commit 7dc661bd8d3261053b69e4e2d0050cd1ee540fc1 upstream.

ALSA bebob driver has an entry for Focusrite Saffire Pro 10 I/O. The
entry matches vendor_id in root directory and model_id in unit
directory of configuration ROM for IEEE 1394 bus.

On the other hand, configuration ROM of Focusrite Liquid Saffire 56
has the same vendor_id and model_id. This device is an application of
TCAT Dice (TCD2220 a.k.a Dice Jr.) however ALSA bebob driver can be
bound to it randomly instead of ALSA dice driver. At present, drivers
in ALSA firewire stack can not handle this situation appropriately.

This commit uses more identical mod_alias for Focusrite Saffire Pro 10
I/O in ALSA bebob driver.

$ python2 crpp < /sys/bus/firewire/devices/fw1/config_rom
               ROM header and bus information block
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
400  042a829d  bus_info_length 4, crc_length 42, crc 33437
404  31333934  bus_name "1394"
408  f0649222  irmc 1, cmc 1, isc 1, bmc 1, pmc 0, cyc_clk_acc 100,
               max_rec 9 (1024), max_rom 2, gen 2, spd 2 (S400)
40c  00130e01  company_id 00130e     |
410  000606e0  device_id 01000606e0  | EUI-64 00130e01000606e0

               root directory
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
414  0009d31c  directory_length 9, crc 54044
418  04000014  hardware version
41c  0c0083c0  node capabilities per IEEE 1394
420  0300130e  vendor
424  81000012  --> descriptor leaf at 46c
428  17000006  model
42c  81000016  --> descriptor leaf at 484
430  130120c2  version
434  d1000002  --> unit directory at 43c
438  d4000006  --> dependent info directory at 450

               unit directory at 43c
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
43c  0004707c  directory_length 4, crc 28796
440  1200a02d  specifier id: 1394 TA
444  13010001  version: AV/C
448  17000006  model
44c  81000013  --> descriptor leaf at 498

               dependent info directory at 450
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
450  000637c7  directory_length 6, crc 14279
454  120007f5  specifier id
458  13000001  version
45c  3affffc7  (immediate value)
460  3b100000  (immediate value)
464  3cffffc7  (immediate value)
468  3d600000  (immediate value)

               descriptor leaf at 46c
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
46c  00056f3b  leaf_length 5, crc 28475
470  00000000  textual descriptor
474  00000000  minimal ASCII
478  466f6375  "Focu"
47c  73726974  "srit"
480  65000000  "e"

               descriptor leaf at 484
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
484  0004a165  leaf_length 4, crc 41317
488  00000000  textual descriptor
48c  00000000  minimal ASCII
490  50726f31  "Pro1"
494  30494f00  "0IO"

               descriptor leaf at 498
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
498  0004a165  leaf_length 4, crc 41317
49c  00000000  textual descriptor
4a0  00000000  minimal ASCII
4a4  50726f31  "Pro1"
4a8  30494f00  "0IO"

$ python2 crpp < /sys/bus/firewire/devices/fw1/config_rom
               ROM header and bus information block
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
400  040442e4  bus_info_length 4, crc_length 4, crc 17124
404  31333934  bus_name "1394"
408  e0ff8112  irmc 1, cmc 1, isc 1, bmc 0, pmc 0, cyc_clk_acc 255,
               max_rec 8 (512), max_rom 1, gen 1, spd 2 (S400)
40c  00130e04  company_id 00130e     |
410  018001e9  device_id 04018001e9  | EUI-64 00130e04018001e9

               root directory
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
414  00065612  directory_length 6, crc 22034
418  0300130e  vendor
41c  8100000a  --> descriptor leaf at 444
420  17000006  model
424  8100000e  --> descriptor leaf at 45c
428  0c0087c0  node capabilities per IEEE 1394
42c  d1000001  --> unit directory at 430

               unit directory at 430
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
430  000418a0  directory_length 4, crc 6304
434  1200130e  specifier id
438  13000001  version
43c  17000006  model
440  8100000f  --> descriptor leaf at 47c

               descriptor leaf at 444
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
444  00056f3b  leaf_length 5, crc 28475
448  00000000  textual descriptor
44c  00000000  minimal ASCII
450  466f6375  "Focu"
454  73726974  "srit"
458  65000000  "e"

               descriptor leaf at 45c
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
45c  000762c6  leaf_length 7, crc 25286
460  00000000  textual descriptor
464  00000000  minimal ASCII
468  4c495155  "LIQU"
46c  49445f53  "ID_S"
470  41464649  "AFFI"
474  52455f35  "RE_5"
478  36000000  "6"

               descriptor leaf at 47c
               -----------------------------------------------------------------
47c  000762c6  leaf_length 7, crc 25286
480  00000000  textual descriptor
484  00000000  minimal ASCII
488  4c495155  "LIQU"
48c  49445f53  "ID_S"
490  41464649  "AFFI"
494  52455f35  "RE_5"
498  36000000  "6"

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+
Fixes: 25784ec2 ("ALSA: bebob: Add support for Focusrite Saffire/SaffirePro series")
Signed-off-by: NTakashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f764c58b7faa26f5714e6907f892abc2bc0de4f8 upstream.

Guenter reported a build warning for CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL=n:

  > With allmodconfig-CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL, this patch results in:
  >
  > In file included from arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:8:0:
  > arch/x86/events/amd/../perf_event.h:1036:45: warning: ‘struct cpu_hw_event’ declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
  >  static inline int intel_cpuc_prepare(struct cpu_hw_event *cpuc, int cpu)

While harmless (an unsed pointer is an unused pointer, no matter the type)
it needs fixing.
Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d01b1f96a82e ("perf/x86/intel: Make cpuc allocations consistent")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190315081410.GR5996@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 31867b23d7d1ee3535136c6a410a6cf56f666bfc upstream.

Otherwise, we can get wrong counts incurring checkpoint hang.

IO_W (CP:  -24, Data:   24, Flush: (   0    0    1), Discard: (   0    0))

Thread A                        Thread B
- f2fs_write_data_pages
 -  __write_data_page
  - f2fs_submit_page_write
   - inc_page_count(F2FS_WB_DATA)
     type is F2FS_WB_DATA due to file is non-atomic one
- f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write
 - set_inode_flag(FI_ATOMIC_FILE)
                                - f2fs_write_end_io
                                 - dec_page_count(F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
                                   type is F2FS_WB_DATA due to file becomes
                                   atomic one

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ecb3dea400d3beaf611ce76ac7a51d4230492cf2 ]

When adding new filter to flower classifier, fl_change() inserts it to
handle_idr before initializing filter extensions and assigning it a mask.
Normally this ordering doesn't matter because all flower classifier ops
callbacks assume rtnl lock protection. However, when filter has an action
that doesn't have its kernel module loaded, rtnl lock is released before
call to request_module(). During this time the filter can be accessed bu
concurrent task before its initialization is completed, which can lead to a
crash.

