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  1. 23 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 10 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 07 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 06 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 05 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 26 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 01 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 20 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 03 1月, 2015 3 次提交
    • A
      x86, traps: Add ist_begin_non_atomic and ist_end_non_atomic · bced35b6
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      In some IST handlers, if the interrupt came from user mode,
we can safely enable preemption.  Add helpers to do it safely.

This is intended to be used my the memory failure code in
do_machine_check.
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      bced35b6
    • A
      x86, traps: Track entry into and exit from IST context · 95927475
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      We currently pretend that IST context is like standard exception
context, but this is incorrect.  IST entries from userspace are like
standard exceptions except that they use per-cpu stacks, so they are
atomic.  IST entries from kernel space are like NMIs from RCU's
perspective -- they are not quiescent states even if they
interrupted the kernel during a quiescent state.

Add and use ist_enter and ist_exit to track IST context.  Even
though x86_32 has no IST stacks, we track these interrupts the same
way.

This fixes two issues:

 - Scheduling from an IST interrupt handler will now warn.  It would
   previously appear to work as long as we got lucky and nothing
   overwrote the stack frame.  (I don't know of any bugs in this
   that would trigger the warning, but it's good to be on the safe
   side.)

 - RCU handling in IST context was dangerous.  As far as I know,
   only machine checks were likely to trigger this, but it's good to
   be on the safe side.

Note that the machine check handlers appears to have been missing
any context tracking at all before this patch.

Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      95927475
    • A
      x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace · 48e08d0f
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      This causes all non-NMI, non-double-fault kernel entries from
userspace to run on the normal kernel stack.  Double-fault is
exempt to minimize confusion if we double-fault directly from
userspace due to a bad kernel stack.

This is, suprisingly, simpler and shorter than the current code.  It
removes the IMO rather frightening paranoid_userspace path, and it
make sync_regs much simpler.

There is no risk of stack overflow due to this change -- the kernel
stack that we switch to is empty.

This will also enable us to create non-atomic sections within
machine checks from userspace, which will simplify memory failure
handling.  It will also allow the upcoming fsgsbase code to be
simplified, because it doesn't need to worry about usergs when
scheduling in paranoid_exit, as that code no longer exists.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      48e08d0f
  19. 08 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  21. 25 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  23. 24 11月, 2014 3 次提交
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret · b645af2d
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail.  This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.

Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace.  To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.

This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception.  It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with.  For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.

This patch throws out bad_iret entirely.  As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C.  It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b645af2d
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS · 6f442be2
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.

On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code.  The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.

This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.

This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6f442be2
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C · af726f21
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
justify writing it in assembly.  Move it to C.

This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.

Fixes: 3891a04aSigned-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      af726f21
  25. 18 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables · fe3d197f
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      This is really the meat of the MPX patch set.  If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one.  There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner.  (small FAQ below).

Long Description:

This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers.  The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.

PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in  the 'mm_struct'.  PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address.  Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.

Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive.  Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.

==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====

MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".

They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.

The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.

==== Why not do this in userspace? ====

This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.

Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
   that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
   area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
   directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
   user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
   which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
   This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
   single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
   of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
   infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.

Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
   is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
   need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
   memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
   constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
   scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
   parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
   kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.

Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
   allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
   handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
   requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
   allocation state there.

Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: NQiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      fe3d197f
  27. 14 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 14 5月, 2014 7 次提交
  31. 06 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  33. 24 4月, 2014 3 次提交
    • M
      kprobes, x86: Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() instead of __kprobes annotation · 9326638c
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro for protecting functions
from kprobes instead of __kprobes annotation under
arch/x86.

This applies nokprobe_inline annotation for some cases,
because NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() will inhibit inlining by
referring the symbol address.

This just folds a bunch of previous NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
cleanup patches for x86 to one patch.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081814.26341.51656.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9326638c
    • M
      kprobes, x86: Call exception_enter after kprobes handled · ecd50f71
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      Move exception_enter() call after kprobes handler
is done. Since the exception_enter() involves
many other functions (like printk), it can cause
recursive int3/break loop when kprobes probe such
functions.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081740.26341.10894.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ecd50f71
    • M
      kprobes/x86: Call exception handlers directly from do_int3/do_debug · 6f6343f5
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      To avoid a kernel crash by probing on lockdep code, call
kprobe_int3_handler() and kprobe_debug_handler()(which was
formerly called post_kprobe_handler()) directly from
do_int3 and do_debug.

Currently kprobes uses notify_die() to hook the int3/debug
exceptoins. Since there is a locking code in notify_die,
the lockdep code can be invoked. And because the lockdep
involves printk() related things, theoretically, we need to
prohibit probing on such code, which means much longer blacklist
we'll have. Instead, hooking the int3/debug for kprobes before
notify_die() can avoid this problem.

Anyway, most of the int3 handlers in the kernel are already
called from do_int3 directly, e.g. ftrace_int3_handler,
poke_int3_handler, kgdb_ll_trap. Actually only
kprobe_exceptions_notify is on the notifier_call_chain.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081733.26341.24423.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6f6343f5
  35. 12 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  37. 13 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  39. 09 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  41. 25 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 23 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      kprobes/x86: Call out into INT3 handler directly instead of using notifier · 17f41571
      由 Jiri Kosina 提交于 
      In fd4363ff ("x86: Introduce int3 (breakpoint)-based
instruction patching"), the mechanism that was introduced for
notifying alternatives code from int3 exception handler that and
exception occured was die_notifier.

