When converting a pfn to a physical address be sure to use 64 bit
wide types or convert the physical address to a pfn if possible.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

If the non-RAM regions in the e820 memory map are larger than the size
of the initial balloon, a BUG was triggered as the frames are remaped
beyond the limit of the linear p2m.  The frames are remapped into the
initial balloon area (xen_extra_mem) but not enough of this is
available.

Ensure enough extra memory regions are added for these remapped
frames.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

This accounting is just used to print a diagnostic message that isn't
very useful.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Commit 5b8e7d80 removed the __init
annotation from xen_set_identity_and_remap_chunk(). Add it again.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

When the physical memory configuration is initialized the p2m entries
for not pouplated memory pages are set to "invalid". As those pages
are beyond the hypervisor built p2m list the p2m tree has to be
extended.

This patch delays processing the extra memory related p2m entries
during the boot process until some more basic memory management
functions are callable. This removes the need to create new p2m
entries until virtual memory management is available.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

Early in the boot process the memory layout of a pv-domain is changed
to match the E820 map (either the host one for Dom0 or the Xen one)
regarding placement of RAM and PCI holes. This requires removing memory
pages initially located at positions not suitable for RAM and adding
them later at higher addresses where no restrictions apply.

To be able to operate on the hypervisor supported p2m list until a
virtual mapped linear p2m list can be constructed, remapping must
be delayed until virtual memory management is initialized, as the
initial p2m list can't be extended unlimited at physical memory
initialization time due to it's fixed structure.

A further advantage is the reduction in complexity and code volume as
we don't have to be careful regarding memory restrictions during p2m
updates.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

Panic if Xen provides a memory map with 0 entries. Although this is
unlikely, it is better to catch the error at the point of seeing the map
than later on as a symptom of some other crash.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Kelly <martkell@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

Instead of ballooning up and down dom0 memory this remaps the existing mfns
that were replaced by the identity map. The reason for this is that the
existing implementation ballooned memory up and and down which caused dom0
to have discontiguous pages. In some cases this resulted in the use of bounce
buffers which reduced network I/O performance significantly. This change will
honor the existing order of the pages with the exception of some boundary
conditions.

To do this we need to update both the Linux p2m table and the Xen m2p table.
Particular care must be taken when updating the p2m table since it's important
to limit table memory consumption and reuse the existing leaf pages which get
freed when an entire leaf page is set to the identity map. To implement this,
mapping updates are grouped into blocks with table entries getting cached
temporarily and then released.

On my test system before:
Total pages: 2105014
Total contiguous: 1640635

After:
Total pages: 2105014
Total contiguous: 2098904
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Rushton <mrushton@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

Remove xen_enable_nmi() to fix a 64-bit guest crash when registering
the NMI callback on Xen 3.1 and earlier.

It's not needed since the NMI callback is set by a set_trap_table
hypercall (in xen_load_idt() or xen_write_idt_entry()).

It's also broken since it only set the current VCPU's callback.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reported-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>

This reverts commit 9103bb0f.

Now than xen_memory_setup() is not called for auto-translated guests,
we can remove this commit.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Tested-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

Since af06d66ee32b (x86: fix setup of PVH Dom0 memory map) in Xen, PVH
dom0 need only use the memory memory provided by Xen which has already
setup all the correct holes.

xen_memory_setup() then ends up being trivial for a PVH guest so
introduce a new function (xen_auto_xlated_memory_setup()).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Tested-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

PCI devices may have BARs located above the end of RAM so mark such
frames as identity frames in the p2m (instead of the default of
missing).

PFNs outside the p2m (above MAX_P2M_PFN) are also considered to be
identity frames for the same reason.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

In xen_add_extra_mem(), if the WARN() checks for bad MFNs trigger it is
likely that they will trigger at lot, spamming the log.

