1. 15 8月, 2019 7 次提交
    • J
      Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation · 8834cfca
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac upstream.
      
      Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
      Spectre v1.
      
      [ Shile: Resolved the conflicts by adding the missed file ]
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      
      Conflicts:
      	Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
      8834cfca
    • T
      x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS · f5d27995
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8 upstream.
      
      Intel provided the following information:
      
       On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
       value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
       last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
       speculatively written segment value.
      
      That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
      entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
      
      Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
      out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
      are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
      Reported-by: NAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      f5d27995
    • J
      x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ · 49e1ce98
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 64dbc122b20f75183d8822618c24f85144a5a94d upstream.
      
      Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
      instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed.  Some
      assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
      when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation.  For
      some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.
      
      Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended.
      
      Fixes: 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      49e1ce98
    • J
      x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 12351a6c
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream.
      
      The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
      Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
      enabled.  Enable those features where applicable.
      
      The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
      
      There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
      
      - When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
        value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction.  This means they can
        write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
        be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
        handler:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
      	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
      	// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
      
        If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
        speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
        may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
        load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
      
        Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
        coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
        switch back to the user GS.  On AMD, this variant isn't possible
        because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
        accesses.
      
        NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
      	doesn't exist quite yet.
      
      - When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
        unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
        restricts GS values to user space addresses only.  That means the
        gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
        needs to be read from user space first.  Something like:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
      	mov (%reg1), %reg2
      	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
      	// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
      
        It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
        there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
        exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future).  Without
        tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
      
        Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
      
        - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
          susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
          reading user space memory, even L1 cached values.  This effectively
          disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
      
        - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
          still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
          memory.  But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
          user value from L1, if it has already been cached.  This is probably
          only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
      
      Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
      
      Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
      is serializing on AMD.
      
      [ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
        	by Dave Hansen ]
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      12351a6c
    • J
      x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 06e45d3a
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream.
      
      Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks.  It can affect any
      conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
      handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic in
      the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
      GS.
      
      For example:
      
      	if (coming from user space)
      		swapgs
      	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
      	mov (%reg), %reg1
      
      When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
      then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value.  So the user can
      speculatively force a read of any kernel value.  If a gadget exists which
      uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
      contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
      attack.
      
      A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
      speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
      of the speculative window.
      
      The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
      
        a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
           isn't user-controlled; and
      
        b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
           "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
           above).
      
      The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
      CR3 write when PTI is enabled.  Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
      lfences can be skipped in those cases.
      
      On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
      
      To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
      features for alternative patching:
      
        X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
        X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
      
      Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.
      
      The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      06e45d3a
    • F
      x86/cpufeatures: Combine word 11 and 12 into a new scattered features word · 74f65670
      Fenghua Yu 提交于
      commit acec0ce081de0c36459eea91647faf99296445a3 upstream.
      
      It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
      whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
      word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
      features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
      added in word 11 in the future.
      
      Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
      Linux-defined leaf.
      
      Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
      name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.
      
      Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
      CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
      code into a separate function.
      
      KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
      X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
      Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
      Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
      Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
      Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
      Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
      Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
      Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      74f65670
    • B
      x86/cpufeatures: Carve out CQM features retrieval · deaf49f3
      Borislav Petkov 提交于
      commit 45fc56e629caa451467e7664fbd4c797c434a6c4 upstream.
      
      ... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a
      patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical,
      sole code movement separate for easy review.
      
      No functional changes.
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: x86@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      deaf49f3
  2. 06 8月, 2019 13 次提交
    • E
      ext4: fix bigalloc cluster freeing when hole punching under load · 46de2e5e
      Eric Whitney 提交于
      commit 7bd75230b43727b258a4f7a59d62114cffe1b6c8 upstream.
      
      Ext4 may not free clusters correctly when punching holes in bigalloc
      file systems under high load conditions.  If it's not possible to
      extend and restart the journal in ext4_ext_rm_leaf() when preparing to
      remove blocks from a punched region, a retry of the entire punch
      operation is triggered in ext4_ext_remove_space().  This causes a
      partial cluster to be set to the first cluster in the extent found to
      the right of the punched region.  However, if the punch operation
      prior to the retry had made enough progress to delete one or more
      extents and a partial cluster candidate for freeing had already been
      recorded, the retry would overwrite the partial cluster.  The loss of
      this information makes it impossible to correctly free the original
      partial cluster in all cases.
      
