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  1. 02 4月, 2015 2 次提交
  3. 25 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 24 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 23 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 20 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      Revert "x86/PCI: Refine the way to release PCI IRQ resources" · 9e8ce4b9
      由 Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于 
      Commit b4b55cda (Refine the way to release PCI IRQ resources)
introduced a regression in the PCI IRQ resource management by causing
the IRQ resource of a device, established when pci_enabled_device()
is called on a fully disabled device, to be released when the driver
is unbound from the device, regardless of the enable_cnt.

This leads to the situation that an ill-behaved driver can now make a
device unusable to subsequent drivers by an imbalance in their use of
pci_enable/disable_device().  That is a serious problem for secondary
drivers like vfio-pci, which are innocent of the transgressions of
the previous driver.

Since the solution of this problem is not immediate and requires
further discussion, revert commit b4b55cda and the issue it was
supposed to address (a bug related to xen-pciback) will be taken
care of in a different way going forward.
Reported-by: NAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      9e8ce4b9
  11. 18 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 16 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • B
      Revert "x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation" · 69797daf
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      This reverts commit:

  f47233c2 ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation")

The main reason for the revert is that the new boot flag does not work
at all currently, and in order to make this work, we need non-trivial
changes to the x86 boot code which we didn't manage to get done in
time for merging.

And even if we did, they would've been too risky so instead of
rushing things and break booting 4.1 on boxes left and right, we
will be very strict and conservative and will take our time with
this to fix and test it properly.
Reported-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Junjie Mao <eternal.n08@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150316100628.GD22995@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      69797daf
  15. 13 3月, 2015 5 次提交
    • W
      KVM: VMX: Set msr bitmap correctly if vcpu is in guest mode · 670125bd
      由 Wincy Van 提交于 
      In commit 3af18d9c ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare for using hardware MSR bitmap"),
we are setting MSR_BITMAP in prepare_vmcs02 if we should use hardware. This
is not enough since the field will be modified by following vmx_set_efer.

Fix this by setting vmx_msr_bitmap_nested in vmx_set_msr_bitmap if vcpu is
in guest mode.
Signed-off-by: NWincy Van <fanwenyi0529@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      670125bd
    • O
      x86/fpu: Drop_fpu() should not assume that tsk equals current · f4c36863
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      drop_fpu() does clear_used_math() and usually this is correct
because tsk == current.

However switch_fpu_finish()->restore_fpu_checking() is called before
__switch_to() updates the "current_task" variable. If it fails,
we will wrongly clear the PF_USED_MATH flag of the previous task.

So use clear_stopped_child_used_math() instead.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150309171041.GB11388@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f4c36863
    • O
      x86/fpu: Avoid math_state_restore() without used_math() in __restore_xstate_sig() · a7c80ebc
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      math_state_restore() assumes it is called with irqs disabled,
but this is not true if the caller is __restore_xstate_sig().

This means that if ia32_fxstate == T and __copy_from_user()
fails, __restore_xstate_sig() returns with irqs disabled too.

This triggers:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:41
   dump_stack
   ___might_sleep
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   __might_sleep
   down_read
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   print_vma_addr
   signal_fault
   sys32_rt_sigreturn

Change __restore_xstate_sig() to call set_used_math()
unconditionally. This avoids enabling and disabling interrupts
in math_state_restore(). If copy_from_user() fails, we can
simply do fpu_finit() by hand.

[ Note: this is only the first step. math_state_restore() should
        not check used_math(), it should set this flag. While
	init_fpu() should simply die. ]
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150307153844.GB25954@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      a7c80ebc
    • S
      crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption · ccfe8c3f
      由 Stephan Mueller 提交于 
      The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.

The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.

In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.

Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.

Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.

[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html

CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      ccfe8c3f
    • P
      kvm: x86: i8259: return initialized data on invalid-size read · c1a6bff2
      由 Petr Matousek 提交于 
      If data is read from PIC with invalid access size, the return data stays
uninitialized even though success is returned.

Fix this by always initializing the data.
Signed-off-by: NPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NNadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      c1a6bff2
  17. 12 3月, 2015 2 次提交
  19. 11 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 10 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 06 3月, 2015 3 次提交
  25. 05 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 04 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  29. 03 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      KVM: SVM: fix interrupt injection (apic->isr_count always 0) · f563db4b
      由 Radim Krčmář 提交于 
      In commit b4eef9b3, we started to use hwapic_isr_update() != NULL
instead of kvm_apic_vid_enabled(vcpu->kvm).  This didn't work because
SVM had it defined and "apicv" path in apic_{set,clear}_isr() does not
change apic->isr_count, because it should always be 1.  The initial
value of apic->isr_count was based on kvm_apic_vid_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
which is always 0 for SVM, so KVM could have injected interrupts when it
shouldn't.

Fix it by implicitly setting SVM's hwapic_isr_update to NULL and make the
initial isr_count depend on hwapic_isr_update() for good measure.

