As a interrupt controller used on some of hisilicon SOCs(660,1610 etc.),
mbigen driver should be enabled when CONFIG_ARCH_HISI is enabled.
Signed-off-by: NMa Jun <majun258@huawei.com>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com
Cc: jason@lakedaemon.net
Cc: marc.zyngier@arm.com
Cc: Catalin.Marinas@arm.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: Will.Deacon@arm.com
Cc: huxinwei@huawei.com
Cc: lizefan@huawei.com
Cc: dingtianhong@huawei.com
Cc: zhaojunhua@hisilicon.com
Cc: liguozhu@hisilicon.com
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458723993-21044-2-git-send-email-majun258@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

When calculate_cpu_foreign_map() recalculates the cpu_foreign_map
cpumask it uses the local variable temp_foreign_map without initialising
it to zero. Since the calculation only ever sets bits in this cpumask
any existing bits at that memory location will remain set and find their
way into cpu_foreign_map too. This could potentially lead to cache
operations suboptimally doing smp calls to multiple VPEs in the same
core, even though the VPEs share primary caches.

Therefore initialise temp_foreign_map using cpumask_clear() before use.

Fixes: cccf34e9 ("MIPS: c-r4k: Fix cache flushing for MT cores")
Signed-off-by: NJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/12759/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

The MIPS_GIC_IPI should only be selected when MIPS_GIC is also
selected, otherwise it results in a compile error. smp-gic.c uses some
functions from include/linux/irqchip/mips-gic.h like
plat_ipi_call_int_xlate() which are only added to the header file when
MIPS_GIC is set. The Lantiq SoC does not use the GIC, but supports SMP.
The calls top the functions from smp-gic.c are already protected by
some #ifdefs

The first part of this was introduced in commit 72e20142 ("MIPS:
Move GIC IPI functions out of smp-cmp.c")
Signed-off-by: NHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/12774/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Ingenic SoC declares ZBOOT support, but debug definitions are missing
for MACH_JZ4780 resulting in a build failure when DEBUG_ZBOOT is set.
The UART addresses are same as with JZ4740, so fix by covering JZ4780
with those as well.
Signed-off-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/12830/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

A few new AVX-512 instruction groups/features are added in cpufeatures.h
for enuermation: AVX512DQ, AVX512BW, and AVX512VL.

Clear the flags in fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps().

The specification for latest AVX-512 including the features can be found at:

  https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/07/b7/319433-023.pdf

Note, I didn't enable the flags in KVM. Hopefully the KVM guys can pick up
the flags and enable them in KVM.
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457667498-37357-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
[ Added more detailed feature descriptions. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Some machines have EFI regions in page zero (physical address
0x00000000) and historically that region has been added to the e820
map via trim_bios_range(), and ultimately mapped into the kernel page
tables. It was not mapped via efi_map_regions() as one would expect.

Alexis reports that with the new separate EFI page tables some boot
services regions, such as page zero, are not mapped. This triggers an
oops during the SetVirtualAddressMap() runtime call.

For the EFI boot services quirk on x86 we need to memblock_reserve()
boot services regions until after SetVirtualAddressMap(). Doing that
while respecting the ownership of regions that may have already been
reserved by the kernel was the motivation behind this commit:

  7d68dc3f ("x86, efi: Do not reserve boot services regions within reserved areas")

That patch was merged at a time when the EFI runtime virtual mappings
were inserted into the kernel page tables as described above, and the
trick of setting ->numpages (and hence the region size) to zero to
track regions that should not be freed in efi_free_boot_services()
meant that we never mapped those regions in efi_map_regions(). Instead
we were relying solely on the existing kernel mappings.

Now that we have separate page tables we need to make sure the EFI
boot services regions are mapped correctly, even if someone else has
already called memblock_reserve(). Instead of stashing a tag in
->numpages, set the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME bit of ->attribute. Since it
generally makes no sense to mark a boot services region as required at
runtime, it's pretty much guaranteed the firmware will not have
already set this bit.

For the record, the specific circumstances under which Alexis
triggered this bug was that an EFI runtime driver on his machine was
responding to the EVT_SIGNAL_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_CHANGE event during
SetVirtualAddressMap().

