The trace_event benchmark thread runs in kernel space in an infinite loop
while also calling cond_resched() in case anything else wants to schedule
in. Unfortunately, on a PREEMPT kernel, that makes it a nop, in which case,
this will never voluntarily schedule. That will cause synchronize_rcu_tasks()
to forever block on this thread, while it is running.

This is exactly what cond_resched_rcu_qs() is for. Use that instead.
Acked-by: N"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

t_hash_start() does not increment *pos, where as t_next() must. But when
t_next() does increment *pos, it must still pass in the original *pos to
t_hash_start() otherwise it will skip the first instance:

 # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
 # echo schedule:traceoff > set_ftrace_filter
 # echo do_IRQ:traceoff > set_ftrace_filter
 # echo call_rcu > set_ftrace_filter
 # cat set_ftrace_filter
call_rcu
schedule:traceoff:unlimited
do_IRQ:traceoff:unlimited

The above called t_hash_start() from t_start() as there was only one
function (call_rcu), but if we add another function:

 # echo xfrm_policy_destroy_rcu >> set_ftrace_filter
 # cat set_ftrace_filter
call_rcu
xfrm_policy_destroy_rcu
do_IRQ:traceoff:unlimited

The "schedule:traceoff" disappears.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

When two function probes are added to set_ftrace_filter, and then one of
them is removed, the update to the function locations is not performed, and
the record keeping of the function states are corrupted, and causes an
ftrace_bug() to occur.

This is easily reproducable by adding two probes, removing one, and then
adding it back again.

 # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
 # echo schedule:traceoff > set_ftrace_filter
 # echo do_IRQ:traceoff > set_ftrace_filter
 # echo \!do_IRQ:traceoff > /debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
 # echo do_IRQ:traceoff > set_ftrace_filter

Causes:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1098 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2369 ftrace_get_addr_curr+0x143/0x220
 Modules linked in: [...]
 CPU: 2 PID: 1098 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.10.0-test+ #405
 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v02.05 05/07/2012
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x68/0x9f
  __warn+0x111/0x130
  ? trace_irq_work_interrupt+0xa0/0xa0
  warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20
  ftrace_get_addr_curr+0x143/0x220
  ? __fentry__+0x10/0x10
  ftrace_replace_code+0xe3/0x4f0
  ? ftrace_int3_handler+0x90/0x90
  ? printk+0x99/0xb5
  ? 0xffffffff81000000
  ftrace_modify_all_code+0x97/0x110
  arch_ftrace_update_code+0x10/0x20
  ftrace_run_update_code+0x1c/0x60
  ftrace_run_modify_code.isra.48.constprop.62+0x8e/0xd0
  register_ftrace_function_probe+0x4b6/0x590
  ? ftrace_startup+0x310/0x310
  ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled.part.4+0x1a/0x30
  ? update_stack_state+0x88/0x110
  ? ftrace_regex_write.isra.43.part.44+0x1d3/0x320
  ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xd0
  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x104/0x800
  ? ftrace_regex_write.isra.43.part.44+0x1d3/0x320
  ? __unwind_start+0x1c0/0x1c0
  ? _mutex_lock_nest_lock+0x800/0x800
  ftrace_trace_probe_callback.isra.3+0xc0/0x130
  ? func_set_flag+0xe0/0xe0
  ? __lock_acquire+0x642/0x1790
  ? __might_fault+0x1e/0x20
  ? trace_get_user+0x398/0x470
  ? strcmp+0x35/0x60
  ftrace_trace_onoff_callback+0x48/0x70
  ftrace_regex_write.isra.43.part.44+0x251/0x320
  ? match_records+0x420/0x420
  ftrace_filter_write+0x2b/0x30
  __vfs_write+0xd7/0x330
  ? do_loop_readv_writev+0x120/0x120
  ? locks_remove_posix+0x90/0x2f0
  ? do_lock_file_wait+0x160/0x160
  ? __lock_is_held+0x93/0x100
  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5c/0xb0
  ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xd0
  ? __sb_start_write+0x10a/0x230
  ? vfs_write+0x222/0x240
  vfs_write+0xef/0x240
  SyS_write+0xab/0x130
  ? SyS_read+0x130/0x130
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x182/0x280
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xad
 RIP: 0033:0x7fe61c157c30
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe87890258 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffff8114a410 RCX: 00007fe61c157c30
 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 000055814798f5e0 RDI: 0000000000000001
 RBP: ffff8800c9027f98 R08: 00007fe61c422740 R09: 00007fe61ca53700
 R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000558147a36400
 R13: 00007ffe8788f160 R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 00007ffe8788f15c
  ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xc0/0x110
 ---[ end trace 99fa09b3d9869c2c ]---
 Bad trampoline accounting at: ffffffff81cc3b00 (do_IRQ+0x0/0x150)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 59df055f ("ftrace: trace different functions with a different tracer")
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Tracing uses rcu_irq_enter() as a way to make sure that RCU is watching when
it needs to use rcu_read_lock() and friends. This is because tracing can
happen as RCU is about to enter user space, or about to go idle, and RCU
does not watch for RCU read side critical sections as it makes the
transition.

