1. 13 7月, 2018 12 次提交
  2. 12 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • C
      bsg: remove read/write support · 28519c89
      Christoph Hellwig 提交于
      The code poses a security risk due to user memory access in ->release
      and had an API that can't be used reliably.  As far as we know it was
      never used for real, but if that turns out wrong we'll have to revert
      this commit and come up with a band aid.
      
      Jann Horn did look software archives for users of this interface,
      and the only users found were example code in sg3_utils, and optional
      support in an optional module of the tgt user space iscsi target,
      which looks like a proof of concept extension of the /dev/sg
      read/write support.
      
      Tony Battersby chimes in that the code is basically unsafe to use in
      general:
      
        The read/write interface on /dev/bsg is impossible to use safely
        because the list of completed commands is per-device (bd->done_list)
        rather than per-fd like it is with /dev/sg.  So if program A and
        program B are both using the write/read interface on the same bsg
        device, then their command responses will get mixed up, and program
        A will read() some command results from program B and vice versa.
        So no, I don't use read/write on /dev/bsg.  From a security standpoint,
        it should definitely be fixed or removed.
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      28519c89
  3. 11 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  4. 09 7月, 2018 25 次提交