Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
and deal with network namespaces in ->open and ->release.  All callers of
proc_create + seq_open_net converted over, and seq_{open,release}_net are
removed entirely.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Just use the address family from the proc private data instead of copying
it into per-file data.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Remove a couple indirections to make the code look like most other
protocols.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

The code should be using the pid namespace from the procfs mount
instead of trying to look it up during open.
Suggested-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Pass the hashtable to the proc private data instead of copying
it into the per-file private data.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Remove the pointless ping_seq_afinfo indirection and make the code look
like most other protocols.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Avoid most of the afinfo indirections and just call the proc helpers
directly.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Remove a couple indirections to make the code look like most other
protocols.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a seq_file show
callback and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.

All trivial callers converted over.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Variant of proc_create_data that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument + a private state size and drastically reduces the boilerplate
code in the callers.

All trivial callers converted over.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.

All trivial callers converted over.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Otherwise we will leak a reference to the network namespace.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

When application fails to pass flags in netlink TLV when replacing
existing skbmod action, the kernel will leak refcnt:

$ tc actions get action skbmod index 1
total acts 0

        action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
         index 1 ref 1 bind 0

For example, at this point a buggy application replaces the action with
index 1 with new smac 00:aa:22:33:44:55, it fails because of zero flags,
however refcnt gets bumped:

$ tc actions get actions skbmod index 1
total acts 0

        action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
         index 1 ref 2 bind 0
$

Tha patch fixes this by calling tcf_idr_release() on existing actions.

Fixes: 86da71b5 ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action")
Signed-off-by: NRoman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In case modules are not configured, error out when tp->ops is null
and prevent later null pointer dereference.

Fixes: 33a48927 ("sched: push TC filter protocol creation into a separate function")
Signed-off-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When application fails to pass flags in netlink TLV for a new skbedit action,
the kernel results in the following oops:

[    8.307732] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000021130
[    8.309167] PGD 80000000193d1067 P4D 80000000193d1067 PUD 180e0067 PMD 0
[    8.310595] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[    8.311334] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper serio_raw
[    8.314190] CPU: 1 PID: 397 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #357
[    8.315252] RIP: 0010:__tcf_idr_release+0x33/0x140
[    8.316203] RSP: 0018:ffffa0718038f840 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    8.317123] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000021100 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    8.319831] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000021100
[    8.321181] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000004adf8 R09: 0000000000000122
[    8.322645] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9e5b01ed R12: 0000000000000000
[    8.324157] R13: ffffffff9e0d3cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    8.325590] FS:  00007f591292e700(0000) GS:ffff8fcf5bc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    8.327001] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    8.327987] CR2: 0000000000021130 CR3: 00000000180e6004 CR4: 00000000001606a0
[    8.329289] Call Trace:
[    8.329735]  tcf_skbedit_init+0xa7/0xb0
[    8.330423]  tcf_action_init_1+0x362/0x410
[    8.331139]  ? try_to_wake_up+0x44/0x430
[    8.331817]  tcf_action_init+0x103/0x190
[    8.332511]  tc_ctl_action+0x11a/0x220
[    8.333174]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x2e0
[    8.333902]  ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[    8.334569]  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x2c0
[    8.335440]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.31+0xf0/0xf0
[    8.336178]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xdb/0x110
[    8.336855]  netlink_unicast+0x167/0x220
[    8.337550]  netlink_sendmsg+0x2a7/0x390
[    8.338258]  sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
[    8.338865]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x2c5/0x2e0
[    8.339531]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x27/0x210
[    8.340271]  ? filemap_fault+0xa2/0x630
[    8.340943]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x108/0x200
[    8.341732]  ? alloc_set_pte+0x2aa/0x530
[    8.342573]  ? finish_fault+0x4e/0x70
[    8.343332]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xbc1/0x10d0
[    8.344337]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[    8.345040]  __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[    8.345678]  do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
[    8.346339]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    8.347206] RIP: 0033:0x7f591191da67
[    8.347831] RSP: 002b:00007fff745abd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[    8.349179] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff745abe70 RCX: 00007f591191da67
[    8.350431] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff745abdc0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    8.351659] RBP: 000000005af35251 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[    8.352922] R10: 00000000000005f1 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[    8.354183] R13: 00007fff745afed0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00000000006767c0
[    8.355400] Code: 41 89 d4 53 89 f5 48 89 fb e8 aa 20 fd ff 85 c0 0f 84 ed 00
00 00 48 85 db 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 40 84 ed 0f 85 cd 00 00 00 45 84 e4 <8b> 53 30
74 0d 85 d2 b8 ff ff ff ff 0f 8f b3 00 00 00 8b 43 2c
[    8.358699] RIP: __tcf_idr_release+0x33/0x140 RSP: ffffa0718038f840
[    8.359770] CR2: 0000000000021130
[    8.360438] ---[ end trace 60c66be45dfc14f0 ]---