There is a small location within the RCU infrastructure that rcu_irq_enter()
itself will not work. If tracing were to occur in that section it will break
if it tries to use rcu_irq_enter().

Originally, this happens with the stack_tracer, because it will call
save_stack_trace when it encounters stack usage that is greater than any
stack usage it had encountered previously. There was a case where that
happened in the RCU section where rcu_irq_enter() did not work, and lockdep
complained loudly about it. To fix it, stack tracing added a call to be
disabled and RCU would disable stack tracing during the critical section
that rcu_irq_enter() was inoperable. This solution worked, but there are
other cases that use rcu_irq_enter() and it would be a good idea to let RCU
give a way to let others know that rcu_irq_enter() will not work. For
example, in trace events.

Another helpful aspect of this change is that it also moves the per cpu
variable called in the RCU critical section into a cache locale along with
other RCU per cpu variables used in that same location.

I'm keeping the stack_trace_disable() code, as that still could be used in
the future by places that really need to disable it. And since it's only a
static inline, it wont take up any kernel text if it is not used.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170405093207.404f8deb@gandalf.local.homeAcked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The tracing subsystem started using rcu_irq_entry() and rcu_irq_exit()
(with my blessing) to allow the current _rcuidle alternative tracepoint
name to be dispensed with while still maintaining good performance.
Unfortunately, this causes RCU's dyntick-idle entry code's tracing to
appear to RCU like an interrupt that occurs where RCU is not designed
to handle interrupts.

This commit fixes this problem by moving the zeroing of ->dynticks_nesting
after the offending trace_rcu_dyntick() statement, which narrows the
window of vulnerability to a pair of adjacent statements that are now
marked with comments to that effect.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170405093207.404f8deb@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170405193928.GM1600@linux.vnet.ibm.comReported-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

In order to eliminate a function call, make "trace_active" into
"disable_stack_tracer" and convert stack_tracer_disable() and friends into
static inline functions.
Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

There are certain parts of the kernel that cannot let stack tracing
proceed (namely in RCU), because the stack tracer uses RCU, and parts of RCU
internals cannot handle having RCU read side locks taken.

Add stack_tracer_disable() and stack_tracer_enable() functions to let RCU
stop stack tracing on the current CPU when it is in those critical sections.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The updates to the trace_active per cpu variable can be updated with the
__this_cpu_*() functions as it only gets updated on the CPU that the variable
is on.

Thanks to Paul McKenney for suggesting __this_cpu_* instead of this_cpu_*.
Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The function tracer needs to be more careful than other subsystems when it
comes to freeing data. Especially if that data is actually executable code.
When a single function is traced, a trampoline can be dynamically allocated
which is called to jump to the function trace callback. When the callback is
no longer needed, the dynamic allocated trampoline needs to be freed. This
is where the issues arise. The dynamically allocated trampoline must not be
used again. As function tracing can trace all subsystems, including
subsystems that are used to serialize aspects of freeing (namely RCU), it
must take extra care when doing the freeing.

Before synchronize_rcu_tasks() was around, there was no way for the function
tracer to know that nothing was using the dynamically allocated trampoline
when CONFIG_PREEMPT was enabled. That's because a task could be indefinitely
preempted while sitting on the trampoline. Now with synchronize_rcu_tasks(),
it will wait till all tasks have either voluntarily scheduled (not on the
trampoline) or goes into userspace (not on the trampoline). Then it is safe
to free the trampoline even with CONFIG_PREEMPT set.
Acked-by: N"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

When a kretprobe is installed on a kernel function, there is a maximum
limit of how many calls in parallel it can catch (aka "maxactive"). A
kernel module could call register_kretprobe() and initialize maxactive
(see example in samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c).

But that is not exposed to userspace and it is currently not possible to
choose maxactive when writing to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events

The default maxactive can be as low as 1 on single-core with a
non-preemptive kernel. This is too low and we need to increase it not
only for recursive functions, but for functions that sleep or resched.

This patch updates the format of the command that can be written to
kprobe_events so that maxactive can be optionally specified.

I need this for a bpf program attached to the kretprobe of
inet_csk_accept, which can sleep for a long time.

This patch includes a basic selftest:

> # ./ftracetest -v  test.d/kprobe/
> === Ftrace unit tests ===
> [1] Kprobe dynamic event - adding and removing	[PASS]
> [2] Kprobe dynamic event - busy event check	[PASS]
> [3] Kprobe dynamic event with arguments	[PASS]
> [4] Kprobes event arguments with types	[PASS]
> [5] Kprobe dynamic event with function tracer	[PASS]
> [6] Kretprobe dynamic event with arguments	[PASS]
> [7] Kretprobe dynamic event with maxactive	[PASS]
>
> # of passed:  7
> # of failed:  0
> # of unresolved:  0
> # of untested:  0
> # of unsupported:  0
> # of xfailed:  0
> # of undefined(test bug):  0

BugLink: https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/1072
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491215782-15490-1-git-send-email-alban@kinvolk.ioAcked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Relying on free_reserved_area() to call ftrace to free init memory proved to
not be sufficient. The issue is that on x86, when debug_pagealloc is
enabled, the init memory is not freed, but simply set as not present. Since
ftrace was uninformed of this, starting function tracing still tries to
update pages that are not present according to the page tables, causing
ftrace to bug, as well as killing the kernel itself.

