NOTE: This patch is based on "sched, numa, mm: Add fault driven
	placement and migration policy" but as it throws away all the policy
	to just leave a basic foundation I had to drop the signed-offs-by.

This patch creates a bare-bones method for setting PTEs pte_numa in the
context of the scheduler that when faulted later will be faulted onto the
node the CPU is running on.  In itself this does nothing useful but any
placement policy will fundamentally depend on receiving hints on placement
from fault context and doing something intelligent about it.
Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>

Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the
owner died and provided a workaround.
See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076

The detailed problem analysis shows:

Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes.

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the
       pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T3 --> observes inconsistent state

This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible
kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that
certain configurations are more likely to expose it.

So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit:

	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {

We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the
futex unconditionally if that's true.

AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner
case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale.

Now the proposed change

-	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
+       if (unlikely(ownerdied ||
+                       !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) {

solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the
"stale WAITERS bit" case.

What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked
on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which
in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3
to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via
pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved!

Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem
because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it
returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to
return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set.

Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the
user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available
pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3
blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the
rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the
user space futex.

lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to
find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that
fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available
nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with
the hash bucket lock held.

So the above scenario changes to:

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between
T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It
also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over.

Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less
dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the
possible wreckage which might be inflicted.

As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts
so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of
avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip
out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as
user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking
about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should
nevertheless :)
Reported-and-tested-by: NSiddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionosAcked-by: NDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Masaki found and patched a kallsyms issue: the last symbol in a
module's symtab wasn't transferred.  This is because we manually copy
the zero'th entry (which is always empty) then copy the rest in a loop
starting at 1, though from src[0].  His fix was minimal, I prefer to
rewrite the loops in more standard form.

There are two loops: one to get the size, and one to copy.  Make these
identical: always count entry 0 and any defined symbol in an allocated
non-init section.

This bug exists since the following commit was introduced.
   module: reduce symbol table for loaded modules (v2)
   commit: 4a496226

LKML: http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/24/27Reported-by: NMasaki Kimura <masaki.kimura.kz@hitachi.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org

If one includes documentation for an external tool, it should be
correct.  This is not:

1. Overriding the input to rngd should typically be neither
   necessary nor desired.  This is especially so since newer
   versions of rngd support a number of different *types* of sources.
2. The default kernel-exported device is called /dev/hwrng not
   /dev/hwrandom nor /dev/hw_random (both of which were used in the
   past; however, kernel and udev seem to have converged on
   /dev/hwrng.)

Overall it is better if the documentation for rngd is kept with rngd
rather than in a kernel Makefile.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

'struct pid' is a "variable sized struct" - a header with an array of
upids at the end.

The size of the array depends on a level (depth) of pid namespaces.  Now a
level of pidns is not limited, so 'struct pid' can be more than one page.

Looks reasonable, that it should be less than a page.  MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL is
not calculated from PAGE_SIZE, because in this case it depends on
architectures, config options and it will be reduced, if someone adds a
new fields in struct pid or struct upid.

I suggest to set MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL = 32, because it saves ability to expand
"struct pid" and it's more than enough for all known for me use-cases.
When someone finds a reasonable use case, we can add a config option or a
sysctl parameter.

In addition it will reduce the effect of another problem, when we have
many nested namespaces and the oldest one starts dying.
zap_pid_ns_processe will be called for each namespace and find_vpid will
be called for each process in a namespace.  find_vpid will be called
minimum max_level^2 / 2 times.  The reason of that is that when we found a
bit in pidmap, we can't determine this pidns is top for this process or it
isn't.

vpid is a heavy operation, so a fork bomb, which create many nested
namespace, can make a system inaccessible for a long time.  For example my
system becomes inaccessible for a few minutes with 4000 processes.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: return -EINVAL in response to excessive nesting, not -ENOMEM]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

57b30ae7 ("workqueue: reimplement cancel_delayed_work() using
try_to_grab_pending()") made cancel_delayed_work() always return %true
unless someone else is also trying to cancel the work item, which is
broken - if the target work item is idle, the return value should be
%false.

try_to_grab_pending() indicates that the target work item was idle by
zero return value.  Use it for return.  Note that this brings
cancel_delayed_work() in line with __cancel_work_timer() in return
value handling.
Signed-off-by: NDan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <444a6439-b1a4-4740-9e7e-bc37267cfe73@default>

Fix the warning:

  kernel/module_signing.c:195:2: warning: format '%lu' expects type 'long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'

by using the proper 'z' modifier for printing a size_t.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The min/max call needed to have explicit types on some architectures
(e.g. mn10300). Use clamp_t instead to avoid the warning:

  kernel/sys.c: In function 'override_release':
  kernel/sys.c:1287:10: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default]
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Emit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the
signature data instead of before it.  This allows module_sig_check() to
be made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the
magic string.  Instead we just need to do a single memcmp().

