Commit c7acec71 ("kernel.h: handle pointers to arrays better in
container_of()") made use of __compiletime_assert() from container_of()
thus increasing the usage of this macro, allowing developers to notice
type conflicts in usage of container_of() at compile time.

However, the implementation of __compiletime_assert relies on compiler
optimizations to report an error.  This means that if a developer uses
"-O0" with any code that performs container_of(), the compiler will always
report an error regardless of whether there is an actual problem in the
code.

This patch disables compile_time_assert when optimizations are disabled to
allow such code to compile with CFLAGS="-O0".

Example compilation failure:

./include/linux/compiler.h:547:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_94' declared with attribute error: pointer type mismatch in container_of()
  _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__)
                                      ^
./include/linux/compiler.h:530:4: note: in definition of macro `__compiletime_assert'
    prefix ## suffix();    \
    ^~~~~~
./include/linux/compiler.h:547:2: note: in expansion of macro `_compiletime_assert'
  _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__)
  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/build_bug.h:46:37: note: in expansion of macro `compiletime_assert'
 #define BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(cond, msg) compiletime_assert(!(cond), msg)
                                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/kernel.h:860:2: note: in expansion of macro `BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG'
  BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__same_type(*(ptr), ((type *)0)->member) && \
  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use do{}while(0), per Michal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170829230114.11662-1-joe@ovn.org
Fixes: c7acec71 ("kernel.h: handle pointers to arrays better in container_of()")
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Cc: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Arnd reported some false positive warnings with GCC 7:

  drivers/hid/wacom_wac.o: warning: objtool: wacom_bpt3_touch()+0x2a5: stack state mismatch: cfa1=7+8 cfa2=6+16
  drivers/iio/adc/vf610_adc.o: warning: objtool: vf610_adc_calculate_rates() falls through to next function vf610_adc_sample_set()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-hibvt.o: warning: objtool: hibvt_pwm_get_state() falls through to next function hibvt_pwm_remove()
  drivers/pwm/pwm-mediatek.o: warning: objtool: mtk_pwm_config() falls through to next function mtk_pwm_enable()
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835aux.o: warning: objtool: .text: unexpected end of section
  drivers/watchdog/digicolor_wdt.o: warning: objtool: dc_wdt_get_timeleft() falls through to next function dc_wdt_restart()

When GCC 7 detects a potential divide-by-zero condition, it sometimes
inserts a UD2 instruction for the case where the divisor is zero,
instead of letting the hardware trap on the divide instruction.

Objtool doesn't consider UD2 to be fatal unless it's annotated with
unreachable().  So it considers the GCC-generated UD2 to be non-fatal,
and it tries to follow the control flow past the UD2 and gets
confused.

Previously, objtool *did* assume UD2 was always a dead end.  That
changed with the following commit:

  d1091c7f ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")

The motivation behind that change was that Peter was planning on using
UD2 for __WARN(), which is *not* a dead end.  However, it turns out
that some emulators rely on UD2 being fatal, so he ended up using
'ud0' instead:

  9a93848f ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0")

For GCC 4.5+, it should be safe to go back to the previous assumption
that UD2 is fatal, even when it's not annotated with unreachable().

But for pre-4.5 versions of GCC, the unreachable() macro isn't
supported, so such cases of UD2 need to be explicitly annotated as
reachable.
Reported-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: d1091c7f ("objtool: Improve detection of BUG() and other dead ends")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e57fa9dfede25f79487da8126ee9cdf7b856db65.1501188854.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This creates an unreachable annotation in asm for CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y.
While here, adjust earlier uses of \t\n into \n\t.
Suggested-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500921349-10803-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Create a new function attribute, __nostackprotector, that can used to turn off
stack protection on a per function basis.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0576fd5c74440ad0250f16ac6609ecf587812456.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
untouched at the end.

Other parts of the kernel use unnamed structures, but the 0-day builder
using gcc-4.4 blows up on static initializers. Officially, it's documented
as only working on gcc 4.6 and later, which further confuses me:
	https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/C11Status
The structure layout randomization already requires gcc 4.7, but instead
of depending on the plugin being enabled, just check the gcc versions
for wider build testing. At Linus's suggestion, the marking is hidden
in a macro to reduce how ugly it looks. Additionally, indenting is left
unchanged since it would make things harder to read.

Randomization of task_struct is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code
in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures
at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to
know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for
"in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other
build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for
distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for
third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now
all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker.

