1. 05 5月, 2019 18 次提交
    • J
      net/tls: don't copy negative amounts of data in reencrypt · dd424182
      Jakub Kicinski 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 97e1caa517e22d62a283b876fb8aa5f4672c83dd ]
      
      There is no guarantee the record starts before the skb frags.
      If we don't check for this condition copy amount will get
      negative, leading to reads and writes to random memory locations.
      Familiar hilarity ensues.
      
      Fixes: 4799ac81 ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
      Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJohn Hurley <john.hurley@netronome.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      dd424182
    • M
      bnxt_en: Fix uninitialized variable usage in bnxt_rx_pkt(). · f1fd68e9
      Michael Chan 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 0b397b17a4120cb80f7bf89eb30587b3dd9b0d1d ]
      
      In bnxt_rx_pkt(), if the driver encounters BD errors, it will recycle
      the buffers and jump to the end where the uninitailized variable "len"
      is referenced.  Fix it by adding a new jump label that will skip
      the length update.  This is the most correct fix since the length
      may not be valid when we get this type of error.
      
      Fixes: 6a8788f2 ("bnxt_en: add support for software dynamic interrupt moderation")
      Reported-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
      Reviewed-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Tested-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f1fd68e9
    • V
      bnxt_en: Free short FW command HWRM memory in error path in bnxt_init_one() · 39635073
      Vasundhara Volam 提交于
      [ Upstream commit f9099d611449836a51a65f40ea7dc9cb5f2f665e ]
      
      In the bnxt_init_one() error path, short FW command request memory
      is not freed. This patch fixes it.
      
      Fixes: e605db80 ("bnxt_en: Support for Short Firmware Message")
      Signed-off-by: NVasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      39635073
    • M
      bnxt_en: Improve multicast address setup logic. · 09a92136
      Michael Chan 提交于
      [ Upstream commit b4e30e8e7ea1d1e35ffd64ca46f7d9a7f227b4bf ]
      
      The driver builds a list of multicast addresses and sends it to the
      firmware when the driver's ndo_set_rx_mode() is called.  In rare
      cases, the firmware can fail this call if internal resources to
      add multicast addresses are exhausted.  In that case, we should
      try the call again by setting the ALL_MCAST flag which is more
      guaranteed to succeed.
      
      Fixes: c0c050c5 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.")
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      09a92136
    • W
      packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly · 6a57fa6f
      Willem de Bruijn 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 486efdc8f6ce802b27e15921d2353cc740c55451 ]
      
      Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its
      length before passing to dev_hard_header.
      
      Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is
      established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len.
      
      Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths
      
      Fixes: 6b8d95f1795c4 ("packet: validate address length if non-zero")
      Suggested-by: NDavid Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      6a57fa6f
    • H
      selftests: fib_rule_tests: print the result and return 1 if any tests failed · 7a42cf4d
      Hangbin Liu 提交于
      [ Upstream commit f68d7c44e76532e46f292ad941aa3706cb9e6e40 ]
      
      Fixes: 65b2b493 ("selftests: net: initial fib rule tests")
      Signed-off-by: NHangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7a42cf4d
    • X
      sctp: avoid running the sctp state machine recursively · b563e9bb
      Xin Long 提交于
      [ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]
      
      Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:
      
        BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100
        Call Trace:
         <IRQ>  [<ffffffffa4375904>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
         [<ffffffffa436fcaf>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72
         [<ffffffffa437b93a>] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00
         [<ffffffffa3cd5326>] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30
         [<ffffffffa437bc4a>] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50
         [<ffffffffa3e22be8>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200
         [<ffffffffa423512d>] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0
         [<ffffffffc0995320>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc098510e>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc098646c>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc0977338>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc099443d>] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc0977384>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc097b3a4>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc09840f1>] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp]
         [<ffffffffc099732b>] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]
      
      As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX
      softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later,
      and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides,
      sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.
      
      Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693 ("sctp: Fix
      oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command
      SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still
      used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will
      be called in this command again.
      
      To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF
      not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st
      sctp_do_sm() directly.
      Reported-by: NYing Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b563e9bb
    • D
      rxrpc: Fix net namespace cleanup · fdd36abd
      David Howells 提交于
      [ Upstream commit b13023421b5179413421333f602850914f6a7ad8 ]
      
      In rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(), there are two phases: (1) make sure the
      ->calls list is empty, emitting error messages if not, and (2) wait for the
      RCU cleanup to happen on outstanding calls (ie. ->nr_calls becomes 0).
      
