VFS already checks if both source and target are directories.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Otherwise, we have to wait for the server to recall it.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

We just had a case in which a buggy server occasionally returns the wrong
attributes during an OPEN call. While the client does catch this sort of
condition in nfs4_open_done(), and causes the nfs4_atomic_open() to return
-EISDIR, the logic in nfs_atomic_lookup() is broken, since it causes a
fallback to an ordinary lookup instead of just returning the error.

When the buggy server then returns a regular file for the fallback lookup,
the VFS allows the open, and bad things start to happen, since the open
file doesn't have any associated NFSv4 state.

The fix is firstly to return the EISDIR/ENOTDIR errors immediately, and
secondly to ensure that we are always careful when dereferencing the
nfs_open_context state pointer.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

* Remove smp_lock.h from files which don't need it (including some headers!)
* Add smp_lock.h to files which do need it
* Make smp_lock.h include conditional in hardirq.h
  It's needed only for one kernel_locked() usage which is under CONFIG_PREEMPT

  This will make hardirq.h inclusion cheaper for every PREEMPT=n config
  (which includes allmodconfig/allyesconfig, BTW)
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The problem is that permission checking is skipped if atomic open is
possible, but when exec opens a file, it just opens it O_READONLY which
means EXEC permission will not be checked at that time.

This problem is observed by the following sequence (executed as root):

  mount -t nfs4 server:/ /mnt4
  echo "ls" >/mnt4/foo
  chmod 744 /mnt4/foo
  su guest -c "mnt4/foo"
Signed-off-by: NFrank Filz <ffilzlnx@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Tested-by: NEugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

NFS appears to be returning an unnecessary "delete" notification when
we're doing an atomic rename. See

  http://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=575684

The fix is to get rid of the redundant call to d_delete().
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Hi Trond,

I have been looking at a bugreport where trying to open applications on KDE
on a NFS mounted home fails temporarily. There have been multiple reports on
different kernel versions pointing to this common issue:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12557
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/269954
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=508866.html

This issue can be reproducible consistently by doing this on a NFS mounted
home (KDE):
1. Open 2 xterm sessions
2. From one of the xterm session, do "ssh -X <remote host>"
3. "stat ~/.Xauthority" on the remote SSH session
4. Close the two xterm sessions
5. On the server do a "stat ~/.Xauthority"
6. Now on the client, try to open xterm
This will fail.

Even if the filehandle had become stale, the NFS client should invalidate
the cache/inode and should repeat LOOKUP. Looking at the packet capture when
the failure occurs shows that there were two subsequent ACCESS() calls with
the same filehandle and both fails with -ESTALE error.

I have tested the fix below. Now the client issue a LOOKUP after the
ACCESS() call fails with -ESTALE. If all this makes sense to you, can you
consider this for inclusion?

Thanks,


If the server returns an -ESTALE error due to stale filehandle in response to
an ACCESS() call, we need to invalidate the cache and inode so that LOOKUP()
can be retried. Without this change, the nfs client retries ACCESS() with the
same filehandle, fails again and could lead to temporary failure of
applications running on nfs mounted home.
Signed-off-by: NSuresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Hi.

I've been looking at a bugzilla which describes a problem where
a customer was advised to use either the "noac" or "actimeo=0"
mount options to solve a consistency problem that they were
seeing in the file attributes.  It turned out that this solution
did not work reliably for them because sometimes, the local
attribute cache was believed to be valid and not timed out.
(With an attribute cache timeout of 0, the cache should always
appear to be timed out.)

In looking at this situation, it appears to me that the problem
is that the attribute cache timeout code has an off-by-one
error in it.  It is assuming that the cache is valid in the
region, [read_cache_jiffies, read_cache_jiffies + attrtimeo].  The
cache should be considered valid only in the region,
[read_cache_jiffies, read_cache_jiffies + attrtimeo).  With this
change, the options, "noac" and "actimeo=0", work as originally
expected.

This problem was previously addressed by special casing the
attrtimeo == 0 case.  However, since the problem is only an off-
by-one error, the cleaner solution is address the off-by-one
error and thus, not require the special case.

    Thanx...

        ps
Signed-off-by: NPeter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

This ensures that we don't have to look up the dentry again after we return
the delegation if we know that the directory didn't change.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

For execute permission on a regular files we need to check if file has
any execute bits at all, regardless of capabilites.

This check is normally performed by generic_permission() but was also
added to the case when the filesystem defines its own ->permission()
method.  In the latter case the filesystem should be responsible for
performing this check.

Move the check from inode_permission() inside filesystems which are
not calling generic_permission().

Create a helper function execute_ok() that returns true if the inode
is a directory or if any execute bits are present in i_mode.

Also fix up the following code:

 - coda control file is never executable
 - sysctl files are never executable
 - hfs_permission seems broken on MAY_EXEC, remove
 - hfsplus_permission is eqivalent to generic_permission(), remove
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

New flag: LOOKUP_EXCL.  Set before doing the final step of pathname
resolution on the paths that have LOOKUP_CREATE and O_EXCL.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Split the LRU lists in two, one set for pages that are backed by real file
systems ("file") and one for pages that are backed by memory and swap
("anon").  The latter includes tmpfs.