      This bug can cause generic/476 to fail when run as part of
      xfstests-bld's bigalloc and bigalloc_1k test cases.  The failure is
      reported when e2fsck detects bad iblocks counts greater than expected
      in units of whole clusters and also detects a number of negative block
      bitmap differences equal to the iblocks discrepancy in cluster units.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      46de2e5e
    • G
      ext4: fix build error when DX_DEBUG is defined · f2d52aff
      Gabriel Krisman Bertazi 提交于
      commit 799578ab16e86b074c184ec5abbda0bc698c7b0b upstream.
      
      Enabling DX_DEBUG triggers the build error below.  info is an attribute
      of  the dxroot structure.
      
      linux/fs/ext4/namei.c:2264:12: error: ‘info’
      undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean ‘insl’?
      	   	  info->indirect_levels));
      
      Fixes: e08ac99f ("ext4: add largedir feature")
      Signed-off-by: NGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Reviewed-by: NLukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      f2d52aff
    • D
      mm/page-writeback.c: fix range_cyclic writeback vs writepages deadlock · b6962996
      Dave Chinner 提交于
      commit 64081362e8ff4587b4554087f3cfc73d3e0a4cd7 upstream.
      
      We've recently seen a workload on XFS filesystems with a repeatable
      deadlock between background writeback and a multi-process application
      doing concurrent writes and fsyncs to a small range of a file.
      
      range_cyclic
      writeback		Process 1		Process 2
      
      xfs_vm_writepages
        write_cache_pages
          writeback_index = 2
          cycled = 0
          ....
          find page 2 dirty
          lock Page 2
          ->writepage
            page 2 writeback
            page 2 clean
            page 2 added to bio
          no more pages
      			write()
      			locks page 1
      			dirties page 1
      			locks page 2
      			dirties page 1
      			fsync()
      			....
      			xfs_vm_writepages
      			write_cache_pages
      			  start index 0
      			  find page 1 towrite
      			  lock Page 1
      			  ->writepage
      			    page 1 writeback
      			    page 1 clean
      			    page 1 added to bio
      			  find page 2 towrite
      			  lock Page 2
      			  page 2 is writeback
      			  <blocks>
      						write()
      						locks page 1
      						dirties page 1
      						fsync()
      						....
      						xfs_vm_writepages
      						write_cache_pages
      						  start index 0
      
          !done && !cycled
            sets index to 0, restarts lookup
          find page 1 dirty
      						  find page 1 towrite
      						  lock Page 1
      						  page 1 is writeback
      						  <blocks>
      
          lock Page 1
          <blocks>
      
      DEADLOCK because:
      
      	- process 1 needs page 2 writeback to complete to make
      	  enough progress to issue IO pending for page 1
      	- writeback needs page 1 writeback to complete so process 2
      	  can progress and unlock the page it is blocked on, then it
      	  can issue the IO pending for page 2
      	- process 2 can't make progress until process 1 issues IO
      	  for page 1
      
      The underlying cause of the problem here is that range_cyclic writeback is
      processing pages in descending index order as we hold higher index pages
      in a structure controlled from above write_cache_pages().  The
      write_cache_pages() caller needs to be able to submit these pages for IO
      before write_cache_pages restarts writeback at mapping index 0 to avoid
      wcp inverting the page lock/writeback wait order.
      
      generic_writepages() is not susceptible to this bug as it has no private
      context held across write_cache_pages() - filesystems using this
      infrastructure always submit pages in ->writepage immediately and so there
      is no problem with range_cyclic going back to mapping index 0.
      
      However:
      	mpage_writepages() has a private bio context,
      	exofs_writepages() has page_collect
      	fuse_writepages() has fuse_fill_wb_data
      	nfs_writepages() has nfs_pageio_descriptor
      	xfs_vm_writepages() has xfs_writepage_ctx
      
      All of these ->writepages implementations can hold pages under writeback
      in their private structures until write_cache_pages() returns, and hence
      they are all susceptible to this deadlock.
      
      Also worth noting is that ext4 has it's own bastardised version of
      write_cache_pages() and so it /may/ have an equivalent deadlock.  I looked
      at the code long enough to understand that it has a similar retry loop for
      range_cyclic writeback reaching the end of the file and then promptly ran
      away before my eyes bled too much.  I'll leave it for the ext4 developers
      to determine if their code is actually has this deadlock and how to fix it
      if it has.
      
