- 03 7月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于
When allocating the L2CAP SKB for transmission, provide the upper layers with a clear distinction on what is the header and what is the body portion of the SKB. Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于
The SKB for L2CAP sockets are all allocated in a central callback in the socket support. Instead of having to pass around the socket priority all the time, assign it to skb->priority when actually allocating the SKB. Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于
The struct l2cap_ops field should not allow any modifications and thus it is better declared as const. Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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- 20 6月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Lukasz Rymanowski 提交于
When pairing fails hci_conn refcnt drops below zero. This cause that ACL link is not disconnected when disconnect timeout fires. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops conn. Anyway, as it is desrcibed in hci_core.h, it is known that refcnt drops below 0 sometimes and it should be fine. If so, let disconnect link when hci_conn_timeout fires and refcnt is 0 or below. This patch does it. This affects PTS test SM_TC_JW_BV_05_C Logs from scenario: [69713.706227] [6515] pair_device: [69713.706230] [6515] hci_conn_add: hci0 dst 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 [69713.706233] [6515] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [69713.706235] [6515] hci_conn_init_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.706239] [6515] hci_req_add_ev: hci0 opcode 0x200d plen 25 [69713.706242] [6515] hci_prepare_cmd: skb len 28 [69713.706243] [6515] hci_req_run: length 1 [69713.706248] [6515] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69713.706251] [6515] hci_dev_put: hci0 orig refcnt 9 [69713.706281] [8909] hci_cmd_work: hci0 cmd_cnt 1 cmd queued 1 [69713.706288] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 1 len 28 [69713.706290] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 28 [69713.706316] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.706382] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711664] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.711668] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 6 [69713.711680] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.711683] [8909] hci_cs_le_create_conn: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.711685] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711688] [8909] hci_req_cmd_complete: opcode 0x200d status 0x00 [69713.711690] [8909] hci_sent_cmd_data: hci0 opcode 0x200d [69713.711695] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.711744] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818875] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.818889] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 21 [69713.818913] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.818917] [8909] hci_le_conn_complete_evt: hci0 status 0x00 [69713.818922] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 19 [69713.818927] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.818938] [8909] hci_conn_add_sysfs: conn ffff88021f65a000 [69713.818975] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69713.818981] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 ... [69713.819021] [8909] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 10 [69713.819025] [8909] l2cap_connect_cfm: hcon ffff88021f65a000 bdaddr 00:1b:dc:06:06:22 status 0 [69713.819028] [8909] hci_chan_create: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 [69713.819031] [8909] l2cap_conn_add: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00 hchan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69713.819034] [8909] l2cap_conn_ready: conn ffff880221005c00 [69713.819036] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.819037] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x02 [69713.819039] [8909] smp_chan_create: [69713.819041] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819043] [8909] smp_send_cmd: code 0x01 [69713.819045] [8909] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.819046] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819049] [8909] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 [69713.819055] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9900, sk ffff88012bf4e800 [69713.819057] [8909] l2cap_le_conn_ready: [69713.819064] [8909] l2cap_chan_create: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69713.819066] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69713.819069] [8909] l2cap_sock_init: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819072] [8909] bt_accept_enqueue: parent ffff880160356000, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.819074] [8909] __l2cap_chan_add: conn ffff880221005c00, psm 0x00, dcid 0x0004 [69713.819076] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819078] [8909] hci_conn_hold: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69713.819080] [8909] smp_conn_security: conn ffff880221005c00 hcon ffff88021f65a000 level 0x01 [69713.819082] [8909] l2cap_sock_ready_cb: sk ffff88005ede5800, parent ffff880160356000 [69713.819086] [8909] le_pairing_complete_cb: status 0 [69713.819091] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.819093] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.819094] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.819096] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.819098] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.819099] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819101] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 10 [69713.819104] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff88005157c100 len 15 priority 7 [69713.819106] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 15 [69713.819108] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 15 [69713.819119] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.819121] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.819123] [8909] process_pending_rx: [69713.819226] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 ... [69713.822022] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: sk ffff880160356000 timeo 0 [69713.822024] [6450] bt_accept_dequeue: parent ffff880160356000 [69713.822026] [6450] bt_accept_unlink: sk ffff88005ede5800 state 1 [69713.822028] [6450] l2cap_sock_accept: new socket ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822368] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822375] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822383] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.822414] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 ... [69713.823255] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.823259] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824322] [6450] l2cap_sock_getname: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.824330] [6450] l2cap_sock_getsockopt: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825029] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.825187] [6450] l2cap_sock_sendmsg: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825189] [6450] bt_sock_wait_ready: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69713.825192] [6450] l2cap_create_basic_pdu: chan ffff88005ede2c00 len 3 [69713.825196] [6450] l2cap_do_send: chan ffff88005ede2c00, skb ffff880160b0b500 len 7 priority 0 [69713.825199] [6450] hci_send_acl: hci0 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 flags 0x0000 [69713.825201] [6450] hci_queue_acl: hci0 nonfrag skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 [69713.825210] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.825213] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.825214] [8909] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.825216] [8909] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.825217] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.825219] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825221] [8909] hci_chan_sent: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 quote 9 [69713.825223] [8909] hci_sched_le: chan ffff88020d60b1c0 skb ffff880160b0b500 len 11 priority 0 [69713.825225] [8909] hci_send_frame: hci0 type 2 len 11 [69713.825227] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 11 [69713.825242] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.825253] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825253] [8909] hci_prio_recalculate: hci0 [69713.825292] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.825768] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69713.866902] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.866921] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.866928] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.866931] [8909] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.866937] [8909] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 9 sco 8 le 0 [69713.866939] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.866940] [8909] hci_sched_acl: hci0 ... [69713.866944] [8909] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.866953] [8909] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.866997] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867840] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69713.867844] [28074] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 7 [69713.867850] [28074] hci_rx_work: hci0 Event packet [69713.867853] [28074] hci_num_comp_pkts_evt: hci0 num_hndl 1 [69713.867857] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69713.867858] [28074] hci_tx_work: hci0 acl 10 sco 8 le 0 [69713.867860] [28074] hci_sched_acl: hci0 [69713.867861] [28074] hci_sched_sco: hci0 [69713.867862] [28074] hci_sched_esco: hci0 [69713.867863] [28074] hci_sched_le: hci0 [69713.867865] [28074] hci_chan_sent: hci0 [69713.867888] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145661] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 [69714.145666] [8909] hci_send_to_monitor: hdev ffff88021f0c7000 len 10 [69714.145676] [8909] hci_rx_work: hci0 ACL data packet [69714.145679] [8909] hci_acldata_packet: hci0 len 6 handle 0x002d flags 0x0002 [69714.145681] [8909] hci_conn_enter_active_mode: hcon ffff88021f65a000 mode 0 [69714.145683] [8909] l2cap_recv_acldata: conn ffff880221005c00 len 6 flags 0x2 [69714.145693] [8909] l2cap_recv_frame: len 2, cid 0x0006 [69714.145696] [8909] hci_send_to_control: len 14 [69714.145710] [8909] smp_chan_destroy: [69714.145713] [8909] pairing_complete: status 3 [69714.145714] [8909] cmd_complete: sock ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145717] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145719] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145720] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 [69714.145722] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145724] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b4f00, sk ffff880160351c00 ... [69714.145735] [6515] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e75a080, sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.145737] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 2 [69714.145739] [8909] l2cap_conn_del: hcon ffff88021f65a000 conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145740] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5400, sk ffff88021e775000 [69714.145743] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8801db6b5e00, sk ffff880160356000 [69714.145744] [8909] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145746] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145748] [8909] l2cap_chan_del: chan ffff88005ede2c00, conn ffff880221005c00, err 13 [69714.145749] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 4 [69714.145751] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 1 [69714.145754] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.145756] [8909] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 3 [69714.145759] [8909] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon ffff88021f65a000 chan ffff88020d60b1c0 [69714.145766] [5949] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff8800941a9680, sk ffff88012bf4d000 [69714.145787] [6515] hci_sock_release: sock ffff88005e75a080 sk ffff88010323ac00 [69714.146002] [6450] hci_sock_recvmsg: sock ffff88005e758780, sk ffff88010323d400 [69714.150795] [6450] l2cap_sock_release: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150799] [6450] l2cap_sock_shutdown: sock ffff8800941ab700, sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150802] [6450] l2cap_chan_close: chan ffff88005ede2c00 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150805] [6450] l2cap_sock_kill: sk ffff88005ede5800 state BT_CLOSED [69714.150806] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 2 [69714.150808] [6450] l2cap_sock_destruct: sk ffff88005ede5800 [69714.150809] [6450] l2cap_chan_put: chan ffff88005ede2c00 orig refcnt 1 [69714.150811] [6450] l2cap_chan_destroy: chan ffff88005ede2c00 [69714.150970] [6450] bt_sock_poll: sock ffff88005e758500, sk ffff88010323b800 ... [69714.151991] [8909] hci_conn_drop: hcon ffff88021f65a000 orig refcnt 0 [69716.150339] [8909] hci_conn_timeout: hcon ffff88021f65a000 state BT_CONNECTED, refcnt -1 Signed-off-by: NLukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
If we need an MITM protected connection but the local and remote IO capabilities cannot provide it we should reject the pairing attempt in the appropriate way. This patch adds the missing checks for such a situation to the smp_cmd_pairing_req() and smp_cmd_pairing_rsp() functions. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
We'll need to do authentication method lookups from more than one place, so refactor the lookup into its own function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When we receive a pairing request or an internal request to start pairing we shouldn't blindly overwrite the existing pending_sec_level value as that may actually be higher than the new one. This patch fixes the SMP code to only overwrite the value in case the new one is higher than the old. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 13 6月, 2014 11 次提交
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由 Marcin Kraglak 提交于
Kernel supports SMP Security Request so don't block increasing security when we are slave. Signed-off-by: NMarcin Kraglak <marcin.kraglak@tieto.com> Acked-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The SMP code expects hdev to be unlocked since e.g. crypto functions will try to (re)lock it. Therefore, we need to release the lock before calling into smp.c from mgmt.c. Without this we risk a deadlock whenever the smp_user_confirm_reply() function is called. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: NLukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Jukka Taimisto 提交于
A deadlock occurs when PDU containing invalid SMP opcode is received on Security Manager Channel over LE link and conn->pending_rx_work worker has not run yet. When LE link is created l2cap_conn_ready() is called and before returning it schedules conn->pending_rx_work worker to hdev->workqueue. Incoming data to SMP fixed channel is handled by l2cap_recv_frame() which calls smp_sig_channel() to handle the SMP PDU. If smp_sig_channel() indicates failure l2cap_conn_del() is called to delete the connection. When deleting the connection, l2cap_conn_del() purges the pending_rx queue and calls flush_work() to wait for the pending_rx_work worker to complete. Since incoming data is handled by a worker running from the same workqueue as the pending_rx_work is being scheduled on, we will deadlock on waiting for pending_rx_work to complete. This patch fixes the deadlock by calling cancel_work_sync() instead of flush_work(). Signed-off-by: NJukka Taimisto <jtt@codenomicon.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When cleaning up the HCI state as part of the power-off procedure we can reuse the hci_stop_discovery() function instead of explicitly sending HCI command related to discovery. The added benefit of this is that it takes care of canceling name resolving and inquiry which were not previously covered by the code. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
We'll need to reuse the same logic for stopping discovery also when cleaning up HCI state when powering off. This patch refactors the code out to its own function that can later (in a subsequent patch) be used also for the power off case. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When inquiry is canceled through the HCI_Cancel_Inquiry command there is no Inquiry Complete event generated. Instead, all we get is the command complete for the HCI_Inquiry_Cancel command. This means that we must call the hci_discovery_set_state() function from the respective command complete handler in order to ensure that user space knows the correct discovery state. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When we store the STK in slave role we should set the correct authentication information for it. If the pairing is producing a HIGH security level the STK is considered authenticated, and otherwise it's considered unauthenticated. This patch fixes the value passed to the hci_add_ltk() function when adding the STK on the slave side. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: NMarcin Kraglak <marcin.kraglak@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When responding to an IO capability request when we're the initiators of the pairing we will not yet have the remote IO capability information. Since the conn->auth_type variable is treated as an "absolute" requirement instead of a hint of what's needed later in the user confirmation request handler it's important that it doesn't have the MITM bit set if there's any chance that the remote device doesn't have the necessary IO capabilities. This patch adds a clarifying comment so that conn->auth_type is left untouched in this scenario. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
