Remove the 'printf_fn_t' typedef as it is not used.
Signed-off-by: NChen Lin <chen45464546@163.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: sboyd@kernel.org
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1526053649-24229-1-git-send-email-chen45464546@163.com

Those three warnings can easily solved by using :: to indicate a
code block:

	./kernel/time/timer.c:1259: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
	./kernel/time/timer.c:1261: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
	./kernel/time/timer.c:1262: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.

While here, align the lines at the block.
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f02e6a0ce27f3b5e33415d92d07a40598904b3ee.1525684985.git.mchehab%2Bsamsung@kernel.org

Checking the equality of cpumask for both new and old tick device doesn't
ensure that it's CPU local device. This will cause issue if a low rating
clockevent tick device is registered first followed by the registration
of higher rating clockevent tick device.

In such case, clockevents_released list will never get emptied as both
the devices get selected as preferred one and we will loop forever in
clockevents_notify_released.
Signed-off-by: NSudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525881728-4858-1-git-send-email-sudeep.holla@arm.com

The clocksource watchdog uses a work to spawn a kthread to run the
watchdog. That is about as silly as it sounds, run the watchdog
directly from the work.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.713862818@infradead.org

AFAICS the hotplug code no longer uses this function.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.656525644@infradead.org

When a registered clocksource gets marked unstable the watchdog_kthread
will de-rate and re-select the clocksource. Ensure it also de-rates
when getting called on an unregistered clocksource.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.594904898@infradead.org

A number of places relies on list_empty(&cs->wd_list), however the
list_head does not get initialized. Do so upon registration, such that
thereafter it is possible to rely on list_empty() correctly reflecting
the list membership status.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NDiego Viola <diego.viola@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.472662715@infradead.org

Because of how the code flips between tsc-early and tsc clocksources
it might need to mark one or both unstable. The current code in
mark_tsc_unstable() only worked because previously it registered the
tsc clocksource once and then never touched it.

Since it now unregisters the tsc-early clocksource, it needs to know
if a clocksource got unregistered and the current cs->mult test
doesn't work for that. Instead use list_empty(&cs->list) to test for
registration.

Furthermore, since clocksource_mark_unstable() needs to place the cs
on the wd_list, it links the cs->list and cs->wd_list serialization.
It must not see a clocsource registered (!empty cs->list) but already
past dequeue_watchdog(). So place {en,de}queue{,_watchdog}() under the
same lock.

Provided cs->list is initialized to empty, this then allows us to
unconditionally use clocksource_mark_unstable(), regardless of the
registration state.

Fixes: aa83c457 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource")
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: NDiego Viola <diego.viola@gmail.com>
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180502135312.GS12217@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net

Revert commits

92af4dcb ("tracing: Unify the "boot" and "mono" tracing clocks")
127bfa5f ("hrtimer: Unify MONOTONIC and BOOTTIME clock behavior")
7250a404 ("posix-timers: Unify MONOTONIC and BOOTTIME clock behavior")
d6c7270e ("timekeeping: Remove boot time specific code")
f2d6fdbf ("Input: Evdev - unify MONOTONIC and BOOTTIME clock behavior")
d6ed449a ("timekeeping: Make the MONOTONIC clock behave like the BOOTTIME clock")
72199320 ("timekeeping: Add the new CLOCK_MONOTONIC_ACTIVE clock")

As stated in the pull request for the unification of CLOCK_MONOTONIC and
CLOCK_BOOTTIME, it was clear that we might have to revert the change.

As reported by several folks systemd and other applications rely on the
documented behaviour of CLOCK_MONOTONIC on Linux and break with the above
changes. After resume daemons time out and other timeout related issues are
observed. Rafael compiled this list:

* systemd kills daemons on resume, after >WatchdogSec seconds
  of suspending (Genki Sky).  [Verified that that's because systemd uses
  CLOCK_MONOTONIC and expects it to not include the suspend time.]

* systemd-journald misbehaves after resume:
  systemd-journald[7266]: File /var/log/journal/016627c3c4784cd4812d4b7e96a34226/system.journal
corrupted or uncleanly shut down, renaming and replacing.
  (Mike Galbraith).