In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to
cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This
comes at the cost of reduced randomization.

Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout,
which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to
randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable
the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization
that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with
bisection.

Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated
initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation
even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require
the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for
automatically chosen structures are marked as well.)

The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are:
- disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch)
- add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking
- clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings
- add whitelisting infrastructure
- support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott)
- raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7

Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The sparse-based checking for non-RCU accesses to RCU-protected pointers
has been around for a very long time, and it is now the only type of
sparse-based checking that is optional.  This commit therefore makes
it unconditional.
Reported-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>

This allows structure annotations for requiring designated initialization
in GCC 5.1.0 and later:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Designated-Inits.html

The structure randomization layout plugin will be using this to help
identify structures that need this form of initialization.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Often all is needed is these small helpers, instead of compiler.h or a
full kprobes.h.  This is important for asm helpers, in fact even some
asm/kprobes.h make use of these helpers...  instead just keep a generic
asm file with helpers useful for asm code with the least amount of
clutter as possible.

Likewise we need now to also address what to do about this file for both
when architectures have CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES, and when they do not.  Then
for when architectures have CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES but have disabled
CONFIG_KPROBES.

Right now most asm/kprobes.h do not have guards against CONFIG_KPROBES,
this means most architecture code cannot include asm/kprobes.h safely.
Correct this and add guards for architectures missing them.
Additionally provide architectures that not have kprobes support with
the default asm-generic solution.  This lets us force asm/kprobes.h on
the header include/linux/kprobes.h always, but most importantly we can
now safely include just asm/kprobes.h on architecture code without
bringing the full kitchen sink of header files.

Two architectures already provided a guard against CONFIG_KPROBES on its
kprobes.h: sh, arch.  The rest of the architectures needed gaurds added.
We avoid including any not-needed headers on asm/kprobes.h unless
kprobes have been enabled.

In a subsequent atomic change we can try now to remove compiler.h from
include/linux/kprobes.h.

During this sweep I've also identified a few architectures defining a
common macro needed for both kprobes and ftrace, that of the definition
of the breakput instruction up.  Some refer to this as
BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION.  This must be kept outside of the #ifdef
CONFIG_KPROBES guard.

[mcgrof@kernel.org: fix arm64 build]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAB=NE6X1WMByuARS4mZ1g9+W=LuVBnMDnh_5zyN0CLADaVh=Jw@mail.gmail.com
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fixup for kprobes declarations moving]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214165933.13ebd4f4@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203233139.32682-1-mcgrof@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Now that constants are traced, it is useful to see the number of constants
that are traced in the likely/unlikely profiler in order to know if they
should be ignored or not.

The likely/unlikely will display a number after the "correct" number if a
"constant" count exists.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

This plugin detects any structures that contain __user attributes and
makes sure it is being fully initialized so that a specific class of
information exposure is eliminated. (This plugin was originally designed
to block the exposure of siginfo in CVE-2013-2141.)

Ported from grsecurity/PaX. This version adds a verbose option to the
plugin and the Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

When running the likely/unlikely profiler, one of the results did not look
accurate. It noted that the unlikely() in link_path_walk() was 100%
incorrect. When I added a trace_printk() to see what was happening there, it
became 80% correct! Looking deeper into what whas happening, I found that
gcc split that if statement into two paths. One where the if statement
became a constant, the other path a variable. The other path had the if
statement always hit (making the unlikely there, always false), but since
the #define unlikely() has:

  #define unlikely() (__builtin_constant_p(x) ? !!(x) : __branch_check__(x, 0))

Where constants are ignored by the branch profiler, the "constant" path
made by the compiler was ignored, even though it was hit 80% of the time.

By just passing the constant value to the __branch_check__() function and
tracing it out of line (as always correct, as likely/unlikely isn't a factor
for constants), then we get back the accurate readings of branches that were
optimized by gcc causing part of the execution to become constant.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and
variables.  If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for
gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then
the plugin will initialize it with random contents.  The variable must
be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields.

These specific functions have been selected because they are init
functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable
times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of
latent entropy.
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Introduce LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION option for architectures to
select to build with -ffunction-sections, -fdata-sections, and link
with --gc-sections. It requires some work (documented) to ensure all
unreferenced entrypoints are live, and requires toolchain and build
verification, so it is made a per-arch option for now.

