Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.
Signed-off-by: NMichael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.

Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.

To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default.  To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net.  Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission.  The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.

With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.

It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime).  It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be
distinguished in SELinux policy.  Please apply.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.

Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
module.

LSM changes:

The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.

Use:

The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).

SELinux changes:

The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Fix unsafe nesting of sb_lock inside sb_security_lock in
selinux_complete_init.  Detected by the kernel locking validator.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace,
and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is
not enabled in configuration.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: NJon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Hi,

The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.

The memory savings are considerable.

On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object.  After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile.  With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case.  On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk
when no policy is loaded.

Discussion is here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296

In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded,
SELinux does not label files at all.  Currently it does add an 'unlabeled'
label in this case, which we've found causes problems later.

SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this
patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding
a persistent label on disk.

The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy
loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security
extended attribute on the new inode on the disk.  This is the only sane
behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to
assign in the absence of a policy.  That state usually doesn't occur, but the
rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show
up on a test install.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using.  The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection.  In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet.  An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.

Patch design approach:

- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association.  The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt.  When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations.  If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.

- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless.  This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context.  With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down.  With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.

The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).

Patch implementation details:

- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag.  As an example (ignoring error
checking):

getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);

The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only.  If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations.  If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.

getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.

- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt.  Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for UDP should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.  A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.

When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space.  An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space.  The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built.  For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end.  For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
  due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
  return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
  audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()
Signed-off-by: NDustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.

These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.

This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).

[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: NDustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being
traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking
outside of the context of a ptrace attach.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers.  These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use
GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a
remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock
held, and is no longer necessary.  Please apply.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Fix the SELinux mprotect checks on executable mappings so that they are not
re-applied when the mapping is already executable as well as cleaning up
the code.  This avoids a situation where e.g.  an application is prevented
from removing PROT_WRITE on an already executable mapping previously
authorized via execmem permission due to an execmod denial.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Remove the "inline" keyword from a bunch of big functions in the kernel with
the goal of shrinking it by 30kb to 40kb
Signed-off-by: NArjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: NJeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Use atomic_inc_not_zero for rcu files instead of special case rcuref.
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association.  Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address.  The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed.  By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.  This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts.  Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context.  The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations.  It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup.  The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.

The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc.  When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.

When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.

When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.

Testing:

The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools.  We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision.  We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch disables the setting of SELinux xattrs on files created in
filesystems labeled via mountpoint labeling (mounted with the context=
option).  selinux_inode_setxattr already prevents explicit setxattr from
userspace on such filesystems, so this provides consistent behavior for
file creation.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch simplifies some checks for magic siginfo values.  It should not
change the behaviour in any way.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch replaces hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constants with
their symbolic names.

No changes in affected .o files.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Now that RCU applied on 'struct file' seems stable, we can place f_rcuhead
in a memory location that is not anymore used at call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead,
file_free_rcu) time, to reduce the size of this critical kernel object.

The trick I used is to move f_rcuhead and f_list in an union called f_u

The callers are changed so that f_rcuhead becomes f_u.fu_rcuhead and f_list
becomes f_u.f_list
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

security/selinux/hooks.c: In function `selinux_inode_getxattr':
security/selinux/hooks.c:2193: warning: unused variable `sbsec'

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from
getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after
the fs level getxattr() function.

The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode
to override the on-disk value.  This could happen in cases such as
upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g.  standard SELinux to
MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem.

In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context
that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk.

The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another
parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call,
so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with
the kernel value.

We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems
(i.e.  mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the
kernel value to the user.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc
unction.  On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.

Before:
text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
86319    4642   15236  106197   19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o

After:
text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
85278    4642   15236  105156   19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP
based protocols.

Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP
or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP.

The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type
parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket.  So, any
socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and
SOCK_DGRAM as UDP.  Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and
SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as
generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking.

This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that
only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket
as TCP or UDP.  The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts
it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET
are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets).

Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed
here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer.

This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as
generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level
check, which then fails for generic sockets.

It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or
any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP.

This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in
selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of
trying to recalculate it.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

With the use of RCU in files structure, the look-up of files using fds can now
be lock-free.  The lookup is protected by rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock().
This patch changes the readers to use lock-free lookup.
Signed-off-by: NManeesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NRavikiran Thirumalai <kiran_th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

In order for the RCU to work, the file table array, sets and their sizes must
be updated atomically.  Instead of ensuring this through too many memory
barriers, we put the arrays and their sizes in a separate structure.  This
patch takes the first step of putting the file table elements in a separate
structure fdtable that is embedded withing files_struct.  It also changes all
the users to refer to the file table using files_fdtable() macro.  Subsequent
applciation of RCU becomes easier after this.
Signed-off-by: NDipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as
they are unused (and likely useless).
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as
they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic
inode security labeling.

If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now.  Also,
is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be
removed.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch modifies tmpfs to call the inode_init_security LSM hook to set
up the incore inode security state for new inodes before the inode becomes
accessible via the dcache.

As there is no underlying storage of security xattrs in this case, it is
not necessary for the hook to return the (name, value, len) triple to the
tmpfs code, so this patch also modifies the SELinux hook function to
correctly handle the case where the (name, value, len) pointers are NULL.

The hook call is needed in tmpfs in order to support proper security
labeling of tmpfs inodes (e.g.  for udev with tmpfs /dev in Fedora).  With
this change in place, we should then be able to remove the
security_inode_post_create/mkdir/...  hooks safely.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created
inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state during the inode creation transaction.  This parallels the
existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes.  Otherwise, it
is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache
prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the
post_create/mkdir/...  LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be
left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash.  SELinux presently works
around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is
initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes
(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but
potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses.  A simple test
program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the
problem.  Similar such false denials have been encountered in real
applications.

This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation
to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Also, support dccp sockets.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch fixes the address length checks in the selinux_socket_connect
hook to be no more restrictive than the underlying ipv4 and ipv6 code;
otherwise, this hook can reject valid connect calls.  This patch is in
response to a bug report where an application was calling connect on an
INET6 socket with an address that didn't include the optional scope id and
failing due to these checks.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field.  This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.

With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file).  This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.

This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>