      There's a few ways I can see avoid this deadlock.  There's probably more,
      but these are the first I've though of:
      
      1. get rid of range_cyclic altogether
      
      2. range_cyclic always stops at EOF, and we start again from
      writeback index 0 on the next call into write_cache_pages()
      
      2a. wcp also returns EAGAIN to ->writepages implementations to
      indicate range cyclic has hit EOF. writepages implementations can
      then flush the current context and call wpc again to continue. i.e.
      lift the retry into the ->writepages implementation
      
      3. range_cyclic uses trylock_page() rather than lock_page(), and it
      skips pages it can't lock without blocking. It will already do this
      for pages under writeback, so this seems like a no-brainer
      
      3a. all non-WB_SYNC_ALL writeback uses trylock_page() to avoid
      blocking as per pages under writeback.
      
      I don't think #1 is an option - range_cyclic prevents frequently
      dirtied lower file offset from starving background writeback of
      rarely touched higher file offsets.
      
      performance as going back to the start of the file implies an
      immediate seek. We'll have exactly the same number of seeks if we
      switch writeback to another inode, and then come back to this one
      later and restart from index 0.
      
      retry loop up into the wcp caller means we can issue IO on the
      pending pages before calling wcp again, and so avoid locking or
      waiting on pages in the wrong order. I'm not convinced we need to do
      this given that we get the same thing from #2 on the next writeback
      call from the writeback infrastructure.
      
      inversion problem, just prevents it from becoming a deadlock
      situation. I'd prefer we fix the inversion, not sweep it under the
      carpet like this.
      
      band-aid fix of #3.
      
      So it seems that the simplest way to fix this issue is to implement
      solution #2
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005054526.21507-1-david@fromorbit.comSigned-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.de>
      Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      b6962996
    • M
      block: fix single range discard merge · 408d2591
      Ming Lei 提交于
      commit 2a5cf35cd6c56b2924bce103413ad3381bdc31fa upstream.
      
      There are actually two kinds of discard merge:
      
      - one is the normal discard merge, just like normal read/write request,
      and call it single-range discard
      
      - another is the multi-range discard, queue_max_discard_segments(rq->q) > 1
      
      For the former case, queue_max_discard_segments(rq->q) is 1, and we
      should handle this kind of discard merge like the normal read/write
      request.
      
      This patch fixes the following kernel panic issue[1], which is caused by
      not removing the single-range discard request from elevator queue.
      
      Guangwu has one raid discard test case, in which this issue is a bit
      easier to trigger, and I verified that this patch can fix the kernel
      panic issue in Guangwu's test case.
      
      [1] kernel panic log from Jens's report
      
       BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000148
       PGD 0 P4D 0.
       Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
       CPU: 37 PID: 763 Comm: kworker/37:1H Not tainted \
      4.20.0-rc3-00649-ge64d9a554a91-dirty #14  Hardware name: Wiwynn \
      Leopard-Orv2/Leopard-DDR BW, BIOS LBM08   03/03/2017       Workqueue: kblockd \
      blk_mq_run_work_fn                                            RIP: \
      0010:blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x81/0x120                                       Code: 24 \
      10 48 89 7c 24 20 74 21 83 fa ff 0f 95 c0 48 8b 4c 24 28 65 48 33 0c 25 28 00 00 00 \
      0f 85 96 00 00 00 48 83 c4 30 5b 5d c3 <48> 8b 87 48 01 00 00 8b 40 04 39 43 20 72 37 \
      f6 87 b0 00 00 00 02  RSP: 0018:ffffc90004aabd30 EFLAGS: 00010246                     \
        RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff888465ea1300 RCX: ffffc90004aabde8
       RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffffc90004aabde8 RDI: 0000000000000000
       RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888465ea1348 R09: 0000000000000000
       R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: ffff888465ea1300
       R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888465ea1348 R15: ffff888465d10000
       FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846f9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
       CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
       CR2: 0000000000000148 CR3: 000000000220a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
       DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
       DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
       Call Trace:
        blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xec/0x480
        ? elv_rb_del+0x11/0x30
        blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x6e/0xf0
        blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xfa/0x170
        __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x5f/0xe0
        process_one_work+0x154/0x350
        worker_thread+0x46/0x3c0
        kthread+0xf5/0x130
        ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
        ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
       Modules linked in: sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel \
      kvm switchtec irqbypass iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support efivars cdc_ether usbnet mii \
      cdc_acm i2c_i801 lpc_ich mfd_core ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq \
      button sch_fq_codel nfsd nfs_acl lockd grace auth_rpcgss oid_registry sunrpc nvme \
      nvme_core fuse sg loop efivarfs autofs4  CR2: 0000000000000148                        \
      