On a random powerpc64le build, this yelds a significant size saving,
it boots and runs fine, but there is a lot I haven't tested as yet, so
these savings may be reduced if there are bugs in the link.

    text      data        bss        dec   filename
11169741   1180744    1923176	14273661   vmlinux
10445269   1004127    1919707	13369103   vmlinux.dce

~700K text, ~170K data, 6% removed from kernel image size.
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

My previous commit:

  112dc0c8 ("locking/barriers: Suppress sparse warnings in lockless_dereference()")

caused sparse to complain that (in radix-tree.h) we use sizeof(void)
since that rcu_dereference()s a void *.

Really, all we need is to have the expression *p in here somewhere
to make sure p is a pointer type, and sizeof(*p) was the thing that
came to my mind first to make sure that's done without really doing
anything at runtime.

Another thing I had considered was using typeof(*p), but obviously
we can't just declare a typeof(*p) variable either, since that may
end up being void. Declaring a variable as typeof(*p)* gets around
that, and still checks that typeof(*p) is valid, so do that. This
type construction can't be done for _________p1 because that will
actually be used and causes sparse address space warnings, so keep
a separate unused variable for it.
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kbuild-all@01.org
Fixes: 112dc0c8 ("locking/barriers: Suppress sparse warnings in lockless_dereference()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472192160-4049-1-git-send-email-johannes@sipsolutions.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

After Peter's commit:

  331b6d8c ("locking/barriers: Validate lockless_dereference() is used on a pointer type")

... we get a lot of sparse warnings (one for every rcu_dereference, and more)
since the expression here is assigning to the wrong address space.

Instead of validating that 'p' is a pointer this way, instead make
it fail compilation when it's not by using sizeof(*(p)). This will
not cause any sparse warnings (tested, likely since the address
space is irrelevant for sizeof), and will fail compilation when
'p' isn't a pointer type.
Tested-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 331b6d8c ("locking/barriers: Validate lockless_dereference() is used on a pointer type")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470909022-687-2-git-send-email-johannes@sipsolutions.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The __pmem address space was meant to annotate codepaths that touch
persistent memory and need to coordinate a call to wmb_pmem().  Now that
wmb_pmem() is gone, there is little need to keep this annotation.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

Since all asm/barrier.h should/must include asm-generic/barrier.h the
latter is a good place for generic infrastructure like this.

This also allows archs to override the new smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep().
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Introduce smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(), this construct is not
uncommon, but the lack of this barrier is.

Use it to better express smp_rmb() uses in WRITE_ONCE(), the IPC
semaphore code and the qspinlock code.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This new form allows using hardware assisted waiting.

Some hardware (ARM64 and x86) allow monitoring an address for changes,
so by providing a pointer we can use this to replace the cpu_relax()
with hardware optimized methods in the future.
Requested-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Use the type to validate the argument @p is indeed a pointer type.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160522104827.GP3193@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

gcc as far back as at least 3.04 documents the function attribute
__malloc__.  Add a shorthand for attaching that to a function
declaration.  This was also suggested by Andi Kleen way back in 2002
[1], but didn't get applied, perhaps because gcc at that time generated
the exact same code with and without this attribute.

This attribute tells the compiler that the return value (if non-NULL)
can be assumed not to alias any other valid pointers at the time of the
call.

Please note that the documentation for a range of gcc versions (starting
from around 4.7) contained a somewhat confusing and self-contradicting
text:

  The malloc attribute is used to tell the compiler that a function may
  be treated as if any non-NULL pointer it returns cannot alias any other
  pointer valid when the function returns and *that the memory has
  undefined content*.  [...] Standard functions with this property include
  malloc and *calloc*.

(emphasis mine). The intended meaning has later been clarified [2]:

  This tells the compiler that a function is malloc-like, i.e., that the
  pointer P returned by the function cannot alias any other pointer valid
  when the function returns, and moreover no pointers to valid objects
  occur in any storage addressed by P.

What this means is that we can apply the attribute to kmalloc and
friends, and it is ok for the returned memory to have well-defined
contents (__GFP_ZERO).  But it is not ok to apply it to kmemdup(), nor
to other functions which both allocate and possibly initialize the
memory with existing pointers.  So unless someone is doing something
pretty perverted kstrdup() should also be a fine candidate.

