- 12 10月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 upstream. Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> [will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit 1b3ccf4be0e7be8c4bd8522066b6cbc92591e912 ] We implement page table isolation as a mitigation for meltdown. Report this to userspace via sysfs. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8f04e8e6e29c93421a95b61cad62e3918425eac7 ] On CPUs with support for PSTATE.SSBS, the kernel can toggle the SSBD state without needing to call into firmware. This patch hooks into the existing SSBD infrastructure so that SSBS is used on CPUs that support it, but it's all made horribly complicated by the very real possibility of big/little systems that don't uniformly provide the new capability. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
commit d71be2b6c0e19180b5f80a6d42039cc074a693a2 upstream. Armv8.5 introduces a new PSTATE bit known as Speculative Store Bypass Safe (SSBS) which can be used as a mitigation against Spectre variant 4. Additionally, a CPU may provide instructions to manipulate PSTATE.SSBS directly, so that userspace can toggle the SSBS control without trapping to the kernel. This patch probes for the existence of SSBS and advertise the new instructions to userspace if they exist. Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 05 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Qian Cai 提交于
[ Upstream commit b99286b088ea843b935dcfb29f187697359fe5cd ] The commit d5370f75 ("arm64: prefetch: add alternative pattern for CPUs without a prefetcher") introduced MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE() to be used in has_no_hw_prefetch() with rv_min=0 which generates a compilation warning from GCC, In file included from ./arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h:8, from ./include/linux/cache.h:6, from ./include/linux/printk.h:9, from ./include/linux/kernel.h:15, from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:10, from arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c:11: arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c: In function 'has_no_hw_prefetch': ./arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h:59:26: warning: comparison of unsigned expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits] _model == (model) && rv >= (rv_min) && rv <= (rv_max); \ ^~ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c:889:9: note: in expansion of macro 'MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE' return MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE(midr, MIDR_THUNDERX, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fix it by converting MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE to a static inline function. Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 21 9月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
commit 2a355ec25729053bb9a1a89b6c1d1cdd6c3b3fb1 upstream. While the CSV3 field of the ID_AA64_PFR0 CPU ID register can be checked to see if a CPU is susceptible to Meltdown and therefore requires kpti to be enabled, existing CPUs do not implement this field. We therefore whitelist all unaffected Cortex-A CPUs that do not implement the CSV3 field. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 06 9月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
[ Upstream commit 5717fe5ab38f9ccb32718bcb03bea68409c9cce4 ] If a CPU doesn't support the page size for which the kernel is configured, then we will complain and refuse to bring it online. For secondary CPUs (and the boot CPU on a system booting with EFI), we will also print an error identifying the mismatch. Consequently, the only time that the cpufeature code can detect a granule size mismatch is for a granule other than the one that is currently being used. Although we would rather such systems didn't exist, we've unfortunately lost that battle and Kevin reports that on his amlogic S922X (odroid-n2 board) we end up warning and taining with defconfig because 16k pages are not supported by all of the CPUs. In such a situation, we don't actually care about the feature mismatch, particularly now that KVM only exposes the sanitised view of the CPU registers (commit 93390c0a - "arm64: KVM: Hide unsupported AArch64 CPU features from guests"). Treat the granule fields as non-strict and let Kevin run without a tainted kernel. Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Reported-by: NKevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com> Tested-by: NKevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com> Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: changelog updated with KVM sanitised regs commit] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 07 8月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
commit 147b9635e6347104b91f48ca9dca61eb0fbf2a54 upstream. If CTR_EL0.{CWG,ERG} are 0b0000 then they must be interpreted to have their architecturally maximum values, which defeats the use of FTR_HIGHER_SAFE when sanitising CPU ID registers on heterogeneous machines. Introduce FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE so that these fields effectively saturate at zero. Fixes: 3c739b57 ("arm64: Keep track of CPU feature registers") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.x- Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 14 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8ab66cbe63aeaf9e5970fb4aaef1c660fca59321 ] The matches() routine for a capability must honor the "scope" passed to it and return the proper results. i.e, when passed with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, it should check the status of the capability on the current CPU. This is used by verify_local_cpu_capabilities() on a late secondary CPU to make sure that it's compliant with the established system features. However, ARM64_HAS_CACHE_{IDC/DIC} always checks the system wide registers and this could mean that a late secondary CPU could return "true" (since the CPU hasn't updated the system wide registers yet) and thus lead the system in an inconsistent state, where the system assumes it has IDC/DIC feature, while the new CPU doesn't. Fixes: commit 6ae4b6e0 ("arm64: Add support for new control bits CTR_EL0.DIC and CTR_EL0.IDC") Cc: Philip Elcan <pelcan@codeaurora.org> Cc: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 25 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dirk Mueller 提交于