Example case of NULL pointer dereference in concurrent dump:

Task 1                           Task 2

tc_new_tfilter()
 fl_change()
  idr_alloc_u32(fnew)
  fl_set_parms()
   tcf_exts_validate()
    tcf_action_init()
     tcf_action_init_1()
      rtnl_unlock()
      request_module()
      ...                        rtnl_lock()
      				 tc_dump_tfilter()
      				  tcf_chain_dump()
				   fl_walk()
				    idr_get_next_ul()
				    tcf_node_dump()
				     tcf_fill_node()
				      fl_dump()
				       mask = &f->mask->key; <- NULL ptr
      rtnl_lock()

Extension initialization and mask assignment don't depend on fnew->handle
that is allocated by idr_alloc_u32(). Move idr allocation code after action
creation and mask assignment in fl_change() to prevent concurrent access
to not fully initialized filter when rtnl lock is released to load action
module.

Fixes: 01683a14 ("net: sched: refactor flower walk to iterate over idr")
Signed-off-by: NVlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NRoi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ]

Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in
common with unix_bind().  unix_state_lock() is useless for those
purposes.

u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time
we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock).  u->path is also
set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and
any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr.

So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those
"lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire()
and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr.

Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now:
    1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr)
and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL.
    2) places holding unix_table_lock.  These are guaranteed that
*(u->addr) is seen fully initialized.  If unix_sock is in one of the
"bound" chains, so's ->path.
    3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe.  All places
that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr)
while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called
when (atomic) refcount hits zero.
    4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe.  unix_bind()
is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file
refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind()
unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine.
Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up
attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call
chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in
the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock()
is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged.
In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed -
unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue
under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual
unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the
same lock right before calling unix_release_sock().
    5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe -
it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry
is guaranteed to be NULL there.
earlier-variant-reviewed-by: N"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit d7cf4a3bf3a83c977a29055e1c4ffada7697b31f ]

smc_poll() returns with mask bit EPOLLPRI if the connection urg_state
is SMC_URG_VALID. Since SMC_URG_VALID is zero, smc_poll signals
EPOLLPRI errorneously if called in state SMC_INIT before the connection
is created, for instance in a non-blocking connect scenario.

This patch switches to non-zero values for the urg states.
Reviewed-by: NKarsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: de8474eb ("net/smc: urgent data support")
Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 3c963a3306eada999be5ebf4f293dfa3d3945487 ]

This patch fixes a subtle PACKET_ORIGDEV regression which was a side
effect of fixes introduced by:

6a9e461f bonding: pass link-local packets to bonding master also.

... to:

b89f04c6 bonding: deliver link-local packets with skb->dev set to link that packets arrived on

While 6a9e461f restored pre-b89f04c6 presence of link-local
packets on bonding masters (which is required e.g. by linux bridges
participating in spanning tree or needed for lab-like setups created
with group_fwd_mask) it also caused the originating device
information to be lost due to cloning.

Maciej Żenczykowski proposed another solution that doesn't require
packet cloning and retains original device information - instead of
returning RX_HANDLER_PASS for all link-local packets it's now limited
only to packets from inactive slaves.

At the same time, packets passed to bonding masters retain correct
information about the originating device and PACKET_ORIGDEV can be used
to determine it.

This elegantly solves all issues so far:

- link-local packets that were removed from bonding masters
- LLDP daemons being forced to explicitly bind to slave interfaces
- PACKET_ORIGDEV having no effect on bond interfaces

Fixes: 6a9e461f (bonding: pass link-local packets to bonding master also.)
Reported-by: NVincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.ch>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Soltys <soltys@ziu.info>
Signed-off-by: NMaciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit bf1dc8bad1d42287164d216d8efb51c5cd381b18 ]

We need a RCU critical section around rt6_info->from deference, and
proper annotation.

Fixes: 4ed591c8ab44 ("net/ipv6: Allow onlink routes to have a device mismatch if it is the default route")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 193f3685d0546b0cea20c99894aadb70098e47bf ]

We must access rt6_info->from under RCU read lock: move the
dereference under such lock, with proper annotation.

v1 -> v2:
 - avoid using multiple, racy, fetch operations for rt->from

Fixes: a68886a6 ("net/ipv6: Make from in rt6_info rcu protected")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 7cc9f7003a969d359f608ebb701d42cafe75b84a ]

When running Docker with userns isolation e.g. --userns-remap="default"
and spawning up some containers with CAP_NET_ADMIN under this realm, I
noticed that link changes on ipvlan slave device inside that container
can affect all devices from this ipvlan group which are in other net
namespaces where the container should have no permission to make changes
to, such as the init netns, for example.

This effectively allows to undo ipvlan private mode and switch globally to
bridge mode where slaves can communicate directly without going through
hostns, or it allows to switch between global operation mode (l2/l3/l3s)
for everyone bound to the given ipvlan master device. libnetwork plugin
here is creating an ipvlan master and ipvlan slave in hostns and a slave
each that is moved into the container's netns upon creation event.

* In hostns:

  # ip -d a
  [...]
  8: cilium_host@bond0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
     link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
     ipvlan  mode l3 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
     inet 10.41.0.1/32 scope link cilium_host
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
  [...]

* Spawn container & change ipvlan mode setting inside of it:

  # docker run -dt --cap-add=NET_ADMIN --network cilium-net --name client -l app=test cilium/netperf
  9fff485d69dcb5ce37c9e33ca20a11ccafc236d690105aadbfb77e4f4170879c

  # docker exec -ti client ip -d a
  [...]
  10: cilium0@if4: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l3 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
      inet 10.41.197.43/32 brd 10.41.197.43 scope global cilium0
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

  # docker exec -ti client ip link change link cilium0 name cilium0 type ipvlan mode l2

  # docker exec -ti client ip -d a
  [...]
  10: cilium0@if4: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l2 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
      inet 10.41.197.43/32 brd 10.41.197.43 scope global cilium0
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

* In hostns (mode switched to l2):

  # ip -d a
  [...]
  8: cilium_host@bond0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l2 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
      inet 10.41.0.1/32 scope link cilium_host
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
  [...]

Same l3 -> l2 switch would also happen by creating another slave inside
the container's network namespace when specifying the existing cilium0
link to derive the actual (bond0) master:

  # docker exec -ti client ip link add link cilium0 name cilium1 type ipvlan mode l2

  # docker exec -ti client ip -d a
  [...]
  2: cilium1@if4: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l2 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
  10: cilium0@if4: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l2 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
      inet 10.41.197.43/32 brd 10.41.197.43 scope global cilium0
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

* In hostns:

  # ip -d a
  [...]
  8: cilium_host@bond0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 0c:c4:7a:e1:3d:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 65535
      ipvlan  mode l2 bridge numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535
      inet 10.41.0.1/32 scope link cilium_host
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
  [...]