[1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/57172
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=56955Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In C programming language, we don't have a easy way to privatize a
member of a structure. However in kernel, sometimes there is a need to
privatize a member in case of potential bugs or misuses.

Fortunately, the noderef attribute of sparse is a way to privatize a
member, as by defining a member as noderef, the address-of operator on
the member will produce a noderef pointer to that member, and if anyone
wants to dereference that kind of pointers to read or modify the member,
sparse will yell.

Based on this, __private modifier and related operation ACCESS_PRIVATE()
are introduced, which could help detect undesigned public uses of
private members of structs. Here is an example of sparse's output if it
detect an undersigned public use:

| kernel/rcu/tree.c:4453:25: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different modifiers)
| kernel/rcu/tree.c:4453:25:    expected struct raw_spinlock [usertype] *lock
| kernel/rcu/tree.c:4453:25:    got struct raw_spinlock [noderef] *<noident>

Also, this patch improves compiler.h a little bit by adding comments for
"#else" and "#endif".
Signed-off-by: NBoqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

In my randconfig tests, I came across a bug that involves several
components:

* gcc-4.9 through at least 5.3
* CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL enabling -fprofile-arcs for all files
* CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES overriding every if()
* The optimized implementation of do_div() that tries to
  replace a library call with an division by multiplication
* code in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.c doing

        u32 adc_clock = 450560; /* 45.056 MHz */
        if (state->config.adc_clock)
                adc_clock = state->config.adc_clock;
        do_div(value, adc_clock);

In this case, gcc fails to determine whether the divisor
in do_div() is __builtin_constant_p(). In particular, it
concludes that __builtin_constant_p(adc_clock) is false, while
__builtin_constant_p(!!adc_clock) is true.

That in turn throws off the logic in do_div() that also uses
__builtin_constant_p(), and instead of picking either the
constant- optimized division, and the code in ilog2() that uses
__builtin_constant_p() to figure out whether it knows the answer at
compile time. The result is a link error from failing to find
multiple symbols that should never have been called based on
the __builtin_constant_p():

dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `____ilog2_NaN'
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod'
ERROR: "____ilog2_NaN" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "__aeabi_uldivmod" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!

This patch avoids the problem by changing __trace_if() to check
whether the condition is known at compile-time to be nonzero, rather
than checking whether it is actually a constant.

I see this one link error in roughly one out of 1600 randconfig builds
on ARM, and the patch fixes all known instances.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455312410-1058841-1-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.deAcked-by: NNicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Fixes: ab3c9c68 ("branch tracer, intel-iommu: fix build with CONFIG_BRANCH_TRACER=y")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.30+
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The comment is out of data. Also point out the performance drawback
of the barrier();__builtin_memcpy(); barrier() followed by another
copy from stack (__u) to lvalue;
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453757600-11441-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
[ Made it a bit more readable. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Introduce smp_cond_acquire() which combines a control dependency and a
read barrier to form acquire semantics.

This primitive has two benefits:

 - it documents control dependencies,
 - its typically cheaper than using smp_load_acquire() in a loop.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

gcc 4.9 added the function attribute assume_aligned, indicating to the
caller that the returned pointer may be assumed to have a certain minimal
alignment.  This is useful if, for example, the return value is passed to
memset().  Add a shorthand macro for that.
Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This seems to be a mis-reading of how alpha memory ordering works, and
is not backed up by the alpha architecture manual.  The helper functions
don't do anything special on any other architectures, and the arguments
that support them being safe on other architectures also argue that they
are safe on alpha.

Basically, the "control dependency" is between a previous read and a
subsequent write that is dependent on the value read.  Even if the
subsequent write is actually done speculatively, there is no way that
such a speculative write could be made visible to other cpu's until it
has been committed, which requires validating the speculation.

Note that most weakely ordered architectures (very much including alpha)
do not guarantee any ordering relationship between two loads that depend
on each other on a control dependency:

    read A
    if (val == 1)
        read B

because the conditional may be predicted, and the "read B" may be
speculatively moved up to before reading the value A.  So we require the
user to insert a smp_rmb() between the two accesses to be correct:

    read A;
    if (A == 1)
        smp_rmb()
        read B

Alpha is further special in that it can break that ordering even if the
*address* of B depends on the read of A, because the cacheline that is
read later may be stale unless you have a memory barrier in between the
pointer read and the read of the value behind a pointer:

    read ptr
    read offset(ptr)

whereas all other weakly ordered architectures guarantee that the data
dependency (as opposed to just a control dependency) will order the two
accesses.  As a result, alpha needs a "smp_read_barrier_depends()" in
between those two reads for them to be ordered.