       ---[ end trace 340a1fb996df1b9b ]---
       RIP: 0010:blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x81/0x120
       Code: 24 10 48 89 7c 24 20 74 21 83 fa ff 0f 95 c0 48 8b 4c 24 28 65 48 33 0c 25 28 \
      00 00 00 0f 85 96 00 00 00 48 83 c4 30 5b 5d c3 <48> 8b 87 48 01 00 00 8b 40 04 39 43 \
      20 72 37 f6 87 b0 00 00 00 02
      
      Fixes: 445251d0 ("blk-mq: fix discard merge with scheduler attached")
      Reported-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Guangwu Zhang <guazhang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: Jianchao Wang <jianchao.w.wang@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      408d2591
    • O
      NFSv4.x: fix lock recovery during delegation recall · d50ef120
      Olga Kornievskaia 提交于
      commit 44f411c353bf6d98d5a34f8f1b8605d43b2e50b8 upstream.
      
      Running "./nfstest_delegation --runtest recall26" uncovers that
      client doesn't recover the lock when we have an appending open,
      where the initial open got a write delegation.
      
      Instead of checking for the passed in open context against
      the file lock's open context. Check that the state is the same.
      Signed-off-by: NOlga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      d50ef120
    • J
      block: fix the DISCARD request merge · e5151915
      Jianchao Wang 提交于
      commit 69840466086d2248898020a08dda52732686c4e6 upstream.
      
      There are two cases when handle DISCARD merge.
      If max_discard_segments == 1, the bios/requests need to be contiguous
      to merge. If max_discard_segments > 1, it takes every bio as a range
      and different range needn't to be contiguous.
      
      But now, attempt_merge screws this up. It always consider contiguity
      for DISCARD for the case max_discard_segments > 1 and cannot merge
      contiguous DISCARD for the case max_discard_segments == 1, because
      rq_attempt_discard_merge always returns false in this case.
      This patch fixes both of the two cases above.
      Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Reviewed-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJianchao Wang <jianchao.w.wang@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      e5151915
    • H
      dm raid: fix false -EBUSY when handling check/repair message · 71e612b3
      Heinz Mauelshagen 提交于
      commit 74694bcbdf7e28a5ad548cdda9ac56d30be00d13 upstream.
      
      Sending a check/repair message infrequently leads to -EBUSY instead of
      properly identifying an active resync.  This occurs because
      raid_message() is testing recovery bits in a racy way.
      
      Fix by calling decipher_sync_action() from raid_message() to properly
      identify the idle state of the RAID device.
      Signed-off-by: NHeinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      71e612b3
    • D
      xfs: fix use-after-free race in xfs_buf_rele · ac911480
      Dave Chinner 提交于
      commit 37fd1678245f7a5898c1b05128bc481fb403c290 upstream.
      
      When looking at a 4.18 based KASAN use after free report, I noticed
      that racing xfs_buf_rele() may race on dropping the last reference
      to the buffer and taking the buffer lock. This was the symptom
      displayed by the KASAN report, but the actual issue that was
      reported had already been fixed in 4.19-rc1 by commit e339dd8d
      ("xfs: use sync buffer I/O for sync delwri queue submission").
      
      Despite this, I think there is still an issue with xfs_buf_rele()
      in this code:
      
              release = atomic_dec_and_lock(&bp->b_hold, &pag->pag_buf_lock);
              spin_lock(&bp->b_lock);
              if (!release) {
      .....
      