Use WARN_ONCE() instead.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

Currently, vdso.so files are prepared and analyzed by a combination
of objcopy, nm, some linker script tricks, and some simple ELF
parsers in the kernel.  Replace all of that with plain C code that
runs at build time.

All five vdso images now generate .c files that are compiled and
linked in to the kernel image.

This should cause only one userspace-visible change: the loaded vDSO
images are stripped more heavily than they used to be.  Everything
outside the loadable segment is dropped.  In particular, this causes
the section table and section name strings to be missing.  This
should be fine: real dynamic loaders don't load or inspect these
tables anyway.  The result is roughly equivalent to eu-strip's
--strip-sections option.

The purpose of this change is to enable the vvar and hpet mappings
to be moved to the page following the vDSO load segment.  Currently,
it is possible for the section table to extend into the page after
the load segment, so, if we map it, it risks overlapping the vvar or
hpet page.  This happens whenever the load segment is just under a
multiple of PAGE_SIZE.

The only real subtlety here is that the old code had a C file with
inline assembler that did 'call VDSO32_vsyscall' and a linker script
that defined 'VDSO32_vsyscall = __kernel_vsyscall'.  This most
likely worked by accident: the linker script entry defines a symbol
associated with an address as opposed to an alias for the real
dynamic symbol __kernel_vsyscall.  That caused ld to relocate the
reference at link time instead of leaving an interposable dynamic
relocation.  Since the VDSO32_vsyscall hack is no longer needed, I
now use 'call __kernel_vsyscall', and I added -Bsymbolic to make it
work.  vdso2c will generate an error and abort the build if the
resulting image contains any dynamic relocations, so we won't
silently generate bad vdso images.

(Dynamic relocations are a problem because nothing will even attempt
to relocate the vdso.)
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c4fcf45524162a34d87fdda1eb046b2a5cecee7.1399317206.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

LTO requires consistent types of symbols over all files.

So "nmi" cannot be declared as a char [] here, need to use the
correct function type.

Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1382458079-24450-8-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.orgSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed
by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need
to be repopulated.
Signed-off-by: NMukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: NStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>

We don't use the filtering that 'xen_cpuid' is doing
because the hypervisor treats 'XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX' as
an invalid instruction. This means that all of the filtering
will have to be done in the hypervisor/toolstack.

Without the filtering we expose to the guest the:

 - cpu topology (sockets, cores, etc);
 - the APERF (which the generic scheduler likes to
    use), see  5e626254
    "xen/setup: filter APERFMPERF cpuid feature out"
 - and the inability to figure out whether MWAIT_LEAF
   should be exposed or not. See
   df88b2d9
   "xen/enlighten: Disable MWAIT_LEAF so that acpi-pad won't be loaded."
 - x2apic, see  4ea9b9ac
   "xen: mask x2APIC feature in PV"

We also check for vector callback early on, as it is a required
feature. PVH also runs at default kernel IOPL.

Finally, pure PV settings are moved to a separate function that are
only called for pure PV, ie, pv with pvmmu. They are also #ifdef
with CONFIG_XEN_PVMMU.
Signed-off-by: NMukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>

commit 6efa20e4
("xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs") and
commit cd9151e2
( "xen/balloon: set a mapping for ballooned out pages")
added new instances of __cpuinit usage.

We removed this a couple versions ago; we now want to remove
the compat no-op stubs.  Introducing new users is not what
we want to see at this point in time, as it will break once
the stubs are gone.

Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

During early setup, when the reserved regions and MMIO holes are being
setup as 1:1 in the p2m, clear any mappings instead of making them 1:1
(execept for the ISA region which is expected to be mapped).

This fixes a regression introduced in 3.5 by 83d51ab4 (xen/setup:
update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup) which caused
hosts with tboot to fail to boot.

tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel
would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable
regions to be mapped by guests.

(XEN)  0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved)
(XEN)  0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable)

tboot marked this region as unusable.

(XEN)  0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable)
(XEN)  00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data)
(XEN)  00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable)
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will
attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel
will crash.

