- 18 1月, 2012 2 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Similar to SIGNATURE, rename INTEGRITY_DIGSIG to INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
It was reported that DIGSIG is confusing name for digital signature module. It was suggested to rename DIGSIG to SIGNATURE. Requested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 20 12月, 2011 4 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation. This patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation, causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns. It needs to be set only once during initialization. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
Don't free a valid measurement entry on TPM PCR extend failure. Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-
由 Roberto Sassu 提交于
Info about new measurements are cached in the iint for performance. When the inode is flushed from cache, the associated iint is flushed as well. Subsequent access to the inode will cause the inode to be re-measured and will attempt to add a duplicate entry to the measurement list. This patch frees the duplicate measurement memory, fixing a memory leak. Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-
- 08 12月, 2011 2 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation. This patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation, causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns. It needs to be set only once during initialization. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 22 11月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Fix build errors by adding Kconfig dependency on KEYS. CRYPTO dependency removed. CC security/integrity/digsig.o security/integrity/digsig.c: In function ?integrity_digsig_verify?: security/integrity/digsig.c:38:4: error: implicit declaration of function ?request_key? security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: error: ?key_type_keyring? undeclared (first use in this function) security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in make[2]: *** [security/integrity/digsig.o] Error 1 Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 09 11月, 2011 2 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
This patch adds support for digital signature verification to EVM. With this feature file metadata can be protected using digital signature instead of an HMAC. When building an image, which has to be flashed to different devices, an HMAC cannot be used to sign file metadata, because the HMAC key should be different on every device. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys. This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
-
- 02 11月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
-
- 15 9月, 2011 5 次提交
-
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
When allocating from slab, initialization is done the first time in init_once() and subsequently on free. Because evm_status was not re-initialized on free, evm_verify_hmac() skipped verifications. This patch re-initializes evm_status. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Before permitting 'security.evm' to be updated, 'security.evm' must exist and be valid. In the case that there are no existing EVM protected xattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits. To differentiate between no 'security.evm' xattr and no xattrs used to calculate 'security.evm', this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
evm_protect_xattr unnecessarily validates the current security.evm integrity, before updating non-evm protected extended attributes and other file metadata. This patch limits validating the current security.evm integrity to evm protected metadata. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
All tristates selected by EVM(boolean) are forced to be builtin, except in the TCG_TPM(tristate) dependency case. Arnaud Lacombe summarizes the Kconfig bug as, "So it would seem direct dependency state influence the state of reverse dependencies.." For a detailed explanation, refer to Arnaud Lacombe's posting http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/23/498. With the "encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency" patch, EVM can now be built without a dependency on TCG_TPM. The trusted-keys dependency requires trusted-keys to either be builtin or not selected. This dependency will prevent the boolean/tristate mismatch from occuring. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotimenet> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
- 10 9月, 2011 3 次提交
-
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Fixes sparse warnings: security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:105:6: warning: symbol 'ima_file_free' was not declared. Should it be static? security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:167:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_mmap' was not declared. Should it be static? security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:192:5: warning: symbol 'ima_bprm_check' was not declared. Should it be static? security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:211:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_check' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Fixes sparse warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:290:5: warning: symbol 'ima_open_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Sparse fix: move iint_initialized to integrity.h Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 18 8月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Although the EVM encrypted-key should be encrypted/decrypted using a trusted-key, a user-defined key could be used instead. When using a user- defined key, a TCG_TPM dependency should not be required. Unfortunately, the encrypted-key code needs to be refactored a bit in order to remove this dependency. This patch adds the TCG_TPM dependency. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotimenet> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 11 8月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
evm_inode_init_security() should return 0, when EVM is not enabled. (Returning an error is a remnant of evm_inode_post_init_security.) Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 09 8月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 James Morris 提交于
Select trusted and encrypted keys if EVM is selected, to ensure the requisite symbols are available. Otherwise, these can be selected as modules while EVM is static, leading to a kernel build failure. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 27 7月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 19 7月, 2011 11 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode. Reported-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
In addition to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission to modify/delete security.evm, prohibit invalid security.evm xattrs from changing, unless in fixmode. This patch prevents inadvertent 'fixing' of security.evm to reflect offline modifications. Changelog v7: - rename boot paramater 'evm_mode' to 'evm' Reported-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
We will use digital signatures in addtion to hmac. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
If EVM is not supported or enabled, evm_verify_hmac() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, which ima_appraise_measurement() ignores and sets the appraisal status based solely on the security.ima verification. evm_verify_hmac() also returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN for other failures, such as temporary failures like -ENOMEM, resulting in possible attack vectors. This patch changes the default return code for temporary/unexpected failures, like -ENOMEM, from INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN to INTEGRITY_FAIL, making evm_verify_hmac() fail safe. As a result, failures need to be re-evaluated in order to catch both temporary errors, such as the -ENOMEM, as well as errors that have been resolved in fix mode. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Additional iint parameter allows to skip lookup in the cache. Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
Using shash is more efficient, because the algorithm is allocated only once. Only the descriptor to store the hash state needs to be allocated for every operation. Changelog v6: - check for crypto_shash_setkey failure Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Initialize 'security.evm' for new files. Changelog v7: - renamed evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - moved struct xattr definition to earlier patch - allocate xattr name Changelog v6: - Use 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data' Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
-
由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes. This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for the type of method. Changelog v6: - move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h - defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - removed unnecessary memset Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
-
- 24 2月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
The original ima_must_measure() function based its results on cached iint information, which required an iint be allocated for all files. Currently, an iint is allocated only for files in policy. As a result, for those files in policy, ima_must_measure() is now called twice: once to determine if the inode is in the measurement policy and, the second time, to determine if it needs to be measured/re-measured. The second call to ima_must_measure() unnecessarily checks to see if the file is in policy. As we already know the file is in policy, this patch removes the second unnecessary call to ima_must_measure(), removes the vestige iint parameter, and just checks the iint directly to determine if the inode has been measured or needs to be measured/re-measured. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
-
- 10 2月, 2011 3 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Now that i_readcount is maintained by the VFS layer, remove the imbalance checking in IMA. Cleans up the IMA code nicely. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR, as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer. Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it belongs. Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other subsystems to use i_readcount. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Convert the inode's i_readcount from an unsigned int to atomic. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
-
- 04 1月, 2011 1 次提交
-
-
由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything is as fine as the return code implies. This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime. Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed, ignoring any remaining rules. default IMA TCB policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 # SYSFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 # DEBUGFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 # TMPFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 # SECURITYFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 < LSM specific rule > dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-