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  1. 17 7月, 2008 2 次提交
    • R
      x86 ptrace: unify syscall tracing · d4d67150
      由 Roland McGrath 提交于 
      This unifies and cleans up the syscall tracing code on i386 and x86_64.

Using a single function for entry and exit tracing on 32-bit made the
do_syscall_trace() into some terrible spaghetti.  The logic is clear and
simple using separate syscall_trace_enter() and syscall_trace_leave()
functions as on 64-bit.

The unification adds PTRACE_SYSEMU and PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP support
on x86_64, for 32-bit ptrace() callers and for 64-bit ptrace() callers
tracing either 32-bit or 64-bit tasks.  It behaves just like 32-bit.

Changing syscall_trace_enter() to return the syscall number shortens
all the assembly paths, while adding the SYSEMU feature in a simple way.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      d4d67150
    • R
      x86 ptrace: unify TIF_SINGLESTEP · 64f09733
      由 Roland McGrath 提交于 
      This unifies the treatment of TIF_SINGLESTEP on i386 and x86_64.
The bit is now excluded from _TIF_WORK_MASK on i386 as it has been
on x86_64.  This means the do_notify_resume() path using it is never
used, so TIF_SINGLESTEP is not cleared on returning to user mode.

Both now leave TIF_SINGLESTEP set when returning to user, so that
it's already set on an int $0x80 system call entry.  This removes
the need for testing TF on the system_call path.  Doing it this way
fixes the regression for PTRACE_SINGLESTEP into a sigreturn syscall,
introduced by commit 1e2e99f0.

The clear_TF_reenable case that sets TIF_SINGLESTEP can only happen
on a non-exception kernel entry, i.e. sysenter/syscall instruction.
That will always get to the syscall exit tracing path.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      64f09733
  3. 12 7月, 2008 1 次提交
  5. 08 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/paravirt: split sysret and sysexit · d75cd22f
      由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于 
      Don't conflate sysret and sysexit; they're different instructions with
different semantics, and may be in use at the same time (at least
within the same kernel, depending on whether its an Intel or AMD
system).

sysexit - just return to userspace, does no register restoration of
    any kind; must explicitly atomically enable interrupts.

sysret - reloads flags from r11, so no need to explicitly enable
    interrupts on 64-bit, responsible for restoring usermode %gs
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citirx.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      d75cd22f
  7. 24 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  9. 13 6月, 2008 1 次提交
    • P
      x86: fix lockdep warning during suspend-to-ram · e32e58a9
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      Andrew Morton wrote:

> I've been seeing the below for a long time during suspend-to-ram on the Vaio.
>
>
> PM: Syncing filesystems ... done.
> PM: Preparing system for mem sleep
> Freezing user space processes ... <4>------------[ cut here ]------------
> WARNING: at kernel/lockdep.c:2658 check_flags+0x4c/0x127()
> Modules linked in: i915 drm ipw2200 sonypi ipv6 autofs4 hidp l2cap bluetooth sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 xt_state nf_conntrack xt_tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables acpi_cpufreq nvram ohci1394 ieee1394 ehci_hcd uhci_hcd sg joydev snd_hda_intel snd_seq_dummy sr_mod snd_seq_oss cdrom snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss ieee80211 pcspkr ieee80211_crypt snd_pcm i2c_i801 snd_timer i2c_core ide_pci_generic piix snd soundcore snd_page_alloc button ext3 jbd ide_disk ide_core [last unloaded: ipw2200]
> Pid: 3250, comm: zsh Not tainted 2.6.26-rc5 #1
>  [<c011c5f5>] warn_on_slowpath+0x41/0x6d
>  [<c01080e6>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
>  [<c013789c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x41/0x5c
>  [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58
>  [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d
>  [<c0138637>] ? __lock_acquire+0xae3/0xb2b
>  [<c0313413>] ? schedule+0x39b/0x3b4
>  [<c0135596>] check_flags+0x4c/0x127
>  [<c01386b9>] lock_acquire+0x3a/0x86
>  [<c0315075>] _spin_lock+0x26/0x53
>  [<c0140660>] ? refrigerator+0x13/0xc3
>  [<c0140660>] refrigerator+0x13/0xc3
>  [<c012684a>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x3c/0x31e
>  [<c0102fe7>] do_notify_resume+0x91/0x6ee
>  [<c01359fd>] ? lock_release_holdtime+0x50/0x56
>  [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58
>  [<c0235d24>] ? read_chan+0x0/0x58c
>  [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d
>  [<c0315694>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58
>  [<c0230afa>] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x5c/0x63
>  [<c0233104>] ? tty_read+0x66/0x98
>  [<c014b3f0>] ? audit_syscall_exit+0x2aa/0x2c5
>  [<c0109430>] ? do_syscall_trace+0x6b/0x16f
>  [<c0103a9c>] work_notifysig+0x13/0x1b
>  =======================
> ---[ end trace 25b49fe59a25afa5 ]---
> possible reason: unannotated irqs-off.
> irq event stamp: 58919
> hardirqs last  enabled at (58919): [<c0103afd>] syscall_exit_work+0x11/0x26