      If two threads race on the b_lock after both dropping a reference
      and one getting dropping the last reference so release = true, we
      end up with:
      
      CPU 0				CPU 1
      atomic_dec_and_lock()
      				atomic_dec_and_lock()
      				spin_lock(&bp->b_lock)
      spin_lock(&bp->b_lock)
      <spins>
      				<release = true bp->b_lru_ref = 0>
      				<remove from lists>
      				freebuf = true
      				spin_unlock(&bp->b_lock)
      				xfs_buf_free(bp)
      <gets lock, reading and writing freed memory>
      <accesses freed memory>
      spin_unlock(&bp->b_lock) <reads/writes freed memory>
      
      IOWs, we can't safely take bp->b_lock after dropping the hold
      reference because the buffer may go away at any time after we
      drop that reference. However, this can be fixed simply by taking the
      bp->b_lock before we drop the reference.
      
      It is safe to nest the pag_buf_lock inside bp->b_lock as the
      pag_buf_lock is only used to serialise against lookup in
      xfs_buf_find() and no other locks are held over or under the
      pag_buf_lock there. Make this clear by documenting the buffer lock
      orders at the top of the file.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com
      Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      ac911480
    • W
      x86: uaccess: Inhibit speculation past access_ok() in user_access_begin() · e28b4155
      Will Deacon 提交于
      commit 6e693b3ffecb0b478c7050b44a4842854154f715 upstream.
      
      Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
      makes the access_ok() check part of the user_access_begin() preceding a
      series of 'unsafe' accesses.  This has the desirable effect of ensuring
      that all 'unsafe' accesses have been range-checked, without having to
      pick through all of the callsites to verify whether the appropriate
      checking has been made.
      
      However, the consolidated range check does not inhibit speculation, so
      it is still up to the caller to ensure that they are not susceptible to
      any speculative side-channel attacks for user addresses that ultimately
      fail the access_ok() check.
      
      This is an oversight, so use __uaccess_begin_nospec() to ensure that
      speculation is inhibited until the access_ok() check has passed.
      Reported-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      e28b4155
    • L
      make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()' · aba1b548
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      commit 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 upstream.
      
      Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
      separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
      direct (optimized) user access.
      
      But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
      at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
      similar.  Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
      actually been range-checked.
      
      If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
      SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
      Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin().  But
      nothing really forces the range check.
      
      By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
      people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
      near the actual accesses.  We have way too long a history of people
      trying to avoid them.
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      
      [ Shile: fix following conflicts by adding a dummy arguments ]
      Conflicts:
      	kernel/compat.c
      	kernel/exit.c
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      aba1b548
    • L
      i915: fix missing user_access_end() in page fault exception case · 22698330
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      commit 0b2c8f8b6b0c7530e2866c95862546d0da2057b0 upstream.
      
      When commit fddcd00a49e9 ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a
      user-write error") unified the error handling for various user access
      problems, it didn't do the user_access_end() that is needed for the
      unsafe_put_user() case.
      
      It's not a huge deal: a missed user_access_end() will only mean that
      SMAP protection isn't active afterwards, and for the error case we'll be
      returning to user mode soon enough anyway.  But it's wrong, and adding
      the proper user_access_end() is trivial enough (and doing it for the
      other error cases where it isn't needed doesn't hurt).
      
      I noticed it while doing the same prep-work for changing
      user_access_begin() that precipitated the access_ok() changes in commit
      96d4f267e40f ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function").
      
      Fixes: fddcd00a49e9 ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a user-write error")
      Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
      Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.20
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      22698330
    • C
      drm/i915: Force the slow path after a user-write error · 5cbce514
      Chris Wilson 提交于
      commit fddcd00a49e9122a3579247151e9cb3ce5a1a36e upstream.
      
      If we fail to write the user relocation back when it is changed, force
      ourselves to take the slow relocation path where we can handle faults in
      the write path. There is still an element of dubiousness as having
      patched up the batch to use the correct offset, it no longer matches the
      presumed_offset in the relocation, so a second pass may miss any changes
      in layout.
      Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: NJoonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
      Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180903083337.13134-3-chris@chris-wilson.co.ukSigned-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      5cbce514
    • A
      userfaultfd: allow get_mempolicy(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR) to trigger userfaults · c15f4d67
      Andrea Arcangeli 提交于
      commit 3b9aadf7278d16d7bed4d5d808501065f70898d8 upstream.
      
      get_mempolicy(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR) called a get_user_pages that would
      not be waiting for userfaults before failing and it would hit on a SIGBUS
      instead.  Using get_user_pages_locked/unlocked instead will allow
      get_mempolicy to allow userfaults to resolve the fault and fill the hole,
      before grabbing the node id of the page.
      
