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  1. 02 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • E
      ipv6: fix uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys() · cea67a2d
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys(),
root caused to a bad assumption of ICMP header being already
pulled in skb->head

ip_multipath_l3_keys() does the correct thing, so it is an IPv6 only bug.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
CPU: 0 PID: 4507 Comm: syz-executor661 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
 ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
 rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
 ip6_route_input+0x65a/0x920 net/ipv6/route.c:1884
 ip6_rcv_finish+0x413/0x6e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
 ipv6_rcv+0x1e16/0x2340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:208
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x47df/0x4a90 net/core/dev.c:4562
 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4627 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x49d/0x630 net/core/dev.c:4701
 netif_receive_skb+0x230/0x240 net/core/dev.c:4725
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1555 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x740f/0x7c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1962
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x1d4/0x330 drivers/net/tun.c:1990
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1782 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
 __vfs_write+0x7fb/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:482
 vfs_write+0x463/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:544
 SYSC_write+0x172/0x360 fs/read_write.c:589
 SyS_write+0x55/0x80 fs/read_write.c:581
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: 23aebdac ("ipv6: Compute multipath hash for ICMP errors from offending packet")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cea67a2d
  3. 24 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 23 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference in seg6_do_srh_encap()- v4 pkts · a957fa19
      由 Ahmed Abdelsalam 提交于 
      In case of seg6 in encap mode, seg6_do_srh_encap() calls set_tun_src()
in order to set the src addr of outer IPv6 header.

The net_device is required for set_tun_src(). However calling ip6_dst_idev()
on dst_entry in case of IPv4 traffic results on the following bug.

Using just dst->dev should fix this BUG.

[  196.242461] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[  196.242975] PGD 800000010f076067 P4D 800000010f076067 PUD 10f060067 PMD 0
[  196.243329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  196.243468] Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd input_leds glue_helper led_class pcspkr serio_raw mac_hid video autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid e1000 i2c_piix4 ahci pata_acpi libahci
[  196.244362] CPU: 2 PID: 1089 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
[  196.244606] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  196.244968] RIP: 0010:seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300
[  196.245236] RSP: 0018:ffffb2ce00b23a60 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  196.245464] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c7f53eea300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  196.245742] RDX: 0000f10000000000 RSI: ffff8c7f52085a6c RDI: ffff8c7f41166850
[  196.246018] RBP: ffffb2ce00b23aa8 R08: 00000000000261e0 R09: ffff8c7f41166800
[  196.246294] R10: ffffdce5040ac780 R11: ffff8c7f41166828 R12: ffff8c7f41166808
[  196.246570] R13: ffff8c7f52085a44 R14: ffffffffb73211c0 R15: ffff8c7e69e44200
[  196.246846] FS:  00007fc448789700(0000) GS:ffff8c7f59d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  196.247286] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  196.247526] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010f05a000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[  196.247804] Call Trace:
[  196.247972]  seg6_do_srh+0x15b/0x1c0
[  196.248156]  seg6_output+0x3c/0x220
[  196.248341]  ? prandom_u32+0x14/0x20
[  196.248526]  ? ip_idents_reserve+0x6c/0x80
[  196.248723]  ? __ip_select_ident+0x90/0x100
[  196.248923]  ? ip_append_data.part.50+0x6c/0xd0
[  196.249133]  lwtunnel_output+0x44/0x70
[  196.249328]  ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40
[  196.249515]  raw_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xac0
[  196.249701]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60
[  196.249897]  ? rw_copy_check_uvector+0x53/0x110
[  196.250106]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2e/0x60
[  196.250299]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xce/0x140
[  196.250508]  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
[  196.250690]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x2a0
[  196.250881]  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
[  196.251074]  ? copy_termios+0x1e/0x70
[  196.251261]  ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[  196.251575]  ? tty_mode_ioctl+0x1c3/0x4e0
[  196.251782]  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
[  196.251972]  ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30
[  196.252152]  ? vvar_fault+0xd2/0x110
[  196.252337]  ? __do_fault+0x1f/0xc0
[  196.252521]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xc1f/0x12d0
[  196.252727]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0
[  196.252919]  __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0
[  196.253107]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x200
[  196.253305]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[  196.253530] RIP: 0033:0x7fc4480b0690
[  196.253715] RSP: 002b:00007ffde9f252f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  196.254053] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 00007fc4480b0690
[  196.254331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000060a360 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  196.254608] RBP: 00007ffde9f253f0 R08: 00000000002d1e81 R09: 0000000000000002
[  196.254884] R10: 00007ffde9f250c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000b22070
[  196.255205] R13: 20c49ba5e353f7cf R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007ffde9f278fe
[  196.255484] Code: a5 0f b6 45 c0 41 88 41 28 41 0f b6 41 2c 48 c1 e0 04 49 8b 54 01 38 49 8b 44 01 30 49 89 51 20 49 89 41 18 48 8b 83 b0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 30 49 8b 86 08 0b 00 00 48 8b 40 20 48 8b 50 08 48 0b 10
[  196.256190] RIP: seg6_do_srh_encap+0x1ac/0x300 RSP: ffffb2ce00b23a60
[  196.256445] CR2: 0000000000000000
[  196.256676] ---[ end trace 71af7d093603885c ]---