One way to mitigate it is to check CAP_NET_ADMIN permissions of
the ipvlan master device's ns, and only then allow to change
mode or flags for all devices bound to it. Above two cases are
then disallowed after the patch.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NMahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8c7a77267eec81dd81af8412f29e50c0b1082548 ]

When a port is added to a team, its initial state is derived
from netif_carrier_ok rather than netif_oper_up.
If it is carrier up but operationally down at the time of being
added, the port state.linkup will be set prematurely.
port state.linkup should be set consistently using
netif_oper_up rather than netif_carrier_ok.

Fixes: f1d22a1e ("team: account for oper state")
Signed-off-by: NGeorge Wilkie <gwilkie@vyatta.att-mail.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f5b51fe804ec2a6edce0f8f6b11ea57283f5857b ]

When a netdevice is unregistered, we flush the relevant exception
via rt6_sync_down_dev() -> fib6_ifdown() -> fib6_del() -> fib6_del_route().

Finally, we end-up calling rt6_remove_exception(), where we release
the relevant dst, while we keep the references to the related fib6_info and
dev. Such references should be released later when the dst will be
destroyed.

There are a number of caches that can keep the exception around for an
unlimited amount of time - namely dst_cache, possibly even socket cache.
As a result device registration may hang, as demonstrated by this script:

ip netns add cl
ip netns add rt
ip netns add srv
ip netns exec rt sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1

ip link add name cl_veth type veth peer name cl_rt_veth
ip link set dev cl_veth netns cl
ip -n cl link set dev cl_veth up
ip -n cl addr add dev cl_veth 2001::2/64
ip -n cl route add default via 2001::1

ip -n cl link add tunv6 type ip6tnl mode ip6ip6 local 2001::2 remote 2002::1 hoplimit 64 dev cl_veth
ip -n cl link set tunv6 up
ip -n cl addr add 2013::2/64 dev tunv6

ip link set dev cl_rt_veth netns rt
ip -n rt link set dev cl_rt_veth up
ip -n rt addr add dev cl_rt_veth 2001::1/64

ip link add name rt_srv_veth type veth peer name srv_veth
ip link set dev srv_veth netns srv
ip -n srv link set dev srv_veth up
ip -n srv addr add dev srv_veth 2002::1/64
ip -n srv route add default via 2002::2

ip -n srv link add tunv6 type ip6tnl mode ip6ip6 local 2002::1 remote 2001::2 hoplimit 64 dev srv_veth
ip -n srv link set tunv6 up
ip -n srv addr add 2013::1/64 dev tunv6

ip link set dev rt_srv_veth netns rt
ip -n rt link set dev rt_srv_veth up
ip -n rt addr add dev rt_srv_veth 2002::2/64

ip netns exec srv netserver & sleep 0.1
ip netns exec cl ping6 -c 4 2013::1
ip netns exec cl netperf -H 2013::1 -t TCP_STREAM -l 3 & sleep 1
ip -n rt link set dev rt_srv_veth mtu 1400
wait %2

ip -n cl link del cl_veth

This commit addresses the issue purging all the references held by the
exception at time, as we currently do for e.g. ipv6 pcpu dst entries.

v1 -> v2:
 - re-order the code to avoid accessing dst and net after dst_dev_put()

Fixes: 93531c67 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 97f0082a0592212fc15d4680f5a4d80f79a1687c ]

Set rtm_table to RT_TABLE_COMPAT for ipv6 for tables > 255 to
keep legacy software happy. This is similar to what was done for
ipv4 in commit 709772e6 ("net: Fix routing tables with
id > 255 for legacy software").
Signed-off-by: NKalash Nainwal <kalash@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6ff7b060535e87c2ae14dd8548512abfdda528fb ]

KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07 ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.

KASAN report details as below:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524

CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
 mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004

Allocated by task 3524:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
 mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 3524:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
 kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
 device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
 put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
 __mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                                ^
 ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 0c692d07 ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 797a22bd5298c2674d927893f46cadf619dad11d ]

syzbot was able to trigger another soft lockup [1]

I first thought it was the O(N^2) issue I mentioned in my
prior fix (f657d22ee1f "net/x25: do not hold the cpu
too long in x25_new_lci()"), but I eventually found
that x25_bind() was not checking SOCK_ZAPPED state under
socket lock protection.

This means that multiple threads can end up calling
x25_insert_socket() for the same socket, and corrupt x25_list

[1]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 123s! [syz-executor.2:10492]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 27515
hardirqs last  enabled at (27514): [<ffffffff81006673>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (27515): [<ffffffff8100668f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last  enabled at (32): [<ffffffff8632ee73>] x25_get_neigh+0xa3/0xd0 net/x25/x25_link.c:336
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffff86324bc3>] x25_find_socket+0x23/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:341
CPU: 0 PID: 10492 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:97
Code: f4 ff ff ff e8 11 9f ea ff 48 c7 05 12 fb e5 08 00 00 00 00 e9 c8 e9 ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 75 08 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ee 01 00 65 8b 15 38 0c 92 7e 81 e2
RSP: 0018:ffff88806e94fc48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffff1100d84dac5 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90006197000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff86324bf3 RDI: ffff88806c26d628
RBP: ffff88806e94fc48 R08: ffff88806c1c6500 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: ffff88806c26d628
R13: ffff888090455200 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3a107e4700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3a107e3db8 CR3: 00000000a5544000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __x25_find_socket net/x25/af_x25.c:327 [inline]
 x25_find_socket+0x7d/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:342
 x25_new_lci net/x25/af_x25.c:355 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x380/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:784
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1662
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1673 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1670 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1670
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f3a107e3c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073c040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3a107e46d4
R13: 00000000004be362 R14: 00000000004ceb98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 10493 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:193 [inline]
RIP: 0010:queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x143/0x290 kernel/locking/qrwlock.c:86
Code: 4c 8d 2c 01 41 83 c7 03 41 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c7 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 0c 01 00 00 8b 03 3d 00 01 00 00 74 1a f3 90 41 0f b6 55 00 <41> 38 d7 7c eb 84 d2 74 e7 48 89 df e8 cc aa 4e 00 eb dd be 04 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888085c47bd8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffffffff89412b00 RCX: 1ffffffff1282560
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff89412b00
RBP: ffff888085c47c70 R08: 1ffffffff1282560 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: 00000000000000ff
R13: fffffbfff1282560 R14: 1ffff11010b88f7d R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00007fdd04086700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdd04064db8 CR3: 0000000090be0000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 queued_write_lock include/asm-generic/qrwlock.h:104 [inline]
 do_raw_write_lock+0x1d6/0x290 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:203
 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:204 [inline]
 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312
 x25_insert_socket+0x21/0xe0 net/x25/af_x25.c:267
 x25_bind+0x273/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:703
 __sys_bind+0x23f/0x290 net/socket.c:1481
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1492 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1490 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1490
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29

Fixes: 90c27297 ("X.25 remove bkl in bind")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8511a653e9250ef36b95803c375a7be0e2edb628 ]

Calculation of qp mtt size (in function mlx4_RST2INIT_wrapper)
ultimately depends on function roundup_pow_of_two.