There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0
kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and
treat it as RAM.

We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up.
A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map
and would need to be handled in another patch.

This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot.

tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel
would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable
regions to be mapped by guests.

  (XEN)  0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable)

tboot marked this region as unusable.

  (XEN)  0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable)
  (XEN)  00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data)
  (XEN)  00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable)
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which
was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the
logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface
in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME -
pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN -
pv_cpu_ops.iret).

That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use
the hypervisor iret.

The other changes that would be neccessary for this would
be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the
ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different
events.

Fortunately for us commit 1db01b49
(xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback
on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right
vector value for NMI.

With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested
x86_64).

For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain)
we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are
already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that
to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking
of X86_FEATURE_APIC.

Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within
a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround.

Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch
does not enable that.

CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com>
CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
[v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments]
Reviewed-by: NBen Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense
some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings
do not offset the cost and complications.  For example, the fix in
commit 5e427ec2 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time")
is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created
with improper use of the various __init prefixes.

After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go
the way of devinit and be phased out.  Once all the users are gone,
we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h.

Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since
notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c)
are flagged as __cpuinit  -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from
arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings.
As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit
content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid
of these warnings.  In any case, they are temporary and harmless.

This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from
all C files.  x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files,
and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can
delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

Remove 32-bit x86 a cmdline param "no-hlt",
and the cpuinfo_x86.hlt_works_ok that it sets.

If a user wants to avoid HLT, then "idle=poll"
is much more useful, as it avoids invocation of HLT
in idle, while "no-hlt" failed to do so.

Indeed, hlt_works_ok was consulted in only 3 places.

First, in /proc/cpuinfo where "hlt_bug yes"
would be printed if and only if the user booted
the system with "no-hlt" -- as there was no other code
to set that flag.

Second, check_hlt() would not invoke halt() if "no-hlt"
were on the cmdline.

Third, it was consulted in stop_this_cpu(), which is invoked
by native_machine_halt()/reboot_interrupt()/smp_stop_nmi_callback() --
all cases where the machine is being shutdown/reset.
The flag was not consulted in the more frequently invoked
play_dead()/hlt_play_dead() used in processor offline and suspend.

Since Linux-3.0 there has been a run-time notice upon "no-hlt" invocations
indicating that it would be removed in 2012.
Signed-off-by: NLen Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org

This macro is only invoked by Xen,
so make its definition specific to Xen.

> set_pm_idle_to_default()
< xen_set_default_idle()
Signed-off-by: NLen Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com

The hypervisor is in charge of allocating the proper "NUMA" memory
and dealing with the CPU scheduler to keep them bound to the proper
NUMA node. The PV guests (and PVHVM) have no inkling of where they
run and do not need to know that right now. In the future we will
need to inject NUMA configuration data (if a guest spans two or more
NUMA nodes) so that the kernel can make the right choices. But those
patches are not yet present.

In the meantime, disable the NUMA capability in the PV guest, which
also fixes a bootup issue. Andre says:

"we see Dom0 crashes due to the kernel detecting the NUMA topology not
by ACPI, but directly from the northbridge (CONFIG_AMD_NUMA).

This will detect the actual NUMA config of the physical machine, but
will crash about the mismatch with Dom0's virtual memory. Variation of
the theme: Dom0 sees what it's not supposed to see.

