- 03 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 提交于
Expose the CPUID.7.EDX[31] bit to the guest, and also guard against various combinations of SPEC_CTRL MSR values. The handling of the MSR (to take into account the host value of SPEC_CTRL Bit(2)) is taken care of in patch: KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 17 3月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Wanpeng Li 提交于
If host CPUs are dedicated to a VM, we can avoid VM exits on HLT. This patch adds the per-VM capability to disable them. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Janakarajan Natarajan 提交于
Add support for AMD Core Performance counters in the guest. The base event select and counter MSRs are changed. In addition, with the core extension, there are 2 extra counters available for performance measurements for a total of 6. With the new MSRs, the logic to map them to the gp_counters[] is changed. New functions are added to check the validity of the get/set MSRs. If the guest has the X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE cpuid flag set, the number of counters available to the vcpu is set to 6. It the flag is not set then it is 4. Signed-off-by: NJanakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> [Squashed "Expose AMD Core Perf Extension flag to guests" - Radim.] Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 24 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Radim Krčmář 提交于
Guests on new hypersiors might set KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT bit when enabling async_PF, but this bit is reserved on old hypervisors, which results in a failure upon migration. To avoid breaking different cases, we are checking for CPUID feature bit before enabling the feature and nothing else. Fixes: 52a5c155 ("KVM: async_pf: Let guest support delivery of async_pf from guest mode") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 04 2月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 KarimAllah Ahmed 提交于
[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ] Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach. To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring when a non-zero is written to it. No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest. [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset] Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NDarren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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由 KarimAllah Ahmed 提交于
Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-4-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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由 Ashok Raj 提交于
The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing later ones. Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID enumeration, IBPB is very different. IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate - Either it can be compiled with retpoline - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then there is a IBPB in that path. (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted in some tsc calibration woes in guest. * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on every VMEXIT. Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations available like RSB stuffing/clearing. * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration and control. Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] [karahmed: - rebase - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] - vmx: support nested] [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] Signed-off-by: NAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-3-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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由 KarimAllah Ahmed 提交于
[dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too] Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-2-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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- 01 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Stanislav Lanci 提交于
This patch allow to enable x86 feature TOPOEXT. This is needed to provide information about SMT on AMD Zen CPUs to the guest. Signed-off-by: NStanislav Lanci <pixo@polepetko.eu> Tested-by: NNick Sarnie <commendsarnex@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 16 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Wanpeng Li 提交于
When running on a virtual machine, IPIs are expensive when the target CPU is sleeping. Thus, it is nice to be able to avoid them for TLB shootdowns. KVM can just do the flush via INVVPID on the guest's behalf the next time the CPU is scheduled. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> [Use "&" to test the bit instead of "==". - Paolo] Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 14 12月, 2017 4 次提交
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由 Yang Zhong 提交于
Intel IceLake cpu has added new cpu features,AVX512_VBMI2/GFNI/ VAES/VPCLMULQDQ/AVX512_VNNI/AVX512_BITALG. Those new cpu features need expose to guest VM. The bit definition: CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 06] AVX512_VBMI2 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 08] GFNI CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 09] VAES CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 10] VPCLMULQDQ CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 11] AVX512_VNNI CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 12] AVX512_BITALG The release document ref below link: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/c5/15/\ architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.pdf The kernel dependency commit in kvm.git: (c128dbfa) Signed-off-by: NYang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
This is encoded as F3 0F C7 /7 with a register argument. The register argument is the second array in the group9 GroupDual, while F3 is the fourth element of a Prefix. Reviewed-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