      To avoid taking the call_lock, the function prechecks ->calls and if empty,
      it returns to avoid taking the lock - this is wrong, however: it still
      needs to go and do the second phase and wait for ->nr_calls to become 0.
      
      Without this, the rxrpc_net struct may get deallocated before we get to the
      RCU cleanup for the last calls.  This can lead to:
      
        Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-16k start=ffff88802b178000, len=16384
        050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 61 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkakkkkkkk
      
      Note the "61" at offset 0x58.  This corresponds to the ->nr_calls member of
      struct rxrpc_net (which is >9k in size, and thus allocated out of the 16k
      slab).
      
      Fix this by flipping the condition on the if-statement, putting the locked
      section inside the if-body and dropping the return from there.  The
      function will then always go on to wait for the RCU cleanup on outstanding
      calls.
      
      Fixes: 2baec2c3 ("rxrpc: Support network namespacing")
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      fdd36abd
    • J
      net/tls: avoid NULL pointer deref on nskb->sk in fallback · a976384b
      Jakub Kicinski 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 2dcb003314032c6efb13a065ffae60d164b2dd35 ]
      
      update_chksum() accesses nskb->sk before it has been set
      by complete_skb(), move the init up.
      
      Fixes: e8f69799 ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
      Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSimon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a976384b
    • A
      net: phy: marvell: Fix buffer overrun with stats counters · 1d412d87
      Andrew Lunn 提交于
      [ Upstream commit fdfdf86720a34527f777cbe0d8599bf0528fa146 ]
      
      marvell_get_sset_count() returns how many statistics counters there
      are. If the PHY supports fibre, there are 3, otherwise two.
      
      marvell_get_strings() does not make this distinction, and always
      returns 3 strings. This then often results in writing past the end
      of the buffer for the strings.
      
      Fixes: 2170fef7 ("Marvell phy: add field to get errors from fiber link.")
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
      Reviewed-by: NFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1d412d87
    • D
      net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc · b48a0a12
      Dan Carpenter 提交于
      [ Upstream commit f949a12fd697479f68d99dc65e9bbab68ee49043 ]
      
      The "fs->location" is a u32 that comes from the user in ethtool_set_rxnfc().
      We can't pass unclamped values to test_bit() or it results in an out of
      bounds access beyond the end of the bitmap.
      
      Fixes: 7318166c ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for ethtool::rxnfc")
      Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b48a0a12
    • E
      l2tp: use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in l2tp_udp_encap_recv() · 485f382f
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit c1c477217882c610a2ba0268f5faf36c9c092528 ]
      
      Canonical way to fetch sk_user_data from an encap_rcv() handler called
      from UDP stack in rcu protected section is to use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(),
      otherwise compiler might read it multiple times.
      
      Fixes: d00fa9ad ("il2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      485f382f
    • E
      l2ip: fix possible use-after-free · e571a339
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit a622b40035d16196bf19b2b33b854862595245fc ]
      
      Before taking a refcount on a rcu protected structure,
      we need to make sure the refcount is not zero.
      
      syzbot reported :
      
      refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.
      WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline]
      WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154
      Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
      CPU: 1 PID: 23533 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #93
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
       panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214
       __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571
       report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186
       fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline]
       fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline]
       do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272
       do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291
       invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
      RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline]
      RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154
      Code: 1d 98 2b 2a 06 31 ff 89 de e8 db 2c 40 fe 84 db 75 dd e8 92 2b 40 fe 48 c7 c7 20 7a a1 87 c6 05 78 2b 2a 06 01 e8 7d d9 12 fe <0f> 0b eb c1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41
      RSP: 0018:ffff888069f0fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286
      RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000f353 RSI: ffffffff815afcb6 RDI: ffffed100d3e1f67
      RBP: ffff888069f0fbb8 R08: ffff88809b1845c0 R09: ffffed1015d23ef1
      R10: ffffed1015d23ef0 R11: ffff8880ae91f787 R12: ffff8880a8f26968
      R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880a49a6440
       l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h:240 [inline]
       l2tp_tunnel_get+0x250/0x580 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:173
       pppol2tp_connect+0xc00/0x1c70 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:702
       __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1808
       __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1819 [inline]
       __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1816 [inline]
       __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1816
      
      Fixes: 54652eb1 ("l2tp: hold tunnel while looking up sessions in l2tp_netlink")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      e571a339
    • W
      ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode · f78ec0cd
      Willem de Bruijn 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 95c169251bf734aa555a1e8043e4d88ec97a04ec ]
      
      A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must
      fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test.
      
      Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested
      for inequality: fl1->owner != fl->owner
      
      Fixes: 4f82f457 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid* and kuid_t")
      Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f78ec0cd
    • E
      ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid() · 39eddbb7
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 6c0afef5fb0c27758f4d52b2210c61b6bd8b4470 ]
      
      syzbot was able to catch a use-after-free read in pid_nr_ns() [1]
      
      ip6fl_seq_show() seems to use RCU protection, dereferencing fl->owner.pid
      but fl_free() releases fl->owner.pid before rcu grace period is started.
      
      [1]
      
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407
      Read of size 4 at addr ffff888094012a04 by task syz-executor.0/18087
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 18087 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #89
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
       print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
       kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
       __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:131
       pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407
       ip6fl_seq_show+0x2f8/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:794
       seq_read+0xad3/0x1130 fs/seq_file.c:268
       proc_reg_read+0x1fe/0x2c0 fs/proc/inode.c:227
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline]
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:688 [inline]
       do_iter_read+0x4a9/0x660 fs/read_write.c:922
       vfs_readv+0xf0/0x160 fs/read_write.c:984
       kernel_readv fs/splice.c:358 [inline]
       default_file_splice_read+0x475/0x890 fs/splice.c:413
       do_splice_to+0x12a/0x190 fs/splice.c:876
       splice_direct_to_actor+0x2d2/0x970 fs/splice.c:953
       do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1062
       do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1443
       __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1498 [inline]
       __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1490 [inline]
       __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x15a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1490
       do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      RIP: 0033:0x458da9
      Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007f300d24bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000458da9
      RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000007
      RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 000000000000005a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f300d24c6d4
      R13: 00000000004c5fa3 R14: 00000000004da748 R15: 00000000ffffffff
      
      Allocated by task 17543:
       save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470
       kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505
       slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline]
       slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline]
       kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555
       alloc_pid+0x55/0x8f0 kernel/pid.c:168
       copy_process.part.0+0x3b08/0x7980 kernel/fork.c:1932
       copy_process kernel/fork.c:1709 [inline]
       _do_fork+0x257/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2226
       __do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2333 [inline]
       __se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2327 [inline]
       __x64_sys_clone+0xbf/0x150 kernel/fork.c:2327
       do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      Freed by task 7789:
       save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459
       kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467
       __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline]
       kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765
       put_pid.part.0+0x111/0x150 kernel/pid.c:111
       put_pid+0x20/0x30 kernel/pid.c:105
       fl_free+0xbe/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:102
       ip6_fl_gc+0x295/0x3e0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:152
       call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325
       expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline]
       __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline]
       __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline]
       run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694
       __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888094012a00
       which belongs to the cache pid_2 of size 88
      The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
       88-byte region [ffff888094012a00, ffff888094012a58)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea0002500480 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88809a483080 index:0xffff888094012980
      flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
      raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00018a3508 ffffea0002524a88 ffff88809a483080
      raw: ffff888094012980 ffff888094012000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff888094012900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff888094012980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff888094012a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
                         ^
       ffff888094012a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff888094012b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
      
      Fixes: 4f82f457 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      39eddbb7
    • E
      ipv6: fix races in ip6_dst_destroy() · 1a9e0134
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 0e2338749192ce0e52e7174c5352f627632f478a ]
      
      We had many syzbot reports that seem to be caused by use-after-free
      of struct fib6_info.
      
      ip6_dst_destroy(), fib6_drop_pcpu_from() and rt6_remove_exception()
      are writers vs rt->from, and use non consistent synchronization among
      themselves.
      
      Switching to xchg() will solve the issues with no possible
      lockdep issues.
      
      BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in atomic_dec_and_test include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:747 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:294 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:292 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:927 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_purge_rt+0x4f6/0x670 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:960
      Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000ffffb4 by task syz-executor.1/7649
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 7649 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #183
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
       kasan_report.cold+0x5/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:321
       check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
       check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191
       kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:108
       atomic_dec_and_test include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:747 [inline]
       fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:294 [inline]
       fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:292 [inline]
       fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:927 [inline]
       fib6_purge_rt+0x4f6/0x670 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:960
       fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1813 [inline]
       fib6_del+0xac2/0x10a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1844
       fib6_clean_node+0x3a8/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2006
       fib6_walk_continue+0x495/0x900 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1928
       fib6_walk+0x9d/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1976
       fib6_clean_tree+0xe0/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2055
       __fib6_clean_all+0x118/0x2a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2071
       fib6_clean_all+0x2b/0x40 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2082
       rt6_sync_down_dev+0x134/0x150 net/ipv6/route.c:4057
       rt6_disable_ip+0x27/0x5f0 net/ipv6/route.c:4062
       addrconf_ifdown+0xa2/0x1220 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3705
       addrconf_notify+0x19a/0x2260 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3630
       notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
       __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
       raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
       call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1753
       call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
       call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1779 [inline]
       dev_close_many+0x33f/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:1522
       rollback_registered_many+0x43b/0xfd0 net/core/dev.c:8177
       rollback_registered+0x109/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8242
       unregister_netdevice_queue net/core/dev.c:9289 [inline]
       unregister_netdevice_queue+0x1ee/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:9282
       unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2658 [inline]
       __tun_detach+0xd5b/0x1000 drivers/net/tun.c:727
       tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:744 [inline]
       tun_chr_close+0xe0/0x180 drivers/net/tun.c:3443
       __fput+0x2e5/0x8d0 fs/file_table.c:278
       ____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309
       task_work_run+0x14a/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113
       exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
       do_exit+0x90a/0x2fa0 kernel/exit.c:876
       do_group_exit+0x135/0x370 kernel/exit.c:980
       __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:991 [inline]
       __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:989 [inline]
       __x64_sys_exit_group+0x44/0x50 kernel/exit.c:989
       do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      RIP: 0033:0x458da9
      Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007ffeafc2a6a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001c RCX: 0000000000458da9
      RDX: 0000000000412a80 RSI: 0000000000a54ef0 RDI: 0000000000000043
      RBP: 00000000004be552 R08: 000000000000000c R09: 000000000004c0d1
      R10: 0000000002341940 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
      R13: 00007ffeafc2a7f0 R14: 000000000004c065 R15: 00007ffeafc2a800
      
      Fixes: a68886a6 ("net/ipv6: Make from in rt6_info rcu protected")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1a9e0134
    • M
      ipv6: A few fixes on dereferencing rt->from · 7ea4f000
      Martin KaFai Lau 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 886b7a50100a50f1cbd08a6f8ec5884dfbe082dc ]
      
      It is a followup after the fix in
      commit 9c69a1320515 ("route: Avoid crash from dereferencing NULL rt->from")
      
      rt6_do_redirect():
      1. NULL checking is needed on rt->from because a parallel
         fib6_info delete could happen that sets rt->from to NULL.
         (e.g. rt6_remove_exception() and fib6_drop_pcpu_from()).
      
      2. fib6_info_hold() is not enough.  Same reason as (1).
         Meaning, holding dst->__refcnt cannot ensure
         rt->from is not NULL or rt->from->fib6_ref is not 0.
      
         Instead of using fib6_info_hold_safe() which ip6_rt_cache_alloc()
         is already doing, this patch chooses to extend the rcu section
         to keep "from" dereference-able after checking for NULL.
      
      inet6_rtm_getroute():
      1. NULL checking is also needed on rt->from for a similar reason.
         Note that inet6_rtm_getroute() is using RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED.
      
      Fixes: a68886a6 ("net/ipv6: Make from in rt6_info rcu protected")
      Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7ea4f000
    • S
      ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation · 3f611a47
      Shmulik Ladkani 提交于
      [ Upstream commit d2f0c961148f65bc73eda72b9fa3a4e80973cb49 ]
      
      Previously, during fragmentation after forwarding, skb->skb_iif isn't
      preserved, i.e. 'ip_copy_metadata' does not copy skb_iif from given
      'from' skb.
      
      As a result, ip_do_fragment's creates fragments with zero skb_iif,
      leading to inconsistent behavior.
      
      Assume for example an eBPF program attached at tc egress (post
      forwarding) that examines __sk_buff->ingress_ifindex:
       - the correct iif is observed if forwarding path does not involve
         fragmentation/refragmentation
       - a bogus iif is observed if forwarding path involves
         fragmentation/refragmentatiom
      
      Fix, by preserving skb_iif during 'ip_copy_metadata'.
      Signed-off-by: NShmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3f611a47
  2. 04 5月, 2019 22 次提交