The event handler for this driver looks like this,

  sub rsp,0x28
  lea rdx,[rip+0x2445] # 0xaa948720
  mov ecx,0x4
  call func_aa9447c0  ; call to ConvertPointer(4, & 0xaa948720)
  mov r11,QWORD PTR [rip+0x2434] # 0xaa948720
  xor eax,eax
  mov BYTE PTR [r11+0x1],0x1
  add rsp,0x28
  ret

Which is pretty typical code for an EVT_SIGNAL_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_CHANGE
handler. The "mov r11, QWORD PTR [rip+0x2424]" was the faulting
instruction because ConvertPointer() was being called to convert the
address 0x0000000000000000, which when converted is left unchanged and
remains 0x0000000000000000.

The output of the oops trace gave the impression of a standard NULL
pointer dereference bug, but because we're accessing physical
addresses during ConvertPointer(), it wasn't. EFI boot services code
is stored at that address on Alexis' machine.
Reported-by: NAlexis Murzeau <amurzeau@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@canonical.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Raphael Hertzog <hertzog@debian.org>
Cc: Roger Shimizu <rogershimizu@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457695163-29632-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=815125Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

i486 derived cores like Intel Quark support only the very old,
legacy x87 FPU (FSAVE/FRSTOR, CPUID bit FXSR is not set), and
our FPU code wasn't handling the saving and restoring there
properly in the 'eagerfpu' case.

So after we made eagerfpu the default for all CPU types:

  58122bf1 x86/fpu: Default eagerfpu=on on all CPUs

these old FPU designs broke. First, Andy Shevchenko reported a splat:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 823 at arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:163 fpu__clear+0x8c/0x160

which was us trying to execute FXRSTOR on those machines even though
they don't support it.

After taking care of that, Bryan O'Donoghue reported that a simple FPU
test still failed because we weren't initializing the FPU state properly
on those machines.

Take care of all that.
Reported-and-tested-by: NBryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie>
Reported-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160311113206.GD4312@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When the Crypto SRAM mappings were added to the Device Tree files
describing the Armada XP boards in commit c466d997 ("ARM: mvebu:
define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-xp boards"), the fact that
those mappings were overlaping with the PCIe memory aperture was
overlooked. Due to this, we currently have for all Armada XP platforms
a situation that looks like this:

Memory mapping on Armada XP boards with internal registers at
0xf1000000:

 - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000	3.75G 	RAM
 - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000	16M	NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB)
 - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000	1M	internal registers
 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000	126M	PCIe memory aperture
 - 0xf8100000 -> 0xf8110000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #0	=> OVERLAPS WITH PCIE !
 - 0xf8110000 -> 0xf8120000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #1	=> OVERLAPS WITH PCIE !
 - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000	1M	PCIe I/O aperture
 - 0xfff0000  -> 0xffffffff	1M	BootROM

The overlap means that when PCIe devices are added, depending on their
memory window needs, they might or might not be mapped into the
physical address space. Indeed, they will not be mapped if the area
allocated in the PCIe memory aperture by the PCI core overlaps with
one of the Crypto SRAM. Typically, a Intel IGB PCIe NIC that needs 8MB
of PCIe memory will see its PCIe memory window allocated from
0xf80000000 for 8MB, which overlaps with the Crypto SRAM windows. Due
to this, the PCIe window is not created, and any attempt to access the
PCIe window makes the kernel explode:

[    3.302213] igb: Copyright (c) 2007-2014 Intel Corporation.
[    3.307841] pci 0000:00:09.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0143)
[    3.313539] mvebu_mbus: cannot add window '4:f8', conflicts with another window
[    3.320870] mvebu-pcie soc:pcie-controller: Could not create MBus window at [mem 0xf8000000-0xf87fffff]: -22
[    3.330811] Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1008) at 0xf08c0018

This problem does not occur on Armada 370 boards, because we use the
following memory mapping (for boards that have internal registers at
0xf1000000):

 - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000	3.75G 	RAM
 - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000	16M	NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB)
 - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000	1M	internal registers
 - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #0 => OK !
 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000	126M	PCIe memory
 - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000	1M	PCIe I/O
 - 0xfff0000  -> 0xffffffff	1M	BootROM

Obviously, the solution is to align the location of the Crypto SRAM
mappings of Armada XP to be similar with the ones on Armada 370, i.e
have them between the "internal registers" area and the beginning of
the PCIe aperture.