If the amount of memory required by the QP is less than one page,
roundup_pow_of_two is called with argument zero.  In this case, the
roundup_pow_of_two result is undefined.

Calling roundup_pow_of_two with a zero argument resulted in the
following stack trace:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/log2.h:61:13
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 4 PID: 26939 Comm: rping Tainted: G OE 4.19.0-rc1
Hardware name: Supermicro X9DR3-F/X9DR3-F, BIOS 3.2a 07/09/2015
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xeb
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x7c
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x254/0x29d
? __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x180/0x180
? debug_show_all_locks+0x310/0x310
? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x260
? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1e0
? mlx4_RST2INIT_QP_wrapper+0xfb1/0x1440 [mlx4_core]
mlx4_RST2INIT_QP_wrapper+0xfb1/0x1440 [mlx4_core]

Fix this by explicitly testing for zero, and returning one if the
argument is zero (assuming that the next higher power of 2 in this case
should be one).

Fixes: c82e9aa0 ("mlx4_core: resource tracking for HCA resources used by guests")
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit c07d27927f2f2e96fcd27bb9fb330c9ea65612d0 ]

In procedures mlx4_cmd_use_events() and mlx4_cmd_use_polling(), we need to
guarantee that there are no FW commands in progress on the comm channel
(for VFs) or wrapped FW commands (on the PF) when SRIOV is active.

We do this by also taking the slave_cmd_mutex when SRIOV is active.

This is especially important when switching from event to polling, since we
free the command-context array during the switch.  If there are FW commands
in progress (e.g., waiting for a completion event), the completion event
handler will access freed memory.

Since the decision to use comm_wait or comm_poll is taken before grabbing
the event_sem/poll_sem in mlx4_comm_cmd_wait/poll, we must take the
slave_cmd_mutex as well (to guarantee that the decision to use events or
polling and the call to the appropriate cmd function are atomic).

Fixes: a7e1f049 ("net/mlx4_core: Fix deadlock when switching between polling and event fw commands")
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e15ce4b8d11227007577e6dc1364d288b8874fbe ]

As part of unloading a device, the driver switches from
FW command event mode to FW command polling mode.

Part of switching over to polling mode is freeing the command context array
memory (unfortunately, currently, without NULLing the command context array
pointer).

The reset flow calls "complete" to complete all outstanding fw commands
(if we are in event mode). The check for event vs. polling mode here
is to test if the command context array pointer is NULL.

If the reset flow is activated after the switch to polling mode, it will
attempt (incorrectly) to complete all the commands in the context array --
because the pointer was not NULLed when the driver switched over to polling
mode.

As a result, we have a use-after-free situation, which results in a
kernel crash.

For example:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [<ffffffff876c4a8e>] __wake_up_common+0x2e/0x90
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace ...
CPU: 2 PID: 940 Comm: kworker/2:3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-862.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090006  04/28/2016
Workqueue: events hv_eject_device_work [pci_hyperv]
task: ffff8d1734ca0fd0 ti: ffff8d17354bc000 task.ti: ffff8d17354bc000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff876c4a8e>]  [<ffffffff876c4a8e>] __wake_up_common+0x2e/0x90
RSP: 0018:ffff8d17354bfa38  EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8d17362d42c8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8d17362d42c8
RBP: ffff8d17354bfa70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: ffff8d173610e000 R12: ffff8d17362d42d0
R13: 0000000000000246 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d1802680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000f16d8000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff876c7adc>] complete+0x3c/0x50
 [<ffffffffc04242f0>] mlx4_cmd_wake_completions+0x70/0x90 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc041e7b1>] mlx4_enter_error_state+0xe1/0x380 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc041fa4b>] mlx4_comm_cmd+0x29b/0x360 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc041ff51>] __mlx4_cmd+0x441/0x920 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffff877f62b1>] ? __slab_free+0x81/0x2f0
 [<ffffffff87951384>] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x84/0xf0
 [<ffffffffc043a8eb>] mlx4_free_mtt_range+0x5b/0xb0 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc043a957>] mlx4_mtt_cleanup+0x17/0x20 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc04272c7>] mlx4_free_eq+0xa7/0x1c0 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc042803e>] mlx4_cleanup_eq_table+0xde/0x130 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc0433e08>] mlx4_unload_one+0x118/0x300 [mlx4_core]
 [<ffffffffc0434191>] mlx4_remove_one+0x91/0x1f0 [mlx4_core]

The fix is to set the command context array pointer to NULL after freeing
the array.

Fixes: f5aef5aa ("net/mlx4_core: Activate reset flow upon fatal command cases")
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 59cbf56fcd98ba2a715b6e97c4e43f773f956393 ]

Same reasons than the ones explained in commit 4179cb5a4c92
("vxlan: test dev->flags & IFF_UP before calling netif_rx()")

netif_rx() or gro_cells_receive() must be called under a strict contract.

At device dismantle phase, core networking clears IFF_UP
and flush_all_backlogs() is called after rcu grace period
to make sure no incoming packet might be in a cpu backlog
and still referencing the device.

A similar protocol is used for gro_cells infrastructure, as
gro_cells_destroy() will be called only after a full rcu
grace period is observed after IFF_UP has been cleared.

Most drivers call netif_rx() from their interrupt handler,
and since the interrupts are disabled at device dismantle,
netif_rx() does not have to check dev->flags & IFF_UP

Virtual drivers do not have this guarantee, and must
therefore make the check themselves.

Otherwise we risk use-after-free and/or crashes.

Fixes: d342894c ("vxlan: virtual extensible lan")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ad6c9986bcb627c7c22b8f9e9a934becc27df87c ]

If we receive a packet while deleting a VXLAN device, there's a chance
vxlan_rcv() is called at the same time as vxlan_dellink(). This is fine,
except that vxlan_dellink() should never ever touch stuff that's still in
use, such as the GRO cells list.

Otherwise, vxlan_rcv() crashes while queueing packets via
gro_cells_receive().

Move the gro_cells_destroy() to vxlan_uninit(), which runs after the RCU
grace period is elapsed and nothing needs the gro_cells anymore.

This is now done in the same way as commit 8e816df8 ("geneve: Use GRO
cells infrastructure.") originally implemented for GENEVE.
Reported-by: NJianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 58ce31cc ("vxlan: GRO support at tunnel layer")
Signed-off-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[  Upstream commit 9d3e1368bb45893a75a5dfb7cd21fdebfa6b47af ]

Commit 7716682c ("tcp/dccp: fix another race at listener
dismantle") let inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() fail, and adjusted
{tcp,dccp}_check_req() accordingly. However, TFO and syncookies
weren't modified, thus leaking allocated resources on error.

