix this by clearing BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and setting fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running to false in the same critical section, delimited by the mutex fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock, as well as doing the call to complete_all() in that same critical section. This gives the protection needed to avoid rescan wait ioctl callers not waiting for a running rescan worker and the lost wake ups problem, since setting that rescan flag and boolean as well as initializing the wait queue is done already in a critical section delimited by that mutex (at qgroup_rescan_init()). Fixes: 57254b6e ("Btrfs: add ioctl to wait for qgroup rescan completion") Fixes: d2c609b8 ("btrfs: properly track when rescan worker is running") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Qu Wenruo 提交于
commit d4e204948fe3e0dc8e1fbf3f8f3290c9c2823be3 upstream. [BUG] The following script can cause btrfs qgroup data space leak: mkfs.btrfs -f $dev mount $dev -o nospace_cache $mnt btrfs subv create $mnt/subv btrfs quota en $mnt btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt btrfs qgroup limit 128m $mnt/subv for (( i = 0; i < 3; i++)); do # Create 3 64M holes for latter fallocate to fail truncate -s 192m $mnt/subv/file xfs_io -c "pwrite 64m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null xfs_io -c "pwrite 128m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null sync # it's supposed to fail, and each failure will leak at least 64M # data space xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 192m" $mnt/subv/file &> /dev/null rm $mnt/subv/file sync done # Shouldn't fail after we removed the file xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 64m" $mnt/subv/file [CAUSE] Btrfs qgroup data reserve code allow multiple reservations to happen on a single extent_changeset: E.g: btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_1M); btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, SZ_1M, SZ_2M); btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_4M); Btrfs qgroup code has its internal tracking to make sure we don't double-reserve in above example. The only pattern utilizing this feature is in the main while loop of btrfs_fallocate() function. However btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data()'s error handling has a bug in that on error it clears all ranges in the io_tree with EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag but doesn't free previously reserved bytes. This bug has a two fold effect: - Clearing EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED ranges This is the correct behavior, but it prevents btrfs_qgroup_check_reserved_leak() to catch the leakage as the detector is purely EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag based. - Leak the previously reserved data bytes. The bug manifests when N calls to btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data are made and the last one fails, leaking space reserved in the previous ones. [FIX] Also free previously reserved data bytes when btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data fails. Fixes: 52472553 ("btrfs: qgroup: Introduce btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data function") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Qu Wenruo 提交于
commit bab32fc069ce8829c416e8737c119f62a57970f9 upstream. [BUG] Under the following case with qgroup enabled, if some error happened after we have reserved delalloc space, then in error handling path, we could cause qgroup data space leakage: From btrfs_truncate_block() in inode.c: ret = btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(inode, &data_reserved, block_start, blocksize); if (ret) goto out; again: page = find_or_create_page(mapping, index, mask); if (!page) { btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved, block_start, blocksize, true); btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, true); ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } [CAUSE] In the above case, btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space() will call btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data() and mark the io_tree range with EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag. In the error handling path, we have the following call stack: btrfs_delalloc_release_space() |- btrfs_free_reserved_data_space() |- btrsf_qgroup_free_data() |- __btrfs_qgroup_release_data(reserved=@reserved, free=1) |- qgroup_free_reserved_data(reserved=@reserved) |- clear_record_extent_bits(); |- freed += changeset.bytes_changed; However due to a completion bug, qgroup_free_reserved_data() will clear EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag in BTRFS_I(inode)->io_failure_tree, other than the correct BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree. Since io_failure_tree is never marked with that flag, btrfs_qgroup_free_data() will not free any data reserved space at all, causing a leakage. This type of error handling can only be triggered by errors outside of qgroup code. So EDQUOT error from qgroup can't trigger it. [FIX] Fix the wrong target io_tree. Reported-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Fixes: bc42bda2 ("btrfs: qgroup: Fix qgroup reserved space underflow by only freeing reserved ranges") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Nikolay Borisov 提交于