The User-Mode Instruction Prevention feature present in recent Intel processor prevents a group of instructions (sgdt, sidt, sldt, smsw, and str) from being executed with CPL > 0. Otherwise, a general protection fault is issued. UMIP instructions in general are also able to trigger vmexits, so we can actually emulate UMIP on older processors. This commit sets up the infrastructure so that kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko can set the UMIP feature bit for CPUID even if the feature is not actually available in hardware. Reviewed-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Add the CPUID bits, make the CR4.UMIP bit not reserved anymore, and add UMIP support for instructions that are already emulated by KVM. Reviewed-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 05 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Brijesh Singh 提交于
This CPUID leaf provides the memory encryption support information on AMD Platform. Its complete description is available in APM volume 2, Section 15.34 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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- 25 8月, 2017 4 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
If the host has protection keys disabled, we cannot read and write the guest PKRU---RDPKRU and WRPKRU fail with #GP(0) if CR4.PKE=0. Block the PKU cpuid bit in that case. This ensures that guest_CR4.PKE=1 implies host_CR4.PKE=1. Fixes: 1be0e61c Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Yu Zhang 提交于
This patch exposes 5 level page table feature to the VM. At the same time, the canonical virtual address checking is extended to support both 48-bits and 57-bits address width. Signed-off-by: NYu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Yu Zhang 提交于
Extends the shadow paging code, so that 5 level shadow page table can be constructed if VM is running in 5 level paging mode. Also extends the ept code, so that 5 level ept table can be constructed if maxphysaddr of VM exceeds 48 bits. Unlike the shadow logic, KVM should still use 4 level ept table for a VM whose physical address width is less than 48 bits, even when the VM is running in 5 level paging mode. Signed-off-by: NYu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> [Unconditionally reset the MMU context in kvm_cpuid_update. Changing MAXPHYADDR invalidates the reserved bit bitmasks. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Yu Zhang 提交于
Return false in kvm_cpuid() when it fails to find the cpuid entry. Also, this routine(and its caller) is optimized with a new argument - check_limit, so that the check_cpuid_limit() fall back can be avoided. Signed-off-by: NYu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 08 6月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Wanpeng Li 提交于
If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds read and write. Luckily, the effect is small: /* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */ for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; if (ej->function == e->function) { It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled. However... ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; After cpuid_entries there is int maxphyaddr; struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt; /* 16-byte aligned */ So we have: - cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992) - maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192) - padding at 27D4...27DF - emulate_ctxt at 27E0 And it writes in the padding. Pfew, writing the ops field of emulate_ctxt would have been much worse. This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds access. Worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function, the loop can bail out. Reported-by: NMoguofang <moguofang@huawei.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Guofang Mo <moguofang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 21 4月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Kyle Huey 提交于
Hardware support for faulting on the cpuid instruction is not required to emulate it, because cpuid triggers a VM exit anyways. KVM handles the relevant MSRs (MSR_PLATFORM_INFO and MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLE) and upon a cpuid-induced VM exit checks the cpuid faulting state and the CPL. kvm_require_cpl is even kind enough to inject the GP fault for us. Signed-off-by: NKyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> [Return "1" from kvm_emulate_cpuid, it's not void. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 02 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
sched/headers: Prepare to move sched_info_on() and force_schedstat_enabled() from <linux/sched.h> to <linux/sched/stat.h> But first update usage sites with the new header dependency. Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 17 2月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
The FPU is always active now when running KVM. Reviewed-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Reviewed-by: NBandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 21 1月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
This reverts commit bc613494. A CPUID instruction executed in VMX non-root mode always causes a VM-exit, regardless of the leaf being queried. Fixes: bc613494 ("KVM: nested VMX: disable perf cpuid reporting") Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> [The issue solved by bc613494 has been resolved with ff651cb6 ("KVM: nVMX: Add nested msr load/restore algorithm").] Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 18 1月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Piotr Luc 提交于
Vector population count instructions for dwords and qwords are to be used in future Intel Xeon & Xeon Phi processors. The bit 14 of CPUID[level:0x07, ECX] indicates that the new instructions are supported by a processor. The spec can be found in the Intel Software Developer Manual (SDM) or in the Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference (ISE). Signed-off-by: NPiotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 15 12月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Yi Sun 提交于
Expose AVX512IFMA/AVX512VBMI/SHA features to guest. AVX512 spec can be found at: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/26/40/319433-026.pdf SHA spec can be found at: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/39/c5/325462-sdm-vol-1-2abcd-3abcd.pdf This patch depends on below patch. http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=147932800828178&w=2Signed-off-by: NYi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 08 12月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Kyle Huey 提交于