The coontrol dependency that "READ_ONCE_CTRL()" and "atomic_read_ctrl()"
had was a control dependency to a subsequent *write*, however, and
nobody can finalize such a subsequent write without having actually done
the read.  And were you to write such a value to a "stale" cacheline
(the way the unordered reads came to be), that would seem to lose the
write entirely.

So the things that make alpha able to re-order reads even more
aggressively than other weak architectures do not seem to be relevant
for a subsequent write.  Alpha memory ordering may be strange, but
there's no real indication that it is *that* strange.

Also, the alpha architecture reference manual very explicitly talks
about the definition of "Dependence Constraints" in section 5.6.1.7,
where a preceding read dominates a subsequent write.

Such a dependence constraint admittedly does not impose a BEFORE (alpha
architecture term for globally visible ordering), but it does guarantee
that there can be no "causal loop".  I don't see how you could avoid
such a loop if another cpu could see the stored value and then impact
the value of the first read.  Put another way: the read and the write
could not be seen as being out of order wrt other cpus.

So I do not see how these "x_ctrl()" functions can currently be necessary.

I may have to eat my words at some point, but in the absense of clear
proof that alpha actually needs this, or indeed even an explanation of
how alpha could _possibly_ need it, I do not believe these functions are
called for.

And if it turns out that alpha really _does_ need a barrier for this
case, that barrier still should not be "smp_read_barrier_depends()".
We'd have to make up some new speciality barrier just for alpha, along
with the documentation for why it really is necessary.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul E McKenney <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Some code may perform racy by design memory reads. This could be
harmless, yet such code may produce KASAN warnings.

To hide such accesses from KASAN this patch introduces
READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() macro. KASAN will not check the memory
accessed by READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(). The KernelThreadSanitizer
(KTSAN) is going to ignore it as well.

This patch creates __read_once_size_nocheck() a clone of
__read_once_size(). The only difference between them is
'no_sanitized_address' attribute appended to '*_nocheck'
function. This attribute tells the compiler that instrumentation
of memory accesses should not be applied to that function. We
declare it as static '__maybe_unsed' because GCC is not capable
to inline such function:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=67368

With KASAN=n READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() is just a clone of READ_ONCE().
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1445243838-17763-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

sparse does not understand the s390 specific hotpatch attribute and
floods the log with messages like
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:92:8: error: attribute 'hotpatch': unknown attribute

Let's just dont use it, if __CHECKER__ is defined.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

The kernel build bot showed a new warning triggered by commit:

  76695af2 ("locking, arch: use WRITE_ONCE()/READ_ONCE() in smp_store_release()/smp_load_acquire()")

because Sparse does not like WRITE_ONCE() accessing elements
from the (sparse) RCU address space:

  fs/afs/inode.c:448:9: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces)
  fs/afs/inode.c:448:9:    expected struct afs_permits *__val
  fs/afs/inode.c:448:9:    got void [noderef] <asn:4>*<noident>

Solution is to force cast away the sparse attributes for the initializer
of the union in WRITE_ONCE().

(And as this now gets too long, also split the macro into multiple lines.)
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1438674948-38310-2-git-send-email-borntraeger@de.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Move the definition of __pmem outside of CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER to fix:

drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c:198:17: sparse: too many arguments for function __builtin_expect
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c:36:33: sparse: expected ; at end of declaration
drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c:48:21: sparse: void declaration

...due to __pmem failing to be defined in some configurations when
CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER=y.
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

Based on an original patch by Ross Zwisler [1].

Writes to persistent memory have the potential to be posted to cpu
cache, cpu write buffers, and platform write buffers (memory controller)
before being committed to persistent media.  Provide apis,
memcpy_to_pmem(), wmb_pmem(), and memremap_pmem(), to write data to
pmem and assert that it is durable in PMEM (a persistent linear address
range).  A '__pmem' attribute is added so sparse can track proper usage
of pointers to pmem.

This continues the status quo of pmem being x86 only for 4.2, but
reworks to ioremap, and wider implementation of memremap() will enable
other archs in 4.3.