However, we have a special case with the OpenBlocks AX3-4 platform,
which has a 128 MB NOR flash. Currently, this NOR flash is mapped from
0xf0000000 to 0xf8000000. This is possible because on OpenBlocks
AX3-4, the internal registers are not at 0xf1000000. And this explains
why the Crypto SRAM mappings were not configured at the same place on
Armada XP.

Hence, the solution is two-fold:

 (1) Move the NOR flash mapping on Armada XP OpenBlocks AX3-4 from
     0xe8000000 to 0xf0000000. This frees the 0xf0000000 ->
     0xf80000000 space.

 (2) Move the Crypto SRAM mappings on Armada XP to be similar to
     Armada 370 (except of course that Armada XP has two Crypto SRAM
     and not one).

After this patch, the memory mapping on Armada XP boards with
registers at 0xf1 is:

 - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000	3.75G 	RAM
 - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000	16M	NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB)
 - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000	1M	internal registers
 - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #0
 - 0xf1110000 -> 0xf1120000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #1
 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000	126M	PCIe memory
 - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000	1M	PCIe I/O
 - 0xfff0000  -> 0xffffffff	1M	BootROM

And the memory mapping for the special case of the OpenBlocks AX3-4
(internal registers at 0xd0000000, NOR of 128 MB):

 - 0x00000000 -> 0xc0000000	3G 	RAM
 - 0xd0000000 -> 0xd1000000	1M	internal registers
 - 0xe800000  -> 0xf0000000	128M	NOR flash
 - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #0
 - 0xf1110000 -> 0xf1120000	64KB	Crypto SRAM #1
 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000	126M	PCIe memory
 - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000	1M	PCIe I/O
 - 0xfff0000  -> 0xffffffff	1M	BootROM

Fixes: c466d997 ("ARM: mvebu: define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-xp boards")
Reported-by: NPhil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Cc: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: NGregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: NOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>

Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.

By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.

This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.

The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.

Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.

This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
Signed-off-by: NHector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: NIsmael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.esSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Commit abd4f750 ("x86: i386-show-unhandled-signals-v3") did turn on
the showing-unhandled-signal behaviour for i386 for some exception handlers,
but for no reason do_trap() is left out (my naive guess is because turning it on
for do_trap() would be too noisy since do_trap() is shared by several exceptions).

And since the same commit make "show_unhandled_signals" a debug tunable(in
/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace), and x86 by default turning it on.

So it would be strange for i386 users who turing it on manually and expect
seeing the unhandled signal output in log, but nothing.

This patch turns it on for i386 in do_trap() as well.
Signed-off-by: NJianyu Zhan <nasa4836@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: heukelum@fastmail.fm
Cc: jbeulich@novell.com
Cc: jdike@addtoit.com
Cc: joe@perches.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457612398-4568-1-git-send-email-nasa4836@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We do use this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss) as a cacheline-aligned, seldomly
accessed per-cpu var as the MONITORX target in delay_mwaitx(). However,
when called in preemptible context, this_cpu_ptr -> smp_processor_id() ->
debug_smp_processor_id() fires:

  BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: udevd/312
  caller is delay_mwaitx+0x40/0xa0

But we don't care about that check - we only need cpu_tss as a MONITORX
target and it doesn't really matter which CPU's var we're touching as
we're going idle anyway. Fix that.
Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: spg_linux_kernel@amd.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160309205622.GG6564@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

KVM has special logic to handle pages with pte.u=1 and pte.w=0 when
CR0.WP=1.  These pages' SPTEs flip continuously between two states:
U=1/W=0 (user and supervisor reads allowed, supervisor writes not allowed)
and U=0/W=1 (supervisor reads and writes allowed, user writes not allowed).