* NetworkManager reports "networking disabled" and networking is broken
  after resume 50% of the time (Pavel).  [May be because of systemd.]

* MATE desktop dims the display and starts the screensaver right after
  system resume (Pavel).

* Full system hang during resume (me).  [May be due to systemd or NM or both.]

That happens on debian and open suse systems.

It's sad, that these problems were neither catched in -next nor by those
folks who expressed interest in this change.
Reported-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Reported-by: Genki Sky <sky@genki.is>,
Reported-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Kaike reported that in tests rdma hrtimers occasionaly stopped working. He
did great debugging, which provided enough context to decode the problem.

CPU 3			     	      	     CPU 2

idle
start sched_timer expires = 712171000000
 queue->next = sched_timer
					    start rdmavt timer. expires = 712172915662
					    lock(baseof(CPU3))
tick_nohz_stop_tick()
tick = 716767000000			    timerqueue_add(tmr)

hrtimer_set_expires(sched_timer, tick);
  sched_timer->expires = 716767000000  <---- FAIL
					     if (tmr->expires < queue->next->expires)
hrtimer_start(sched_timer)		          queue->next = tmr;
lock(baseof(CPU3))
					     unlock(baseof(CPU3))
timerqueue_remove()
timerqueue_add()

ts->sched_timer is queued and queue->next is pointing to it, but then
ts->sched_timer.expires is modified.

This not only corrupts the ordering of the timerqueue RB tree, it also
makes CPU2 see the new expiry time of timerqueue->next->expires when
checking whether timerqueue->next needs to be updated. So CPU2 sees that
the rdma timer is earlier than timerqueue->next and sets the rdma timer as
new next.

Depending on whether it had also seen the new time at RB tree enqueue, it
might have queued the rdma timer at the wrong place and then after removing
the sched_timer the RB tree is completely hosed.

The problem was introduced with a commit which tried to solve inconsistency
between the hrtimer in the tick_sched data and the underlying hardware
clockevent. It split out hrtimer_set_expires() to store the new tick time
in both the NOHZ and the NOHZ + HIGHRES case, but missed the fact that in
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case the hrtimer might still be queued.

Use hrtimer_start(timer, tick...) for the NOHZ + HIGHRES case which sets
timer->expires after canceling the timer and move the hrtimer_set_expires()
invocation into the NOHZ only code path which is not affected as it merily
uses the hrtimer as next event storage so code pathes can be shared with
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case.

Fixes: d4af6d93 ("nohz: Fix spurious warning when hrtimer and clockevent get out of sync")
Reported-by: N"Wan Kaike" <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marciniszyn Mike" <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Dalessandro Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Cc: "Fleck John" <john.fleck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: "Weiny Ira" <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org"
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804241637390.1679@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804242119210.1597@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

It's been missing for a while but no one is touching that up.  Fix it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315060639.9578-1-peterx@redhat.com

CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b2c8625 ("tracing: Add NMI tracing in hwlat detector")
Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

File /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist displays random addresses:

[root@s8360046 linux]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist
0x0000000047149a90-0x00000000bfcb099a	print_type_x8
....

This breaks 'perf probe' which uses the blacklist file to prohibit
probes on certain functions by checking the address range.

Fix this by printing the correct (unhashed) address.

The file mode is read all but this is not an issue as the file
hierarchy points out:
 # ls -ld /sys/ /sys/kernel/ /sys/kernel/debug/ /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/
	/sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist
dr-xr-xr-x 12 root root 0 Apr 19 07:56 /sys/
drwxr-xr-x  8 root root 0 Apr 19 07:56 /sys/kernel/
drwx------ 16 root root 0 Apr 19 06:56 /sys/kernel/debug/
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 0 Apr 19 06:56 /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/
-r--r--r--  1 root root 0 Apr 19 06:56 /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist

Everything in and below /sys/kernel/debug is rwx to root only,
no group or others have access.