This happens with the said config option enabled and on a machine where
this scanning is still enabled (K8 and Fam10h, not Bulldozer class)

We have this dump then:
NUMA: Warning: node ids are out of bound, from=-1 to=-1 distance=10
Scanning NUMA topology in Northbridge 24
Number of physical nodes 4
Node 0 MemBase 0000000000000000 Limit 0000000040000000
Node 1 MemBase 0000000040000000 Limit 0000000138000000
Node 2 MemBase 0000000138000000 Limit 00000001f8000000
Node 3 MemBase 00000001f8000000 Limit 0000000238000000
Initmem setup node 0 0000000000000000-0000000040000000
  NODE_DATA [000000003ffd9000 - 000000003fffffff]
Initmem setup node 1 0000000040000000-0000000138000000
  NODE_DATA [0000000137fd9000 - 0000000137ffffff]
Initmem setup node 2 0000000138000000-00000001f8000000
  NODE_DATA [00000001f095e000 - 00000001f0984fff]
Initmem setup node 3 00000001f8000000-0000000238000000
Cannot find 159744 bytes in node 3
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.3.6 #1 AMD Dinar/Dinar
RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81d220e6>]  [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96
.. snip..
  [<ffffffff81d23024>] sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x64/0x178
  [<ffffffff81d23348>] sparse_init+0xe4/0x25a
  [<ffffffff81d16840>] paging_init+0x13/0x22
  [<ffffffff81d07fbb>] setup_arch+0x9c6/0xa9b
  [<ffffffff81683954>] ? printk+0x3c/0x3e
  [<ffffffff81d01a38>] start_kernel+0xe5/0x468
  [<ffffffff81d012cf>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1
  [<ffffffff81007153>] ? xen_setup_runstate_info+0x2c/0x36
  [<ffffffff81d050ee>] xen_start_kernel+0x565/0x56c
"

so we just disable NUMA scanning by setting numa_off=1.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com>
Acked-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

Revert "xen/x86: Workaround 64-bit hypervisor and 32-bit initial domain." and "xen/x86: Use memblock_reserve for sensitive areas."

This reverts commit 806c312e and
commit 59b29440.

And also documents setup.c and why we want to do it that way, which
is that we tried to make the the memblock_reserve more selective so
that it would be clear what region is reserved. Sadly we ran
in the problem wherein on a 64-bit hypervisor with a 32-bit
initial domain, the pt_base has the cr3 value which is not
neccessarily where the pagetable starts! As Jan put it: "
Actually, the adjustment turns out to be correct: The page
tables for a 32-on-64 dom0 get allocated in the order "first L1",
"first L2", "first L3", so the offset to the page table base is
indeed 2. When reading xen/include/public/xen.h's comment
very strictly, this is not a violation (since there nothing is said
that the first thing in the page table space is pointed to by
pt_base; I admit that this seems to be implied though, namely
do I think that it is implied that the page table space is the
range [pt_base, pt_base + nt_pt_frames), whereas that
range here indeed is [pt_base - 2, pt_base - 2 + nt_pt_frames),
which - without a priori knowledge - the kernel would have
difficulty to figure out)." - so lets just fall back to the
easy way and reserve the whole region.
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

When we are finished with return PFNs to the hypervisor, then
populate it back, and also mark the E820 MMIO and E820 gaps
as IDENTITY_FRAMEs, we then call P2M to set areas that can
be used for ballooning. We were off by one, and ended up
over-writting a P2M entry that most likely was an IDENTITY_FRAME.
For example:

1-1 mapping on 40000->40200
1-1 mapping on bc558->bc5ac
1-1 mapping on bc5b4->bc8c5
1-1 mapping on bc8c6->bcb7c
1-1 mapping on bcd00->100000
Released 614 pages of unused memory
Set 277889 page(s) to 1-1 mapping
Populating 40200-40466 pfn range: 614 pages added

=> here we set from 40466 up to bc559 P2M tree to be
INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. We should have done it up to bc558.

The end result is that if anybody is trying to construct
a PTE for PFN bc558 they end up with ~PAGE_PRESENT.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by-and-Tested-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

instead of a big memblock_reserve. This way we can be more
selective in freeing regions (and it also makes it easier
to understand where is what).

[v1: Move the auto_translate_physmap to proper line]
[v2: Per Stefano suggestion add more comments]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count
populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem
region and ignored.

Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned.