The advantage of doing this is that the VM will not have to scan over lots
of anonymous pages (which we generally do not want to swap out), just to
find the page cache pages that it should evict.

This patch has the infrastructure and a basic policy to balance how much
we scan the anon lists and how much we scan the file lists.  The big
policy changes are in separate patches.

[lee.schermerhorn@hp.com: collect lru meminfo statistics from correct offset]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: prevent incorrect oom under split_lru]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix pagevec_move_tail() doesn't treat unevictable page]
[hugh@veritas.com: memcg swapbacked pages active]
[hugh@veritas.com: splitlru: BDI_CAP_SWAP_BACKED]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix /proc/vmstat units]
[nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp: memcg: fix handling of shmem migration]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: adjust Quicklists field of /proc/meminfo]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix style issue of get_scan_ratio()]
Signed-off-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The cache_change_attribute is used to decide whether or not a directory has
changed, in which case we may need to look it up again. Again, the use of
'jiffies' leads to an issue of resolution.

Once again, the fix is to change nfs_inode->cache_change_attribute, and
just make it a simple counter.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

It appears that 'jiffies' timestamps do not have high enough resolution for
nfs_inode_attrs_need_update(). One problem is that a GETATTR can be
launched within < 1 jiffy of the last operation that updated the attribute.
Another problem is that RPC calls can take < 1 jiffy to execute.

We can fix this by switching the variables to use a simple global counter
that gets incremented every time we start another GETATTR call.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Add the flag NFS_MOUNT_LOOKUP_CACHE_NONEG to turn off the caching of
negative dentries. In reality what we do is to force
nfs_lookup_revalidate() to always discard negative dentries.

Add the flag NFS_MOUNT_LOOKUP_CACHE_NONE for enforcing stricter
revalidation of dentries. It forces the revalidate code to always do a
lookup instead of just checking the cached mtime of the parent directory.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
  about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
  MAY_... found in mask.

The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)

folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Page accesses are serialised using the page locks, whereas all attribute
updates are serialised using the inode->i_lock.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Page cache accesses are serialised using page locks, whereas attribute
updates are serialised using inode->i_lock.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Attribute updates are safe, and dentry operations are protected using VFS
level locks. Defer removing the BKL from sillyrename until a separate
patch.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

All dentry-related operations are already BKL-safe, since they are
protected by the VFS locking. No extra locks should be needed in the NFS
code.

In the case of nfs_revalidate_inode(), we're only doing an attribute
update (protected by the inode->i_lock).
In the case of nfs_lookup(), we're instantiating a new dentry, so there
should be no contention possible until after we call d_materialise_unique.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

nfs_instantiate() does not require the BKL, neither do the attribute
updates or the RPC code.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

All the NFSv4 stateful operations are already protected by other locks (in
particular by the rpc_sequence locks.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: some fops use NFSDBG_FILE, some use NFSDBG_VFS.  Let's use
NFSDBG_FILE for all fops, and consistently report file names instead
of inode numbers.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: Report the same debugging info and count function calls the
same for files and directories in nfs_opendir() and nfs_file_open().
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: Report the same debugging info in nfs_llseek_dir() and
nfs_llseek_file().
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: Report the same debugging info, count function calls the same,
and use similar function naming in nfs_fsync_dir() and nfs_fsync().
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

invalidate_inode_pages2_range() takes page offset arguments, not byte
ranges.

Another thought is that individual pages might perhaps get evicted by VM
pressure, in which case we might perhaps want to re-read not only the
evicted page, but all subsequent pages too (in case the server returns
more/less data per page so that the alignment of the next entry
changes). We should therefore remove the condition that we only do this on
page->index==0.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: NHarvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

If we depend on the inodes for writeability, we will not catch the r/o mounts
when implemented.

This patches uses __mnt_want_write().  It does not guarantee that the mount
will stay writeable after the check.  But, this is OK for one of the checks
because it is just for a printk().

The other two are probably unnecessary and duplicate existing checks in the
VFS.  This won't make them better checks than before, but it will make them
detect r/o mounts.
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The NFSv4 protocol allows clients to negotiate security protocols on the
fly in the case where an administrator on the server changes the export
settings and/or in the case where we may have a filesystem migration event.

Instead of having the NFS client code cache credentials that are tied to a
particular AUTH method it is therefore preferable to have a generic credential
that can be converted into whatever AUTH is in use by the RPC client when
the read/write/sillyrename/... is put on the wire.

We do this by means of the new "generic" credential, which basically just
caches the minimal information that is needed to look up an RPCSEC_GSS,
AUTH_SYS, or AUTH_NULL credential.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

As long as the directory contents haven't changed, we should just let the
path walk proceed to cross the mountpoint. Apart from being an optimisation
in the case of 'nohide' mountpoint traversals, it also fixes an issue with
referrals: referral inodes don't have valid filehandles, so calling
nfs_revalidate_inode() on them is a bug.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The error field in nfs_readdir_descriptor_t is never used outside of the
function in which it is set. Remove the field and change the place that
does use it to use an existing local variable.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Thanks to Yawei Niu for spotting the race.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>