Instead of relying on free_reserved_area(), have init/main.c call ftrace
directly just before it frees the init memory. Then it needs to use
__init_begin and __init_end to know where the init memory location is.
Looking at all archs (and testing what I can), it appears that this should
work for each of them.
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

I noticed that if I use dd to read the set_ftrace_filter file that the first
hash command is repeated.

 # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
 # echo schedule > set_ftrace_filter
 # echo do_IRQ >> set_ftrace_filter
 # echo schedule:traceoff >> set_ftrace_filter
 # echo do_IRQ:traceoff >> set_ftrace_filter

 # cat set_ftrace_filter
 schedule
 do_IRQ
 schedule:traceoff:unlimited
 do_IRQ:traceoff:unlimited

 # dd if=set_ftrace_filter bs=1
 schedule
 do_IRQ
 schedule:traceoff:unlimited
 schedule:traceoff:unlimited
 do_IRQ:traceoff:unlimited
 98+0 records in
 98+0 records out
 98 bytes copied, 0.00265011 s, 37.0 kB/s

This is due to the way t_start() calls t_next() as well as the seq_file
calls t_next() and the state is slightly different between the two. Namely,
t_start() will call t_next() with a local "pos" variable.

By separating out the function listing from t_next() into its own function,
we can have better control of outputting the functions and the hash of
triggers. This simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

If all functions are enabled, there's a comment displayed in the file to
denote that:

  # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
  # cat set_ftrace_filter
 #### all functions enabled ####

If a function trigger is set, those are displayed as well:

  # echo schedule:traceoff >> /debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
  # cat set_ftrace_filter
 #### all functions enabled ####
 schedule:traceoff:unlimited

But if you read that file with dd, the output can change:

  # dd if=/debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter bs=1
 #### all functions enabled ####
 32+0 records in
 32+0 records out
 32 bytes copied, 7.0237e-05 s, 456 kB/s

This is because the "pos" variable is updated for the comment, but func_pos
is not. "func_pos" is used by the triggers (or hashes) to know how many
functions were printed and it bases its index from the pos - func_pos.
func_pos should be 1 to count for the comment printed. But since it is not,
t_hash_start() thinks that one trigger was already printed.

The cat gets to t_hash_start() via t_next() and not t_start() which updates
both pos and func_pos.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The loop in t_start() of calling t_next() will call t_hash_start() if the
pos is beyond the functions and enters the hash items. There's no reason to
check if p is NULL and call t_hash_start(), as that would be redundant.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Instead of testing if the hash to use is the filter_hash or the notrace_hash
at each iteration, do the test at open, and set the iter->hash to point to
the corresponding filter or notrace hash. Then use that directly instead of
testing which hash needs to be used each iteration.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The return status check of __seq_open_private() is rather strange:

	iter = __seq_open_private();
	if (iter) {
		/* do stuff */
	}

	return iter ? 0 : -ENOMEM;

It makes much more sense to do the return of failure right away:

	iter = __seq_open_private();
	if (!iter)
		return -ENOMEM;

	/* do stuff */

	return 0;

This clean up will make updates to this code a bit nicer.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Currently trace_handle_return() looks like this:

 static inline enum print_line_t trace_handle_return(struct trace_seq *s)
 {
        return trace_seq_has_overflowed(s) ?
                TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE : TRACE_TYPE_HANDLED;
 }

Where trace_seq_overflowed(s) is:

 static inline bool trace_seq_has_overflowed(struct trace_seq *s)
 {
	return s->full || seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s->seq);
 }

And seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s->seq) is:

 static inline bool
 seq_buf_has_overflowed(struct seq_buf *s)
 {
	return s->len > s->size;
 }

Making trace_handle_return() into:

 return (s->full || (s->seq->len > s->seq->size)) ?
           TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE :
           TRACE_TYPE_HANDLED;

One would think this is not an issue to keep as an inline. But because this
is used in the TRACE_EVENT() macro, it is extended for every tracepoint in
the system. Taking a look at a single tracepoint x86_irq_vector (was the
first one I randomly chosen). As trace_handle_return is used in the
TRACE_EVENT() macro of trace_raw_output_##call() we disassemble
trace_raw_output_x86_irq_vector and do a diff:

- is the original
+ is the out-of-line code

I removed identical lines that were different just due to different
addresses.