For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is:
 [    0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed
 [    0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100
 [    0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000
 [    0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory
 [    0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping
-[    0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added
+[    0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added
+[    0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added
 [    0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
 [    0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
 [    0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
 [    0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable)
 [    0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS)
...
 [    0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable)
 [    0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable)
...
 [    0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration:
...
-[    0.000000]  reserved[0x4]       [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes
-[    0.000000]  reserved[0x5]       [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes

Related xen memory layout:
(XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map:
(XEN)  0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable)
(XEN)  00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
(XEN)  0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable)
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
[v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others]
Suggested by David, thanks.
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

We did not take into account that xen_released_pages would be
used outside the initial E820 parsing code. As such we would
did not subtract from xen_released_pages the count of pages
that we had populated back (instead we just did a simple
extra_pages = released - populated).

The balloon driver uses xen_released_pages to set the initial
current_pages count.  If this is wrong (too low) then when a new
(higher) target is set, the balloon driver will request too many pages
from Xen."

This fixes errors such as:

(XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (51 of 512)
during bootup and
free_memory            : 0

where the free_memory should be 128.
Acked-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[v1: Per David's review made the git commit better]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA
mapping this must also be updated.  Otherwise, the page will be not
released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be
freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being
reallocated at a different PFN.

This was already being done for the ISA memory region in
xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages
as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as
reserved in the e820 map.

This fixes errors such as:

(XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152
(XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17)
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter
of using the proper hypercall.
Acked-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces
of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry.

The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs
which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The
E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole):
BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
 Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable)
 Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
 Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable)

The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that
can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820
looks like the normal thing:

BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
 Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
 Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
 Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable)
 Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved)
 Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable)
 Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved)
 Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable)
 Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS)
..
With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not
work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used
by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that
by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those
regions and tells us that:

Freeing  20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed
Freeing  40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed
Freeing  bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed
Freeing  badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed
Freeing  bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed
Released 283999 pages of unused memory

Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned
to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain
boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by
the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up
to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver
is not always compiled in for the initial domain.

This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap)
which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that
were released.

The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in
the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in
the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the
M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away.
As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the
only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping
(which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages
are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall.

The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the
nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages.

On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get:

no dom0_mem
-Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)
+Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)

dom0_mem=3G
-Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)
+Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)

dom0_mem=max:3G
-Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)
+Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init)

And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem=
argument is.
Acked-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[v2: Use populate hypercall]
[v3: Remove debug printks]
[v4: Simplify code]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

Otherwise we can get these meaningless:
Freeing  bad80-badf4 pfn range: 0 pages freed

We also can do this for the summary ones - no point of printing
"Set 0 page(s) to 1-1 mapping"
Acked-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[v1: Extended to the summary printks]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

By using the functionality provided by "[CPUFREQ]: provide
disable_cpuidle() function to disable the API."

Under the Xen hypervisor we do not want the initial domain to exercise
the cpufreq scaling drivers. This is b/c the Xen hypervisor is
in charge of doing this as well and we can end up with both the
Linux kernel and the hypervisor trying to change the P-states
leading to weird performance issues.
Acked-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
[v2: Fix compile error spotted by Benjamin Schweikert <b.schweikert@googlemail.com>]

We needed that call in the past to force the kernel to use
default_idle (which called safe_halt, which called xen_safe_halt).

But set_pm_idle_to_default() does now that, so there is no need
to use this boot option operand.
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

d312ae87 "xen: use maximum reservation to limit amount of usable RAM"
clamped the total amount of RAM to the current maximum reservation. This is
correct for dom0 but is not correct for guest domains. In order to boot a guest
"pre-ballooned" (e.g. with memory=1G but maxmem=2G) in order to allow for
future memory expansion the guest must derive max_pfn from the e820 provided by
the toolstack and not the current maximum reservation (which can reflect only
the current maximum, not the guest lifetime max). The existing algorithm
already behaves this correctly if we do not artificially limit the maximum
number of pages for the guest case.