The caller calls action's ->init() and passes pointer to "struct tc_action *a",
which later may be initialized to point at the existing action, otherwise
"struct tc_action *a" is still invalid, and therefore dereferencing it is an
error as happens in tcf_idr_release, where refcnt is decremented.

So in case of missing flags tcf_idr_release must be called only for
existing actions.

v2:
    - prepare patch for net tree

Fixes: 5e1567ae ("net sched: skbedit action fix late binding")
Signed-off-by: NRoman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix more memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers. Part of them were fixed
earlier in 91948309.

* udp_sendmsg one was there since the beginning when linux sources were
  first added to git;
* ping_v4_sendmsg one was copy/pasted in c319b4d7.

Whenever return happens in udp_sendmsg() or ping_v4_sendmsg() IP options
have to be freed if they were allocated previously.

Add label so that future callers (if any) can use it instead of kfree()
before return that is easy to forget.

Fixes: c319b4d7 (net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind)
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add a tracepoint to log transmission failure from the UDP transport socket
being used by AF_RXRPC.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Add a tracepoint to log received ICMP/ICMP6 events and other error
messages.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Fix the kernel call initiation to set the minimum security level for kernel
initiated calls (such as from kAFS) from the sockopt value.

Fixes: 19ffa01c ("rxrpc: Use structs to hold connection params and protocol info")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

AF_RXRPC tries to turn on IP_RECVERR and IP_MTU_DISCOVER on the UDP socket
it just opened for communications with the outside world, regardless of the
type of socket.  Unfortunately, this doesn't work with an AF_INET6 socket.

Fix this by turning on IPV6_RECVERR and IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER instead if the
socket is of the AF_INET6 family.

Without this, kAFS server and address rotation doesn't work correctly
because the algorithm doesn't detect received network errors.

Fixes: 75b54cb5 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The expect_rx_by call timeout is supposed to be set when a call is started
to indicate that we need to receive a packet by that point.  This is
currently put back every time we receive a packet, but it isn't started
when we first send a packet.  Without this, the call may wait forever if
the server doesn't deign to reply.

Fix this by setting the timeout upon a successful UDP sendmsg call for the
first DATA packet.  The timeout is initiated only for initial transmission
and not for subsequent retries as we don't want the retry mechanism to
extend the timeout indefinitely.

Fixes: a158bdd3 ("rxrpc: Fix call timeouts")
Reported-by: NMarc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

In Commit 1f45f78f ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too"),
it held the chunk in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg to access it safely later
in recvmsg. However, it also added sctp_chunk_put in fail_mark err path,
which is only triggered before holding the chunk.

syzbot reported a use-after-free crash happened on this err path, where
it shouldn't call sctp_chunk_put.

This patch simply removes this call.

Fixes: 1f45f78f ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too")
Reported-by: syzbot+141d898c5f24489db4aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sysbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in recvmsg() that
I tracked down to tipc_sk_set_orig_addr(), missing
srcaddr->member.scope initialization.

This patches moves srcaddr->sock.scope init to follow
fields order and ease future verifications.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
CPU: 0 PID: 4549 Comm: syz-executor287 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x135/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1157
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2285
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335
 do_syscall_64+0x154/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4455e9
RSP: 002b:00007fe3bd36ddb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac24 RCX: 00000000004455e9
RDX: 0000000000002002 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff98ce4b6f R14: 00007fe3bd36e9c0 R15: 0000000000000003

Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2246
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335

Byte 19 of 32 is uninitialized

Fixes: 31c82a2d ("tipc: add second source address to recvmsg()/recvfrom()")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Acked-by: NJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Damir reported a breakage of SO_BINDTODEVICE for UDP sockets.
In absence of VRF devices, after commit fb74c277 ("net:
ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups") the dif mismatch
isn't fatal anymore for UDP socket lookup with non null
sk_bound_dev_if, breaking SO_BINDTODEVICE semantics.