This works because at the end of the signature data there is the
fixed-length signature information block.  This block then falls
immediately prior to the magic number.

From the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate
the size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module
data.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This reverts commit 7e3aa30a.

The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().

threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.

Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

This reverts commit 7e381b0e.

The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed
threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for
synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead
of explicitly grabbing task_lock().

threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as
opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it
wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup
locks.

Revert the incorrect optimization.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost>
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Bitterly-Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

free_pid_ns() operates in a recursive fashion:

free_pid_ns(parent)
  put_pid_ns(parent)
    kref_put(&ns->kref, free_pid_ns);
      free_pid_ns

thus if there was a huge nesting of namespaces the userspace may trigger
avalanche calling of free_pid_ns leading to kernel stack exhausting and a
panic eventually.

This patch turns the recursion into an iterative loop.

Based on a patch by Andrew Vagin.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export put_pid_ns() to modules]
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents.  This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).

CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: NPaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The console_cpu_notify() function runs with interrupts disabled in the
CPU_DYING case.  It therefore cannot block, for example, as will happen
when it calls console_lock().  Therefore, remove the CPU_DYING leg of
the switch statement to avoid this problem.
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NSrivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

notify_on_release must be triggered when the last process in a cgroup is
move to another. But if the first(and only) process in a cgroup is moved to
another, notify_on_release is not triggered.

	# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/SRC
	# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/DST
	#
	# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/notify_on_release
	# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/notify_on_release
	#
	# sleep 300 &
	[1] 8629
	#
	# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/tasks
	# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/tasks
	-> notify_on_release for /SRC must be triggered at this point,
	   but it isn't.

This is because put_css_set() is called before setting CGRP_RELEASABLE
in cgroup_task_migrate(), and is a regression introduce by the
commit:74a1166d(cgroups: make procs file writable), which was merged
into v3.0.

Cc: Ben Blum <bblum@andrew.cmu.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0.x and later
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

...and fix up the callers. For do_file_open_root, just declare a
struct filename on the stack and fill out the .name field. For
do_filp_open, make it also take a struct filename pointer, and fix up its
callers to call it appropriately.

For filp_open, add a variant that takes a struct filename pointer and turn
filp_open into a wrapper around it.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.

Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* allow kernel_execve() leave the actual return to userland to
caller (selected by CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE).  Callers
updated accordingly.
* architecture that does select GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE in its
Kconfig should have its ret_from_kernel_thread() do this:
	call schedule_tail
	call the callback left for it by copy_thread(); if it ever
returns, that's because it has just done successful kernel_execve()
	jump to return from syscall
IOW, its only difference from ret_from_fork() is that it does call the
callback.
* such an architecture should also get rid of ret_from_kernel_execve()
and __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE

This is the last part of infrastructure patches in that area - from
that point on work on different architectures can live independently.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It is possible to miss data when using the kdb pager.  The kdb pager
does not pay attention to the maximum column constraint of the screen
or serial terminal.  This result is not incrementing the shown lines
correctly and the pager will print more lines that fit on the screen.
Obviously that is less than useful when using a VGA console where you
cannot scroll back.

The pager will now look at the kdb_buffer string to see how many
characters are printed.  It might not be perfect considering you can
output ASCII that might move the cursor position, but it is a
substantially better approximation for viewing dmesg and trace logs.

This also means that the vt screen needs to set the kdb COLUMNS
variable.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>

If you press 'q' the pager should exit instead of printing everything
from dmesg which can really bog down a 9600 baud serial link.

The same is true for the bta command.
Signed-off-by: NJason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>

Allow gdb to auto load kernel modules when it is attached,
which makes it trivially easy to debug module init functions
or pre-set breakpoints in a kernel module that has not loaded yet.
Signed-off-by: NJason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>

Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.

