1. 18 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target · ca26cffa
      Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
      Up to f5caf621 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
      we were able to use x86 headers to build to the 'bpf' clang target, as
      done by the BPF code in tools/perf/.
      
      With that commit, we ended up with following failure for 'perf test LLVM', this
      is because "clang ... -target bpf ..." fails since 4.0 does not have bpf inline
      asm support and 6.0 does not recognize the register 'esp', fix it by guarding
      that part with an #ifndef __BPF__, that is defined by clang when building to
      the "bpf" target.
      
        # perf test -v LLVM
        37: LLVM search and compile                               :
        37.1: Basic BPF llvm compile                              :
        --- start ---
        test child forked, pid 25526
        Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
        include option is set to  -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated  -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
        set env: NR_CPUS=4
        set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
        set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
        set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
        set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated  -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
        set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
        llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
         * bpf-script-example.c
         * Test basic LLVM building
         */
        #ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
        # error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
        # error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
        #endif
        #define BPF_ANY 0
        #define BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY 2
        #define BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem 1
        #define BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem 2
      
        static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, void *key) =
      	  (void *) BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem;
        static void *(*bpf_map_update_elem)(void *map, void *key, void *value, int flags) =
      	  (void *) BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem;
      
        struct bpf_map_def {
      	  unsigned int type;
      	  unsigned int key_size;
      	  unsigned int value_size;
      	  unsigned int max_entries;
        };
      
        #define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
        struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") flip_table = {
      	  .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,
      	  .key_size = sizeof(int),
      	  .value_size = sizeof(int),
      	  .max_entries = 1,
        };
      
        SEC("func=SyS_epoll_wait")
        int bpf_func__SyS_epoll_wait(void *ctx)
        {
      	  int ind =0;
      	  int *flag = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&flip_table, &ind);
      	  int new_flag;
      	  if (!flag)
      		  return 0;
      	  /* flip flag and store back */
      	  new_flag = !*flag;
      	  bpf_map_update_elem(&flip_table, &ind, &new_flag, BPF_ANY);
      	  return new_flag;
        }
        char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
        int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
        ' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
        test child finished with 0
        ---- end ----
        LLVM search and compile subtest 0: Ok
        37.2: kbuild searching                                    :
        --- start ---
        test child forked, pid 25950
        Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
        include option is set to  -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated  -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
        set env: NR_CPUS=4
        set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
        set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
        set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
        set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated  -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
        set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
        set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
        llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
         * bpf-script-test-kbuild.c
         * Test include from kernel header
         */
        #ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
        # error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
        # error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
        #endif
        #define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
      
        #include <uapi/linux/fs.h>
        #include <uapi/asm/ptrace.h>
      
        SEC("func=vfs_llseek")
        int bpf_func__vfs_llseek(void *ctx)
        {
      	  return 0;
        }
      
        char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
        int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
        ' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
        In file included from <stdin>:12:
        In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h:5:
        In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/compiler.h:242:
        In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h:5:
        In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h:10:
        /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:145:50: error: unknown register name 'esp' in asm
        register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
                                                         ^
        /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:44:18: note: expanded from macro '_ASM_SP'
        #define _ASM_SP         __ASM_REG(sp)
                                ^
        /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:27:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_REG'
        #define __ASM_REG(reg)         __ASM_SEL_RAW(e##reg, r##reg)
                                       ^
        /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:18:29: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_SEL_RAW'
        # define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a)
                                    ^
        /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:11:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_FORM_RAW'
        # define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x)     #x
                                       ^
        <scratch space>:4:1: note: expanded from here
        "esp"
        ^
        1 error generated.
        ERROR:	unable to compile -
        Hint:	Check error message shown above.
        Hint:	You can also pre-compile it into .o using:
           		  clang -target bpf -O2 -c -
           	  with proper -I and -D options.
        Failed to compile test case: 'kbuild searching'
        test child finished with -1
        ---- end ----
        LLVM search and compile subtest 1: FAILED!
      
      Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
      Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
      Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128175948.GL3298@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
      ca26cffa
  2. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      
      How this work was done:
      
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
         lines).
      
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
      
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
      
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
      
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
      
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
      
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
      
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
      
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
      
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
      
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
      
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
      
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  3. 30 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  4. 29 9月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 · 520a13c5
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit:
      
        f5caf621 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
      
      is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4.
      
      Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that
      the issue is with this code:
      
        register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp");
        #define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp)
      
      Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP.  That causes GCC
      to produce the following bogus code:
      
        ffffffff8147461d:       89 e0                   mov    %esp,%eax
        ffffffff8147461f:       4c 89 f7                mov    %r14,%rdi
        ffffffff81474622:       4c 89 fe                mov    %r15,%rsi
        ffffffff81474625:       ba 20 00 00 00          mov    $0x20,%edx
        ffffffff8147462a:       89 c4                   mov    %eax,%esp
        ffffffff8147462c:       e8 bf 52 05 00          callq  ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled>
      
      Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer
      for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up
      and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer.  The upper 32 bits
      are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer.
      
      So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with
      the actual full-size stack pointer.
      
      This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the
      actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because
      CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso).
      Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the
      use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file.
      Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: Nkernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
      Diagnosed-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
      Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: f5caf621 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@trebleSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      520a13c5
  5. 23 9月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang · f5caf621
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the
      stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame
      pointer is set up first:
      
        static inline void foo()
        {
      	register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
      	asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp))
        }
      
      Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer.
      
      The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global
      variable.
      
      It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC
      version.  With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as
      before:
      
      	defconfig	defconfig-nofp	distro		distro-nofp
       before	9820389		9491555		8816046		8516940
       after	9820389		9491555		8816046		8516940
      
      With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed.  It now changes its
      behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global.
      That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before
      inserting *any* inline asm.  (Therefore, listing the variable as an
      output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.)  It's a bit
      overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible.  And in fact,
      there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled:
      
      	defconfig	defconfig-nofp	distro		distro-nofp
       before	9796316		9468236		9076191		8790305
       after	9796957		9464267		9076381		8785949
      
      So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint
      is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for
      older versions.
      Suggested-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Reported-by: NMatthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f5caf621
  6. 17 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • K
      locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection · 7a46ec0e
      Kees Cook 提交于
      This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
      performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.
      
      This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
      but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
      has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
      the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
      protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
      to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
      use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.
      
      Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
      it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
      be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
      and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
      be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
      conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
      the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
      common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
      provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
      overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
      rendered unexploitable:
      
        http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/
      
        http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016
      
      This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
      (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
      resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
      have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
      use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
      avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
      vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
      conditions to remain universally silent.
      
      On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
      (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
      produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
      changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
      notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).
      
      On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
      0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
      overflow-only race condition.
      
      As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
      to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
      operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
      in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
      to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
      default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
      prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
      change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
      located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
      to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
      reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
      .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
      error reporting routine.
      
      Example assembly comparison:
      
      refcount_inc() before:
      
        .text:
        ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
      
      refcount_inc() after:
      
        .text:
        ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
        ffffffff8154614d:       0f 88 80 d5 17 00       js     ffffffff816c36d3
        ...
        .text.unlikely:
        ffffffff816c36d3:       48 8d 4d f4             lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
        ffffffff816c36d7:       0f ff                   (bad)
      
      These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
      to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
      unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
      (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):
      
        2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
      		    cycles		protections
        atomic_t           82249267387	none
        refcount_t-fast    82211446892	overflow, untested dec-to-zero
        refcount_t-full   144814735193	overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero
      
      This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
      overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
      on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
      code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
      to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
      code to be a refcount-only protection.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
      Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
      Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
      Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
      Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
      Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
      Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
      Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beastSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7a46ec0e
  7. 05 5月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      x86/mm/kaslr: Use the _ASM_MUL macro for multiplication to work around Clang incompatibility · 121843eb
      Matthias Kaehlcke 提交于
      The constraint "rm" allows the compiler to put mix_const into memory.
      When the input operand is a memory location then MUL needs an operand
      size suffix, since Clang can't infer the multiplication width from the
      operand.
      
