1. 30 1月, 2018 6 次提交
    • N
      dev: advertise the new ifindex when the netns iface changes · 38e01b30
      Nicolas Dichtel 提交于
      The goal is to let the user follow an interface that moves to another
      netns.
      
      CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
      CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      38e01b30
    • N
      dev: always advertise the new nsid when the netns iface changes · c36ac8e2
      Nicolas Dichtel 提交于
      The user should be able to follow any interface that moves to another
      netns.  There is no reason to hide physical interfaces.
      
      CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
      CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c36ac8e2
    • M
      ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only · 7ece54a6
      Martin KaFai Lau 提交于
      If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it
      implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket.  However, in inet6_bind(),
      this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done
      after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully.
      
      This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses
      the 'get_port()'.
      
      In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets,
      udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called.  udp_reuseport_add_sock()
      checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to
      sk2->sk_reuseport_cb.  In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be
      1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here.  The end result is,
      reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing
      sk2->sk_reuseport_cb.
      
      It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an
      IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED).  Only one of the socket will
      receive packet.
      
      The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port().
      The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored
      in case get_port() failed.  The situation is similar to the
      inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed.
      
      Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> who created an easy
      reproduction which leads to a fix.
      
      Fixes: e32ea7e7 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection")
      Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7ece54a6
    • C
      rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID for RTM_DELLINK · b61ad68a
      Christian Brauner 提交于
      - Backwards Compatibility:
        If userspace wants to determine whether RTM_DELLINK supports the
        IFLA_IF_NETNSID property they should first send an RTM_GETLINK request
        with IFLA_IF_NETNSID on lo. If either EACCESS is returned or the reply
        does not include IFLA_IF_NETNSID userspace should assume that
        IFLA_IF_NETNSID is not supported on this kernel.
        If the reply does contain an IFLA_IF_NETNSID property userspace
        can send an RTM_DELLINK with a IFLA_IF_NETNSID property. If they receive
        EOPNOTSUPP then the kernel does not support the IFLA_IF_NETNSID property
        with RTM_DELLINK. Userpace should then fallback to other means.
      
      - Security:
        Callers must have CAP_NET_ADMIN in the owning user namespace of the
        target network namespace.
      Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b61ad68a
    • C
      rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID for RTM_SETLINK · c310bfcb
      Christian Brauner 提交于
      - Backwards Compatibility:
        If userspace wants to determine whether RTM_SETLINK supports the
        IFLA_IF_NETNSID property they should first send an RTM_GETLINK request
        with IFLA_IF_NETNSID on lo. If either EACCESS is returned or the reply
        does not include IFLA_IF_NETNSID userspace should assume that
        IFLA_IF_NETNSID is not supported on this kernel.
        If the reply does contain an IFLA_IF_NETNSID property userspace
        can send an RTM_SETLINK with a IFLA_IF_NETNSID property. If they receive
        EOPNOTSUPP then the kernel does not support the IFLA_IF_NETNSID property
        with RTM_SETLINK. Userpace should then fallback to other means.
      
        To retain backwards compatibility the kernel will first check whether a
        IFLA_NET_NS_PID or IFLA_NET_NS_FD property has been passed. If either
        one is found it will be used to identify the target network namespace.
        This implies that users who do not care whether their running kernel
        supports IFLA_IF_NETNSID with RTM_SETLINK can pass both
        IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} and IFLA_IF_NETNSID referring to the same network
        namespace.
      
      - Security:
        Callers must have CAP_NET_ADMIN in the owning user namespace of the
        target network namespace.
      Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c310bfcb
    • C
      rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID in do_setlink() · 7c4f63ba
      Christian Brauner 提交于
      RTM_{NEW,SET}LINK already allow operations on other network namespaces
      by identifying the target network namespace through IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID}
      properties. This is done by looking for the corresponding properties in
      do_setlink(). Extend do_setlink() to also look for the IFLA_IF_NETNSID
      property. This introduces no functional changes since all callers of
      do_setlink() currently block IFLA_IF_NETNSID by reporting an error before
      they reach do_setlink().
      