This changeset addresses the issue making the dif match mandatory
again in the above scenario.
Reported-by: NDamir Mansurov <dnman@oktetlabs.ru>
Fixes: fb74c277 ("net: ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
Fixes: 1801b570 ("net: ipv6: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

After route cache is flushed via ipv4_sysctl_rtcache_flush(), we forget
to reset fnhe_mtu_locked in rt_bind_exception(). When pmtu is updated
in __ip_rt_update_pmtu(), it will return directly since the pmtu is
still locked. e.g.

+ ip netns exec client ping 10.10.1.1 -c 1 -s 1400 -M do
PING 10.10.1.1 (10.10.1.1) 1400(1428) bytes of data.
>From 10.10.0.254 icmp_seq=1 Frag needed and DF set (mtu = 0)
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Trivial fix to spelling mistake in dev_warn message text
Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Trivial fix to spelling mistake in error string
Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When we get link properties through netlink interface with
tipc_nl_node_get_link(), we don't validate TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME
attribute at all, instead we directly use it. As a consequence,
KMSAN detected the TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME attribute was an uninitialized
value, and then posted the following complaint:

==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strcmp+0xf7/0x160 lib/string.c:329
CPU: 1 PID: 4527 Comm: syz-executor655 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
  kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
  __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
  strcmp+0xf7/0x160 lib/string.c:329
  tipc_nl_node_get_link+0x220/0x6f0 net/tipc/node.c:1881
  genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 [inline]
  genl_rcv_msg+0x1686/0x1810 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2447
  genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x166b/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1048/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
  sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
  __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
  SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
  SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
  do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x445589
RSP: 002b:00007fb7ee66cdb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac24 RCX: 0000000000445589
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020023000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffa2bf3f3f R14: 00007fb7ee66d9c0 R15: 0000000000000001

Uninit was created at:
  kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
  kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
  kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
  __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
  __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
  netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1183 [inline]
  netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1875
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
  sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
  __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
  SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
  SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
  do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
==================================================================

To quiet the complaint, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME attribute has been
validated in tipc_nl_node_get_link() before it's used.

Reported-by: syzbot+df0257c92ffd4fcc58cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There are follow comment errors:
1 The function name is wrong in p9_release_pages() comment.
2 The function name and variable name is wrong in p9_poll_workfn() comment.
3 There is no variable dm_mr and lkey in struct p9_trans_rdma.
4 The function name is wrong in rdma_create_trans() comment.
5 There is no variable initialized in struct virtio_chan.
6 The variable name is wrong in p9_virtio_zc_request() comment.
Signed-off-by: NSun Lianwen <sunlw.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

... and store num_bvecs for client code's convenience.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>

syzbot loves to set very small mtu on devices, since it brings joy.
We must make llc_ui_sendmsg() fool proof.

usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to wrapped address (offset 0, size 18446612139802320068)!

kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:100!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 17464 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #36
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88
RSP: 0018:ffff8801868bf800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffffffff87d2fb00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: ffffffff81610731 RDI: ffffed0030d17ef6
RBP: ffff8801868bf858 R08: ffff88018daa4200 R09: ffffed003b5c4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R11: ffff8801dae27d87 R12: ffffffff87d2f8e0
R13: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R14: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R15: ffffffff87d2f7a0
FS:  00007f56a14ac700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2bc21000 CR3: 00000001abeb1000 CR4: 00000000001426f0
DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000030602
Call Trace:
 check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:153 [inline]
 __check_object_size+0x5d9/0x5d9 mm/usercopy.c:256
 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:108 [inline]
 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:139 [inline]
 copy_from_iter_full include/linux/uio.h:121 [inline]
 memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3305 [inline]
 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x4b1/0x1530 net/llc/af_llc.c:941
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x455979
RSP: 002b:00007f56a14abc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56a14ac6d4 RCX: 0000000000455979
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 00000000200012c0 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000548 R14: 00000000006fbf60 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 55 c0 e8 c0 55 bb ff ff 75 c8 48 8b 55 c0 4d 89 f9 ff 75 d0 4d 89 e8 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 41 56 48 c7 c7 80 fa d2 87 e8 a0 0b a3 ff <0f> 0b e8 95 55 bb ff e8 c0 a8 f7 ff 8b 95 14 ff ff ff 4d 89 e8
RIP: usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: ffff8801868bf800