[1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2015-May/000932.html

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
[djbw: various reworks]
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

This mirrors the change introduced by 7d0ae808 of same title
in Linus' tree; it's not obvious as a merge resolution since we moved
the function.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

I want to use lockless_dereference() from seqlock.h, which would mean
including rcupdate.h from it, however rcupdate.h already includes
seqlock.h.

Avoid this by moving lockless_dereference() into compiler.h. This is
somewhat tricky since it uses smp_read_barrier_depends() which isn't
available there, but its a CPP macro so we can get away with it.

The alternative would be moving it into asm/barrier.h, but that would
be updating each arch (I can do if people feel that is more
appropriate).

Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

The current formulation of control dependencies fails on DEC Alpha,
which does not respect dependencies of any kind unless an explicit
memory barrier is provided.  This means that the current fomulation of
control dependencies fails on Alpha.  This commit therefore creates a
READ_ONCE_CTRL() that has the same overhead on non-Alpha systems, but
causes Alpha to produce the needed ordering.  This commit also applies
READ_ONCE_CTRL() to the one known use of control dependencies.

Use of READ_ONCE_CTRL() also has the beneficial effect of adding a bit
of self-documentation to control dependencies.
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>

Since we assume set_mb() to result in a single store followed by a
full memory barrier, employ WRITE_ONCE().
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Looks like commit :

 43239cbe ("kernel: Change ASSIGN_ONCE(val, x) to WRITE_ONCE(x, val)")

left behind a reference to ASSIGN_ONCE(). Update this to WRITE_ONCE().
Signed-off-by: NPreeti U Murthy <preeti@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150430115721.22278.94082.stgit@preeti.in.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

In commit 0b053c95 ("lib: memzero_explicit: use barrier instead
of OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR"), we made memzero_explicit() more robust in
case LTO would decide to inline memzero_explicit() and eventually
find out it could be elimiated as dead store.

While using barrier() works well for the case of gcc, recent efforts
from LLVMLinux people suggest to use llvm as an alternative to gcc,
and there, Stephan found in a simple stand-alone user space example
that llvm could nevertheless optimize and thus elimitate the memset().
A similar issue has been observed in the referenced llvm bug report,
which is regarded as not-a-bug.

Based on some experiments, icc is a bit special on its own, while it
doesn't seem to eliminate the memset(), it could do so with an own
implementation, and then result in similar findings as with llvm.

The fix in this patch now works for all three compilers (also tested
with more aggressive optimization levels). Arguably, in the current
kernel tree it's more of a theoretical issue, but imho, it's better
to be pedantic about it.

It's clearly visible with gcc/llvm though, with the below code: if we
would have used barrier() only here, llvm would have omitted clearing,
not so with barrier_data() variant:

  static inline void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
  {
    memset(s, 0, count);
    barrier_data(s);
  }

  int main(void)
  {
    char buff[20];
    memzero_explicit(buff, sizeof(buff));
    return 0;
  }

  $ gcc -O2 test.c
  $ gdb a.out
  (gdb) disassemble main
  Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x0000000000400400  <+0>: lea   -0x28(%rsp),%rax
   0x0000000000400405  <+5>: movq  $0x0,-0x28(%rsp)
   0x000000000040040e <+14>: movq  $0x0,-0x20(%rsp)
   0x0000000000400417 <+23>: movl  $0x0,-0x18(%rsp)
   0x000000000040041f <+31>: xor   %eax,%eax
   0x0000000000400421 <+33>: retq
  End of assembler dump.

  $ clang -O2 test.c
  $ gdb a.out
  (gdb) disassemble main
  Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x00000000004004f0  <+0>: xorps  %xmm0,%xmm0
   0x00000000004004f3  <+3>: movaps %xmm0,-0x18(%rsp)
   0x00000000004004f8  <+8>: movl   $0x0,-0x8(%rsp)
   0x0000000000400500 <+16>: lea    -0x18(%rsp),%rax
   0x0000000000400505 <+21>: xor    %eax,%eax
   0x0000000000400507 <+23>: retq
  End of assembler dump.

As gcc, clang, but also icc defines __GNUC__, it's sufficient to define
this in compiler-gcc.h only to be picked up. For a fallback or otherwise
unsupported compiler, we define it as a barrier. Similarly, for ecc which
does not support gcc inline asm.

Reference: https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=15495Reported-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Tested-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Cc: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The fact that volatile allows for atomic load/stores is a special case
not a requirement for {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(). Their primary purpose is to
force the compiler to emit load/stores _once_.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>