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  1. 12 10月, 2015 2 次提交
  3. 01 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      arm64/efi: Fix boot crash by not padding between EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME regions · 0ce3cc00
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      The new Properties Table feature introduced in UEFIv2.5 may
split memory regions that cover PE/COFF memory images into
separate code and data regions. Since these regions only differ
in the type (runtime code vs runtime data) and the permission
bits, but not in the memory type attributes (UC/WC/WT/WB), the
spec does not require them to be aligned to 64 KB.

Since the relative offset of PE/COFF .text and .data segments
cannot be changed on the fly, this means that we can no longer
pad out those regions to be mappable using 64 KB pages.
Unfortunately, there is no annotation in the UEFI memory map
that identifies data regions that were split off from a code
region, so we must apply this logic to all adjacent runtime
regions whose attributes only differ in the permission bits.

So instead of rounding each memory region to 64 KB alignment at
both ends, only round down regions that are not directly
preceded by another runtime region with the same type
attributes. Since the UEFI spec does not mandate that the memory
map be sorted, this means we also need to sort it first.

Note that this change will result in all EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
regions whose start addresses are not aligned to the OS page
size to be mapped with executable permissions (i.e., on kernels
compiled with 64 KB pages). However, since these mappings are
only active during the time that UEFI Runtime Services are being
invoked, the window for abuse is rather small.
Tested-by: NMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [UEFI 2.4 only]
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.0+
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-3-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0ce3cc00
  5. 23 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86, efi, kasan: #undef memset/memcpy/memmove per arch · 769a8089
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      In not-instrumented code KASAN replaces instrumented memset/memcpy/memmove
with not-instrumented analogues __memset/__memcpy/__memove.

However, on x86 the EFI stub is not linked with the kernel.  It uses
not-instrumented mem*() functions from arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c

So we don't replace them with __mem*() variants in EFI stub.

On ARM64 the EFI stub is linked with the kernel, so we should replace
mem*() functions with __mem*(), because the EFI stub runs before KASAN
sets up early shadow.

So let's move these #undef mem* into arch's asm/efi.h which is also
included by the EFI stub.

Also, this will fix the warning in 32-bit build reported by kbuild test
robot:

	efi-stub-helper.c:599:2: warning: implicit declaration of function 'memcpy'

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use 80 cols in comment]
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      769a8089
  7. 11 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      kexec: split kexec_load syscall from kexec core code · 2965faa5
      由 Dave Young 提交于 
      There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2965faa5
  9. 31 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      efi: Check for NULL efi kernel parameters · 9115c758
      由 Ricardo Neri 提交于 
      Even though it is documented how to specifiy efi parameters, it is
possible to cause a kernel panic due to a dereference of a NULL pointer when
parsing such parameters if "efi" alone is given:

PANIC: early exception 0e rip 10:ffffffff812fb361 error 0 cr2 0
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.2.0-rc1+ #450
[ 0.000000]  ffffffff81fe20a9 ffffffff81e03d50 ffffffff8184bb0f 00000000000003f8
[ 0.000000]  0000000000000000 ffffffff81e03e08 ffffffff81f371a1 64656c62616e6520
[ 0.000000]  0000000000000069 000000000000005f 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] Call Trace:
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff8184bb0f>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f371a1>] early_idt_handler_common+0x81/0xae
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff812fb361>] ? parse_option_str+0x11/0x90
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f4dd69>] arch_parse_efi_cmdline+0x15/0x42
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f376e1>] do_early_param+0x50/0x8a
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff8106b1b3>] parse_args+0x1e3/0x400
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37a43>] parse_early_options+0x24/0x28
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37691>] ? loglevel+0x31/0x31
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37a78>] parse_early_param+0x31/0x3d
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f3ae98>] setup_arch+0x2de/0xc08
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff8109629a>] ? vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37b20>] start_kernel+0x90/0x423
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[ 0.000000]  [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef
[ 0.000000] RIP 0xffffffff81ba2efc

This panic is not reproducible with "efi=" as this will result in a non-NULL
zero-length string.