--- /tmp/irq-vec-orig	2017-03-16 09:12:48.569384851 -0400
+++ /tmp/irq-vec-ool	2017-03-16 09:13:39.378153385 -0400
@@ -6,27 +6,23 @@
        53                      push   %rbx
        48 89 fb                mov    %rdi,%rbx
        4c 8b a7 c0 20 00 00    mov    0x20c0(%rdi),%r12
        e8 f7 72 13 00          callq  ffffffff81155c80 <trace_raw_output_prep>
        83 f8 01                cmp    $0x1,%eax
        74 05                   je     ffffffff8101e993 <trace_raw_output_x86_irq_vector+0x23>
        5b                      pop    %rbx
        41 5c                   pop    %r12
        5d                      pop    %rbp
        c3                      retq
        41 8b 54 24 08          mov    0x8(%r12),%edx
-       48 8d bb 98 10 00 00    lea    0x1098(%rbx),%rdi
+       48 81 c3 98 10 00 00    add    $0x1098,%rbx
-       48 c7 c6 7b 8a a0 81    mov    $0xffffffff81a08a7b,%rsi
+       48 c7 c6 ab 8a a0 81    mov    $0xffffffff81a08aab,%rsi
-       e8 c5 85 13 00          callq  ffffffff81156f70 <trace_seq_printf>

 === here's the start of the main difference ===

+       48 89 df                mov    %rbx,%rdi
+       e8 62 7e 13 00          callq  ffffffff81156810 <trace_seq_printf>
-       8b 93 b8 20 00 00       mov    0x20b8(%rbx),%edx
-       31 c0                   xor    %eax,%eax
-       85 d2                   test   %edx,%edx
-       75 11                   jne    ffffffff8101e9c8 <trace_raw_output_x86_irq_vector+0x58>
-       48 8b 83 a8 20 00 00    mov    0x20a8(%rbx),%rax
-       48 39 83 a0 20 00 00    cmp    %rax,0x20a0(%rbx)
-       0f 93 c0                setae  %al
+       48 89 df                mov    %rbx,%rdi
+       e8 4a c5 12 00          callq  ffffffff8114af00 <trace_handle_return>
        5b                      pop    %rbx
-       0f b6 c0                movzbl %al,%eax

 === end ===

        41 5c                   pop    %r12
        5d                      pop    %rbp
        c3                      retq

If you notice, the original has 22 bytes of text more than the out of line
version. As this is for every TRACE_EVENT() defined in the system, this can
become quite large.

   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
8690305	5450490	1298432	15439227	 eb957b	vmlinux-orig
8681725	5450490	1298432	15430647	 eb73f7	vmlinux-handle

This change has a total of 8580 bytes in savings.

 $ objdump -dr /tmp/vmlinux-orig | grep '^[0-9a-f]* <trace_raw_output' | wc -l
324

That's 324 tracepoints. But this does not include modules (which contain
many more tracepoints). For an allyesconfig build:

 $ objdump -dr vmlinux-allyes-orig | grep '^[0-9a-f]* <trace_raw_output' | wc -l
1401

That's 1401 tracepoints giving us:

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
137920629       140221067       53264384        331406080       13c0db00 vmlinux-allyes-orig
137827709       140221067       53264384        331313160       13bf7008 vmlinux-allyes-handle

92920 bytes in savings!!!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170315021431.13107-2-andi@firstfloor.orgReported-by: NAndi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Adding a hook into free_reserve_area() that informs ftrace that boot up init
text is being free, lets ftrace safely remove those init functions from its
records, which keeps ftrace from trying to modify text that no longer
exists.

Note, this still does not allow for tracing .init text of modules, as
modules require different work for freeing its init code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488502497.7212.24.camel@linux.intel.com

Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Requested-by: NTodd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Register the function tracer right after the tracing buffers are initialized
in early boot up. This will allow function tracing to begin early if it is
enabled via the kernel command line.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

As tracing can now be enabled very early in boot up, even before some
critical system services (like scheduling), do not run the tracer selftests
until after early_initcall() is performed. If a tracer is registered before
such time, it is saved off in a list and the test is run when the system is
able to handle more diverse functions.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Create an early_trace_init() function that will initialize the buffers and
allow for ealier use of trace_printk(). This will also allow for future work
to have function tracing start earlier at boot up.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Commit bfc8c901 ("mem-hotplug: implement get/put_online_mems")
introduced new functions get/put_online_mems() and mem_hotplug_begin/end()
in order to allow similar semantics for memory hotplug like for cpu
hotplug.

The corresponding functions for cpu hotplug are get/put_online_cpus()
and cpu_hotplug_begin/done() for cpu hotplug.

The commit however missed to introduce functions that would serialize
memory hotplug operations like they are done for cpu hotplug with
cpu_maps_update_begin/done().

This basically leaves mem_hotplug.active_writer unprotected and allows
concurrent writers to modify it, which may lead to problems as outlined
by commit f931ab47 ("mm: fix devm_memremap_pages crash, use
mem_hotplug_{begin, done}").

That commit was extended again with commit b5d24fda ("mm,
devm_memremap_pages: hold device_hotplug lock over mem_hotplug_{begin,
done}") which serializes memory hotplug operations for some call sites
by using the device_hotplug lock.