Contrary to tcp_check_req(), in both syncookies and TFO cases,
we need to drop the request socket. Also, since the child socket is
created with inet_csk_clone_lock(), we have to unlock it and drop an
extra reference (->sk_refcount is initially set to 2 and
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() drops only one ref).

For TFO, we also need to revert the work done by tcp_try_fastopen()
(with reqsk_fastopen_remove()).

Fixes: 7716682c ("tcp/dccp: fix another race at listener dismantle")
Signed-off-by: NGuillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f2feaefdabb0a6253aa020f65e7388f07a9ed47c ]

Since commit eeea10b8 ("tcp: add
tcp_v4_fill_cb()/tcp_v4_restore_cb()"), tcp_vX_fill_cb is only called
after tcp_filter(). That means, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq still points to
the IP-part of the cb.

We thus should not mock with it, as this can trigger bugs (thanks
syzkaller):
[   12.349396] ==================================================================
[   12.350188] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x19b3/0x1a20
[   12.351035] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006adbc208 by task test_ip6_datagr/1799

Setting end_seq is actually no more necessary in tcp_filter as it gets
initialized later on in tcp_vX_fill_cb.

Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: eeea10b8 ("tcp: add tcp_v4_fill_cb()/tcp_v4_restore_cb()")
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6466e715651f9f358e60c5ea4880e4731325827f ]

Returning 0 as inq to userspace indicates there is no more data to
read, and the application needs to wait for EPOLLIN. For a connection
that has received FIN from the remote peer, however, the application
must continue reading until getting EOF (return value of 0
from tcp_recvmsg) or an error, if edge-triggered epoll (EPOLLET) is
being used. Otherwise, the application will never receive a new
EPOLLIN, since there is no epoll edge after the FIN.

Return 1 when there is no data left on the queue but the
connection has received FIN, so that the applications continue
reading.

Fixes: b75eba76 (tcp: send in-queue bytes in cmsg upon read)
Signed-off-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2e990dfd13974d9eae493006f42ffb48707970ef ]

syzbot reported a NULL-ptr deref caused by that sched->init() in
sctp_stream_init() set stream->rr_next = NULL.

  kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
  RIP: 0010:sctp_sched_rr_dequeue+0xd3/0x170 net/sctp/stream_sched_rr.c:141
  Call Trace:
    sctp_outq_dequeue_data net/sctp/outqueue.c:90 [inline]
    sctp_outq_flush_data net/sctp/outqueue.c:1079 [inline]
    sctp_outq_flush+0xba2/0x2790 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1205

All sched info is saved in sout->ext now, in sctp_stream_init()
sctp_stream_alloc_out() will not change it, there's no need to
call sched->init() again, since sctp_outq_init() has already
done it.

Fixes: 5bbbbe32 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations")
Reported-by: syzbot+4c9934f20522c0efd657@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 69ffaebb90369ce08657b5aea4896777b9d6e8fc ]

rxrpc_get_client_conn() adds a new call to the front of the waiting_calls
queue if the connection it's going to use already exists.  This is bad as
it allows calls to get starved out.

Fix this by adding to the tail instead.

Also change the other enqueue point in the same function to put it on the
front (ie. when we have a new connection).  This makes the point that in
the case of a new connection the new call goes at the front (though it
doesn't actually matter since the queue should be unoccupied).

Fixes: 45025bce ("rxrpc: Improve management and caching of client connection objects")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ee60ad219f5c7c4fb2f047f88037770063ef785f ]

The race occurs in __mkroute_output() when 2 threads lookup a dst:

  CPU A                 CPU B
  find_exception()
                        find_exception() [fnhe expires]
                        ip_del_fnhe() [fnhe is deleted]
  rt_bind_exception()

In rt_bind_exception() it will bind a deleted fnhe with the new dst, and
this dst will get no chance to be freed. It causes a dev defcnt leak and
consecutive dmesg warnings:

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for ethX to become free. Usage count = 1

Especially thanks Jon to identify the issue.

This patch fixes it by setting fnhe_daddr to 0 in ip_del_fnhe() to stop
binding the deleted fnhe with a new dst when checking fnhe's fnhe_daddr
and daddr in rt_bind_exception().

It works as both ip_del_fnhe() and rt_bind_exception() are protected by
fnhe_lock and the fhne is freed by kfree_rcu().

Fixes: deed49df ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route")
Signed-off-by: NJon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ae9819e339b451da7a86ab6fe38ecfcb6814e78a ]

Hardware has the CBS (Credit Based Shaper) which affects only Q3
and Q2. When updating the CBS settings, even if the driver does so
after waiting for Tx DMA finished, there is a possibility that frame
data still remains in TxFIFO.

To avoid this, decrease TxFIFO depth of Q3 and Q2 to one.

This patch has been exercised this using netperf TCP_MAERTS, TCP_STREAM
and UDP_STREAM tests run on an Ebisu board. No performance change was
detected, outside of noise in the tests, both in terms of throughput and
CPU utilisation.

Fixes: c156633f ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper")
Signed-off-by: NMasaru Nagai <masaru.nagai.vx@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: NKazuya Mizuguchi <kazuya.mizuguchi.ks@renesas.com>
[simon: updated changelog]
Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 9417d81f4f8adfe20a12dd1fadf73a618cbd945d ]

sk_setup_caps() is called to set sk->sk_dst_cache in pptp_connect,
so we have to dst_release(sk->sk_dst_cache) in pptp_sock_destruct,
otherwise, the dst refcnt will leak.

It can be reproduced by this syz log:

  r1 = socket$pptp(0x18, 0x1, 0x2)
  bind$pptp(r1, &(0x7f0000000100)={0x18, 0x2, {0x0, @local}}, 0x1e)
  connect$pptp(r1, &(0x7f0000000000)={0x18, 0x2, {0x3, @remote}}, 0x1e)

Consecutive dmesg warnings will occur:

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1

v1->v2:
  - use rcu_dereference_protected() instead of rcu_dereference_check(),
    as suggested by Eric.

Fixes: 00959ade ("PPTP: PPP over IPv4 (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol)")
Reported-by: NXiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ee74d0bd4325efb41e38affe5955f920ed973f23 ]

In case x25_connect() fails and frees the socket neighbour,
we also need to undo the change done to x25->state.