Thus, verify that the pointer to the parameter string is not NULL. This is
consistent with other parameter-parsing functions which check for NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: NRicardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      9115c758
  11. 15 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • L
      efi: Handle memory error structures produced based on old versions of standard · 4c62360d
      由 Luck, Tony 提交于 
      The memory error record structure includes as its first field a
bitmask of which subsequent fields are valid. The allows new fields
to be added to the structure while keeping compatibility with older
software that parses these records. This mechanism was used between
versions 2.2 and 2.3 to add four new fields, growing the size of the
structure from 73 bytes to 80. But Linux just added all the new
fields so this test:
	if (gdata->error_data_length >= sizeof(*mem_err))
		cper_print_mem(newpfx, mem_err);
	else
		goto err_section_too_small;
now make Linux complain about old format records being too short.

Add a definition for the old format of the structure and use that
for the minimum size check. Pass the actual size to cper_print_mem()
so it can sanity check the validation_bits field to ensure that if
a BIOS using the old format sets bits as if it were new, we won't
access fields beyond the end of the structure.
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      4c62360d
  13. 01 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 08 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • P
      efi: Work around ia64 build problem with ESRT driver · 3846c158
      由 Peter Jones 提交于 
      So, I'm told this problem exists in the world:

 > Subject: Build error in -next due to 'efi: Add esrt support'
 >
 > Building ia64:defconfig ... failed
 > --------------
 > Error log:
 >
 > drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c:28:31: fatal error: asm/early_ioremap.h: No such file or directory
 >

I'm not really sure how it's okay that we have things in asm-generic on
some platforms but not others - is having it the same everywhere not the
whole point of asm-generic?

That said, ia64 doesn't have early_ioremap.h .  So instead, since it's
difficult to imagine new IA64 machines with UEFI 2.5, just don't build
this code there.

To me this looks like a workaround - doing something like:

generic-y += early_ioremap.h

in arch/ia64/include/asm/Kbuild would appear to be more correct, but
ia64 has its own early_memremap() decl in arch/ia64/include/asm/io.h ,
and it's a macro.  So adding the above /and/ requiring that asm/io.h be
included /after/ asm/early_ioremap.h in all cases would fix it, but
that's pretty ugly as well.  Since I'm not going to spend the rest of my
life rectifying ia64 headers vs "generic" headers that aren't generic,
it's much simpler to just not build there.

Note that I've only actually tried to build this patch on x86_64, but
esrt.o still gets built there, and that would seem to demonstrate that
the conditional building is working correctly at all the places the code
built before.  I no longer have any ia64 machines handy to test that the
exclusion actually works there.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
(Compile-)Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      3846c158
  17. 05 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 06 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 05 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 01 5月, 2015 3 次提交
  25. 01 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 25 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • Y
      efi/libstub: Fix boundary checking in efi_high_alloc() · 7ed620bb
      由 Yinghai Lu 提交于 
      While adding support loading kernel and initrd above 4G to grub2 in legacy
mode, I was referring to efi_high_alloc().
That will allocate buffer for kernel and then initrd, and initrd will
use kernel buffer start as limit.

During testing found two buffers will be overlapped when initrd size is
very big like 400M.

It turns out efi_high_alloc() boundary checking is not right.
end - size will be the new start, and should not compare new
start with max, we need to make sure end is smaller than max.

[ Basically, with the current efi_high_alloc() code it's possible to
  allocate memory above 'max', because efi_high_alloc() doesn't check
  that the tail of the allocation is below 'max'.

  If you have an EFI memory map with a single entry that looks like so,

   [0xc0000000-0xc0004000]

  And want to allocate 0x3000 bytes below 0xc0003000 the current code
  will allocate [0xc0001000-0xc0004000], not [0xc0000000-0xc0003000]
  like you would expect. - Matt ]
Signed-off-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      7ed620bb
  29. 18 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes" · 43a9f696
      由 Matt Fleming 提交于 
      This reverts commit d1a8d66b.