      This introduces the helpers:
      
      static struct net *rtnl_link_get_net_by_nlattr(struct net *src_net, struct
                                                     nlattr *tb[])
      
      static struct net *rtnl_link_get_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
                                                   struct net *src_net,
      					     struct nlattr *tb[], int cap)
      
      to simplify permission checks and target network namespace retrieval for
      RTM_* requests that already support IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} but get extended
      to IFLA_IF_NETNSID. To perserve backwards compatibility the helpers look
      for IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} properties first before checking for
      IFLA_IF_NETNSID.
      Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7c4f63ba
  2. 27 1月, 2018 4 次提交
    • D
      bpf: fix subprog verifier bypass by div/mod by 0 exception · f6b1b3bf
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      One of the ugly leftovers from the early eBPF days is that div/mod
      operations based on registers have a hard-coded src_reg == 0 test
      in the interpreter as well as in JIT code generators that would
      return from the BPF program with exit code 0. This was basically
      adopted from cBPF interpreter for historical reasons.
      
      There are multiple reasons why this is very suboptimal and prone
      to bugs. To name one: the return code mapping for such abnormal
      program exit of 0 does not always match with a suitable program
      type's exit code mapping. For example, '0' in tc means action 'ok'
      where the packet gets passed further up the stack, which is just
      undesirable for such cases (e.g. when implementing policy) and
      also does not match with other program types.
      
      While trying to work out an exception handling scheme, I also
      noticed that programs crafted like the following will currently
      pass the verifier:
      
        0: (bf) r6 = r1
        1: (85) call pc+8
        caller:
         R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_-1
        callee:
         frame1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_1
        10: (b4) (u32) r2 = (u32) 0
        11: (b4) (u32) r3 = (u32) 1
        12: (3c) (u32) r3 /= (u32) r2
        13: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76)
        14: (95) exit
        returning from callee:
         frame1: R0_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)
                 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv0
                 R3_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
                 R10=fp0,call_1
        to caller at 2:
         R0_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
         R10=fp0,call_-1
      
        from 14 to 2: R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)
                      R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_-1
        2: (bf) r1 = r6
        3: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80)
        4: (bf) r2 = r0
        5: (07) r2 += 8
        6: (2d) if r2 > r1 goto pc+1
         R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8,imm=0) R1=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
         R2=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8,imm=0) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
         R10=fp0,call_-1
        7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r0 +0)
        8: (b7) r0 = 1
        9: (95) exit
      
        from 6 to 8: safe
        processed 16 insns (limit 131072), stack depth 0+0
      
      Basically what happens is that in the subprog we make use of a
      div/mod by 0 exception and in the 'normal' subprog's exit path
      we just return skb->data back to the main prog. This has the
      implication that the verifier thinks we always get a pkt pointer
      in R0 while we still have the implicit 'return 0' from the div
      as an alternative unconditional return path earlier. Thus, R0
      then contains 0, meaning back in the parent prog we get the
      address range of [0x0, skb->data_end] as read and writeable.
      Similar can be crafted with other pointer register types.
      
      Since i) BPF_ABS/IND is not allowed in programs that contain
      BPF to BPF calls (and generally it's also disadvised to use in
      native eBPF context), ii) unknown opcodes don't return zero
      anymore, iii) we don't return an exception code in dead branches,
      the only last missing case affected and to fix is the div/mod
      handling.
      
      What we would really need is some infrastructure to propagate
      exceptions all the way to the original prog unwinding the
      current stack and returning that code to the caller of the
      BPF program. In user space such exception handling for similar
      runtimes is typically implemented with setjmp(3) and longjmp(3)
      as one possibility which is not available in the kernel,
      though (kgdb used to implement it in kernel long time ago). I
      implemented a PoC exception handling mechanism into the BPF
      interpreter with porting setjmp()/longjmp() into x86_64 and
      adding a new internal BPF_ABRT opcode that can use a program
      specific exception code for all exception cases we have (e.g.
      div/mod by 0, unknown opcodes, etc). While this seems to work
      in the constrained BPF environment (meaning, here, we don't
      need to deal with state e.g. from memory allocations that we
      would need to undo before going into exception state), it still
      has various drawbacks: i) we would need to implement the
      setjmp()/longjmp() for every arch supported in the kernel and
      for x86_64, arm64, sparc64 JITs currently supporting calls,
      ii) it has unconditional additional cost on main program
      entry to store CPU register state in initial setjmp() call,
      and we would need some way to pass the jmp_buf down into
      ___bpf_prog_run() for main prog and all subprogs, but also
      storing on stack is not really nice (other option would be
      per-cpu storage for this, but it also has the drawback that
      we need to disable preemption for every BPF program types).
      All in all this approach would add a lot of complexity.
      