Before my last bug fix, we had use-after-free so this
patch fixes a latent bug.

syzbot report :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 16137 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #117
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:x25_write_internal+0x1e8/0xdf0 net/x25/x25_subr.c:173
Code: 00 40 88 b5 e0 fe ff ff 0f 85 01 0b 00 00 48 8b 8b 80 04 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 79 1c 48 89 fe 48 c1 ee 03 <0f> b6 34 16 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 83 c2 03 40 38 f2 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888076717a08 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: ffff88805f2f2292 RBX: ffff8880a0ae6000 RCX: 0000000000000000
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000018d0d0ee): kobject_uevent_env
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 000000000000001c
RBP: ffff888076717b40 R08: ffff8880950e0580 R09: ffffed100be5e46d
R10: ffffed100be5e46c R11: ffff88805f2f2363 R12: ffff888065579840
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000018d0d0ee): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop5'
R13: 1ffff1100ece2f47 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: 0000000000000013
FS:  00007fb88cf43700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9a42a41028 CR3: 0000000087a67000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 x25_release+0xd0/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:658
 __sock_release+0xd3/0x2b0 net/socket.c:579
 sock_close+0x1b/0x30 net/socket.c:1162
 __fput+0x2df/0x8d0 fs/file_table.c:278
 ____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309
 task_work_run+0x14a/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 get_signal+0x1961/0x1d50 kernel/signal.c:2388
 do_signal+0x87/0x1940 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:816
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x244/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x52d/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457f29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fb88cf42c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457f29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb88cf436d4
R13: 00000000004be462 R14: 00000000004cec98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Modules linked in:

Fixes: 95d6ebd53c79 ("net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_device_event()")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 95d6ebd53c79522bf9502dbc7e89e0d63f94dae4 ]

In case of failure x25_connect() does a x25_neigh_put(x25->neighbour)
but forgets to clear x25->neighbour pointer, thus triggering use-after-free.

Since the socket is visible in x25_list, we need to hold x25_list_lock
to protect the operation.

syzbot report :

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_kill_by_device net/x25/af_x25.c:217 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_device_event+0x296/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:252
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a030edd0 by task syz-executor003/7854

CPU: 0 PID: 7854 Comm: syz-executor003 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
 x25_kill_by_device net/x25/af_x25.c:217 [inline]
 x25_device_event+0x296/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:252
 notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
 __dev_notify_flags+0x1e9/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:7607
 dev_change_flags+0x10d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:7643
 dev_ifsioc+0x2b0/0x940 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:237
 dev_ioctl+0x1b8/0xc70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:488
 sock_do_ioctl+0x1bd/0x300 net/socket.c:995
 sock_ioctl+0x32b/0x610 net/socket.c:1096
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0xd6e/0x1390 fs/ioctl.c:696
 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4467c9
Code: e8 0c e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 5b 07 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fdbea222d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc58 RCX: 00000000004467c9
RDX: 0000000020000340 RSI: 0000000000008914 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dbc50 R08: 00007fdbea223700 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fdbea223700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc5c
R13: 6000030030626669 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000030626669

Allocated by task 7843:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:468
 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:509
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x760 mm/slab.c:3615
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
 x25_link_device_up+0x46/0x3f0 net/x25/x25_link.c:249
 x25_device_event+0x116/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:242
 notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
 __dev_notify_flags+0x121/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:7605
 dev_change_flags+0x10d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:7643
 dev_ifsioc+0x2b0/0x940 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:237
 dev_ioctl+0x1b8/0xc70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:488
 sock_do_ioctl+0x1bd/0x300 net/socket.c:995
 sock_ioctl+0x32b/0x610 net/socket.c:1096
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0xd6e/0x1390 fs/ioctl.c:696
 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 7865:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:457
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:465
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3494 [inline]
 kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3811
 x25_neigh_put include/net/x25.h:253 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x8d8/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:824
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a030edc0
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
 256-byte region [ffff8880a030edc0, ffff8880a030eec0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000280c380 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88812c3f07c0 index:0x0
flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea0002806788 ffffea00027f0188 ffff88812c3f07c0
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880a030e000 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+04babcefcd396fabec37@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a843dc4ebaecd15fca1f4d35a97210f72ea1473b ]

In func check_6rd,tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen may equal to
32,so UBSAN complain about it.

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/ipv6/sit.c:781:47
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
CPU: 6 PID: 20036 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.27 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1
04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113
ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x81 lib/ubsan.c:159
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x293/0x2e8 lib/ubsan.c:425
check_6rd.constprop.9+0x433/0x4e0 net/ipv6/sit.c:781
try_6rd net/ipv6/sit.c:806 [inline]
ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:866 [inline]
sit_tunnel_xmit+0x141c/0x2720 net/ipv6/sit.c:1033
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4300 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4309 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17c/0x780 net/core/dev.c:3259
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1656/0x2500 net/core/dev.c:3829
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:501 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xa36/0x2290 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
ip6_finish_output+0x3e7/0xa20 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1e2/0x720 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x99/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:176
ip6_send_skb+0x9d/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1697
ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc0/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1717
rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:616 [inline]
rawv6_sendmsg+0x2435/0x3530 net/ipv6/raw.c:946
inet_sendmsg+0xf8/0x5c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xc8/0x110 net/socket.c:631
___sys_sendmsg+0x6cf/0x890 net/socket.c:2114
__sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2152
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Signed-off-by: Nlinmiaohe <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 1e027960edfaa6a43f9ca31081729b716598112b ]

syzbot found another add_timer() issue, this time in net/hsr [1]

Let's use mod_timer() which is safe.

[1]
kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:1136!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 15909 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
kobject: 'loop2' (00000000f5629718): kobject_uevent_env
RIP: 0010:add_timer kernel/time/timer.c:1136 [inline]
RIP: 0010:add_timer+0x654/0xbe0 kernel/time/timer.c:1134
Code: 0f 94 c5 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 09 61 0f 00 45 84 ed 0f 84 77 fd ff ff e8 bb 5f 0f 00 e8 07 10 a0 ff e9 68 fd ff ff e8 ac 5f 0f 00 <0f> 0b e8 a5 5f 0f 00 0f 0b e8 9e 5f 0f 00 4c 89 b5 58 ff ff ff e9
RSP: 0018:ffff8880656eeca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
kobject: 'loop2' (00000000f5629718): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop2'
RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: 1ffff1100caddd9a RCX: ffffc9000c436000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff816056c4 RDI: ffff88806a2f6cc8
RBP: ffff8880656eed58 R08: ffff888067f4a300 R09: ffff888067f4abc8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88806a2f6cc0
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8880656eed30
FS:  00007fc2019bf700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000738000 CR3: 0000000067e8e000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 hsr_check_announce net/hsr/hsr_device.c:99 [inline]
 hsr_check_carrier_and_operstate+0x567/0x6f0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:120
 hsr_netdev_notify+0x297/0xa00 net/hsr/hsr_main.c:51
 notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
 dev_open net/core/dev.c:1436 [inline]
 dev_open+0x143/0x160 net/core/dev.c:1424
 team_port_add drivers/net/team/team.c:1203 [inline]
 team_add_slave+0xa07/0x15d0 drivers/net/team/team.c:1933
 do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2358 [inline]
 do_set_master+0x1d4/0x230 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2332
 do_setlink+0x966/0x3510 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2493
 rtnl_setlink+0x271/0x3b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2747
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x465/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5192
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2485
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5210
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1925
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:632
 sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:923
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1869 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e0/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:680
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:956 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:937
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1001
 do_writev+0xf6/0x290 fs/read_write.c:1036
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1106 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1106
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457f29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc2019bec78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457f29
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2019bf6d4
R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004dd218 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Fixes: f421436a ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Arvid Brodin <arvid.brodin@alten.se>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626 ]