When SMEP is in effect, however, U=0 will enable kernel execution of
this page.  To avoid this, KVM also sets NX=1 in the shadow PTE together
with U=0, making the two states U=1/W=0/NX=gpte.NX and U=0/W=1/NX=1.
When guest EFER has the NX bit cleared, the reserved bit check thinks
that the latter state is invalid; teach it that the smep_andnot_wp case
will also use the NX bit of SPTEs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NXiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.inel.com>
Fixes: c258b62bSigned-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Yes, all of these are needed. :) This is admittedly a bit odd, but
kvm-unit-tests access.flat tests this if you run it with "-cpu host"
and of course ept=0.

KVM runs the guest with CR0.WP=1, so it must handle supervisor writes
specially when pte.u=1/pte.w=0/CR0.WP=0.  Such writes cause a fault
when U=1 and W=0 in the SPTE, but they must succeed because CR0.WP=0.
When KVM gets the fault, it sets U=0 and W=1 in the shadow PTE and
restarts execution.  This will still cause a user write to fault, while
supervisor writes will succeed.  User reads will fault spuriously now,
and KVM will then flip U and W again in the SPTE (U=1, W=0).  User reads
will be enabled and supervisor writes disabled, going back to the
originary situation where supervisor writes fault spuriously.

When SMEP is in effect, however, U=0 will enable kernel execution of
this page.  To avoid this, KVM also sets NX=1 in the shadow PTE together
with U=0.  If the guest has not enabled NX, the result is a continuous
stream of page faults due to the NX bit being reserved.

The fix is to force EFER.NX=1 even if the CPU is taking care of the EFER
switch.  (All machines with SMEP have the CPU_LOAD_IA32_EFER vm-entry
control, so they do not use user-return notifiers for EFER---if they did,
EFER.NX would be forced to the same value as the host).

There is another bug in the reserved bit check, which I've split to a
separate patch for easier application to stable kernels.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NXiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: f6577a5fSigned-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Now that slow-path syscalls always enter C before enabling
interrupts, it's straightforward to call enter_from_user_mode() before
enabling interrupts rather than doing it as part of entry tracing.

With this change, we should finally be able to retire exception_enter().

This will also enable optimizations based on knowing that we never
change context tracking state with interrupts on.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bc376ecf87921a495e874ff98139b1ca2f5c5dd7.1457558566.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We want all of the syscall entries to run with interrupts off so that
we can efficiently run context tracking before enabling interrupts.

This will regress int $0x80 performance on 32-bit kernels by a
couple of cycles.  This shouldn't matter much -- int $0x80 is not a
fast path.

This effectively reverts:

  657c1eea ("x86/entry/32: Fix entry_INT80_32() to expect interrupts to be on")

... and fixes the same issue differently.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59b4f90c9ebfccd8c937305dbbbca680bc74b905.1457558566.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Leonid Shatz noticed that the SDM interpretation of the following
recent commit:

  394db20c ("x86/fpu: Disable AVX when eagerfpu is off")

... is incorrect and that the original behavior of the FPU code was correct.

Because AVX is not stated in CR0 TS bit description, it was mistakenly
believed to be not supported for lazy context switch. This turns out
to be false:

  Intel Software Developer's Manual Vol. 3A, Sec. 2.5 Control Registers:

   'TS Task Switched bit (bit 3 of CR0) -- Allows the saving of the x87 FPU/
    MMX/SSE/SSE2/SSE3/SSSE3/SSE4 context on a task switch to be delayed until
    an x87 FPU/MMX/SSE/SSE2/SSE3/SSSE3/SSE4 instruction is actually executed
    by the new task.'

  Intel Software Developer's Manual Vol. 2A, Sec. 2.4 Instruction Exception
  Specification:

   'AVX instructions refer to exceptions by classes that include #NM
    "Device Not Available" exception for lazy context switch.'

So revert the commit.
Reported-by: NLeonid Shatz <leonid.shatz@ravellosystems.com>
Signed-off-by: NYu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457569734-3785-1-git-send-email-yu-cheng.yu@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Ingo suggested that the comments should explain when the various
entries are used.  This adds these explanations and improves other
parts of the comments.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9524ecef7a295347294300045d08354d6a57c6e7.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now that SYSENTER with TF set puts X86_EFLAGS_TF directly into
regs->flags, we don't need a TIF_SINGLESTEP fixup in the syscall
entry code.  Remove it.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d15f24da52dafc9d2f0b8d76f55544f4779c517.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The first instruction of the SYSENTER entry runs on its own tiny
stack.  That stack can be used if a #DB or NMI is delivered before
the SYSENTER prologue switches to a real stack.