In addition with commit 3fc21924 ("mm: validate device_hotplug is held
for memory hotplug") a sanity check was added to mem_hotplug_begin() to
verify that the device_hotplug lock is held.

This in turn triggers the following warning on s390:

WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1 at drivers/base/core.c:643 assert_held_device_hotplug+0x4a/0x58
 Call Trace:
  assert_held_device_hotplug+0x40/0x58)
  mem_hotplug_begin+0x34/0xc8
  add_memory_resource+0x7e/0x1f8
  add_memory+0xda/0x130
  add_memory_merged+0x15c/0x178
  sclp_detect_standby_memory+0x2ae/0x2f8
  do_one_initcall+0xa2/0x150
  kernel_init_freeable+0x228/0x2d8
  kernel_init+0x2a/0x140
  kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc

One possible fix would be to add more lock_device_hotplug() and
unlock_device_hotplug() calls around each call site of
mem_hotplug_begin/end().  But that would give the device_hotplug lock
additional semantics it better should not have (serialize memory hotplug
operations).

Instead add a new memory_add_remove_lock which has the similar semantics
like cpu_add_remove_lock for cpu hotplug.

To keep things hopefully a bit easier the lock will be locked and unlocked
within the mem_hotplug_begin/end() functions.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314125226.16779-2-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Reported-by: NSebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

While going through the event inheritance code Oleg got confused.

Add some comments to better explain the silent dissapearance of
orphaned events.

So what happens is that at perf_event_release_kernel() time; when an
event looses its connection to userspace (and ceases to exist from the
user's perspective) we can still have an arbitrary amount of inherited
copies of the event. We want to synchronously find and remove all
these child events.

Since that requires a bit of lock juggling, there is the possibility
that concurrent clone()s will create new child events. Therefore we
first mark the parent event as DEAD, which marks all the extant child
events as orphaned.

We then avoid copying orphaned events; in order to avoid getting more
of them.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.289567442@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We have ctx->event_list that contains all events; no need to
repeatedly iterate the group lists to find them all.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.239678244@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

While hunting for clues to a use-after-free, Oleg spotted that
perf_event_init_context() can loose an error value with the result
that fork() can succeed even though we did not fully inherit the perf
event context.
Spotted-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 889ff015 ("perf/core: Split context's event group list into pinned and non-pinned lists")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.190342547@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Dmitry reported syzcaller tripped a use-after-free in perf_release().

After much puzzlement Oleg spotted the below scenario:

  Task1                           Task2

  fork()
    perf_event_init_task()
    /* ... */
    goto bad_fork_$foo;
    /* ... */
    perf_event_free_task()
      mutex_lock(ctx->lock)
      perf_free_event(B)

                                  perf_event_release_kernel(A)
                                    mutex_lock(A->child_mutex)
                                    list_for_each_entry(child, ...) {
                                      /* child == B */
                                      ctx = B->ctx;
                                      get_ctx(ctx);
                                      mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex);

        mutex_lock(A->child_mutex)
        list_del_init(B->child_list)
        mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex)

        /* ... */

      mutex_unlock(ctx->lock);
      put_ctx() /* >0 */
    free_task();
                                      mutex_lock(ctx->lock);
                                      mutex_lock(A->child_mutex);
                                      /* ... */
                                      mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex);
                                      mutex_unlock(ctx->lock)
                                      put_ctx() /* 0 */
                                        ctx->task && !TOMBSTONE
                                          put_task_struct() /* UAF */

This patch closes the hole by making perf_event_free_task() destroy the
task <-> ctx relation such that perf_event_release_kernel() will no longer
observe the now dead task.
Spotted-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c6e5b732 ("perf: Synchronously clean up child events")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314155949.GE32474@worktop
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.140295131@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

I was testing Daniel's changes with his test case, and tweaked it a
little. Instead of having the runtime equal to the deadline, I
increased the deadline ten fold.

Daniel's test case had:

	attr.sched_runtime  = 2 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 2 ms */
	attr.sched_deadline = 2 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 2 ms */
	attr.sched_period   = 2 * 1000 * 1000 * 1000;	/* 2 s */

To make it more interesting, I changed it to:

	attr.sched_runtime  =  2 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 2 ms */
	attr.sched_deadline = 20 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 20 ms */
	attr.sched_period   =  2 * 1000 * 1000 * 1000;	/* 2 s */

The results were rather surprising. The behavior that Daniel's patch
was fixing came back. The task started using much more than .1% of the
CPU. More like 20%.

Looking into this I found that it was due to the dl_entity_overflow()
constantly returning true. That's because it uses the relative period
against relative runtime vs the absolute deadline against absolute
runtime.

  runtime / (deadline - t) > dl_runtime / dl_period

There's even a comment mentioning this, and saying that when relative
deadline equals relative period, that the equation is the same as using
deadline instead of period. That comment is backwards! What we really
want is:

  runtime / (deadline - t) > dl_runtime / dl_deadline

We care about if the runtime can make its deadline, not its period. And
then we can say "when the deadline equals the period, the equation is
the same as using dl_period instead of dl_deadline".