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction calls both kvm_x86_ops->skip_emulated_instruction and kvm_vcpu_check_singlestep, skipping the emulated instruction and generating a trap if necessary. Replacing skip_emulated_instruction calls with kvm_skip_emulated_instruction is straightforward, except for: - ICEBP, which is already inside a trap, so avoid triggering another trap. - Instructions that can trigger exits to userspace, such as the IO insns, MOVs to CR8, and HALT. If kvm_skip_emulated_instruction does trigger a KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP exit, and the handling code for IN/OUT/MOV CR8/HALT also triggers an exit to userspace, the latter will take precedence. The singlestep will be triggered again on the next instruction, which is the current behavior. - Task switch instructions which would require additional handling (e.g. the task switch bit) and are instead left alone. - Cases where VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME do not proceed to the next instruction, which do not trigger singlestep traps as mentioned previously. Signed-off-by: NKyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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由 Kyle Huey 提交于
Once skipping the emulated instruction can potentially trigger an exit to userspace (via KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP) kvm_emulate_cpuid will need to propagate a return value. Signed-off-by: NKyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 22 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
From the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 10.4.3, "Enabling or Disabling the Local APIC," When IA32_APIC_BASE[11] is 0, the processor is functionally equivalent to an IA-32 processor without an on-chip APIC. The CPUID feature flag for the APIC (see Section 10.4.2, "Presence of the Local APIC") is also set to 0. Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> [Changed subject tag from nVMX to x86.] Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 17 11月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Luwei Kang 提交于
Add two new AVX512 subfeatures support for KVM guest. AVX512_4VNNIW: Vector instructions for deep learning enhanced word variable precision. AVX512_4FMAPS: Vector instructions for deep learning floating-point single precision. Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NHe Chen <he.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NLuwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com> [Changed subject tags.] Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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由 Jiang Biao 提交于
The use of local variable *function* is not necessary here. Remove it to avoid compiling warning with -Wunused-but-set-variable option. Signed-off-by: NJiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 07 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
This removes all the obvious code paths that depend on lazy FPU mode. It shouldn't change the generated code at all. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475627678-20788-5-git-send-email-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 19 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Luwei Kang 提交于
Expose AVX512DQ, AVX512BW, AVX512VL feature to guest. Its spec can be found at: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/b4/3a/319433-024.pdfSigned-off-by: NLuwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com> [Resolved a trivial conflict with removed F(PCOMMIT).] Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 24 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dan Williams 提交于
This reverts commit 8b3e34e4. Given the deprecation of the pcommit instruction, the relevant VMX features and CPUID bits are not going to be rolled into the SDM. Remove their usage from KVM. Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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- 14 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. In the case of kvm where it is modular, we can extend that to also include files that are building basic support functionality but not related to loading or registering the final module; such files also have no need whatsoever for module.h The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using. Since module.h was the source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed. Several instances got replaced with moduleparam.h since that was really all that was required for those particular files. Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Acked-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160714001901.31603-8-paul.gortmaker@windriver.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 02 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
This causes an ugly dmesg splat. Beautified syzkaller testcase: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> long r[8]; int main() { struct kvm_cpuid2 c = { 0 }; r[2] = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR); r[3] = ioctl(r[2], KVM_CREATE_VM, 0); r[4] = ioctl(r[3], KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0x8); r[7] = ioctl(r[4], KVM_SET_CPUID, &c); return 0; } Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 13 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1459801503-15600-10-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 11 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
This ensures that the guest doesn't see XSAVE extensions (e.g. xgetbv1 or xsavec) that the host lacks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 22 3月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Huaitong Han 提交于
X86_FEATURE_PKU is referred to as "PKU" in the hardware documentation: CPUID.7.0.ECX[3]:PKU. X86_FEATURE_OSPKE is software support for pkeys, enumerated with CPUID.7.0.ECX[4]:OSPKE, and it reflects the setting of CR4.PKE(bit 22). This patch disables CPUID:PKU without ept, because pkeys is not yet implemented for shadow paging. Signed-off-by: NHuaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NXiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Huaitong Han 提交于
This patch removes magic number with enum cpuid_leafs. Signed-off-by: NHuaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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