Since commit d3aec8a2 ("arm64: capabilities: Restrict KPTI detection to boot-time CPUs") we rely on errata flags being already populated during feature enumeration. The order of errata and features was flipped as part of commit ed478b3f ("arm64: capabilities: Group handling of features and errata workarounds"). Return to the orginal order of errata and feature evaluation to ensure errata flags are present during feature evaluation. Fixes: ed478b3f ("arm64: capabilities: Group handling of features and errata workarounds") CC: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> CC: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NDirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 09 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Up to ARMv8.3, the combinaison of Stage-1 and Stage-2 attributes results in the strongest attribute of the two stages. This means that the hypervisor has to perform quite a lot of cache maintenance just in case the guest has some non-cacheable mappings around. ARMv8.4 solves this problem by offering a different mode (FWB) where Stage-2 has total control over the memory attribute (this is limited to systems where both I/O and instruction fetches are coherent with the dcache). This is achieved by having a different set of memory attributes in the page tables, and a new bit set in HCR_EL2. On such a system, we can then safely sidestep any form of dcache management. Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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- 06 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Mark Rutland 提交于
Some code cares about the SPSR_ELx format for exceptions taken from AArch32 to inspect or manipulate the SPSR_ELx value, which is already in the SPSR_ELx format, and not in the AArch32 PSR format. To separate these from cases where we care about the AArch32 PSR format, migrate these cases to use the PSR_AA32_* definitions rather than COMPAT_PSR_*. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 05 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
If there is a mismatch in the I/D min line size, we must always use the system wide safe value both in applications and in the kernel, while performing cache operations. However, we have been checking more bits than just the min line sizes, which triggers false negatives. We may need to trap the user accesses in such cases, but not necessarily patch the kernel. This patch fixes the check to do the right thing as advertised. A new capability will be added to check mismatches in other fields and ensure we trap the CTR accesses. Fixes: be68a8aa ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix CTR_EL0 field definitions") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 23 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
We inspect __kpti_forced early on as part of the cpufeature enable callback which remaps the swapper page table using non-global entries. Ensure that __kpti_forced has been updated to reflect the kpti= command-line option before we start using it. Fixes: ea1e3de8 ("arm64: entry: Add fake CPU feature for unmapping the kernel at EL0") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16.x- Reported-by: NWei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com> Tested-by: NSudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Tested-by: NWei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 01 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dave Martin 提交于
Stateful CPU architecture extensions may require the signal frame to grow to a size that exceeds the arch's MINSIGSTKSZ #define. However, changing this #define is an ABI break. To allow userspace the option of determining the signal frame size in a more forwards-compatible way, this patch adds a new auxv entry tagged with AT_MINSIGSTKSZ, which provides the maximum signal frame size that the process can observe during its lifetime. If AT_MINSIGSTKSZ is absent from the aux vector, the caller can assume that the MINSIGSTKSZ #define is sufficient. This allows for a consistent interface with older kernels that do not provide AT_MINSIGSTKSZ. The idea is that libc could expose this via sysconf() or some similar mechanism. There is deliberately no AT_SIGSTKSZ. The kernel knows nothing about userspace's own stack overheads and should not pretend to know. For arm64: The primary motivation for this interface is the Scalable Vector Extension, which can require at least 4KB or so of extra space in the signal frame for the largest hardware implementations. To determine the correct value, a "Christmas tree" mode (via the add_all argument) is added to setup_sigframe_layout(), to simulate addition of all possible records to the signal frame at maximum possible size. If this procedure goes wrong somehow, resulting in a stupidly large frame layout and hence failure of sigframe_alloc() to allocate a record to the frame, then this is indicative of a kernel bug. In this case, we WARN() and no attempt is made to populate AT_MINSIGSTKSZ for userspace. For arm64 SVE: The SVE context block in the signal frame needs to be considered too when computing the maximum possible signal frame size. Because the size of this block depends on the vector length, this patch computes the size based not on the thread's current vector length but instead on the maximum possible vector length: this determines the maximum size of SVE context block that can be observed in any signal frame for the lifetime of the process. Signed-off-by: NDave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 15 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Catalin Marinas 提交于
This patch increases the ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to 128 so that it covers the currently known Cache Writeback Granule (CTR_EL0.CWG) on arm64 and moves the fallback in cache_line_size() from L1_CACHE_BYTES to this constant. In addition, it warns (and taints) if the CWG is larger than ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN as this is not safe with non-coherent DMA. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 24 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Mark Rutland 提交于
We're missing a sentinel entry in kpti_safe_list. Thus is_midr_in_range_list() can walk past the end of kpti_safe_list. Depending on the contents of memory, this could erroneously match a CPU's MIDR, cause a data abort, or other bad outcomes. Add the sentinel entry to avoid this. Fixes: be5b2998 ("arm64: capabilities: Add support for checks based on a list of MIDRs") Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reported-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Tested-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 27 3月, 2018 21 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