      If the user calls get_mempolicy() with MPOL_F_ADDR | MPOL_F_NODE for an
      address inside an area managed by uffd and there is no page at that
      address, the page allocation from within get_mempolicy() will fail
      because get_user_pages() does not allow for page fault retry required
      for uffd; the user will get SIGBUS.
      
      With this patch, the page fault will be resolved by the uffd and the
      get_mempolicy() will continue normally.
      
      Background:
      
      Via code review, previously the syscall would have returned -EFAULT
      (vm_fault_to_errno), now it will block and wait for an userfault (if
      it's waken before the fault is resolved it'll still -EFAULT).
      
      This way get_mempolicy will give a chance to an "unaware" app to be
      compliant with userfaults.
      
      The reason this visible change is that becoming "userfault compliant"
      cannot regress anything: all other syscalls including read(2)/write(2)
      had to become "userfault compliant" long time ago (that's one of the
      things userfaultfd can do that PROT_NONE and trapping segfaults can't).
      
      So this is just one more syscall that become "userfault compliant" like
      all other major ones already were.
      
      This has been happening on virtio-bridge dpdk process which just called
      get_mempolicy on the guest space post live migration, but before the
      memory had a chance to be migrated to destination.
      
      I didn't run an strace to be able to show the -EFAULT going away, but
      I've the confirmation of the below debug aid information (only visible
      with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y) going away with the patch:
      
          [20116.371461] FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 0
          [20116.371464] CPU: 1 PID: 13381 Comm: vhost-events Not tainted 4.17.12-200.fc28.x86_64 #1
          [20116.371465] Hardware name: LENOVO 20FAS2BN0A/20FAS2BN0A, BIOS N1CET54W (1.22 ) 02/10/2017
          [20116.371466] Call Trace:
          [20116.371473]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
          [20116.371476]  handle_userfault.cold.37+0x1b/0x22
          [20116.371479]  ? remove_wait_queue+0x20/0x60
          [20116.371481]  ? poll_freewait+0x45/0xa0
          [20116.371483]  ? do_sys_poll+0x31c/0x520
          [20116.371485]  ? radix_tree_lookup_slot+0x1e/0x50
          [20116.371488]  shmem_getpage_gfp+0xce7/0xe50
          [20116.371491]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x1a/0x2c0
          [20116.371493]  shmem_fault+0x78/0x1e0
          [20116.371495]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x3a1/0x450
          [20116.371498]  __do_fault+0x1f/0xc0
          [20116.371500]  __handle_mm_fault+0xe2e/0x12f0
          [20116.371502]  handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
          [20116.371504]  __get_user_pages+0x238/0x790
          [20116.371506]  get_user_pages+0x3e/0x50
          [20116.371510]  kernel_get_mempolicy+0x40b/0x700
          [20116.371512]  ? vfs_write+0x170/0x1a0
          [20116.371515]  __x64_sys_get_mempolicy+0x21/0x30
          [20116.371517]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
          [20116.371520]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      The above harmless debug message (not a kernel crash, just a
      dump_stack()) is shown with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y to more quickly identify
      and improve kernel spots that may have to become "userfaultfd
      compliant" like this one (without having to run an strace and search
      for syscall misbehavior).  Spots like the above are more closer to a
      kernel bug for the non-cooperative usages that Mike focuses on, than
      for for dpdk qemu-cooperative usages that reproduced it, but it's still
      nicer to get this fixed for dpdk too.
      
      The part of the patch that caused me to think is only the
      implementation issue of mpol_get, but it looks like it should work safe
      no matter the kind of mempolicy structure that is (the default static
      policy also starts at 1 so it'll go to 2 and back to 1 without crashing
      everything at 0).
      
      [rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com: changelog addition]
        http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180904073718.GA26916@rapoport-lnx
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831214848.23676-1-aarcange@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: NMaxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      c15f4d67
  3. 01 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  4. 29 7月, 2019 3 次提交
  5. 25 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • J
      ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME · 4cf85eef
      Jann Horn 提交于
      commit 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee upstream.
      
      This fixes CVE-2019-13272.
      
      Fix two issues:
      
      When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
      reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
      to get_cred().  However, the object lifetime rules for things like
      struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
      a stable reference.
      
      PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
      acting as the subject, but that's not the case.  If a malicious
      unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
      at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
      (because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
      with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
      which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
      
      Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
      that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
      current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
      for access control.
      
      This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
      any code that it will actually break.
      
      Fixes: 64b875f7 ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
      Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      4cf85eef
  6. 24 7月, 2019 5 次提交
  7. 20 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 18 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • X
      ext4: unlock unused_pages timely when doing writeback · 404ed43a
      Xiaoguang Wang 提交于
      commit a297b2fcee461e40df763e179cbbfba5a9e572d2 upstream.
      
      In mpage_add_bh_to_extent(), when accumulated extents length is greater
      than MAX_WRITEPAGES_EXTENT_LEN or buffer head's b_stat is not equal, we
      will not continue to search unmapped area for this page, but note this
      page is locked, and will only be unlocked in mpage_release_unused_pages()
      after ext4_io_submit, if io also is throttled by blk-throttle or similar
      io qos, we will hold this page locked for a while, it's unnecessary.
      
      I think the best fix is to refactor mpage_add_bh_to_extent() to let it
      return some hints whether to unlock this page, but given that we will
      improve dioread_nolock later, we can let it done later, so currently
      the simple fix would just call mpage_release_unused_pages() before
      ext4_io_submit().
      Signed-off-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
      404ed43a
  9. 10 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  10. 05 7月, 2019 6 次提交
    • B
      xfs: serialize unaligned dio writes against all other dio writes · 6fb16296
      Brian Foster 提交于
      commit 2032a8a27b5cc0f578d37fa16fa2494b80a0d00a upstream.
      
      XFS applies more strict serialization constraints to unaligned
      direct writes to accommodate things like direct I/O layer zeroing,
      unwritten extent conversion, etc. Unaligned submissions acquire the
      exclusive iolock and wait for in-flight dio to complete to ensure
      multiple submissions do not race on the same block and cause data
      corruption.
      
      This generally works in the case of an aligned dio followed by an
      unaligned dio, but the serialization is lost if I/Os occur in the
      opposite order. If an unaligned write is submitted first and
      immediately followed by an overlapping, aligned write, the latter
      submits without the typical unaligned serialization barriers because
      there is no indication of an unaligned dio still in-flight. This can
      lead to unpredictable results.
      
      To provide proper unaligned dio serialization, require that such
      direct writes are always the only dio allowed in-flight at one time
      for a particular inode. We already acquire the exclusive iolock and
      drain pending dio before submitting the unaligned dio. Wait once
      more after the dio submission to hold the iolock across the I/O and
      prevent further submissions until the unaligned I/O completes. This
      is heavy handed, but consistent with the current pre-submission
      serialization for unaligned direct writes.
      Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAllison Henderson <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAlvin Zheng <Alvin@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      6fb16296
    • S
      sched: disable auto group by default · c6377f05
      Shanpei Chen 提交于
      Autogroup feature is used to improve interactivity for desktop
      application. Since our kernel runs on server, just like RHEL8,
      disable it by default to avoid unnecessary computing.
      
      More details, please refer https://lwn.net/Articles/416641/Signed-off-by: NShanpei Chen <shanpeic@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      c6377f05
    • D
      kernel/sched/psi.c: expose pressure metrics on root cgroup · 9b8a3541
      Dan Schatzberg 提交于
      commit df5ba5be7425e1df296d40c5f37a39d98ec666a2 upstream.
      
      Pressure metrics are already recorded and exposed in procfs for the
      entire system, but any tool which monitors cgroup pressure has to
      special case the root cgroup to read from procfs.  This patch exposes
      the already recorded pressure metrics on the root cgroup.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190510174938.3361741-1-dschatzberg@fb.comSigned-off-by: NDan Schatzberg <dschatzberg@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      9b8a3541
    • S
      psi: introduce psi monitor · 1e2bb28e
      Suren Baghdasaryan 提交于
      commit 0e94682b73bfa6c44c98af7a26771c9c08c055d5 upstream.
      
      Psi monitor aims to provide a low-latency short-term pressure detection
      mechanism configurable by users.  It allows users to monitor psi metrics
      growth and trigger events whenever a metric raises above user-defined
      threshold within user-defined time window.
      