commit 6af112b11a4bc1b560f60a618ac9c1dcefe9836e upstream. When doing any form of incremental send the parent and the child trees need to be compared via btrfs_compare_trees. This can result in long loop chains without ever relinquishing the CPU. This causes softlockup detector to trigger when comparing trees with a lot of items. Example report: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 24s! [snapperd:16153] CPU: 0 PID: 16153 Comm: snapperd Not tainted 5.2.9-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20 lr : btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0xe0/0x1e8 [btrfs] sp : ffff00001273b7e0 Call trace: __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20 release_extent_buffer+0xdc/0x120 [btrfs] free_extent_buffer.part.0+0xb0/0x118 [btrfs] free_extent_buffer+0x24/0x30 [btrfs] btrfs_release_path+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_free_path.part.0+0x20/0x40 [btrfs] btrfs_free_path+0x24/0x30 [btrfs] get_inode_info+0xa8/0xf8 [btrfs] finish_inode_if_needed+0xe0/0x6d8 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x9c/0x410 [btrfs] btrfs_compare_trees+0x284/0x648 [btrfs] send_subvol+0x33c/0x520 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x8a0/0xaf0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x199c/0x2288 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b0/0x820 ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x188 el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90 el0_svc+0x8/0xc Fix this by adding a call to cond_resched at the beginning of the main loop in btrfs_compare_trees. Fixes: 7069830a ("Btrfs: add btrfs_compare_trees function") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
commit efad8a853ad2057f96664328a0d327a05ce39c76 upstream. At ctree.c:get_old_root(), we are accessing a root's header owner field after we have freed the respective extent buffer. This results in an use-after-free that can lead to crashes, and when CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set, results in a stack trace like the following: [ 3876.799331] stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [ 3876.799363] CPU: 0 PID: 15436 Comm: pool Not tainted 5.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-54 #1 [ 3876.799385] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3876.799433] RIP: 0010:btrfs_search_old_slot+0x652/0xd80 [btrfs] (...) [ 3876.799502] RSP: 0018:ffff9f08c1a2f9f0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 3876.799518] RAX: ffff8dd300000000 RBX: ffff8dd85a7a9348 RCX: 000000038da26000 [ 3876.799538] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffe522ce368980 RDI: 0000000000000246 [ 3876.799559] RBP: dae1922adadad000 R08: 0000000008020000 R09: ffffe522c0000000 [ 3876.799579] R10: ffff8dd57fd788c8 R11: 000000007511b030 R12: ffff8dd781ddc000 [ 3876.799599] R13: ffff8dd9e6240578 R14: ffff8dd6896f7a88 R15: ffff8dd688cf90b8 [ 3876.799620] FS: 00007f23ddd97700(0000) GS:ffff8dda20200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3876.799643] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3876.799660] CR2: 00007f23d4024000 CR3: 0000000710bb0005 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [ 3876.799682] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3876.799703] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3876.799723] Call Trace: [ 3876.799735] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0 [ 3876.799749] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30 [ 3876.799779] resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc80 [btrfs] [ 3876.799810] find_parent_nodes+0x38d/0x1180 [btrfs] [ 3876.799841] btrfs_check_shared+0x11a/0x1d0 [btrfs] [ 3876.799870] ? extent_fiemap+0x598/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 3876.799895] extent_fiemap+0x598/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 3876.799913] do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x700 [ 3876.799926] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 [ 3876.799938] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x20 [ 3876.799953] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 3876.799965] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x220 [ 3876.799977] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 3876.799993] RIP: 0033:0x7f23e0013dd7 (...) [ 3876.800056] RSP: 002b:00007f23ddd96ca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 3876.800078] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f23d80210f8 RCX: 00007f23e0013dd7 [ 3876.800099] RDX: 00007f23d80210f8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3876.800626] RBP: 000055fa2a2a2440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f23ddd96d7c [ 3876.801143] R10: 00007f23d8022000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f23ddd96d80 [ 3876.801662] R13: 00007f23ddd96d78 R14: 00007f23d80210f0 R15: 00007f23ddd96d80 (...) [ 3876.805107] ---[ end trace e53161e179ef04f9 ]--- Fix that by saving the root's header owner field into a local variable before freeing the root's extent buffer, and then use that local variable when needed. Fixes: 30b0463a ("Btrfs: fix accessing the root pointer in tree mod log functions") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+ Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Christophe Leroy 提交于
commit 3acd48507dc43eeeb0a1fe965b8bad91cab904a7 upstream. Various notifications of type "BUG kmalloc-4096 () : Redzone overwritten" have been observed recently in various parts of the kernel. After some time, it has been made a relation with the use of BTRFS filesystem and with SLUB_DEBUG turned on. [ 22.809700] BUG kmalloc-4096 (Tainted: G W ): Redzone overwritten [ 22.810286] INFO: 0xbe1a5921-0xfbfc06cd. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc [ 22.810866] INFO: Allocated in __load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs] age=22 cpu=0 pid=224 [ 22.811193] __slab_alloc.constprop.26+0x44/0x70 [ 22.811345] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf0/0x2ec [ 22.811588] __load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs] [ 22.811848] load_free_space_cache+0xf4/0x1b0 [btrfs] [ 22.812090] cache_block_group+0x1d0/0x3d0 [btrfs] [ 22.812321] find_free_extent+0x680/0x12a4 [btrfs] [ 22.812549] btrfs_reserve_extent+0xec/0x220 [btrfs] [ 22.812785] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x178/0x5f4 [btrfs] [ 22.813032] __btrfs_cow_block+0x150/0x5d4 [btrfs] [ 22.813262] btrfs_cow_block+0x194/0x298 [btrfs] [ 22.813484] commit_cowonly_roots+0x44/0x294 [btrfs] [ 22.813718] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x63c/0xc0c [btrfs] [ 22.813973] close_ctree+0xf8/0x2a4 [btrfs] [ 22.814107] generic_shutdown_super+0x80/0x110 [ 22.814250] kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30 [ 22.814437] btrfs_kill_super+0x18/0x90 [btrfs] [ 22.814590] INFO: Freed in proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248 age=41 cpu=0 pid=83 [ 22.814841] proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248 [ 22.814967] proc_single_show+0x54/0x98 [ 22.815086] seq_read+0x278/0x45c [ 22.815190] __vfs_read+0x28/0x17c [ 22.815289] vfs_read+0xa8/0x14c [ 22.815381] ksys_read+0x50/0x94 [ 22.815475] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38 Commit 69d24804 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of memcpy") changed the way bitmap blocks are copied. But allthough bitmaps have the size of a page, they were allocated with kzalloc(). Most of the time, kzalloc() allocates aligned blocks of memory, so copy_page() can be used. But when some debug options like SLAB_DEBUG are activated, kzalloc() may return unaligned pointer. On powerpc, memcpy(), copy_page() and other copying functions use 'dcbz' instruction which provides an entire zeroed cacheline to avoid memory read when the intention is to overwrite a full line. Functions like memcpy() are writen to care about partial cachelines at the start and end of the destination, but copy_page() assumes it gets pages. As pages are naturally cache aligned, copy_page() doesn't care about partial lines. This means that when copy_page() is called with a misaligned pointer, a few leading bytes are zeroed. To fix it, allocate bitmaps through kmem_cache instead of using kzalloc() The cache pool is created with PAGE_SIZE alignment constraint. Reported-by: NErhard F. <erhard_f@mailbox.org> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204371 Fixes: 69d24804 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of memcpy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ rename to btrfs_free_space_bitmap ] Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Mark Salyzyn 提交于
commit 5c2e9f346b815841f9bed6029ebcb06415caf640 upstream. When filtering xattr list for reading, presence of trusted xattr results in a security audit log. However, if there is other content no errno will be set, and if there isn't, the errno will be -ENODATA and not -EPERM as is usually associated with a lack of capability. The check does not block the request to list the xattrs present. Switch to ns_capable_noaudit to reflect a more appropriate check. Signed-off-by: NMark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+ Fixes: a082c6f6 ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin") Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Ding Xiang 提交于