This reverts commit 1f85b42a. The internal dma-direct.h API has changed in -next, which collides with us trying to use it to manage non-coherent DMA devices on systems with unreasonably large cache writeback granules. This isn't at all trivial to resolve, so revert our changes for now and we can revisit this after the merge window. Effectively, this just restores our behaviour back to that of 4.16. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
An allnoconfig build complains about unused symbols due to functions that are called via conditional cpufeature and cpu_errata table entries. Annotate these as __maybe_unused if they are likely to be generic, or predicate their compilation on the same option as the table entry if they are specific to a given alternative. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Some variants of the Arm Cortex-55 cores (r0p0, r0p1, r1p0) suffer from an erratum 1024718, which causes incorrect updates when DBM/AP bits in a page table entry is modified without a break-before-make sequence. The work around is to skip enabling the hardware DBM feature on the affected cores. The hardware Access Flag management features is not affected. There are some other cores suffering from this errata, which could be added to the midr_list to trigger the work around. Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: ckadabi@codeaurora.org Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We enable hardware DBM bit in a capable CPU, very early in the boot via __cpu_setup. This doesn't give us a flexibility of optionally disable the feature, as the clearing the bit is a bit costly as the TLB can cache the settings. Instead, we delay enabling the feature until the CPU is brought up into the kernel. We use the feature capability mechanism to handle it. The hardware DBM is a non-conflicting feature. i.e, the kernel can safely run with a mix of CPUs with some using the feature and the others don't. So, it is safe for a late CPU to have this capability and enable it, even if the active CPUs don't. To get this handled properly by the infrastructure, we unconditionally set the capability and only enable it on CPUs which really have the feature. Also, we print the feature detection from the "matches" call back to make sure we don't mislead the user when none of the CPUs could use the feature. Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap. This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks. To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other fields except the matches & cpu_enable. This ensures : 1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects 2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches". This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action. The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules). If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being called multiple times. This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af4 ("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability"). Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Add helpers for detecting an errata on list of midr ranges of affected CPUs, with the same work around. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We expect all CPUs to be running at the same EL inside the kernel with or without VHE enabled and we have strict checks to ensure that any mismatch triggers a kernel panic. If VHE is enabled, we use the feature based on the boot CPU and all other CPUs should follow. This makes it a perfect candidate for a capability based on the boot CPU, which should be matched by all the CPUs (both when is ON and OFF). This saves us some not-so-pretty hooks and special code, just for verifying the conflict. The patch also makes the VHE capability entry depend on CONFIG_ARM64_VHE. Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
The kernel detects and uses some of the features based on the boot CPU and expects that all the following CPUs conform to it. e.g, with VHE and the boot CPU running at EL2, the kernel decides to keep the kernel running at EL2. If another CPU is brought up without this capability, we use custom hooks (via check_early_cpu_features()) to handle it. To handle such capabilities add support for detecting and enabling capabilities based on the boot CPU. A bit is added to indicate if the capability should be detected early on the boot CPU. The infrastructure then ensures that such capabilities are probed and "enabled" early on in the boot CPU and, enabled on the subsequent CPUs. Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
KPTI is treated as a system wide feature and is only detected if all the CPUs in the sysetm needs the defense, unless it is forced via kernel command line. This leaves a system with a mix of CPUs with and without the defense vulnerable. Also, if a late CPU needs KPTI but KPTI was not activated at boot time, the CPU is currently allowed to boot, which is a potential security vulnerability. This patch ensures that the KPTI is turned on if at least one CPU detects the capability (i.e, change scope to SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU). Also rejetcs a late CPU, if it requires the defense, when the system hasn't enabled it, Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Now that we have the flexibility of defining system features based on individual CPUs, introduce CPU feature type that can be detected on a local SCOPE and ignores the conflict on late CPUs. This is applicable for ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH, where it is fine for the system to have CPUs without hardware prefetch turning up later. We only suffer a performance penalty, nothing fatal. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Now that the features and errata workarounds have the same rules and flow, group the handling of the tables. Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