This is however problematic, as early code might be using jump
labels even before the notifier registration has been performed,
which will then lead to an oops due to unhandled exception. One
of such occurences has been encountered by Fengguang:

 int3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1-01429-g04bf576 #8
 task: ffff88000da1b040 ti: ffff88000da1c000 task.ti: ffff88000da1c000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811098cc>]  [<ffffffff811098cc>] ttwu_do_wakeup+0x28/0x225
 RSP: 0000:ffff88000dd03f10  EFLAGS: 00000006
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000dd12940 RCX: ffffffff81769c40
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
 RBP: ffff88000dd03f28 R08: ffffffff8176a8c0 R09: 0000000000000002
 R10: ffffffff810ff484 R11: ffff88000dd129e8 R12: ffff88000dbc90c0
 R13: ffff88000dbc90c0 R14: ffff88000da1dfd8 R15: ffff88000da1dfd8
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88000dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 00000000ffffffff CR3: 0000000001c88000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Stack:
  ffff88000dd12940 ffff88000dbc90c0 ffff88000da1dfd8 ffff88000dd03f48
  ffffffff81109e2b ffff88000dd12940 0000000000000000 ffff88000dd03f68
  ffffffff81109e9e 0000000000000000 0000000000012940 ffff88000dd03f98
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  [<ffffffff81109e2b>] ttwu_do_activate.constprop.56+0x6d/0x79
  [<ffffffff81109e9e>] sched_ttwu_pending+0x67/0x84
  [<ffffffff8110c845>] scheduler_ipi+0x15a/0x2b0
  [<ffffffff8104dfb4>] smp_reschedule_interrupt+0x38/0x41
  [<ffffffff8173bf5d>] reschedule_interrupt+0x6d/0x80
  <EOI>
  [<ffffffff810ff484>] ? __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5/0xc1
  [<ffffffff8105cc30>] ? native_safe_halt+0xd/0x16
  [<ffffffff81015f10>] default_idle+0x147/0x282
  [<ffffffff81017026>] arch_cpu_idle+0x3d/0x5d
  [<ffffffff81127d6a>] cpu_idle_loop+0x46d/0x5db
  [<ffffffff81127f5c>] cpu_startup_entry+0x84/0x84
  [<ffffffff8104f4f8>] start_secondary+0x3c8/0x3d5
  [...]

Fix this by directly calling poke_int3_handler() from the int3
exception handler (analogically to what ftrace has been doing
already), instead of relying on notifier, registration of which
might not have yet been finalized by the time of the first trap.
Reported-and-tested-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1307231007490.14024@pobox.suse.czSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      17f41571
  45. 17 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • K
      x86: Make sure IDT is page aligned · 4df05f36
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      Since the IDT is referenced from a fixmap, make sure it is page aligned.
Merge with 32-bit one, since it was already aligned to deal with F00F
bug. Since bss is cleared before IDT setup, it can live there. This also
moves the other *_idt_table variables into common locations.

This avoids the risk of the IDT ever being moved in the bss and having
the mapping be offset, resulting in calling incorrect handlers. In the
current upstream kernel this is not a manifested bug, but heavily patched
kernels (such as those using the PaX patch series) did encounter this bug.

The tables other than idt_table technically do not need to be page
aligned, at least not at the current time, but using a common
declaration avoids mistakes.  On 64 bits the table is exactly one page
long, anyway.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130716183441.GA14232@www.outflux.netReported-by: NPaX Team <pageexec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      4df05f36
  47. 21 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  49. 19 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  51. 14 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  53. 12 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • K
      x86: Use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs · 4eefbe79
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      Make a copy of the IDT (as seen via the "sidt" instruction) read-only.
This primarily removes the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory
write attacks, and has the added benefit of also not leaking the kernel
base offset, if it has been relocated.

We already did this on vendor == Intel and family == 5 because of the
F0 0F bug -- regardless of if a particular CPU had the F0 0F bug or
not.  Since the workaround was so cheap, there simply was no reason to
be very specific.  This patch extends the readonly alias to all CPUs,
but does not activate the #PF to #UD conversion code needed to deliver
the proper exception in the F0 0F case except on Intel family 5
processors.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130410192422.GA17344@www.outflux.net
Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      4eefbe79
  55. 08 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • F
      context_tracking: Restore correct previous context state on exception exit · 6c1e0256
      由 Frederic Weisbecker 提交于 
      On exception exit, we restore the previous context tracking state based on
the regs of the interrupted frame. Iff that frame is in user mode as
stated by user_mode() helper, we restore the context tracking user mode.

However there is a tiny chunck of low level arch code after we pass through
user_enter() and until the CPU eventually resumes userspace.
If an exception happens in this tiny area, exception_enter() correctly
exits the context tracking user mode but exception_exit() won't restore
it because of the value returned by user_mode(regs).

As a result we may return to userspace with the wrong context tracking
state.

To fix this, change exception_enter() to return the context tracking state
prior to its call and pass this saved state to exception_exit(). This restores
the real context tracking state of the interrupted frame.

(May be this patch was suggested to me, I don't recall exactly. If so,
sorry for the missing credit).
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org>
Cc: Mats Liljegren <mats.liljegren@enea.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      6c1e0256