commit 97f024b9171e74c4443bbe8a8dce31b917f97ac5 upstream. if ovl_encode_real_fh() fails, no memory was allocated and the error in the error-valued pointer should be returned. Fixes: 9b6faee0 ("ovl: check ERR_PTR() return value from ovl_encode_fh()") Signed-off-by: NDing Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+ Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Steve French 提交于
commit 3e7a02d47872081f4b6234a9f72500f1d10f060c upstream. In some cases to work around server bugs or performance problems it can be helpful to be able to disable requesting SMB2.1/SMB3 leases on a particular mount (not to all servers and all shares we are mounted to). Add new mount parm "nolease" which turns off requesting leases on directory or file opens. Currently the only way to disable leases is globally through a module load parameter. This is more granular. Suggested-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Bob Peterson 提交于
commit f0b444b349e33ae0d3dd93e25ca365482a5d17d4 upstream. In function sweep_bh_for_rgrps, which is a helper for punch_hole, it uses variable buf_in_tr to keep track of when it needs to commit pending block frees on a partial delete that overflows the transaction created for the delete. The problem is that the variable was initialized at the start of function sweep_bh_for_rgrps but it was never cleared, even when starting a new transaction. This patch reinitializes the variable when the transaction is ended, so the next transaction starts out with it cleared. Fixes: d552a2b9 ("GFS2: Non-recursive delete") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
commit 7be3cb019db1cbd5fd5ffe6d64a23fefa4b6f229 upstream. When brk was moved for binaries without an interpreter, it should have been limited to ET_DYN only. In other words, the special case was an ET_DYN that lacks an INTERP, not just an executable that lacks INTERP. The bug manifested for giant static executables, where the brk would end up in the middle of the text area on 32-bit architectures. Reported-and-tested-by: NRichard Kojedzinszky <richard@kojedz.in> Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
commit d5880c7a8620290a6c90ced7a0e8bd0ad9419601 upstream. unlock_page() was missing in case of an already in-flight write against the same page. Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Fixes: ff17be08 ("fuse: writepage: skip already in flight") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13 Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Yan, Zheng 提交于
[ Upstream commit 87bc5b895d94a0f40fe170d4cf5771c8e8f85d15 ] remove_session_caps() relies on __wait_on_freeing_inode(), to wait for freeing inode to remove its caps. But VFS wakes freeing inode waiters before calling destroy_inode(). [ jlayton: mainline moved to ->free_inode before the original patch was merged. This backport reinstates ceph_destroy_inode and just has it do the call_rcu call. ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/40102Signed-off-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Sasha Levin 提交于
This reverts commit 81281039. The backport was incorrect and was causing kernel panics. Revert and re-apply a correct backport from Jeff Layton. Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Qu Wenruo 提交于
[ Upstream commit 2a28468e525f3924efed7f29f2bc5a2926e7e19a ] [BUG] With fuzzed image and MIXED_GROUPS super flag, we can hit the following BUG_ON(): kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c:491! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 1849 Comm: sync Tainted: G O 5.2.0-custom #27 RIP: 0010:update_existing_head_ref.cold+0x44/0x46 [btrfs] Call Trace: add_delayed_ref_head+0x20c/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x1fc/0x490 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x123/0x380 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x435/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x110/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x230/0xa00 [btrfs] ? __lock_acquire+0x105e/0x1e20 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x67/0xc0 [btrfs] alloc_reserved_file_extent+0x9e/0x340 [btrfs] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x78e/0x1240 [btrfs] ? kvm_clock_read+0x18/0x30 ? __sched_clock_gtod_offset+0x21/0x50 btrfs_run_delayed_refs.part.0+0x4e/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x23/0x30 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x53/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_fs+0x7c/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 sync_fs_one_sb+0x23/0x30 iterate_supers+0x95/0x100 ksys_sync+0x62/0xb0 __ia32_sys_sync+0xe/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [CAUSE] This situation is caused by several factors: - Fuzzed image The extent tree of this fs missed one backref for extent tree root. So we can allocated space from that slot. - MIXED_BG feature Super block has MIXED_BG flag. - No mixed block groups exists All block groups are just regular ones. This makes data space_info->block_groups[] contains metadata block groups. And when we reserve space for data, we can use space in metadata block group. Then we hit the following file operations: - fallocate We need to allocate data extents. find_free_extent() choose to use the metadata block to allocate space from, and choose the space of extent tree root, since its backref is missing. This generate one delayed ref head with is_data = 1. - extent tree update We need to update extent tree at run_delayed_ref time. This generate one delayed ref head with is_data = 0, for the same bytenr of old extent tree root. Then we trigger the BUG_ON(). [FIX] The quick fix here is to check block_group->flags before using it. The problem can only happen for MIXED_GROUPS fs. Regular filesystems won't have space_info with DATA|METADATA flag, and no way to hit the bug. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203255Reported-by: NJungyeon Yoon <jungyeon.yoon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 01 10月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Chao Yu 提交于
[ Upstream commit 10f966bbf521bb9b2e497bbca496a5141f4071d0 ] f2fs uses EFAULT as error number to indicate filesystem is corrupted all the time, but generic filesystems use EUCLEAN for such condition, we need to change to follow others. This patch adds two new macros as below to wrap more generic error code macros, and spread them in code. EFSBADCRC EBADMSG /* Bad CRC detected */ EFSCORRUPTED EUCLEAN /* Filesystem is corrupted */ Reported-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Acked-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8612de3f7ba6e900465e340516b8313806d27b2d ] Zorro Lang reported a crash in generic/475 if we try to inactivate a corrupt inode with a NULL attr fork (stack trace shortened somewhat): RIP: 0010:xfs_bmapi_read+0x311/0xb00 [xfs] RSP: 0018:ffff888047f9ed68 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888047f9f038 RCX: 1ffffffff5f99f51 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: ffff888002a41f00 R08: ffffed10005483f0 R09: ffffed10005483ef R10: ffffed10005483ef R11: ffff888002a41f7f R12: 0000000000000004 R13: ffffe8fff53b5768 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f11d44b5b80(0000) GS:ffff888114200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000ef6000 CR3: 000000002e176003 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: xfs_dabuf_map.constprop.18+0x696/0xe50 [xfs] xfs_da_read_buf+0xf5/0x2c0 [xfs] xfs_da3_node_read+0x1d/0x230 [xfs] xfs_attr_inactive+0x3cc/0x5e0 [xfs] xfs_inactive+0x4c8/0x5b0 [xfs] xfs_fs_destroy_inode+0x31b/0x8e0 [xfs] destroy_inode+0xbc/0x190 xfs_bulkstat_one_int+0xa8c/0x1200 [xfs] xfs_bulkstat_one+0x16/0x20 [xfs] xfs_bulkstat+0x6fa/0xf20 [xfs] xfs_ioc_bulkstat+0x182/0x2b0 [xfs] xfs_file_ioctl+0xee0/0x12a0 [xfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1000 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x4d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f11d39a3e5b The "obvious" cause is that the attr ifork is null despite the inode claiming an attr fork having at least one extent, but it's not so obvious why we ended up with an inode in that state. Reported-by: NZorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204031Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBill O'Donnell <billodo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Chao Yu 提交于
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ] As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233 - Reproduces gcc poc_13.c ./run.sh f2fs - Kernel messages F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133! RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0 Call Trace: f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0 do_write_page+0x57/0x100 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0 __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0 f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130 f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810 do_fsync+0x33/0x60 __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap. Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of current in-used segment. Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Chao Yu 提交于
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ] As Pavel Machek reported: "We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing fsck" if filesystem can do that." Still we need improve the original patch with: - use unlikely keyword - add message print - return EUCLEAN However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such condition check here as below reasons: - We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), - If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that. - We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product. - There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}. So I propose to revert this unneeded check. This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a. Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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