If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In the cases where we already know the length of the parent, pass it as
a parm so we don't need to recompute it. In the cases where we don't
know the length, pass in AUDIT_NAME_FULL (-1) to indicate that it should
be determined.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

All the callers set this to NULL now.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.

Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.

While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

For now, we just have two possibilities:

UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else

In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.

Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If name is NULL then the condition in the loop will never be true. Also,
with this change, we can eliminate the check for n->name == NULL since
the equivalence check will never be true if it is.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In some cases, we were passing in NULL even when we have a dentry.
Reported-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Most of them never returned anyway - only two functions had to be
changed.  That allows to simplify their callers a whole lot.

Note that this does *not* apply to kthread_run() callbacks - all of
those had been called from the same kernel_thread() callback, which
did do_exit() already.  This is strictly about very few low-level
kernel_thread() callbacks (there are only 6 of those, mostly as part
of kthread.h and kmod.h exported mechanisms, plus kernel_init()
itself).
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

With a system where, num_present_cpus < num_possible_cpus, even if all
CPUs are online, non-present CPUs don't have per_cpu buffers allocated.
If per_cpu/<cpu>/buffer_size_kb is modified for such a CPU, it can cause
a panic due to NULL dereference in ring_buffer_resize().

To fix this, resize operation is allowed only if the per-cpu buffer has
been initialized.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1349912427-6486-1-git-send-email-vnagarnaik@google.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Signed-off-by: NVaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

It doesn't, because the clean targets don't include kernel/Makefile, and
because two files were missing from the list.
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Place an indication that the certificate should use utf8 strings into the
x509.genkey template generated by kernel/Makefile.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Use the same digest type for the autogenerated key signature as for the module
signature so that the hash algorithm is guaranteed to be present in the kernel.

Without this, the X.509 certificate loader may reject the X.509 certificate so
generated because it was self-signed and the signature will be checked against
itself - but this won't work if the digest algorithm must be loaded as a
module.

The symptom is that the key fails to load with the following message emitted
into the kernel log:

	MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-65)

the error in brackets being -ENOPKG.  What you should see is something like:

	MODSIGN: Loaded cert 'Magarathea: Glacier signing key: 9588321144239a119d3406d4c4cf1fbae1836fa0'

Note that this doesn't apply to certificates that are not self-signed as we
don't check those currently as they require the parent CA certificate to be
available.
Reported-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Check the signature on the module against the keys compiled into the kernel or
available in a hardware key store.

Currently, only RSA keys are supported - though that's easy enough to change,
and the signature is expected to contain raw components (so not a PGP or
PKCS#7 formatted blob).

The signature blob is expected to consist of the following pieces in order:

 (1) The binary identifier for the key.  This is expected to match the
     SubjectKeyIdentifier from an X.509 certificate.  Only X.509 type
     identifiers are currently supported.

 (2) The signature data, consisting of a series of MPIs in which each is in
     the format of a 2-byte BE word sizes followed by the content data.

 (3) A 12 byte information block of the form:

	struct module_signature {
		enum pkey_algo		algo : 8;
		enum pkey_hash_algo	hash : 8;
		enum pkey_id_type	id_type : 8;
		u8			__pad;
		__be32			id_length;
		__be32			sig_length;
	};

     The three enums are defined in crypto/public_key.h.

     'algo' contains the public-key algorithm identifier (0->DSA, 1->RSA).

     'hash' contains the digest algorithm identifier (0->MD4, 1->MD5, 2->SHA1,
      etc.).

     'id_type' contains the public-key identifier type (0->PGP, 1->X.509).

     '__pad' should be 0.

     'id_length' should contain in the binary identifier length in BE form.

     'sig_length' should contain in the signature data length in BE form.

     The lengths are in BE order rather than CPU order to make dealing with
     cross-compilation easier.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (minor Kconfig fix)

Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module
verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring
during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public
keys found in the PGP keyring.

These can be seen by root:

[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys
07ad4ee0 I-----     1 perm 3f010000     0     0 crypto    modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd []
15c7f8c3 I-----     1 perm 1f030000     0     0 keyring   .module_sign: 1/4
...

It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in
their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>