Fixes: 8936ef76 ("ipv6: sr: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting encap source address")
Signed-off-by: NAhmed Abdelsalam <amsalam20@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a957fa19
  7. 19 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • P
      netfilter: nf_tables: NAT chain and extensions require NF_TABLES · 39f2ff08
      由 Pablo Neira Ayuso 提交于 
      Move these options inside the scope of the 'if' NF_TABLES and
NF_TABLES_IPV6 dependencies. This patch fixes:

   net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_nat_do_chain':
>> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:37: undefined reference to `nft_do_chain'
   net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_chain_nat_ipv6_exit':
>> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:94: undefined reference to `nft_unregister_chain_type'
   net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.o: In function `nft_chain_nat_ipv6_init':
>> net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_nat_ipv6.c:87: undefined reference to `nft_register_chain_type'

that happens with:

CONFIG_NF_TABLES=m
CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV6=y

Fixes: 02c7b25e ("netfilter: nf_tables: build-in filter chain type")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      39f2ff08
  9. 06 4月, 2018 5 次提交
    • J
      net/ipv6: Increment OUTxxx counters after netfilter hook · 71a1c915
      由 Jeff Barnhill 提交于 
      At the end of ip6_forward(), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS and
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS are incremented immediately before the NF_HOOK call
for NFPROTO_IPV6 / NF_INET_FORWARD.  As a result, these counters get
incremented regardless of whether or not the netfilter hook allows the
packet to continue being processed.  This change increments the counters
in ip6_forward_finish() so that it will not happen if the netfilter hook
chooses to terminate the packet, which is similar to how IPv4 works.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Barnhill <0xeffeff@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      71a1c915
    • E
      vti6: better validate user provided tunnel names · 537b361f
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Use valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

Fixes: ed1efb2a ("ipv6: Add support for IPsec virtual tunnel interfaces")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      537b361f
    • E
      ip6_tunnel: better validate user provided tunnel names · db7a65e3
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Use valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      db7a65e3
    • E
      ip6_gre: better validate user provided tunnel names · 5f42df01
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Use dev_valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

syzbot caught the following bug :

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip6gre_tunnel_locate+0x334/0x860 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:339
Write of size 20 at addr ffff8801afb9f7b8 by task syzkaller851048/4466

CPU: 1 PID: 4466 Comm: syzkaller851048 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x29f lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0xac/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
 ip6gre_tunnel_locate+0x334/0x860 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:339
 ip6gre_tunnel_ioctl+0x69d/0x12e0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1195
 dev_ifsioc+0x43e/0xb90 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:334
 dev_ioctl+0x69a/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:525
 sock_ioctl+0x47e/0x680 net/socket.c:1015
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1cf/0x1650 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 SyS_ioctl+0x24/0x30 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: c12b395a ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5f42df01
    • E
      ipv6: sit: better validate user provided tunnel names · b95211e0
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Use dev_valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

syzbot caught the following bug :