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch removes "experimental" from the help text where depends on
CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL was already removed.
Signed-off-by: NGeorg Hofmann <georg@hofmannsweb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In the case of writing a partial tls record we forgot to clear the
ctx->in_tcp_sendpages flag, causing some connections to stall.

Fixes: c212d2c7 ("net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks")
Signed-off-by: NAndre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

syzbot reported a use-after-free in tls_sk_proto_close

Add a boolean value to cleanup a bit this function.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tls_sk_proto_close+0x8ab/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:297
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801ae40a858 by task syz-executor363/4503

CPU: 0 PID: 4503 Comm: syz-executor363 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #34
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
 tls_sk_proto_close+0x8ab/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:297
 inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
 sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
 __fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x1aee/0x2730 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x16f/0x430 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x886/0x1960 kernel/signal.c:2469
 do_signal+0x98/0x2040 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x28a/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4457b9
RSP: 002b:00007fdf4d766da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000006dac3c RCX: 00000000004457b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000006dac3c
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dac38
R13: 3692738801137283 R14: 6bf92c39443c4c1d R15: 0000000000000006

Allocated by task 4498:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:512 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:701 [inline]
 create_ctx net/tls/tls_main.c:521 [inline]
 tls_init+0x1f9/0xb00 net/tls/tls_main.c:633
 tcp_set_ulp+0x1bc/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:153
 do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.39+0x44a/0x2600 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2588
 tcp_setsockopt+0xc1/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2893
 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3039
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 4503:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
 kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
 tls_sw_free_resources+0x2a3/0x360 net/tls/tls_sw.c:1037
 tls_sk_proto_close+0x67c/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:288
 inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
 sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
 __fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x1aee/0x2730 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x16f/0x430 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x886/0x1960 kernel/signal.c:2469
 do_signal+0x98/0x2040 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x28a/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801ae40a800
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
 256-byte region [ffff8801ae40a800, ffff8801ae40a900)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006b90280 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801ae40a080 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801ae40a080 0000000000000000 000000010000000c
raw: ffffea0006bea9e0 ffffea0006bc94a0 ffff8801da8007c0 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Fixes: dd0bed16 ("tls: support for Inline tls record")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Atul Gupta <atul.gupta@chelsio.com>
Cc: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Cc: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Cc: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.

The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.

This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.

While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
do the delayed authentication.

v1->v2:
  fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.
Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

2016 spec, section 10.24.2 specifies that the block ack
timeout in the ADD BA request is advisory.

That means we should check the value in the response and
act upon it (same as buffer size).
Signed-off-by: NSara Sharon <sara.sharon@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

The IEEE P802.11-REVmd D1.0 specification updated the SAE authentication
timeout to be 2000 milliseconds (see dot11RSNASAERetransPeriod). Update
the SAE timeout setting accordingly.

While at it, reduce some code duplication in the timeout configuration.
Signed-off-by: NIlan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Make sure to free the rfkill device in case registration fails during
probe.

Fixes: 5e7ca393 ("net: rfkill: gpio: convert to resource managed allocation")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>	# 3.13
Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NHeikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Making sure the headers line up properly with the actual value output of the command
`cat /proc/net/netlink`

Before the patch:
<sk       Eth Pid    Groups   Rmem     Wmem     Dump     Locks     Drops     Inode
<ffff8cd2c2f7b000 0   909    00000550 0        0        0 2        0        18946

After the patch:
>sk               Eth Pid        Groups   Rmem     Wmem     Dump  Locks    Drops    Inode
>0000000033203952 0   897        00000113 0        0        0     2        0        14906
Signed-off-by: NBo YU <tsu.yubo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed85 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>