We have code in place to prevent us from overflowing the tiny stack.
For added paranoia, add a canary to the stack and check it in
do_debug() -- that way, if something goes wrong with the #DB logic,
we'll eventually notice.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6ff9a806f39098b166dc2c41c1db744df5272f29.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI.  On x86_32, there's no IST,
so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack.

Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch
off the stack quickly when this happens.  The old fixup had several issues:

 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP.  This wasn't
    obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1].

 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the
    stack frame.  I'm not convinced this digging was correct.

 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back.  Instead, it
    synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET
    back to the SYSENTER code.  That frame was highly questionable.
    For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively
    abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was
    frightening.  For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the
    FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time
    PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic
    flags were clobbered.

Simplify this considerably.  Instead of looking at the saved frame
to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against
the SYSENTER stack directly.  Malicious user code cannot spoof the
kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can
use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses.

With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally
passes on 32-bit kernels.

[1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86
    shenanigans as far as I can tell.  A user can't point EIP at
    entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32,
    like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus
    violate the CS segment limit.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The SYSENTER stack is only used on 32-bit kernels.  Remove it on 64-bit kernels.

( We may end up using it down the road on 64-bit kernels. If so,
  we'll re-enable it for CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION. )
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9dbd18429f9ff61a76b6eda97a9ea20510b9f6ba.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step).

As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step
through the kernel until something clears TF.  There is absolutely
nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1].

Simplify the handling considerably with two changes:

  1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC.  We can
     add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever.

  2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue.

That's all we need to do.

Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit
kernels.  There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but
the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first
instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite
correctly.  The next two patches will fix that.

[1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and
    making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER
    code.  Needless to say, this is a bad idea.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Leaving any bits set in DR6 on return from a debug exception is
asking for trouble.  Prevent it by writing zero right away and
clarify the comment.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3857676e1be8fb27db4b89bbb1e2052b7f435ff4.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The SDM says that debug exceptions clear BTF, and we need to keep
TIF_BLOCKSTEP in sync with BTF.  Clear it unconditionally and improve
the comment.

I suspect that the fact that kmemcheck could cause TIF_BLOCKSTEP not
to be cleared was just an oversight.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa86e55d196e6dde5b38839595bde2a292c52fdc.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We weren't restoring FLAGS at all on SYSEXIT.  Apparently no one cared.

With this patch applied, native kernels should always honor
task_pt_regs()->flags, which opens the door for some sys_iopl()
cleanups.  I'll do those as a separate series, though, since getting
it right will involve tweaking some paravirt ops.

( The short version is that, before this patch, sys_iopl(), invoked via
  SYSENTER, wasn't guaranteed to ever transfer the updated
  regs->flags, so sys_iopl() had to change the hardware flags register
  as well. )
Reported-by: NBrian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3f98b207472dc9784838eb5ca2b89dcc845ce269.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This makes the 32-bit code work just like the 64-bit code.  It should
speed up syscalls on 32-bit kernels on Skylake by something like 20
cycles (by analogy to the 64-bit compat case).

It also cleans up NT just like we do for the 64-bit case.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/07daef3d44bd1ed62a2c866e143e8df64edb40ee.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

CLAC is slow, and the SYSENTER code already has an unlikely path
that runs if unusual flags are set.  Drop the CLAC and instead rely
on the unlikely path to clear AC.

This seems to save ~24 cycles on my Skylake laptop.  (Hey, Intel,
make this faster please!)
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/90d6db2189f9add83bc7bddd75a0c19ebbd676b2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The fork of a process with four page table levels is broken since
git commit 6252d702 "[S390] dynamic page tables."

All new mm contexts are created with three page table levels and
an asce limit of 4TB. If the parent has four levels dup_mmap will
add vmas to the new context which are outside of the asce limit.
The subsequent call to copy_page_range will walk the three level
page table structure of the new process with non-zero pgd and pud
indexes. This leads to memory clobbers as the pgd_index *and* the
pud_index is added to the mm->pgd pointer without a pgd_deref
in between.