Fixes: b4eef9b3 ("kvm: x86: vmx: NULL out hwapic_isr_update() in case of !enable_apicv")
Reported-and-tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      f563db4b
  31. 28 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  33. 27 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  35. 24 2月, 2015 6 次提交
  37. 22 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  39. 21 2月, 2015 2 次提交
    • P
      kprobes/x86: Check for invalid ftrace location in __recover_probed_insn() · 2a6730c8
      由 Petr Mladek 提交于 
      __recover_probed_insn() should always be called from an address
where an instructions starts. The check for ftrace_location()
might help to discover a potential inconsistency.

This patch adds WARN_ON() when the inconsistency is detected.
Also it adds handling of the situation when the original code
can not get recovered.
Suggested-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>
Cc: Ananth NMavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1424441250-27146-3-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.czSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      2a6730c8
    • P
      kprobes/x86: Use 5-byte NOP when the code might be modified by ftrace · 650b7b23
      由 Petr Mladek 提交于 
      can_probe() checks if the given address points to the beginning
of an instruction. It analyzes all the instructions from the
beginning of the function until the given address. The code
might be modified by another Kprobe. In this case, the current
code is read into a buffer, int3 breakpoint is replaced by the
saved opcode in the buffer, and can_probe() analyzes the buffer
instead.

There is a bug that __recover_probed_insn() tries to restore
the original code even for Kprobes using the ftrace framework.
But in this case, the opcode is not stored. See the difference
between arch_prepare_kprobe() and arch_prepare_kprobe_ftrace().
The opcode is stored by arch_copy_kprobe() only from
arch_prepare_kprobe().

This patch makes Kprobe to use the ideal 5-byte NOP when the
code can be modified by ftrace. It is the original instruction,
see ftrace_make_nop() and ftrace_nop_replace().

Note that we always need to use the NOP for ftrace locations.
Kprobes do not block ftrace and the instruction might get
modified at anytime. It might even be in an inconsistent state
because it is modified step by step using the int3 breakpoint.

The patch also fixes indentation of the touched comment.

Note that I found this problem when playing with Kprobes. I did
it on x86_64 with gcc-4.8.3 that supported -mfentry. I modified
samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c and added offset 5 to put
the probe right after the fentry area:

 static struct kprobe kp = {
 	.symbol_name	= "do_fork",
+	.offset = 5,
 };

Then I was able to load kprobe_example before jprobe_example
but not the other way around:

  $> modprobe jprobe_example
  $> modprobe kprobe_example
  modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kprobe_example': Invalid or incomplete multibyte or wide character

It did not make much sense and debugging pointed to the bug
described above.
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Ananth NMavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1424441250-27146-2-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.czSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      650b7b23
  41. 20 2月, 2015 2 次提交
  43. 19 2月, 2015 4 次提交
    • Q
      x86/microcode/intel: Handle truncated microcode images more robustly · 35a9ff4e
      由 Quentin Casasnovas 提交于 
      We do not check the input data bounds containing the microcode before
copying a struct microcode_intel_header from it. A specially crafted
microcode could cause the kernel to read invalid memory and lead to a
denial-of-service.
Signed-off-by: NQuentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-3-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
[ Made error message differ from the next one and flipped comparison. ]
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      35a9ff4e
    • Q
      x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader · f84598bd
      由 Quentin Casasnovas 提交于 
      mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: NQuentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      f84598bd
    • H
      x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems · 4e7c22d4
      由 Hector Marco-Gisbert 提交于 
      The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.

The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":

  static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
  {
           unsigned int random_variable = 0;

           if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
                   !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
                   random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
                   random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
           }
           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
  }

Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):

	  random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;

then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.

These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).

This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().

The successful fix can be tested with:

  $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
  7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
  ...

Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: NHector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: NIsmael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.netSigned-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      4e7c22d4
    • D
      x86/mm/init: Fix incorrect page size in init_memory_mapping() printks · f15e0518
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      With 32-bit non-PAE kernels, we have 2 page sizes available
(at most): 4k and 4M.

Enabling PAE replaces that 4M size with a 2M one (which 64-bit
systems use too).

But, when booting a 32-bit non-PAE kernel, in one of our
early-boot printouts, we say:

  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff]
   [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff] page 4k
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff]
   [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff] page 2M
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00100000-0x36ffffff]
   [mem 0x00100000-0x003fffff] page 4k
   [mem 0x00400000-0x36ffffff] page 2M
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff]
   [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff] page 4k

Which is obviously wrong.  There is no 2M page available.  This
is probably because of a badly-named variable: in the map_range
code: PG_LEVEL_2M.

Instead of renaming all the PG_LEVEL_2M's.  This patch just
fixes the printout:

  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff]
   [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff] page 4k
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff]
   [mem 0x37000000-0x373fffff] page 4M
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00100000-0x36ffffff]
   [mem 0x00100000-0x003fffff] page 4k
   [mem 0x00400000-0x36ffffff] page 4M
  init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff]
   [mem 0x37400000-0x377fdfff] page 4k
  BRK [0x03206000, 0x03206fff] PGTABLE
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150210212030.665EC267@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      f15e0518