Joy - I so love entry.S

Best I can make of it:

syscall_exit_work
  resume_userspace
    DISABLE_INTERRUPTS
    (no TRACE_IRQS_OFF)
      work_pending
        work_notifysig
          do_notify_resume()
            do_signal()
              get_signal_to_deliver()
                try_to_freeze()
                  refrigerator()
                    task_lock() -> check_flags() -> BANG

The normal path is:

syscall_exit_work
  resume_userspace
    DISABLE_INTERRUPTS
    restore_all
      TRACE_IRQS_IRET
      iret

No idea why that would not warn..
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      e32e58a9
  11. 24 5月, 2008 2 次提交
    • S
      ftrace: use dynamic patching for updating mcount calls · d61f82d0
      由 Steven Rostedt 提交于 
      This patch replaces the indirect call to the mcount function
pointer with a direct call that will be patched by the
dynamic ftrace routines.

On boot up, the mcount function calls the ftace_stub function.
When the dynamic ftrace code is initialized, the ftrace_stub
is replaced with a call to the ftrace_record_ip, which records
the instruction pointers of the locations that call it.

Later, the ftraced daemon will call kstop_machine and patch all
the locations to nops.

When a ftrace is enabled, the original calls to mcount will now
be set top call ftrace_caller, which will do a direct call
to the registered ftrace function. This direct call is also patched
when the function that should be called is updated.

All patching is performed by a kstop_machine routine to prevent any
type of race conditions that is associated with modifying code
on the fly.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      d61f82d0
    • A
      ftrace: add basic support for gcc profiler instrumentation · 16444a8a
      由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于 
      If CONFIG_FTRACE is selected and /proc/sys/kernel/ftrace_enabled is
set to a non-zero value the ftrace routine will be called everytime
we enter a kernel function that is not marked with the "notrace"
attribute.

The ftrace routine will then call a registered function if a function
happens to be registered.

[ This code has been highly hacked by Steven Rostedt and Ingo Molnar,
  so don't blame Arnaldo for all of this ;-) ]

Update:
  It is now possible to register more than one ftrace function.
  If only one ftrace function is registered, that will be the
  function that ftrace calls directly. If more than one function
  is registered, then ftrace will call a function that will loop
  through the functions to call.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      16444a8a
  13. 13 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  15. 25 4月, 2008 4 次提交
  17. 20 4月, 2008 1 次提交
  19. 17 4月, 2008 2 次提交
  21. 19 2月, 2008 1 次提交
  23. 10 2月, 2008 1 次提交
  25. 30 1月, 2008 4 次提交
  27. 17 10月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      paravirt: refactor struct paravirt_ops into smaller pv_*_ops · 93b1eab3
      由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于 
      This patch refactors the paravirt_ops structure into groups of
functionally related ops:

pv_info - random info, rather than function entrypoints
pv_init_ops - functions used at boot time (some for module_init too)
pv_misc_ops - lazy mode, which didn't fit well anywhere else
pv_time_ops - time-related functions
pv_cpu_ops - various privileged instruction ops
pv_irq_ops - operations for managing interrupt state
pv_apic_ops - APIC operations
pv_mmu_ops - operations for managing pagetables

There are several motivations for this:

1. Some of these ops will be general to all x86, and some will be
   i386/x86-64 specific.  This makes it easier to share common stuff
   while allowing separate implementations where needed.

2. At the moment we must export all of paravirt_ops, but modules only
   need selected parts of it.  This allows us to export on a case by case
   basis (and also choose which export license we want to apply).

3. Functional groupings make things a bit more readable.

Struct paravirt_ops is now only used as a template to generate
patch-site identifiers, and to extract function pointers for inserting
into jmp/calls when patching.  It is only instantiated when needed.
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Zach Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>
Cc: Anthony Liguory <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Glauber de Oliveira Costa" <glommer@gmail.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
      93b1eab3
  29. 12 10月, 2007 1 次提交
  31. 11 10月, 2007 3 次提交
  33. 19 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  35. 18 7月, 2007 2 次提交
    • J
      xen: use iret directly when possible · 9ec2b804
      由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于 
      Most of the time we can simply use the iret instruction to exit the
kernel, rather than having to use the iret hypercall - the only
exception is if we're returning into vm86 mode, or from delivering an
NMI (which we don't support yet).

When running native, iret has the behaviour of testing for a pending
interrupt atomically with re-enabling interrupts.  Unfortunately
there's no way to do this with Xen, so there's a window in which we
could get a recursive exception after enabling events but before
actually returning to userspace.