If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
  comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de  ................
    00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff  ..I.............
  backtrace:
    [<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
    [<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
    [<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
    [<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
    [<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
    [<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
    [<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
    [<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
    [<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
    [<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
    [<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
    [<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
    [<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
    [<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
    [<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
    [<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
    [<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
    [<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Fixes: c5a75911 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: NHulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit deb6bfabdbb634e91f36a4e9cb00a7137d72d886 ]

It has been observed that tx queue may stall while downloading
from certain web sites (example www.speedtest.net)

The cause has been tracked down to a corner case where
the tx interrupt vector was disabled automatically, but
was not re enabled later.

The lan743x has two mechanisms to enable/disable individual
interrupts. Interrupts can be enabled/disabled by individual
source, and they can also be enabled/disabled by individual
vector which has been mapped to the source. Both must be
enabled for interrupts to work properly.

The TX code path, primarily uses the interrupt enable/disable of
the TX source bit, while leaving the vector enabled all the time.

However, while investigating this issue it was noticed that
the driver requested the use of the vector auto clear feature.

The test above revealed a case where the vector enable was
cleared unintentionally.

This patch fixes the issue by deleting the lines that request
the vector auto clear feature to be used.

Fixes: 23f0703c ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver")
Signed-off-by: NBryan Whitehead <Bryan.Whitehead@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit dd9d9f5907bb475f8b1796c47d4ecc7fb9b72136 ]

It has been noticed that running the speed test at
www.speedtest.net occasionally causes a kernel panic.

Investigation revealed that under this test RX buffer allocation
sometimes fails and returns NULL. But the lan743x driver did
not handle this case.

This patch fixes this issue by attempting to allocate a buffer
before sending the new rx packet to the OS. If the allocation
fails then the new rx packet is dropped and the existing buffer
is reused in the DMA ring.

Updates for v2:
    Additional 2 locations where allocation was not checked,
        has been changed to reuse existing buffer.

Fixes: 23f0703c ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver")
Signed-off-by: NBryan Whitehead <Bryan.Whitehead@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 163d1c3d6f17556ed3c340d3789ea93be95d6c28 ]

Back in 2013 Hannes took care of most of such leaks in commit
bceaa902 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")

But the bug in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() has not been fixed.

syzbot report :

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
CPU: 1 PID: 10996 Comm: syz-executor362 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #11
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:600
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x9f4/0xb10 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:694
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601
 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:174 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x311/0x570 net/socket.c:227
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xb65/0x1310 net/socket.c:2283
 do_recvmmsg+0x646/0x10c0 net/socket.c:2390
 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2469 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2492 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg+0x1d1/0x350 net/socket.c:2485
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:2485
 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x445819
Code: e8 6c b6 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b 12 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f64453eddb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac28 RCX: 0000000000445819
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020002f80 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dac2c
R13: 00007ffeba8f87af R14: 00007f64453ee9c0 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf

Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xf6/0x1310 net/socket.c:2244
 do_recvmmsg+0x646/0x10c0 net/socket.c:2390

Bytes 0-31 of 32 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 32 starts at ffff8880ae62fbb0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000000

Fixes: a32e0eec ("l2tp: introduce L2TPv3 IP encapsulation support for IPv6")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 22c74764aa2943ecdf9f07c900d8a9c8ba6c9265 ]

If a non local multicast packet reaches ip_route_input_rcu() while
the ingress device IPv4 private data (in_dev) is NULL, we end up
doing a NULL pointer dereference in IN_DEV_MFORWARD().

Since the later call to ip_route_input_mc() is going to fail if
!in_dev, we can fail early in such scenario and avoid the dangerous
code path.

v1 -> v2:
 - clarified the commit message, no code changes
Reported-by: NTianhao Zhao <tizhao@redhat.com>
Fixes: e58e4159 ("net: Enable support for VRF with ipv4 multicast")
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2a5ff07a0eb945f291e361aa6f6becca8340ba46 ]

We keep receiving syzbot reports [1] that show that tunnels do not play
the rcu/IFF_UP rules properly.

At device dismantle phase, gro_cells_destroy() will be called
only after a full rcu grace period is observed after IFF_UP
has been cleared.

This means that IFF_UP needs to be tested before queueing packets
into netif_rx() or gro_cells.

This patch implements the test in gro_cells_receive() because
too many callers do not seem to bother enough.

[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffff4ca0b9ffffe
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1929 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1945 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:2656 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy net/core/gro_cells.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy+0x19d/0x360 net/core/gro_cells.c:78
Code: 03 42 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 53 01 00 00 48 8d 7a 08 49 8b 47 08 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 89 f9 49 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 21 00 0f 85 10 01 00 00 48 89 c1 48 89 42 08 48 c1 e9 03
RSP: 0018:ffff8880aa3f79a8 EFLAGS: 00010a02
RAX: 00ffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffffe8ffffc64b70 RCX: 1ffff8ca0b9ffffe
RDX: ffffc6505cffffe8 RSI: ffffffff858410ca RDI: ffffc6505cfffff0
RBP: ffff8880aa3f7a08 R08: ffff8880aa3e8580 R09: fffffbfff1263645
R10: fffffbfff1263644 R11: ffffffff8931b223 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffe8ffffc64b80 R15: ffffe8ffffc64b75
kobject: 'loop2' (000000004bd7d84a): kobject_uevent_env
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe CR3: 0000000094941000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Call Trace:
kobject: 'loop2' (000000004bd7d84a): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop2'
 ip_tunnel_dev_free+0x19/0x60 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1010
 netdev_run_todo+0x51c/0x7d0 net/core/dev.c:8970
 rtnl_unlock+0xe/0x10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:116
 ip_tunnel_delete_nets+0x423/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1124
 vti_exit_batch_net+0x23/0x30 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:495
 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0x105/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:156
 cleanup_net+0x3fb/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
 process_one_work+0x98e/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2173
 worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2319
 kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Modules linked in:
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe
   [ end trace 513fc9c1338d1cb3 ]
RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1929 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1945 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:2656 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy net/core/gro_cells.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy+0x19d/0x360 net/core/gro_cells.c:78
Code: 03 42 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 53 01 00 00 48 8d 7a 08 49 8b 47 08 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 89 f9 49 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 21 00 0f 85 10 01 00 00 48 89 c1 48 89 42 08 48 c1 e9 03
RSP: 0018:ffff8880aa3f79a8 EFLAGS: 00010a02
RAX: 00ffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffffe8ffffc64b70 RCX: 1ffff8ca0b9ffffe
RDX: ffffc6505cffffe8 RSI: ffffffff858410ca RDI: ffffc6505cfffff0
RBP: ffff8880aa3f7a08 R08: ffff8880aa3e8580 R09: fffffbfff1263645
R10: fffffbfff1263644 R11: ffffffff8931b223 R12: dffffc0000000000
kobject: 'loop3' (00000000e4ee57a6): kobject_uevent_env
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffe8ffffc64b80 R15: ffffe8ffffc64b75
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe CR3: 0000000094941000 CR4: 00000000001406f0

Fixes: c9e6bc64 ("net: add gro_cells infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6d2b0f02f5a07a4bf02e4cbc90d7eaa85cac2986 ]

proc_exit_connector() uses ->real_parent lockless. This is not
safe that its parent can go away at any moment, so use RCU to
protect it, and ensure that this task is not released.