Ard reported a boot failure when running UEFI under Qemu and Xen and
experimenting with various Tianocore build options,

 "As it turns out, when allocating room for the UEFI memory map using
  UEFI's AllocatePool (), it may result in two new memory map entries
  being created, for instance, when using Tianocore's preallocated region
  feature. For example, the following region

  0x00005ead5000-0x00005ebfffff [Conventional Memory|   |  |  |  |  |WB|WT|WC|UC]

  may be split like this

  0x00005ead5000-0x00005eae2fff [Conventional Memory|   |  |  |  |  |WB|WT|WC|UC]
  0x00005eae3000-0x00005eae4fff [Loader Data        |   |  |  |  |  |WB|WT|WC|UC]
  0x00005eae5000-0x00005ebfffff [Conventional Memory|   |  |  |  |  |WB|WT|WC|UC]

  if the preallocated Loader Data region was chosen to be right in the
  middle of the original free space.

  After patch d1a8d66b ("efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to
  obtain map and desc sizes"), this is not being dealt with correctly
  anymore, as the existing logic to allocate room for a single additional
  entry has become insufficient."

Mark requested to reinstate the old loop we had before commit
d1a8d66b, which grows the memory map buffer until it's big enough to
hold the EFI memory map.
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      43a9f696
  31. 14 2月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      x86_64: kasan: add interceptors for memset/memmove/memcpy functions · 393f203f
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Recently instrumentation of builtin functions calls was removed from GCC
5.0.  To check the memory accessed by such functions, userspace asan
always uses interceptors for them.

So now we should do this as well.  This patch declares
memset/memmove/memcpy as weak symbols.  In mm/kasan/kasan.c we have our
own implementation of those functions which checks memory before accessing
it.

Default memset/memmove/memcpy now now always have aliases with '__'
prefix.  For files that built without kasan instrumentation (e.g.
mm/slub.c) original mem* replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants,
cause we don't want to check memory accesses there.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      393f203f
    • A
      kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure · 0b24becc
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0b24becc
  33. 21 1月, 2015 3 次提交
  35. 20 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  37. 16 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      arm64/efi: efistub: Apply __init annotation · ddeeefe2
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      This ensures all stub component are freed when the kernel proper is
done booting, by prefixing the names of all ELF sections that have
the SHF_ALLOC attribute with ".init". This approach ensures that even
implicitly emitted allocated data (like initializer values and string
literals) are covered.

At the same time, remove some __init annotations in the stub that have
now become redundant, and add the __init annotation to handle_kernel_image
which will now trigger a section mismatch warning without it.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      ddeeefe2
  39. 13 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      arm64/efi: move SetVirtualAddressMap() to UEFI stub · f3cdfd23
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      In order to support kexec, the kernel needs to be able to deal with the
state of the UEFI firmware after SetVirtualAddressMap() has been called.
To avoid having separate code paths for non-kexec and kexec, let's move
the call to SetVirtualAddressMap() to the stub: this will guarantee us
that it will only be called once (since the stub is not executed during
kexec), and ensures that the UEFI state is identical between kexec and
normal boot.

This implies that the layout of the virtual mapping needs to be created
by the stub as well. All regions are rounded up to a naturally aligned
multiple of 64 KB (for compatibility with 64k pages kernels) and recorded
in the UEFI memory map. The kernel proper reads those values and installs
the mappings in a dedicated set of page tables that are swapped in during
UEFI Runtime Services calls.
Acked-by: NLeif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Tested-by: NLeif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      f3cdfd23
  41. 12 1月, 2015 3 次提交
  43. 08 1月, 2015 2 次提交
  45. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  47. 12 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/x86: Move x86 back to libstub · 243b6754
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      This reverts commit 84be8805, which itself reverted my original
attempt to move x86 from #include'ing .c files from across the tree
to using the EFI stub built as a static library.

The issue that affected the original approach was that splitting
the implementation into several .o files resulted in the variable
'efi_early' becoming a global with external linkage, which under
-fPIC implies that references to it must go through the GOT. However,
dealing with this additional GOT entry turned out to be troublesome
on some EFI implementations. (GCC's visibility=hidden attribute is
supposed to lift this requirement, but it turned out not to work on
the 32-bit build.)