      Another poor-man's solution would be to have some sort of
      additional shared register or scratch buffer to hold state
      for exceptions, and test that after every call return to
      chain returns and pass R0 all the way down to BPF prog caller.
      This is also problematic in various ways: i) an additional
      register doesn't map well into JITs, and some other scratch
      space could only be on per-cpu storage, which, again has the
      side-effect that this only works when we disable preemption,
      or somewhere in the input context which is not available
      everywhere either, and ii) this adds significant runtime
      overhead by putting conditionals after each and every call,
      as well as implementation complexity.
      
      Yet another option is to teach verifier that div/mod can
      return an integer, which however is also complex to implement
      as verifier would need to walk such fake 'mov r0,<code>; exit;'
      sequeuence and there would still be no guarantee for having
      propagation of this further down to the BPF caller as proper
      exception code. For parent prog, it is also is not distinguishable
      from a normal return of a constant scalar value.
      
      The approach taken here is a completely different one with
      little complexity and no additional overhead involved in
      that we make use of the fact that a div/mod by 0 is undefined
      behavior. Instead of bailing out, we adapt the same behavior
      as on some major archs like ARMv8 [0] into eBPF as well:
      X div 0 results in 0, and X mod 0 results in X. aarch64 and
      aarch32 ISA do not generate any traps or otherwise aborts
      of program execution for unsigned divides. I verified this
      also with a test program compiled by gcc and clang, and the
      behavior matches with the spec. Going forward we adapt the
      eBPF verifier to emit such rewrites once div/mod by register
      was seen. cBPF is not touched and will keep existing 'return 0'
      semantics. Given the options, it seems the most suitable from
      all of them, also since major archs have similar schemes in
      place. Given this is all in the realm of undefined behavior,
      we still have the option to adapt if deemed necessary and
      this way we would also have the option of more flexibility
      from LLVM code generation side (which is then fully visible
      to verifier). Thus, this patch i) fixes the panic seen in
      above program and ii) doesn't bypass the verifier observations.
      
        [0] ARM Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8 [ARM DDI 0487B.b]
            http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0487b.b/DDI0487B_b_armv8_arm.pdf
            1) aarch64 instruction set: section C3.4.7 and C6.2.279 (UDIV)
               "A division by zero results in a zero being written to
                the destination register, without any indication that
                the division by zero occurred."
            2) aarch32 instruction set: section F1.4.8 and F5.1.263 (UDIV)
               "For the SDIV and UDIV instructions, division by zero
                always returns a zero result."
      
      Fixes: f4d7e40a ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      f6b1b3bf
    • D
      bpf: xor of a/x in cbpf can be done in 32 bit alu · 1d621674
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Very minor optimization; saves 1 byte per program in x86_64
      JIT in cBPF prologue.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      1d621674
    • S
      VSOCK: set POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM for TCP_CLOSING · ba3169fc
      Stefan Hajnoczi 提交于
      select(2) with wfds but no rfds must return when the socket is shut down
      by the peer.  This way userspace notices socket activity and gets -EPIPE
      from the next write(2).
      
      Currently select(2) does not return for virtio-vsock when a SEND+RCV
      shutdown packet is received.  This is because vsock_poll() only sets
      POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM for TCP_CLOSE, not the TCP_CLOSING state that the
      socket is in when the shutdown is received.
      Signed-off-by: NStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ba3169fc
    • A
      dccp: don't restart ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() if sk in closed state · dd5684ec
      Alexey Kodanev 提交于
      ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() timer callback always restarts the timer
      again and can run indefinitely (unless it is stopped outside), and after
      commit 120e9dab ("dccp: defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time"),
      which moved ccid_hc_tx_delete() (also includes sk_stop_timer()) from
      dccp_destroy_sock() to sk_destruct(), this started to happen quite often.
      The timer prevents releasing the socket, as a result, sk_destruct() won't
      be called.
      
      Found with LTP/dccp_ipsec tests running on the bonding device,
      which later couldn't be unloaded after the tests were completed:
      
        unregister_netdevice: waiting for bond0 to become free. Usage count = 148
      
      Fixes: 2a91aa39 ("[DCCP] CCID2: Initial CCID2 (TCP-Like) implementation")
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dd5684ec
  3. 26 1月, 2018 30 次提交