From the Bluetooth Core Specification 4.1 page 1958: "if both devices have set the Authentication_Requirements parameter to one of the MITM Protection Not Required options, authentication stage 1 shall function as if both devices set their IO capabilities to DisplayOnly (e.g., Numeric comparison with automatic confirmation on both devices)" So far our implementation has done user confirmation for all just-works cases regardless of the MITM requirements, however following the specification to the word means that we should not be doing confirmation when neither side has the MITM flag set. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: NSzymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The conn->link_key variable tracks the type of link key in use. It is set whenever we respond to a link key request as well as when we get a link key notification event. These two events do not however always guarantee that encryption is enabled: getting a link key request and responding to it may only mean that the remote side has requested authentication but not encryption. On the other hand, the encrypt change event is a certain guarantee that encryption is enabled. The real encryption state is already tracked in the conn->link_mode variable through the HCI_LM_ENCRYPT bit. This patch fixes a check for encryption in the hci_conn_auth function to use the proper conn->link_mode value and thereby eliminates the chance of a false positive result. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The src_type member of struct hci_conn should always reflect the address type of the src_member. It should never be overridden. There is already code in place in the command status handler of HCI_LE_Create_Connection to copy the right initiator address into conn->init_addr_type. Without this patch, if privacy is enabled, we will send the wrong address type in the SMP identity address information PDU (it'll e.g. contain our public address but a random address type). Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 12 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Octavian Purdila 提交于
There are several instances where a pskb_copy or __pskb_copy is immediately followed by an skb_clone. Add a couple of new functions to allow the copy skb to be allocated from the fclone cache and thus speed up subsequent skb_clone calls. Cc: Alexander Smirnov <alex.bluesman.smirnov@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Cc: Arvid Brodin <arvid.brodin@alten.se> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org> Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org> Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com> Cc: Andrew Hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: NOctavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 02 6月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Jukka Taimisto 提交于
-[0x01 Introduction We have found a programming error causing a deadlock in Bluetooth subsystem of Linux kernel. The problem is caused by missing release_sock() call when L2CAP connection creation fails due full accept queue. The issue can be reproduced with 3.15-rc5 kernel and is also present in earlier kernels. -[0x02 Details The problem occurs when multiple L2CAP connections are created to a PSM which contains listening socket (like SDP) and left pending, for example, configuration (the underlying ACL link is not disconnected between connections). When L2CAP connection request is received and listening socket is found the l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() function (net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c) is called. This function locks the 'parent' socket and then checks if the accept queue is full. 1178 lock_sock(parent); 1179 1180 /* Check for backlog size */ 1181 if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) { 1182 BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog); 1183 return NULL; 1184 } If case the accept queue is full NULL is returned, but the 'parent' socket is not released. Thus when next L2CAP connection request is received the code blocks on lock_sock() since the parent is still locked. Also note that for connections already established and waiting for configuration to complete a timeout will occur and l2cap_chan_timeout() (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c) will be called. All threads calling this function will also be blocked waiting for the channel mutex since the thread which is waiting on lock_sock() alread holds the channel mutex. We were able to reproduce this by sending continuously L2CAP connection request followed by disconnection request containing invalid CID. This left the created connections pending configuration. After the deadlock occurs it is impossible to kill bluetoothd, btmon will not get any more data etc. requiring reboot to recover. -[0x03 Fix Releasing the 'parent' socket when l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returns NULL seems to fix the issue. Signed-off-by: NJukka Taimisto <jtt@codenomicon.com> Reported-by: NTommi Mäkilä <tmakila@codenomicon.com> Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When checking whether a legacy link key provides at least HIGH security level we also need to check for FIPS level which is one step above HIGH. This patch fixes a missing check in the hci_link_key_request_evt() function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 01 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Due to recent changes to the way that the MITM requirement is set for outgoing pairing attempts we can no longer rely on the hcon->auth_type variable (which is actually good since it was formed from BR/EDR concepts that don't really exist for SMP). To match the logic that BR/EDR now uses simply rely on the local IO capability and/or needed security level to set the MITM requirement for outgoing pairing requests. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 31 5月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Jukka Rissanen 提交于