The init_new_context() function is selecting the number of page
table levels for a new context. The function is used by mm_init()
which in turn is called by dup_mm() and mm_alloc(). These two are
used by fork() and exec(). The init_new_context() function can
distinguish the two cases by looking at mm->context.asce_limit,
for fork() the mm struct has been copied and the number of page
table levels may not change. For exec() the mm_alloc() function
set the new mm structure to zero, in this case a three-level page
table is created as the temporary stack space is located at
STACK_TOP_MAX = 4TB.

This fixes CVE-2016-2143.
Reported-by: NMarcin Kościelnicki <koriakin@0x04.net>
Reviewed-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning.

In the case of cpuidle, CPUs exit the kernel a number of levels deep in
C code.  Any instrumented functions on this critical path will leave
portions of the stack shadow poisoned.

If CPUs lose context and return to the kernel via a cold path, we
restore a prior context saved in __cpu_suspend_enter are forgotten, and
we never remove the poison they placed in the stack shadow area by
functions calls between this and the actual exit of the kernel.

Thus, (depending on stackframe layout) subsequent calls to instrumented
functions may hit this stale poison, resulting in (spurious) KASAN
splats to the console.

To avoid this, clear any stale poison from the idle thread for a CPU
prior to bringing a CPU online.
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: NLorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 66b3923a ("arm64: hugetlb: add support for PTE contiguous bit")
introduced support for huge pages using the contiguous bit in the PTE
as opposed to block mappings, which may be slightly unwieldy (512M) in
64k page configurations.

Unfortunately, this support has resulted in some late regressions when
running the libhugetlbfs test suite with 64k pages and CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
as a result of a BUG:

 | readback (2M: 64):	------------[ cut here ]------------
 | kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:446!
 | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
 | Modules linked in:
 | CPU: 7 PID: 1448 Comm: readback Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7 #148
 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 | task: fffffe0040964b00 ti: fffffe00c2668000 task.ti: fffffe00c2668000
 | PC is at remove_inode_hugepages+0x44c/0x480
 | LR is at remove_inode_hugepages+0x264/0x480

Rather than revert the entire patch, simply avoid advertising the
contiguous huge page sizes for now while people are actively working on
a fix. This patch can then be reverted once things have been sorted out.

Cc: David Woods <dwoods@ezchip.com>
Reported-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

Commit dfd55ad8 ("arm64: vmemmap: use virtual projection of linear
region") fixed an issue where the struct page array would overflow into the
adjacent virtual memory region if system RAM was placed so high up in
physical memory that its addresses were not representable in the build time
configured virtual address size.

However, the fix failed to take into account that the vmemmap region needs
to be relatively aligned with respect to the sparsemem section size, so that
a sequence of page structs corresponding with a sparsemem section in the
linear region appears naturally aligned in the vmemmap region.

So round up vmemmap to sparsemem section size. Since this essentially moves
the projection of the linear region up in memory, also revert the reduction
of the size of the vmemmap region.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: dfd55ad8 ("arm64: vmemmap: use virtual projection of linear region")
Tested-by: NMark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDavid Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Tested-by: NRobert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

Rename dma_*_writecombine() to dma_*_wc(), so that the naming
is coherent across the various write-combining APIs. Keep the
old names for compatibility for a while, these can be removed
at a later time. A guard is left to enable backporting of the
rename, and later remove of the old mapping defines seemlessly.

Build tested successfully with allmodconfig.

The following Coccinelle SmPL patch was used for this simple
transformation:

@ rename_dma_alloc_writecombine @
expression dev, size, dma_addr, gfp;
@@

-dma_alloc_writecombine(dev, size, dma_addr, gfp)
+dma_alloc_wc(dev, size, dma_addr, gfp)

@ rename_dma_free_writecombine @
expression dev, size, cpu_addr, dma_addr;
@@

-dma_free_writecombine(dev, size, cpu_addr, dma_addr)
+dma_free_wc(dev, size, cpu_addr, dma_addr)

@ rename_dma_mmap_writecombine @
expression dev, vma, cpu_addr, dma_addr, size;
@@

-dma_mmap_writecombine(dev, vma, cpu_addr, dma_addr, size)
+dma_mmap_wc(dev, vma, cpu_addr, dma_addr, size)

We also keep the old names as compatibility helpers, and
guard against their definition to make backporting easier.

Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: airlied@linux.ie
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: julia.lawall@lip6.fr
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: mst@redhat.com
Cc: tomi.valkeinen@ti.com
Cc: toshi.kani@hp.com
Cc: vinod.koul@intel.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453516462-4844-1-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Sync it to the Kconfig default for 32-bit.
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: tim.gardner@canonical.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160309134821.GD6564@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

After fixing FPU option parsing, we now parse the 'no387' boot option
too early: no387 clears X86_FEATURE_FPU before it's even probed, so
the boot CPU promptly re-enables it.

I suspect it gets even more confused on SMP.

Fix the probing code to leave X86_FEATURE_FPU off if it's been
disabled by setup_clear_cpu_cap().
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Fixes: 4f81cbaf ("x86/fpu: Fix early FPU command-line parsing")
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Make use of the EXTABLE_FAULT exception table entries to write
a kernel copy routine that doesn't crash the system if it
encounters a machine check. Prime use case for this is to copy
from large arrays of non-volatile memory used as storage.

We have to use an unrolled copy loop for now because current
hardware implementations treat a machine check in "rep mov"
as fatal. When that is fixed we can simplify.

Return type is a "bool". True means that we copied OK, false means
that it didn't.
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a44e1055efc2d2a9473307b22c91caa437aa3f8b.1456439214.git.tony.luck@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Drop the quirk() function pointer in favor of a simple boolean which
says whether the quirk should be applied or not. Update comment while at
it.
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Harish Chegondi <harish.chegondi@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160308164041.GF16568@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

It no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86_64 has very clean espfix handling on paravirt: espfix64 is set
up in native_iret, so paravirt systems that override iret bypass
espfix64 automatically.  This is robust and straightforward.

x86_32 is messier.  espfix is set up before the IRET paravirt patch
point, so it can't be directly conditionalized on whether we use
native_iret.  We also can't easily move it into native_iret without
regressing performance due to a bizarre consideration.  Specifically,
on 64-bit kernels, the logic is:

  if (regs->ss & 0x4)
          setup_espfix;

On 32-bit kernels, the logic is:

  if ((regs->ss & 0x4) && (regs->cs & 0x3) == 3 &&
      (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) == 0)
          setup_espfix;

The performance of setup_espfix itself is essentially irrelevant, but
the comparison happens on every IRET so its performance matters.  On
x86_64, there's no need for any registers except flags to implement
the comparison, so we fold the whole thing into native_iret.  On
x86_32, we don't do that because we need a free register to
implement the comparison efficiently.  We therefore do espfix setup
before restoring registers on x86_32.

This patch gets rid of the explicit paravirt_enabled check by
introducing X86_BUG_ESPFIX on 32-bit systems and using an ALTERNATIVE
to skip espfix on paravirt systems where iret != native_iret.  This is
also messy, but it's at least in line with other things we do.

This improves espfix performance by removing a branch, but no one
cares.  More importantly, it removes a paravirt_enabled user, which is
good because paravirt_enabled is ill-defined and is going away.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

ignore_nmis is used in two distinct places:

 1. modified through {stop,restart}_nmi by alternative_instructions
 2. read by do_nmi to determine if default_do_nmi should be called or not

thus the access pattern conforms to __read_mostly and do_nmi() is a fastpath.
Signed-off-by: NKostenzer Felix <fkostenzer@live.at>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

With MACHINE_HAS_VX, we convert the floating point registers from the
vector registeres when storing the status. For other VCPUs, these are
stored to vcpu->run->s.regs.vrs, but we are using current->thread.fpu.vxrs,
which resolves to the currently loaded VCPU.

So kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() currently writes the wrong floating
point registers (converted from the vector registers) when called from
another VCPU on a z13.

This is only the case for old user space not handling SIGP STORE STATUS and
SIGP STOP AND STORE STATUS, but relying on the kernel implementation. All
other calls come from the loaded VCPU via kvm_s390_store_status().

Fixes: 9abc2a08 (KVM: s390: fix memory overwrites when vx is disabled)
Reviewed-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>