      Add and use the _ASM_MUL macro which determines the operand size and
      resolves to the NUL instruction with the corresponding suffix.
      
      This fixes the following error when building with clang:
      
        CC      arch/x86/lib/kaslr.o
        /tmp/kaslr-dfe1ad.s: Assembler messages:
        /tmp/kaslr-dfe1ad.s:182: Error: no instruction mnemonic suffix given and no register operands; can't size instruction
      Signed-off-by: NMatthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
      Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>
      Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael Davidson <md@google.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170501224741.133938-1-mka@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      121843eb
  8. 09 6月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 18 2月, 2016 1 次提交
  10. 14 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 24 4月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      kprobes: Introduce NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro to maintain kprobes blacklist · 376e2424
      Masami Hiramatsu 提交于
      Introduce NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro which builds a kprobes
      blacklist at kernel build time.
      
      The usage of this macro is similar to EXPORT_SYMBOL(),
      placed after the function definition:
      
        NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(function);
      
      Since this macro will inhibit inlining of static/inline
      functions, this patch also introduces a nokprobe_inline macro
      for static/inline functions. In this case, we must use
      NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() for the inline function caller.
      
      When CONFIG_KPROBES=y, the macro stores the given function
      address in the "_kprobe_blacklist" section.
      
      Since the data structures are not fully initialized by the
      macro (because there is no "size" information),  those
      are re-initialized at boot time by using kallsyms.
      Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081705.26341.96719.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp
      Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
      Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Christopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org>
      Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
      Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      376e2424
  12. 30 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 21 4月, 2012 4 次提交
  14. 21 7月, 2011 2 次提交
    • J
      x86: Fix write lock scalability 64-bit issue · a750036f
      Jan Beulich 提交于
      With the write lock path simply subtracting RW_LOCK_BIAS there
      is, on large systems, the theoretical possibility of overflowing
      the 32-bit value that was used so far (namely if 128 or more
      CPUs manage to do the subtraction, but don't get to do the
      inverse addition in the failure path quickly enough).
      
      A first measure is to modify RW_LOCK_BIAS itself - with the new
      value chosen, it is good for up to 2048 CPUs each allowed to
      nest over 2048 times on the read path without causing an issue.
      Quite possibly it would even be sufficient to adjust the bias a
      little further, assuming that allowing for significantly less
      nesting would suffice.
      
      However, as the original value chosen allowed for even more
      nesting levels, to support more than 2048 CPUs (possible
      currently only for 64-bit kernels) the lock itself gets widened
      to 64 bits.
      Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4E258E0D020000780004E3F0@nat28.tlf.novell.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      a750036f
    • J
      x86: Unify rwlock assembly implementation · 4625cd63
      Jan Beulich 提交于
      Rather than having two functionally identical implementations
      for 32- and 64-bit configurations, extend the existing assembly
      abstractions enough to fold the two rwlock implementations into
      a shared one.
      Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4E258DD7020000780004E3EA@nat28.tlf.novell.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      4625cd63
  15. 01 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  16. 23 10月, 2008 2 次提交
  17. 19 8月, 2008 1 次提交
  18. 23 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • V
      x86: consolidate header guards · 77ef50a5
      Vegard Nossum 提交于
      This patch is the result of an automatic script that consolidates the
      format of all the headers in include/asm-x86/.
      
      The format:
      
      1. No leading underscore. Names with leading underscores are reserved.
      2. Pathname components are separated by two underscores. So we can
         distinguish between mm_types.h and mm/types.h.
      3. Everything except letters and numbers are turned into single
         underscores.
      Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
      77ef50a5
  19. 09 7月, 2008 3 次提交
  20. 17 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  21. 04 2月, 2008 1 次提交
  22. 30 1月, 2008 3 次提交