[  747.624551] ==================================================================
[  747.632946] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in proc_exit_connector+0x1f7/0x310
[  747.640686] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88a0276988e0 by task sshd/2882
[  747.648032]
[  747.649804] CPU: 11 PID: 2882 Comm: sshd Tainted: G            E     4.19.26-rc2 #11
[  747.658629] Hardware name: IBM x3550M4 -[7914OFV]-/00AM544, BIOS -[D7E142BUS-1.71]- 07/31/2014
[  747.668419] Call Trace:
[  747.671269]  dump_stack+0xf0/0x19b
[  747.675186]  ? show_regs_print_info+0x5/0x5
[  747.679988]  ? kmsg_dump_rewind_nolock+0x59/0x59
[  747.685302]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
[  747.691162]  kasan_report+0x258/0x380
[  747.695835]  ? proc_exit_connector+0x1f7/0x310
[  747.701402]  proc_exit_connector+0x1f7/0x310
[  747.706767]  ? proc_coredump_connector+0x2d0/0x2d0
[  747.712715]  ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x29/0x50
[  747.718270]  ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x29/0x50
[  747.723820]  ? ___preempt_schedule+0x16/0x18
[  747.729193]  ? ___preempt_schedule+0x16/0x18
[  747.734574]  do_exit+0xa11/0x14f0
[  747.738880]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x590/0x590
[  747.744525]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x3c0/0x3c0
[  747.761448]  ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xeb/0x1c0
[  747.767589]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x1a6/0x290
[  747.773154]  ? check_chain_key+0x139/0x1f0
[  747.778345]  ? check_flags.part.35+0x240/0x240
[  747.783908]  ? __lock_acquire+0x2300/0x2300
[  747.789171]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x59/0x70
[  747.795316]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x59/0x70
[  747.801457]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x10f/0x1e0
[  747.806914]  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x120/0x120
[  747.812481]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0
[  747.817645]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2e/0x50
[  747.822708]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x12db/0x1fa0
[  747.828367]  ? __pmd_alloc+0x2d0/0x2d0
[  747.833143]  ? check_noncircular+0x50/0x50
[  747.838309]  ? match_held_lock+0x7f/0x340
[  747.843380]  ? check_noncircular+0x50/0x50
[  747.848561]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x21a/0x5f0
[  747.853730]  ? check_flags.part.35+0x240/0x240
[  747.859290]  ? check_chain_key+0x139/0x1f0
[  747.864474]  ? __do_page_fault+0x40f/0x760
[  747.869655]  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x4b/0x1f0
[  747.875319]  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d5/0x7b0
[  747.880877]  ? trace_raw_output_preemptirq_template+0x90/0x90
[  747.887895]  ? trace_raw_output_sys_exit+0x80/0x80
[  747.893860]  ? up_read+0x3b/0x90
[  747.898142]  ? stop_critical_timings+0x260/0x260
[  747.903909]  do_group_exit+0xe0/0x1c0
[  747.908591]  ? __x64_sys_exit+0x30/0x30
[  747.913460]  ? trace_raw_output_preemptirq_template+0x90/0x90
[  747.920485]  ? tracer_hardirqs_on+0x270/0x270
[  747.925956]  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x28/0x30
[  747.931214]  do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
[  747.935988]  ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x2f0/0x2f0
[  747.941931]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[  747.947788]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x1d0/0x1d0
[  747.953838]  ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x16/0x8e
[  747.958915]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[  747.964784]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  747.971021] RIP: 0033:0x7f572f154c68
[  747.975606] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  747.979791] RSP: 002b:00007ffed2dfaa58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
[  747.989324] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f572f431840 RCX: 00007f572f154c68
[  747.997910] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000001
[  748.006495] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: fffffffffffffee0
[  748.015079] R10: 00007f572f4387e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f572f431840
[  748.023664] R13: 000055a7f90f2c50 R14: 000055a7f96e2310 R15: 000055a7f96e2310
[  748.032287]
[  748.034509] Allocated by task 2300:
[  748.038982]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[  748.043562]  kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf5/0x2e0
[  748.049018]  copy_process+0x1781/0x4790
[  748.053884]  _do_fork+0x166/0x9a0
[  748.058163]  do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
[  748.062943]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  748.069180]
[  748.071405] Freed by task 15395:
[  748.075591]  __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
[  748.080752]  kmem_cache_free+0xc2/0x310
[  748.085619]  free_task+0xea/0x130
[  748.089901]  __put_task_struct+0x177/0x230
[  748.095063]  finish_task_switch+0x51b/0x5d0
[  748.100315]  __schedule+0x506/0xfa0
[  748.104791]  schedule+0xca/0x260
[  748.108978]  futex_wait_queue_me+0x27e/0x420
[  748.114333]  futex_wait+0x251/0x550
[  748.118814]  do_futex+0x75b/0xf80
[  748.123097]  __x64_sys_futex+0x231/0x2a0
[  748.128065]  do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
[  748.132835]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  748.139066]
[  748.141289] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88a027698000
[  748.141289]  which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 12160
[  748.156589] The buggy address is located 2272 bytes inside of
[  748.156589]  12160-byte region [ffff88a027698000, ffff88a02769af80)
[  748.171114] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  748.177055] page:ffffea00809da600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888107d01e00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[  748.189136] flags: 0x57ffffc0008100(slab|head)
[  748.194688] raw: 0057ffffc0008100 ffffea00809a3200 0000000300000003 ffff888107d01e00
[  748.204424] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000020002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  748.214146] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  748.220976]
[  748.223197] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  748.229128]  ffff88a027698780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  748.238271]  ffff88a027698800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  748.247414] >ffff88a027698880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  748.256564]                                                        ^
[  748.264267]  ffff88a027698900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  748.273493]  ffff88a027698980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  748.282630] ==================================================================

Fixes: b086ff87 ("connector: add parent pid and tgid to coredump and exit events")
Signed-off-by: NZhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: NLi RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Acked-by: NEvgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>