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ipip6_tunnel_locate+0x63b/0xaa0 net/ipv6/sit.c:254
Write of size 33 at addr ffff8801b64076d8 by task syzkaller932654/4453

CPU: 0 PID: 4453 Comm: syzkaller932654 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x29f lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0xac/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
 ipip6_tunnel_locate+0x63b/0xaa0 net/ipv6/sit.c:254
 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl+0xe71/0x241b net/ipv6/sit.c:1221
 dev_ifsioc+0x43e/0xb90 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:334
 dev_ioctl+0x69a/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:525
 sock_ioctl+0x47e/0x680 net/socket.c:1015
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1cf/0x1650 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 SyS_ioctl+0x24/0x30 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b95211e0
  11. 05 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  13. 04 4月, 2018 5 次提交
  15. 02 4月, 2018 3 次提交
  17. 01 4月, 2018 11 次提交
  19. 31 3月, 2018 7 次提交
    • A
      bpf: Post-hooks for sys_bind · aac3fc32
      由 Andrey Ignatov 提交于 
      "Post-hooks" are hooks that are called right before returning from
sys_bind. At this time IP and port are already allocated and no further
changes to `struct sock` can happen before returning from sys_bind but
BPF program has a chance to inspect the socket and change sys_bind
result.

Specifically it can e.g. inspect what port was allocated and if it
doesn't satisfy some policy, BPF program can force sys_bind to fail and
return EPERM to user.

Another example of usage is recording the IP:port pair to some map to
use it in later calls to sys_connect. E.g. if some TCP server inside
cgroup was bound to some IP:port_n, it can be recorded to a map. And
later when some TCP client inside same cgroup is trying to connect to
127.0.0.1:port_n, BPF hook for sys_connect can override the destination
and connect application to IP:port_n instead of 127.0.0.1:port_n. That
helps forcing all applications inside a cgroup to use desired IP and not
break those applications if they e.g. use localhost to communicate
between each other.

== Implementation details ==

Post-hooks are implemented as two new attach types
`BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND` for
existing prog type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK`.

Separate attach types for IPv4 and IPv6 are introduced to avoid access
to IPv6 field in `struct sock` from `inet_bind()` and to IPv4 field from
`inet6_bind()` since those fields might not make sense in such cases.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      aac3fc32
    • A
      bpf: Hooks for sys_connect · d74bad4e
      由 Andrey Ignatov 提交于 
      == The problem ==

See description of the problem in the initial patch of this patch set.

== The solution ==

The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 2nd
part of the problem: making outgoing connecttion from desired IP.

It adds new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT` and
`BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT` for program type
`BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` that can be used to override both
source and destination of a connection at connect(2) time.

Local end of connection can be bound to desired IP using newly
introduced BPF-helper `bpf_bind()`. It allows to bind to only IP though,
and doesn't support binding to port, i.e. leverages
`IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` socket option. There are two reasons for this:
* looking for a free port is expensive and can affect performance
  significantly;
* there is no use-case for port.

As for remote end (`struct sockaddr *` passed by user), both parts of it
can be overridden, remote IP and remote port. It's useful if an
application inside cgroup wants to connect to another application inside
same cgroup or to itself, but knows nothing about IP assigned to the
cgroup.

Support is added for IPv4 and IPv6, for TCP and UDP.

IPv4 and IPv6 have separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind
hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g. user_ip6 fields
when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound.