So far we have treated the feature capabilities as system wide and this wouldn't help with features that could be detected locally on one or more CPUs (e.g, KPTI, Software prefetch). This patch splits the feature detection to two phases : 1) Local CPU features are checked on all boot time active CPUs. 2) System wide features are checked only once after all CPUs are active. Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Right now we run through the errata workarounds check on all boot active CPUs, with SCOPE_ALL. This wouldn't help for detecting erratum workarounds with a SYSTEM_SCOPE. There are none yet, but we plan to introduce some: let us clean this up so that such workarounds can be detected and enabled correctly. So, we run the checks with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU on all CPUs and SCOPE_SYSTEM checks are run only once after all the boot time CPUs are active. Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We are about to group the handling of all capabilities (features and errata workarounds). This patch open codes the wrapper routines to make it easier to merge the handling. Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
While processing the list of capabilities, it is useful to filter out some of the entries based on the given mask for the scope of the capabilities to allow better control. This can be used later for handling LOCAL vs SYSTEM wide capabilities and more. All capabilities should have their scope set to either LOCAL_CPU or SYSTEM. No functional/flow change. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Now that each capability describes how to treat the conflicts of CPU cap state vs System wide cap state, we can unify the verification logic to a single place. Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
When a CPU is brought up, it is checked against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations of conflict. x-----------------------------x | Type | System | Late CPU | |-----------------------------| | a | y | n | |-----------------------------| | b | n | y | x-----------------------------x Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as long as the system already enables it. Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds that cannot be activated after the kernel has finished booting.And we ignore (b) for features. Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs etc). Add two different flags to indicate how the conflict should be handled. ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may have the capability ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may not have the cappability. Now that we have the flags to describe the behavior of the errata and the features, as we treat them, define types for ERRATUM and FEATURE. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities have some properties that decide how they should be treated : 1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either : - if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) Or - if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM) 2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code. Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps, which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI) and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability. 3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations of conflict. x-----------------------------x | Type | System | Late CPU | ------------------------------| | a | y | n | ------------------------------| | b | n | y | x-----------------------------x Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as long as the system already enables it. Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features. Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs etc). So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability. And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly, we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above. We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability. As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We have errata work around processing code in cpu_errata.c, which calls back into helpers defined in cpufeature.c. Now that we are going to make the handling of capabilities generic, by adding the information to each capability, move the errata work around specific processing code. No functional changes. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
We trigger CPU errata work around check on the boot CPU from smp_prepare_boot_cpu() to make sure that we run the checks only after the CPU feature infrastructure is initialised. While this is correct, we can also do this from init_cpu_features() which initilises the infrastructure, and is called only on the Boot CPU. This helps to consolidate the CPU capability handling to cpufeature.c. No functional changes. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Dave Martin 提交于
We issue the enable() call back for all CPU hwcaps capabilities available on the system, on all the CPUs. So far we have ignored the argument passed to the call back, which had a prototype to accept a "void *" for use with on_each_cpu() and later with stop_machine(). However, with commit 0a0d111d ("arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback"), there are some users of the argument who wants the matching capability struct pointer where there are multiple matching criteria for a single capability. Clean up the declaration of the call back to make it clear. 1) Renamed to cpu_enable(), to imply taking necessary actions on the called CPU for the entry. 2) Pass const pointer to the capability, to allow the call back to check the entry. (e.,g to check if any action is needed on the CPU) 3) We don't care about the result of the call back, turning this to a void. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Acked-by: NRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> [suzuki: convert more users, rename call back and drop results] Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 20 3月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Expose the new features introduced by Arm v8.4 extensions to Arm v8-A profile. These include : 1) Data indpendent timing of instructions. (DIT, exposed as HWCAP_DIT) 2) Unaligned atomic instructions and Single-copy atomicity of loads and stores. (AT, expose as HWCAP_USCAT) 3) LDAPR and STLR instructions with immediate offsets (extension to LRCPC, exposed as HWCAP_ILRCPC) 4) Flag manipulation instructions (TS, exposed as HWCAP_FLAGM). Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 19 3月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Now that we can dynamically compute the kernek/hyp VA mask, there is no need for a feature flag to trigger the alternative patching. Let's drop the flag and everything that depends on it. Acked-by: NChristoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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