Background:
Directory /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes is created by debugfs_create_dir()
which sets the mode bits to rwxr-xr-x. Maybe change that to use the
parent's directory mode bits instead?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180419105556.86664-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com

Fixes: ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.15+
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NThomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Kernel is crashing when user tries to record 'ftrace:function' event
with empty filter:

  # perf record -e ftrace:function --filter="" ls

  # dmesg
  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  ...
  RIP: 0010:ftrace_profile_set_filter+0x14b/0x2d0
  RSP: 0018:ffffa4a7c0da7d20 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: ffffa4a7c0da7d64 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8c48ffc968f0
  ...
  Call Trace:
   _perf_ioctl+0x54a/0x6b0
   ? rcu_all_qs+0x5/0x30
  ...

After patch:
  # perf record -e ftrace:function --filter="" ls
  failed to set filter "" on event ftrace:function with 22 (Invalid argument)

Also, if user tries to echo "" > filter, it used to throw an error.
This behavior got changed by commit 80765597 ("tracing: Rewrite
filter logic to be simpler and faster"). This patch restores the
behavior as a side effect:

Before patch:
  # echo "" > filter
  #

After patch:
  # echo "" > filter
  bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
  #

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420150758.19787-1-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com

Fixes: 80765597 ("tracing: Rewrite filter logic to be simpler and faster")
Signed-off-by: NRavi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beastSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove dead code that bails on `attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE` - the
previous check already bails on `attr->value_size != 4`.
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Change over clock_nanosleep syscalls to use y2038 safe
__kernel_timespec times. This will enable changing over
of these syscalls to use new y2038 safe syscalls when
the architectures define the CONFIG_64BIT_TIME.

Note that nanosleep syscall is deprecated and does not have a
plan for making it y2038 safe. But, the syscall should work as
before on 64 bit machines and on 32 bit machines, the syscall
works correctly until y2038 as before using the existing compat
syscall version. There is no new syscall for supporting 64 bit
time_t on 32 bit architectures.

Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Change over clock_settime, clock_gettime and clock_getres
syscalls to use __kernel_timespec times. This will enable
changing over of these syscalls to use new y2038 safe syscalls
when the architectures define the CONFIG_64BIT_TIME.

Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

get/put_timespec64() interfaces will eventually be used for
conversions between the new y2038 safe struct __kernel_timespec
and struct timespec64.

The new y2038 safe syscalls have a common entry for native
and compat interfaces.
On compat interfaces, the high order bits of nanoseconds
should be zeroed out. This is because the application code
or the libc do not guarantee zeroing of these. If used without
zeroing, kernel might be at risk of using timespec values
incorrectly.

Note that clearing of bits is dependent on CONFIG_64BIT_TIME
for now. This is until COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME has been handled
correctly. x86 will be the first architecture that will use the
CONFIG_64BIT_TIME.
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

clock_gettime, clock_settime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
compat syscalls are also repurposed to provide backward compatibility
to support 32 bit time_t on 32 bit systems.

Note that nanosleep compat syscall will also be treated the same way
as the above syscalls as it shares common handler functions with
clock_nanosleep. But, there is no plan to provide y2038 safe solution
for nanosleep.
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

These functions are used in the repurposed compat syscalls
to provide backward compatibility for using 32 bit time_t
on 32 bit systems.
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Commit a9445e47 ("posix-cpu-timers: Make set_process_cpu_timer()
more robust") moved the check into the 'if' statement. Unfortunately,
it did so on the right side of an && which means that it may get short
circuited and never evaluated. This is easily reproduced with:

$ cat loop.c
void main() {
  struct rlimit res;
  /* set the CPU time limit */
  getrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU,&res);
  res.rlim_cur = 2;
  res.rlim_max = 2;
  setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU,&res);

  while (1);
}

Which will hang forever instead of being killed. Fix this by pulling the
evaluation out of the if statement but checking the return value instead.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1568337
Fixes: a9445e47 ("posix-cpu-timers: Make set_process_cpu_timer() more robust")
Signed-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Max R . P . Grossmann" <m@max.pm>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417215742.2521-1-labbott@redhat.com

Reading file /proc/modules shows the correct address:
[root@s35lp76 ~]# cat /proc/modules | egrep '^qeth_l2'
qeth_l2 94208 1 - Live 0x000003ff80401000

and reading file /sys/module/qeth_l2/sections/.text
[root@s35lp76 ~]# cat /sys/module/qeth_l2/sections/.text
0x0000000018ea8363
displays a random address.