== Implementation notes ==

The patch introduces new field in `struct proto`: `pre_connect` that is
a pointer to a function with same signature as `connect` but is called
before it. The reason is in some cases BPF hooks should be called way
before control is passed to `sk->sk_prot->connect`. Specifically
`inet_dgram_connect` autobinds socket before calling
`sk->sk_prot->connect` and there is no way to call `bpf_bind()` from
hooks from e.g. `ip4_datagram_connect` or `ip6_datagram_connect` since
it'd cause double-bind. On the other hand `proto.pre_connect` provides a
flexible way to add BPF hooks for connect only for necessary `proto` and
call them at desired time before `connect`. Since `bpf_bind()` is
allowed to bind only to IP and autobind in `inet_dgram_connect` binds
only port there is no chance of double-bind.

bpf_bind() sets `force_bind_address_no_port` to bind to only IP despite
of value of `bind_address_no_port` socket field.

bpf_bind() sets `with_lock` to `false` when calling to __inet_bind()
and __inet6_bind() since all call-sites, where bpf_bind() is called,
already hold socket lock.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      d74bad4e
    • A
      net: Introduce __inet_bind() and __inet6_bind · 3679d585
      由 Andrey Ignatov 提交于 
      Refactor `bind()` code to make it ready to be called from BPF helper
function `bpf_bind()` (will be added soon). Implementation of
`inet_bind()` and `inet6_bind()` is separated into `__inet_bind()` and
`__inet6_bind()` correspondingly. These function can be used from both
`sk_prot->bind` and `bpf_bind()` contexts.

New functions have two additional arguments.

`force_bind_address_no_port` forces binding to IP only w/o checking
`inet_sock.bind_address_no_port` field. It'll allow to bind local end of
a connection to desired IP in `bpf_bind()` w/o changing
`bind_address_no_port` field of a socket. It's useful since `bpf_bind()`
can return an error and we'd need to restore original value of
`bind_address_no_port` in that case if we changed this before calling to
the helper.

`with_lock` specifies whether to lock socket when working with `struct
sk` or not. The argument is set to `true` for `sk_prot->bind`, i.e. old
behavior is preserved. But it will be set to `false` for `bpf_bind()`
use-case. The reason is all call-sites, where `bpf_bind()` will be
called, already hold that socket lock.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      3679d585
    • A
      bpf: Hooks for sys_bind · 4fbac77d
      由 Andrey Ignatov 提交于 
      == The problem ==

There is a use-case when all processes inside a cgroup should use one
single IP address on a host that has multiple IP configured.  Those
processes should use the IP for both ingress and egress, for TCP and UDP
traffic. So TCP/UDP servers should be bound to that IP to accept
incoming connections on it, and TCP/UDP clients should make outgoing
connections from that IP. It should not require changing application
code since it's often not possible.

Currently it's solved by intercepting glibc wrappers around syscalls
such as `bind(2)` and `connect(2)`. It's done by a shared library that
is preloaded for every process in a cgroup so that whenever TCP/UDP
server calls `bind(2)`, the library replaces IP in sockaddr before
passing arguments to syscall. When application calls `connect(2)` the
library transparently binds the local end of connection to that IP
(`bind(2)` with `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` to avoid performance penalty).

Shared library approach is fragile though, e.g.:
* some applications clear env vars (incl. `LD_PRELOAD`);
* `/etc/ld.so.preload` doesn't help since some applications are linked
  with option `-z nodefaultlib`;
* other applications don't use glibc and there is nothing to intercept.

== The solution ==

The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 1st
part of the problem: binding TCP/UDP servers on desired IP. It does not
depend on application environment and implementation details (whether
glibc is used or not).

It adds new eBPF program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` and
attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND`
(similar to already existing `BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE`).

The new program type is intended to be used with sockets (`struct sock`)
in a cgroup and provided by user `struct sockaddr`. Pointers to both of
them are parts of the context passed to programs of newly added types.

The new attach types provides hooks in `bind(2)` system call for both
IPv4 and IPv6 so that one can write a program to override IP addresses
and ports user program tries to bind to and apply such a program for
whole cgroup.