After correcting this, now when the task gets enqueued, it can throttle
correctly, and Daniel's fix to the throttling of sleeping deadline
tasks works even when the runtime and deadline are not the same.
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luca Abeni <luca.abeni@santannapisa.it>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira <romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta <tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02135a27f1ae3fe5fd032568a5a2f370e190e8d7.1488392936.git.bristot@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

During the activation, CBS checks if it can reuse the current task's
runtime and period. If the deadline of the task is in the past, CBS
cannot use the runtime, and so it replenishes the task. This rule
works fine for implicit deadline tasks (deadline == period), and the
CBS was designed for implicit deadline tasks. However, a task with
constrained deadline (deadine < period) might be awakened after the
deadline, but before the next period. In this case, replenishing the
task would allow it to run for runtime / deadline. As in this case
deadline < period, CBS enables a task to run for more than the
runtime / period. In a very loaded system, this can cause a domino
effect, making other tasks miss their deadlines.

To avoid this problem, in the activation of a constrained deadline
task after the deadline but before the next period, throttle the
task and set the replenishing timer to the begin of the next period,
unless it is boosted.

Reproducer:

 --------------- %< ---------------
  int main (int argc, char **argv)
  {
	int ret;
	int flags = 0;
	unsigned long l = 0;
	struct timespec ts;
	struct sched_attr attr;

	memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
	attr.size = sizeof(attr);

	attr.sched_policy   = SCHED_DEADLINE;
	attr.sched_runtime  = 2 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 2 ms */
	attr.sched_deadline = 2 * 1000 * 1000;		/* 2 ms */
	attr.sched_period   = 2 * 1000 * 1000 * 1000;	/* 2 s */

	ts.tv_sec = 0;
	ts.tv_nsec = 2000 * 1000;			/* 2 ms */

	ret = sched_setattr(0, &attr, flags);

	if (ret < 0) {
		perror("sched_setattr");
		exit(-1);
	}

	for(;;) {
		/* XXX: you may need to adjust the loop */
		for (l = 0; l < 150000; l++);
		/*
		 * The ideia is to go to sleep right before the deadline
		 * and then wake up before the next period to receive
		 * a new replenishment.
		 */
		nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
	}

	exit(0);
  }
  --------------- >% ---------------

On my box, this reproducer uses almost 50% of the CPU time, which is
obviously wrong for a task with 2/2000 reservation.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luca Abeni <luca.abeni@santannapisa.it>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira <romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta <tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/edf58354e01db46bf42df8d2dd32418833f68c89.1488392936.git.bristot@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Currently, the replenishment timer is set to fire at the deadline
of a task. Although that works for implicit deadline tasks because the
deadline is equals to the begin of the next period, that is not correct
for constrained deadline tasks (deadline < period).

For instance:

f.c:
 --------------- %< ---------------
int main (void)
{
	for(;;);
}
 --------------- >% ---------------

  # gcc -o f f.c

  # trace-cmd record -e sched:sched_switch                              \
				   -e syscalls:sys_exit_sched_setattr   \
   chrt -d --sched-runtime  490000000					\
           --sched-deadline 500000000					\
	   --sched-period  1000000000 0 ./f

  # trace-cmd report | grep "{pid of ./f}"

After setting parameters, the task is replenished and continue running
until being throttled:

         f-11295 [003] 13322.113776: sys_exit_sched_setattr: 0x0

The task is throttled after running 492318 ms, as expected:

         f-11295 [003] 13322.606094: sched_switch:   f:11295 [-1] R ==> watchdog/3:32 [0]

But then, the task is replenished 500719 ms after the first
replenishment:

    <idle>-0     [003] 13322.614495: sched_switch:   swapper/3:0 [120] R ==> f:11295 [-1]

Running for 490277 ms:

         f-11295 [003] 13323.104772: sched_switch:   f:11295 [-1] R ==>  swapper/3:0 [120]

Hence, in the first period, the task runs 2 * runtime, and that is a bug.

During the first replenishment, the next deadline is set one period away.
So the runtime / period starts to be respected. However, as the second
replenishment took place in the wrong instant, the next replenishment
will also be held in a wrong instant of time. Rather than occurring in
the nth period away from the first activation, it is taking place
in the (nth period - relative deadline).
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NLuca Abeni <luca.abeni@santannapisa.it>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: NJuri Lelli <juri.lelli@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira <romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta <tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac50d89887c25285b47465638354b63362f8adff.1488392936.git.bristot@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We hang if SIGKILL has been sent, but the task is stuck in down_read()
(after do_exit()), even though no task is doing down_write() on the
rwsem in question:

  INFO: task libupnp:21868 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
  libupnp         D    0 21868      1 0x08100008
  ...
  Call Trace:
  __schedule()
  schedule()
  __down_read()
  do_exit()
  do_group_exit()
  __wake_up_parent()

This bug has already been fixed for CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM=y in
the following commit:

 04cafed7 ("locking/rwsem: Fix down_write_killable()")

... however, this bug also exists for CONFIG_RWSEM_GENERIC_SPINLOCK=y.
Signed-off-by: NNiklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Niklas Cassel <niklass@axis.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: d4799608 ("locking/rwsem: Introduce basis for down_write_killable()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487981873-12649-1-git-send-email-niklass@axis.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

'calc_load_update' is accessed without any kind of locking and there's
a clear assumption in the code that only a single value is read or
written.