Instead, use a pure getter function to get a reference to efi_early.
This approach results in no additional GOT entries being generated,
so there is no need for any changes in the early GOT handling.
Tested-by: NMaarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      243b6754
  49. 05 11月, 2014 2 次提交
  51. 04 10月, 2014 5 次提交
    • M
      efi: Delete the in_nmi() conditional runtime locking · 60b4dc77
      由 Matt Fleming 提交于 
      commit 5dc3826d9f08 ("efi: Implement mandatory locking for UEFI Runtime
Services") implemented some conditional locking when accessing variable
runtime services that Ingo described as "pretty disgusting".

The intention with the !efi_in_nmi() checks was to avoid live-locks when
trying to write pstore crash data into an EFI variable. Such lockless
accesses are allowed according to the UEFI specification when we're in a
"non-recoverable" state, but whether or not things are implemented
correctly in actual firmware implementations remains an unanswered
question, and so it would seem sensible to avoid doing any kind of
unsynchronized variable accesses.

Furthermore, the efi_in_nmi() tests are inadequate because they don't
account for the case where we call EFI variable services from panic or
oops callbacks and aren't executing in NMI context. In other words,
live-locking is still possible.

Let's just remove the conditional locking altogether. Now we've got the
->set_variable_nonblocking() EFI variable operation we can abort if the
runtime lock is already held. Aborting is by far the safest option.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      60b4dc77
    • M
      efi: Provide a non-blocking SetVariable() operation · 6d80dba1
      由 Matt Fleming 提交于 
      There are some circumstances that call for trying to write an EFI
variable in a non-blocking way. One such scenario is when writing pstore
data in efi_pstore_write() via the pstore_dump() kdump callback.

Now that we have an EFI runtime spinlock we need a way of aborting if
there is contention instead of spinning, since when writing pstore data
from the kdump callback, the runtime lock may already be held by the CPU
that's running the callback if we crashed in the middle of an EFI
variable operation.

The situation is sufficiently special that a new EFI variable operation
is warranted.

Introduce ->set_variable_nonblocking() for this use case. It is an
optional EFI backend operation, and need only be implemented by those
backends that usually acquire locks to serialize access to EFI
variables, as is the case for virt_efi_set_variable() where we now grab
the EFI runtime spinlock.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      6d80dba1
    • M
      efi: Resolve some shadow warnings · b2fce819
      由 Mark Rustad 提交于 
      It is a really bad idea to declare variables or parameters that
have the same name as common types. It is valid C, but it gets
surprising if a macro expansion attempts to declare an inner
local with that type. Change the local names to eliminate the
hazard.

Change s16 => str16, s8 => str8.

This resolves warnings seen when using W=2 during make, for instance:

drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c: In function ‘dup_variable_bug’:
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c:324:44: warning: declaration of ‘s16’ shadows a global declaration [-Wshadow]
 static void dup_variable_bug(efi_char16_t *s16, efi_guid_t *vendor_guid,

drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c:328:8: warning: declaration of ‘s8’ shadows a global declaration [-Wshadow]
  char *s8;
Signed-off-by: NMark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      b2fce819
    • L
      efi: Introduce efi_md_typeattr_format() · 98d2a6ca
      由 Laszlo Ersek 提交于 
      At the moment, there are three architectures debug-printing the EFI memory
map at initialization: x86, ia64, and arm64. They all use different format
strings, plus the EFI memory type and the EFI memory attributes are
similarly hard to decode for a human reader.

Introduce a helper __init function that formats the memory type and the
memory attributes in a unified way, to a user-provided character buffer.

The array "memory_type_name" is copied from the arm64 code, temporarily
duplicating it. The (otherwise optional) braces around each string literal
in the initializer list are dropped in order to match the kernel coding
style more closely. The element size is tightened from 32 to 20 bytes
(maximum actual string length + 1) so that we can derive the field width
from the element size.
Signed-off-by: NLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
[ Dropped useless 'register' keyword, which compiler will ignore ]
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      98d2a6ca
    • D
      efi: Add kernel param efi=noruntime · 5ae3683c
      由 Dave Young 提交于 
      noefi kernel param means actually disabling efi runtime, Per suggestion
from Leif Lindholm efi=noruntime should be better. But since noefi is
already used in X86 thus just adding another param efi=noruntime for
same purpose.
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      5ae3683c