== Implementation notes ==

[1]
Separate attach types for `AF_INET` and `AF_INET6` are added
intentionally to prevent reading/writing to offsets that don't make
sense for corresponding socket family. E.g. if user passes `sockaddr_in`
it doesn't make sense to read from / write to `user_ip6[]` context
fields.

[2]
The write access to `struct bpf_sock_addr_kern` is implemented using
special field as an additional "register".

There are just two registers in `sock_addr_convert_ctx_access`: `src`
with value to write and `dst` with pointer to context that can't be
changed not to break later instructions. But the fields, allowed to
write to, are not available directly and to access them address of
corresponding pointer has to be loaded first. To get additional register
the 1st not used by `src` and `dst` one is taken, its content is saved
to `bpf_sock_addr_kern.tmp_reg`, then the register is used to load
address of pointer field, and finally the register's content is restored
from the temporary field after writing `src` value.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      4fbac77d
    • D
      net/ipv6: Fix route leaking between VRFs · b6cdbc85
      由 David Ahern 提交于 
      Donald reported that IPv6 route leaking between VRFs is not working.
The root cause is the strict argument in the call to rt6_lookup when
validating the nexthop spec.

ip6_route_check_nh validates the gateway and device (if given) of a
route spec. It in turn could call rt6_lookup (e.g., lookup in a given
table did not succeed so it falls back to a full lookup) and if so
sets the strict argument to 1. That means if the egress device is given,
the route lookup needs to return a result with the same device. This
strict requirement does not work with VRFs (IPv4 or IPv6) because the
oif in the flow struct is overridden with the index of the VRF device
to trigger a match on the l3mdev rule and force the lookup to its table.

The right long term solution is to add an l3mdev index to the flow
struct such that the oif is not overridden. That solution will not
backport well, so this patch aims for a simpler solution to relax the
strict argument if the route spec device is an l3mdev slave. As done
in other places, use the FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF to know that the
RT6_LOOKUP_F_IFACE flag needs to be removed.

Fixes: ca254490 ("net: Add VRF support to IPv6 stack")
Reported-by: NDonald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b6cdbc85
    • D
      ipv6: sr: fix seg6 encap performances with TSO enabled · 5807b22c
      由 David Lebrun 提交于 
      Enabling TSO can lead to abysmal performances when using seg6 in
encap mode, such as with the ixgbe driver. This patch adds a call to
iptunnel_handle_offloads() to remove the encapsulation bit if needed.

Before:
root@comp4-seg6bpf:~# iperf3 -c fc00::55
Connecting to host fc00::55, port 5201
[  4] local fc45::4 port 36592 connected to fc00::55 port 5201
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth       Retr  Cwnd
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec   196 KBytes  1.60 Mbits/sec   47   6.66 KBytes
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec   304 KBytes  2.49 Mbits/sec  100   5.33 KBytes
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec   284 KBytes  2.32 Mbits/sec   92   5.33 KBytes

After:
root@comp4-seg6bpf:~# iperf3 -c fc00::55
Connecting to host fc00::55, port 5201
[  4] local fc45::4 port 43062 connected to fc00::55 port 5201
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth       Retr  Cwnd
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec  1.03 GBytes  8.89 Gbits/sec    0    743 KBytes
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec  1.03 GBytes  8.87 Gbits/sec    0    743 KBytes
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec  1.03 GBytes  8.87 Gbits/sec    0    743 KBytes
Reported-by: NTom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
Fixes: 6c8702c6 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5807b22c
    • L
      ipv6: do not set routes if disable_ipv6 has been enabled · 428604fb
      由 Lorenzo Bianconi 提交于 
      Do not allow setting ipv6 routes from userspace if disable_ipv6 has been
enabled. The issue can be triggered using the following reproducer:

- sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1
- ip -6 route add a:b:c:d::/64 dev em1
- ip -6 route show
  a:b:c:d::/64 dev em1 metric 1024 pref medium

Fix it checking disable_ipv6 value in ip6_route_info_create routine
Signed-off-by: NLorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      428604fb
  21. 30 3月, 2018 4 次提交