This breaks the perf tool which uses this address on s390
to calculate start of .text section in memory.

Fix this by printing the correct (unhashed) address.

Thanks to Jessica Yu for helping on this.

Fixes: ef0010a3 ("vsprintf: don't use 'restricted_pointer()' when not restricting")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.15+
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

The __current_kernel_time() function based on 'struct timespec' is no
longer recommended for new code, and the only user of this function has
been replaced by commit 6909e29f ("kdb: use __ktime_get_real_seconds
instead of __current_kernel_time").

Remove the obsolete interface.
Signed-off-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: sboyd@kernel.org
Cc: broonie@kernel.org
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1a9dbea7ee2cda7efe9ed330874075cf17fdbff6.1523596316.git.baolin.wang@linaro.org

Convert the clockevents driver from old-style printk() to pr_info() and
pr_cont(), to fix split kernel messages like below:

    Clockevents: could not switch to one-shot mode:
     dummy_timer is not functional.
Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522942018-14471-1-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be

If the get_callchain_buffers fails to allocate the buffer it will
decrease the nr_callchain_events right away.

There's no point of checking the allocation error for
nr_callchain_events > 1. Removing that check.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-3-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

The syzbot hit KASAN bug in perf_callchain_store having the entry stored
behind the allocated bounds [1].

We miss the sample_max_stack check for the initial event that allocates
callchain buffers. This missing check allows to create an event with
sample_max_stack value bigger than the global sysctl maximum:

  # sysctl -a | grep perf_event_max_stack
  kernel.perf_event_max_stack = 127

  # perf record -vv -C 1 -e cycles/max-stack=256/ kill
  ...
  perf_event_attr:
    size                             112
    ...
    sample_max_stack                 256
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  sys_perf_event_open: pid -1  cpu 1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8 = 4

Note the '-C 1', which forces perf record to create just single event.
Otherwise it opens event for every cpu, then the sample_max_stack check
fails on the second event and all's fine.

The fix is to run the sample_max_stack check also for the first event
with callchains.

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152352732920874&w=2

Reported-by: syzbot+7c449856228b63ac951e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 97c79a38 ("perf core: Per event callchain limit")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-2-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Return immediately when we find issue in the user stack checks. The
error value could get overwritten by following check for
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 60e2364e ("perf: Add ability to sample machine state on interrupt")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-1-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Store preempting context switch out event into Perf trace as a part of
PERF_RECORD_SWITCH[_CPU_WIDE] record.

Percentage of preempting and non-preempting context switches help
understanding the nature of workloads (CPU or IO bound) that are running
on a machine;

The event is treated as preemption one when task->state value of the
thread being switched out is TASK_RUNNING. Event type encoding is
implemented using PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT_PREEMPT bit;
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9ff84e83-a0ca-dd82-a6d0-cb951689be74@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

We might need to do some actions before the shadow variable is freed.
For example, we might need to remove it from a list or free some data
that it points to.

This is already possible now. The user can get the shadow variable
by klp_shadow_get(), do the necessary actions, and then call
klp_shadow_free().

This patch allows to do it a more elegant way. The user could implement
the needed actions in a callback that is passed to klp_shadow_free()
as a parameter. The callback usually does reverse operations to
the constructor callback that can be called by klp_shadow_*alloc().

It is especially useful for klp_shadow_free_all(). There we need to do
these extra actions for each found shadow variable with the given ID.

Note that the memory used by the shadow variable itself is still released
later by rcu callback. It is needed to protect internal structures that
keep all shadow variables. But the destructor is called immediately.
The shadow variable must not be access anyway after klp_shadow_free()
is called. The user is responsible to protect this any suitable way.