Make this explicit by using READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE(), and avoid
unintentionally seeing multiple values, or having the load/stores
split.

Technically the loads in calc_global_*() don't require this since
those are the only functions that update 'calc_load_update', but I've
added the READ_ONCE() for consistency.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Morten Rasmussen <morten.rasmussen@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217120731.11868-3-matt@codeblueprint.co.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

If we crossed a sample window while in NO_HZ we will add LOAD_FREQ to
the pending sample window time on exit, setting the next update not
one window into the future, but two.

This situation on exiting NO_HZ is described by:

  this_rq->calc_load_update < jiffies < calc_load_update

In this scenario, what we should be doing is:

  this_rq->calc_load_update = calc_load_update		     [ next window ]

But what we actually do is:

  this_rq->calc_load_update = calc_load_update + LOAD_FREQ   [ next+1 window ]

This has the effect of delaying load average updates for potentially
up to ~9seconds.

This can result in huge spikes in the load average values due to
per-cpu uninterruptible task counts being out of sync when accumulated
across all CPUs.

It's safe to update the per-cpu active count if we wake between sample
windows because any load that we left in 'calc_load_idle' will have
been zero'd when the idle load was folded in calc_global_load().

This issue is easy to reproduce before,

  commit 9d89c257 ("sched/fair: Rewrite runnable load and utilization average tracking")

just by forking short-lived process pipelines built from ps(1) and
grep(1) in a loop. I'm unable to reproduce the spikes after that
commit, but the bug still seems to be present from code review.
Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Morten Rasmussen <morten.rasmussen@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Fixes: commit 5167e8d5 ("sched/nohz: Rewrite and fix load-avg computation -- again")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217120731.11868-2-matt@codeblueprint.co.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The following warning can be triggered by hot-unplugging the CPU
on which an active SCHED_DEADLINE task is running on:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/sched.h:833 replenish_dl_entity+0x71e/0xc40
 rq->clock_update_flags < RQCF_ACT_SKIP
 CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Tainted: G    B           4.11.0-rc1+ #24
 Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
  __warn+0x172/0x1b0
  warn_slowpath_fmt+0xb4/0xf0
  ? __warn+0x1b0/0x1b0
  ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x2c0/0x2c0
  ? cpudl_set+0x3d/0x2b0
  replenish_dl_entity+0x71e/0xc40
  enqueue_task_dl+0x2ea/0x12e0
  ? dl_task_timer+0x777/0x990
  ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x270/0xa50
  dl_task_timer+0x316/0x990
  ? enqueue_task_dl+0x12e0/0x12e0
  ? enqueue_task_dl+0x12e0/0x12e0
  __hrtimer_run_queues+0x270/0xa50
  ? hrtimer_cancel+0x20/0x20
  ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x119/0x600
  hrtimer_interrupt+0x19c/0x600
  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
  local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x74/0xe0
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0
  apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0

The DL task will be migrated to a suitable later deadline rq once the DL
timer fires and currnet rq is offline. The rq clock of the new rq should
be updated. This patch fixes it by updating the rq clock after holding
the new rq's rq lock.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488865888-15894-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Thomas spotted that fixup_pi_state_owner() can return errors and we
fail to unlock the rt_mutex in that case.
Reported-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.867401760@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

While working on the futex code, I stumbled over this potential
use-after-free scenario. Dmitry triggered it later with syzkaller.

pi_mutex is a pointer into pi_state, which we drop the reference on in
unqueue_me_pi(). So any access to that pointer after that is bad.

Since other sites already do rt_mutex_unlock() with hb->lock held, see
for example futex_lock_pi(), simply move the unlock before
unqueue_me_pi().
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.801744246@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The setup/remove_state/instance() functions in the hotplug core code are
serialized against concurrent CPU hotplug, but unfortunately not serialized
against themself.

As a consequence a concurrent invocation of these function results in
corruption of the callback machinery because two instances try to invoke
callbacks on remote cpus at the same time. This results in missing callback
invocations and initiator threads waiting forever on the completion.

The obvious solution to replace get_cpu_online() with cpu_hotplug_begin()
is not possible because at least one callsite calls into these functions
from a get_online_cpu() locked region.

Extend the protection scope of the cpuhp_state_mutex from solely protecting
the state arrays to cover the callback invocation machinery as well.

Fixes: 5b7aa87e ("cpu/hotplug: Implement setup/removal interface")
Reported-and-tested-by: NBart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314150645.g4tdyoszlcbajmna@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The purgatory code defines global variables which are referenced via a
symbol lookup in the kexec code (core and arch).