For a guest booted with maxmem=512, memory=128 this results in:
 [    0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
 [    0.000000]  Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable)
 [    0.000000]  Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
-[    0.000000]  Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000008100000 (usable)
-[    0.000000]  Xen: 0000000008100000 - 0000000020800000 (unusable)
+[    0.000000]  Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020800000 (usable)
...
 [    0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active
 [    0.000000] DMI not present or invalid.
 [    0.000000] e820 update range: 0000000000000000 - 0000000000010000 (usable) ==> (reserved)
 [    0.000000] e820 remove range: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (usable)
-[    0.000000] last_pfn = 0x8100 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000
+[    0.000000] last_pfn = 0x20800 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000
 [    0.000000] initial memory mapped : 0 - 027ff000
 [    0.000000] Base memory trampoline at [c009f000] 9f000 size 4096
-[    0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000008100000
-[    0.000000]  0000000000 - 0008100000 page 4k
-[    0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 8100000 @ 27bb000-27ff000
+[    0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000020800000
+[    0.000000]  0000000000 - 0020800000 page 4k
+[    0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 20800000 @ 26f8000-27ff000
 [    0.000000] xen: setting RW the range 27e8000 - 27ff000
 [    0.000000] 0MB HIGHMEM available.
-[    0.000000] 129MB LOWMEM available.
-[    0.000000]   mapped low ram: 0 - 08100000
-[    0.000000]   low ram: 0 - 08100000
+[    0.000000] 520MB LOWMEM available.
+[    0.000000]   mapped low ram: 0 - 20800000
+[    0.000000]   low ram: 0 - 20800000

With this change "xl mem-set <domain> 512M" will successfully increase the
guest RAM (by reducing the balloon).

There is no change for dom0.
Reported-and-Tested-by: NGeorge Shuklin <george.shuklin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

The idea behind commit d91ee586 ("cpuidle: replace xen access to x86
pm_idle and default_idle") was to have one call - disable_cpuidle()
which would make pm_idle not be molested by other code.  It disallows
cpuidle_idle_call to be set to pm_idle (which is excellent).

But in the select_idle_routine() and idle_setup(), the pm_idle can still
be set to either: amd_e400_idle, mwait_idle or default_idle.  This
depends on some CPU flags (MWAIT) and in AMD case on the type of CPU.

In case of mwait_idle we can hit some instances where the hypervisor
(Amazon EC2 specifically) sets the MWAIT and we get:

  Brought up 2 CPUs
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP

  Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.1.0-0.rc6.git0.3.fc16.x86_64 #1
  RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81015d1d>]  [<ffffffff81015d1d>] mwait_idle+0x6f/0xb4
  ...
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff8100e2ed>] cpu_idle+0xae/0xe8
   [<ffffffff8149ee78>] cpu_bringup_and_idle+0xe/0x10
  RIP  [<ffffffff81015d1d>] mwait_idle+0x6f/0xb4
   RSP <ffff8801d28ddf10>

In the case of amd_e400_idle we don't get so spectacular crashes, but we
do end up making an MSR which is trapped in the hypervisor, and then
follow it up with a yield hypercall.  Meaning we end up going to
hypervisor twice instead of just once.

The previous behavior before v3.0 was that pm_idle was set to
default_idle regardless of select_idle_routine/idle_setup.

We want to do that, but only for one specific case: Xen.  This patch
does that.

Fixes RH BZ #739499 and Ubuntu #881076
Reported-by: NStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an
identity (1-1) p2m mapping.  If an available page has a PFN within one
of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost)
so release them before setting up the mapping.

This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available
(depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if
the initial pages overlap with reserved regions.

The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages.  This
fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the
DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple
regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high
memory).  This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of
available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small).

As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is
simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the
hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions
and gaps are preserved).  Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions
above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split
in two if necessary).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>