Be aware that the destructor is called under klp_shadow_lock. It is
the same as for the contructor in klp_shadow_alloc().
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

The existing API allows to pass a sample data to initialize the shadow
data. It works well when the data are position independent. But it fails
miserably when we need to set a pointer to the shadow structure itself.

Unfortunately, we might need to initialize the pointer surprisingly
often because of struct list_head. It is even worse because the list
might be hidden in other common structures, for example, struct mutex,
struct wait_queue_head.

For example, this was needed to fix races in ALSA sequencer. It required
to add mutex into struct snd_seq_client. See commit b3defb79
("ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free") and commit d15d662e
("ALSA: seq: Fix racy pool initializations")

This patch makes the API more safe. A custom constructor function and data
are passed to klp_shadow_*alloc() functions instead of the sample data.

Note that ctor_data are no longer a template for shadow->data. It might
point to any data that might be necessary when the constructor is called.

Also note that the constructor is called under klp_shadow_lock. It is
an internal spin_lock that synchronizes alloc() vs. get() operations,
see klp_shadow_get_or_alloc(). On one hand, this adds a risk of ABBA
deadlocks. On the other hand, it allows to do some operations safely.
For example, we could add the new structure into an existing list.
This must be done only once when the structure is allocated.
Reported-by: NNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

This warning message is not very helpful, as the return value should
already show information about the error. Also, this message will
spam dmesg if the user space does testing in a loop, like:

    for x in {0..5}
    do
        echo p:xx xx+$x >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
    done
Reported-by: NVince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180413185513.3626052-1-songliubraving@fb.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

There were some documentation locations that irda was mentioned, as well
as an old MAINTAINERS entry and the networking sysctl entries.  Clean
these all out as this stuff really is finally gone.
Reported-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they
are booted.  With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the
kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address.  In particular,
kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets
the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it.

Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem.  By returning 1
in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off.  This
allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand.  While the trick works
fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the
architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer.

Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing
kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it.  With this change
architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need.

A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the
purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field.  As now the information
stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The current code uses the sh_offset field in purgatory_info->sechdrs to
store a pointer to the current load address of the section.  Depending
whether the section will be loaded or not this is either a pointer into
purgatory_info->purgatory_buf or kexec_purgatory.  This is not only a
violation of the ELF standard but also makes the code very hard to
understand as you cannot tell if the memory you are using is read-only
or not.

Remove this misuse and store the offset of the section in
pugaroty_info->purgatory_buf in sh_offset.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-10-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The main loop currently uses quite a lot of variables to update the
section headers.  Some of them are unnecessary.  So clean them up a
little.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-9-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

To update the entry point there is an extra loop over all section
headers although this can be done in the main loop.  So move it there
and eliminate the extra loop and variable to store the 'entry section
index'.

Also, in the main loop, move the usual case, i.e.  non-bss section, out
of the extra if-block.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-8-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When inspecting __kexec_load_purgatory you find that it has two tasks

	1) setting up the kexec_buffer for the new kernel and,
	2) setting up pi->sechdrs for the final load address.

The two tasks are independent of each other.  To improve readability
split up __kexec_load_purgatory into two functions, one for each task,
and call them directly from kexec_load_purgatory.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-7-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When the relocations are applied to the purgatory only the section the
relocations are applied to is writable.  The other sections, i.e.  the
symtab and .rel/.rela, are in read-only kexec_purgatory.  Highlight this
by marking the corresponding variables as 'const'.

While at it also change the signatures of arch_kexec_apply_relocations* to
take section pointers instead of just the index of the relocation section.
This removes the second lookup and sanity check of the sections in arch
code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-6-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The stripped purgatory does not contain a symtab.  So when looking for
symbols this is done in read-only kexec_purgatory.  Highlight this by
marking the corresponding variables as 'const'.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-5-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The kexec_purgatory buffer is read-only.  Thus all pointers into
kexec_purgatory are read-only, too.  Point this out by explicitly
marking purgatory_info->ehdr as 'const' and update the comments in
purgatory_info.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-4-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>