This causes a problem: if the nested interrupt causes one of the
task's TIF_WORK_MASK flags to be set, they will not be checked again
before returning to userspace.  This means that pending work may be
left pending indefinitely, until the process enters and leaves the
kernel again.  The net effect is that a pending signal or reschedule
event could be delayed for an unbounded amount of time.

To deal with this, the xen event upcall handler checks to see if the
EIP is within the critical section of the iret code, after events
are (potentially) enabled up to the iret itself.  If its within this
range, it calls the iret critical section fixup, which adjusts the
stack to deal with any unrestored registers, and then shifts the
stack frame up to replace the previous invocation.
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
      9ec2b804
    • J
      xen: Core Xen implementation · 5ead97c8
      由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于 
      This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen
implementation, including:
 - booting and setup
 - pagetable setup
 - privileged instructions
 - segmentation
 - interrupt flags
 - upcalls
 - multicall batching

BOOTING AND SETUP

The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen
domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder
then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel.

Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note).
The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S.
In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke
lots of binutils bugs.

Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state
(32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's
not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper.  The main
steps are:
  1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a
     structure assignment.
  2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the
     head.S generated pagetables in a native boot).
  3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top
     of the address space for its own use.
  4. Call start_kernel()

PAGETABLE SETUP

Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back
via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state.  One
of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the
construction of the initial init_mm pagetable.  Because Xen places
tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be
valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we
need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these
constraints in mind.  It turns out that the easiest way to do this is
use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just
insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist.

This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of
xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as
read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but
lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set
properly.

PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION

When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0.
This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it
still can't run privileged instructions directly.  Non-performance
critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception
and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but
more performance-critical instructions have their own specific
paravirt_ops.  In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls
for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different
from the normal native version.

The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of:
  Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT,
     TLS and so on.  Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly
     modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new
     entries can be validated.  This is important because Xen uses
     segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the
     hypervisor itself.
  Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints,
     so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be
     converted to the form Xen expects.  Xen sets int 0x80 up specially
     so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel
     without going via the hypervisor.  sysenter isn't supported.
  Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to
     Xen.
  TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding
     Xen hypercalls.
  Control registers: all the control registers are privileged.  The most
     important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable,
     and we handle it specially.

Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not
privileged.  We want to control what CPU features are visible to the
rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op.
Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems.

INTERRUPT FLAGS

Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is
contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure.  Because the guest
kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely
ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables
interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall).

(A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively
synonymous.  However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a
"mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.)

There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which
are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state.  The only thing
worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly
see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make
sure it gets delivered.

UPCALLS

Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented
by each guest.  One is the event upcalls, which is how events
(interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests.  The other is
the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either
reloading a segment register, or caused by iret.  These are
implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal
iret_exc path when necessary.

MULTICALL BATCHING

Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls
to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into
the hypervisor.  This is particularly useful for context switches,
since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update
TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one.  This patch implements a
generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many
places in the Xen code.
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com>
Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
      5ead97c8
  37. 07 7月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      i386: fix regression, endless loop in ptrace singlestep over an int80 · 1e2e99f0
      由 Jason Wessel 提交于 
      The commit 635cf99a introduced a
regression.  Executing a ptrace single step after certain int80
accesses will infinitely loop and never advance the PC.

The TIF_SINGLESTEP check should be done on the return from the syscall
and not before it.

I loops on each single step on the pop right after the int80 which writes out
to the console.  At that point you can issue as many single steps as you want
and it will not advance any further.

The test case is below:

/* Test whether singlestep through an int80 syscall works.
 */
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <string.h>

static int child, status;
static struct user_regs_struct regs;

static void do_child()
{
	char str[80] = "child: int80 test\n";

	ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0);
	kill(getpid(), SIGUSR1);
	write(fileno(stdout),str,strlen(str));
	asm ("int $0x80" : : "a" (20)); /* getpid */
}

static void do_parent()
{
	unsigned long eip, expected = 0;
again:
	waitpid(child, &status, 0);
	if (WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status))
		return;

	if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
		ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child, 0, &regs);
		eip = regs.eip;
		if (expected)
			fprintf(stderr, "child stop @ %08lx, expected %08lx %s\n",
					eip, expected,
					eip == expected ? "" : " <== ERROR");

		if (*(unsigned short *)eip == 0x80cd) {
			fprintf(stderr, "int 0x80 at %08x\n", (unsigned int)eip);
			expected = eip + 2;
		} else
			expected = 0;

		ptrace(PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, child, NULL, NULL);
	}
	goto again;
}

int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
{
	child = fork();
	if (child)
		do_parent();
	else
		do_child();
	return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: NJason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>
Acked-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1e2e99f0
  39. 03 5月, 2007 8 次提交
  41. 13 2月, 2007 1 次提交