Default values for various channel settings were missing. This way channel users do not need to set default values themselves. Signed-off-by: NJukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Jukka Rissanen 提交于
The universal/local bit handling was incorrectly done in the code. So when setting EUI address from BD address we do this: - If BD address type is PUBLIC, then we clear the universal bit in EUI address. If the address type is RANDOM, then the universal bit is set (BT 6lowpan draft chapter 3.2.2) - After this we invert the universal/local bit according to RFC 2464 When figuring out BD address we do the reverse: - Take EUI address from stateless IPv6 address, invert the universal/local bit according to RFC 2464 - If universal bit is 1 in this modified EUI address, then address type is set to RANDOM, otherwise it is PUBLIC Note that 6lowpan_iphc.[ch] does the final toggling of U/L bit before sending or receiving the network packet. Signed-off-by: NJukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When checking whether we need to request authentication or not we should include HCI_SECURITY_FIPS to the levels that always need authentication. This patch fixes check for it in the hci_outgoing_auth_needed() function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
In case there are new LTK types in the future we shouldn't just blindly assume that != MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED means that the key is authenticated. This patch adds explicit checks for each allowed key type in the form of a switch statement and skips any key which has an unknown value. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 24 5月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
On the mgmt level we have a key type parameter which currently accepts two possible values: 0x00 for unauthenticated and 0x01 for authenticated. However, in the internal struct smp_ltk representation we have an explicit "authenticated" boolean value. To make this distinction clear, add defines for the possible mgmt values and do conversion to and from the internal authenticated value. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 20 5月, 2014 6 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Now that smp_confirm() is called "inline" we can have it return a response code and have the sending of it be done in the shared place for command handlers. One exception is when we're entering smp.c from mgmt.c when user space responds to authentication, in which case we still need our own code to call smp_failure(). Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Since we're now calling smp_random() "inline" we can have it directly return a response code and have the shared command handler send the response. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
There's no reason to have "smp" in this variable name since it is already part of the SMP struct which provides sufficient context. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When the SMP code was initially created (mid-2011) parts of the Bluetooth subsystem were still not converted to use workqueues. This meant that the crypto calls, which could sleep, couldn't be called directly. Because of this the "confirm" and "random" work structs were introduced. These days the entire Bluetooth subsystem runs through workqueues which makes these structs unnecessary. This patch removes them and converts the calls to queue them to use direct function calls instead. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
There is no reason to have the initial local value conditional to whether the remote value has bonding set or not. We can either way start off with the value we received. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
There are no users of the smp_chan struct outside of smp.c so move it away from smp.h. The addition of the l2cap.h include to hci_core.c, hci_conn.c and mgmt.c is something that should have been there already previously to avoid warnings of undeclared struct l2cap_conn, but the compiler warning was apparently shadowed away by the mention of l2cap_conn in the struct smp_chan definition. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 16 5月, 2014 6 次提交
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
conn_info_age value is calculated in ms, so need to be converted to jiffies. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
This patch adds support for max_tx_power in Get Connection Information request. Value is read only once for given connection and then always returned in response as parameter. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
This patch adds support to store local maximum TX power level for connection when reply for HCI_Read_Transmit_Power_Level is received. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
TX power for LE links is immutable thus we do not need to query for it if already have value. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
This patch adds support for Get Connection Information mgmt command which can be used to query for information about connection, i.e. RSSI and local TX power level. In general values cached in hci_conn are returned as long as they are considered valid, i.e. do not exceed age limit set in hdev. This limit is calculated as random value between min/max values to avoid client trying to guess when to poll for updated information. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Andrzej Kaczmarek 提交于
This patch adds conn_info_min_age and conn_info_max_age parameters to debugfs which determine lifetime of connection information. Actual lifetime will be random value between min and max age. Default values for min and max age are 1000ms and 3000ms respectively. Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Kaczmarek <andrzej.kaczmarek@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 15 5月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Samuel Ortiz 提交于
0466 was probably meant to be 0644, there's no reason why everyone except root could write there. Signed-off-by: NSamuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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