      Time window and threshold are both expressed in usecs.  Multiple psi
      resources with different thresholds and window sizes can be monitored
      concurrently.
      
      Psi monitors activate when system enters stall state for the monitored
      psi metric and deactivate upon exit from the stall state.  While system
      is in the stall state psi signal growth is monitored at a rate of 10
      times per tracking window.  Min window size is 500ms, therefore the min
      monitoring interval is 50ms.  Max window size is 10s with monitoring
      interval of 1s.
      
      When activated psi monitor stays active for at least the duration of one
      tracking window to avoid repeated activations/deactivations when psi
      signal is bouncing.
      
      Notifications to the users are rate-limited to one per tracking window.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190319235619.260832-8-surenb@google.comSigned-off-by: NSuren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      1e2bb28e
    • J
      kernel: cgroup: add poll file operation · ce8f59c5
      Johannes Weiner 提交于
      commit dc50537bdd1a0804fa2cbc990565ee9a944e66fa upstream.
      
      Cgroup has a standardized poll/notification mechanism for waking all
      pollers on all fds when a filesystem node changes.  To allow polling for
      custom events, add a .poll callback that can override the default.
      
      This is in preparation for pollable cgroup pressure files which have
      per-fd trigger configurations.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124211518.244221-3-surenb@google.comSigned-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSuren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      ce8f59c5
    • J
      fs: kernfs: add poll file operation · ba79ed2d
      Johannes Weiner 提交于
      commit 147e1a97c4a0bdd43f55a582a9416bb9092563a9 upstream.
      
      Patch series "psi: pressure stall monitors", v3.
      
      Android is adopting psi to detect and remedy memory pressure that
      results in stuttering and decreased responsiveness on mobile devices.
      
      Psi gives us the stall information, but because we're dealing with
      latencies in the millisecond range, periodically reading the pressure
      files to detect stalls in a timely fashion is not feasible.  Psi also
      doesn't aggregate its averages at a high enough frequency right now.
      
      This patch series extends the psi interface such that users can
      configure sensitive latency thresholds and use poll() and friends to be
      notified when these are breached.
      
      As high-frequency aggregation is costly, it implements an aggregation
      method that is optimized for fast, short-interval averaging, and makes
      the aggregation frequency adaptive, such that high-frequency updates
      only happen while monitored stall events are actively occurring.
      
      With these patches applied, Android can monitor for, and ward off,
      mounting memory shortages before they cause problems for the user.  For
      example, using memory stall monitors in userspace low memory killer
      daemon (lmkd) we can detect mounting pressure and kill less important
      processes before device becomes visibly sluggish.
      
      In our memory stress testing psi memory monitors produce roughly 10x
      less false positives compared to vmpressure signals.  Having ability to
      specify multiple triggers for the same psi metric allows other parts of
      Android framework to monitor memory state of the device and act
      accordingly.
      
      The new interface is straightforward.  The user opens one of the
      pressure files for writing and writes a trigger description into the
      file descriptor that defines the stall state - some or full, and the
      maximum stall time over a given window of time.  E.g.:
      
              /* Signal when stall time exceeds 100ms of a 1s window */
              char trigger[] = "full 100000 1000000";
              fd = open("/proc/pressure/memory");
              write(fd, trigger, sizeof(trigger));
              while (poll() >= 0) {
                      ...
              }
              close(fd);
      
      When the monitored stall state is entered, psi adapts its aggregation
      frequency according to what the configured time window requires in order
      to emit event signals in a timely fashion.  Once the stalling subsides,
      aggregation reverts back to normal.
      
      The trigger is associated with the open file descriptor.  To stop
      monitoring, the user only needs to close the file descriptor and the
      trigger is discarded.
      
      Patches 1-4 prepare the psi code for polling support.  Patch 5
      implements the adaptive polling logic, the pressure growth detection
      optimized for short intervals, and hooks up write() and poll() on the
      pressure files.
      
      The patches were developed in collaboration with Johannes Weiner.
      
      This patch (of 5):
      
      Kernfs has a standardized poll/notification mechanism for waking all
      pollers on all fds when a filesystem node changes.  To allow polling for
      custom events, add a .poll callback that can override the default.
      
      This is in preparation for pollable cgroup pressure files which have
      per-fd trigger configurations.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124211518.244221-2-surenb@google.comSigned-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSuren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
      Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      ba79ed2d