A recent commit addressing sparse warnings made these static and thereby
broke kexec_file.

Why did this happen? Simply because the whole machinery is undocumented and
lacks any form of forward declarations. The variable names are unspecific
and lack a prefix, so adding forward declarations creates shadow variables
in the core code. Aside of that the code relies on magic constants and
duplicate struct definitions with no way to ensure that these things stay
in sync. The section placement of the purgatory variables happened by
chance and not by design.

Unbreak kexec and cleanup the mess:

 - Add proper forward declarations and document the usage
 - Use common struct definition
 - Use the proper common defines instead of magic constants
 - Add a purgatory_ prefix to have a proper name space
 - Use ARRAY_SIZE() instead of a homebrewn reimplementation
 - Add proper sections to the purgatory variables [ From Mike ]

Fixes: 72042a8c ("x86/purgatory: Make functions and variables static")
Reported-by: NMike Galbraith <&lt;efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <der.herr@hofr.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1703101315140.3681@nanosSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Patch series "userfaultfd non-cooperative further update for 4.11 merge
window".

Unfortunately I noticed one relevant bug in userfaultfd_exit while doing
more testing.  I've been doing testing before and this was also tested
by kbuild bot and exercised by the selftest, but this bug never
reproduced before.

I dropped userfaultfd_exit as result.  I dropped it because of
implementation difficulty in receiving signals in __mmput and because I
think -ENOSPC as result from the background UFFDIO_COPY should be enough
already.

Before I decided to remove userfaultfd_exit, I noticed userfaultfd_exit
wasn't exercised by the selftest and when I tried to exercise it, after
moving it to a more correct place in __mmput where it would make more
sense and where the vma list is stable, it resulted in the
event_wait_completion in D state.  So then I added the second patch to
be sure even if we call userfaultfd_event_wait_completion too late
during task exit(), we won't risk to generate tasks in D state.  The
same check exists in handle_userfault() for the same reason, except it
makes a difference there, while here is just a robustness check and it's
run under WARN_ON_ONCE.

While looking at the userfaultfd_event_wait_completion() function I
looked back at its callers too while at it and I think it's not ok to
stop executing dup_fctx on the fcs list because we relay on
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to execute
userfaultfd_ctx_put(fctx->orig) which is paired against
userfaultfd_ctx_get(fctx->orig) in dup_userfault just before
list_add(fcs).  This change only takes care of fctx->orig but this area
also needs further review looking for similar problems in fctx->new.

The only patch that is urgent is the first because it's an use after
free during a SMP race condition that affects all processes if
CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=y.  Very hard to reproduce though and probably
impossible without SLUB poisoning enabled.

This patch (of 3):

I once reproduced this oops with the userfaultfd selftest, it's not
easily reproducible and it requires SLUB poisoning to reproduce.

    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 2 PID: 18421 Comm: userfaultfd Tainted: G               ------------ T 3.10.0+ #15
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8801f83b9440 ti: ffff8801f833c000 task.ti: ffff8801f833c000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81451299>]  [<ffffffff81451299>] userfaultfd_exit+0x29/0xa0
    RSP: 0018:ffff8801f833fe80  EFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: ffff8801f833ffd8 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff8801f83b9440
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800baf18600
    RBP: ffff8801f833fee8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8127ceb3 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff8800baf186b0 R14: ffff8801f83b99f8 R15: 00007faed746c700
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88023fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007faf0966f028 CR3: 0000000001bc6000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
      do_exit+0x297/0xd10
      SyS_exit+0x17/0x20
      tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
    Code: 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 83 ec 58 48 8b 1f 48 85 db 75 11 eb 73 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 5b 10 48 85 db 74 64 <4c> 8b a3 b8 00 00 00 4d 85 e4 74 eb 41 f6 84 24 2c 01 00 00 80
    RIP  [<ffffffff81451299>] userfaultfd_exit+0x29/0xa0
     RSP <ffff8801f833fe80>
    ---[ end trace 9fecd6dcb442846a ]---

In the debugger I located the "mm" pointer in the stack and walking
mm->mmap->vm_next through the end shows the vma->vm_next list is fully
consistent and it is null terminated list as expected.  So this has to
be an SMP race condition where userfaultfd_exit was running while the
vma list was being modified by another CPU.

When userfaultfd_exit() run one of the ->vm_next pointers pointed to
SLAB_POISON (RBX is the vma pointer and is 0x6b6b..).

The reason is that it's not running in __mmput but while there are still
other threads running and it's not holding the mmap_sem (it can't as it
has to wait the even to be received by the manager).  So this is an use
after free that was happening for all processes.

One more implementation problem aside from the race condition:
userfaultfd_exit has really to check a flag in mm->flags before walking
the vma or it's going to slowdown the exit() path for regular tasks.

One more implementation problem: at that point signals can't be
delivered so it would also create a task in D state if the manager
doesn't read the event.

The major design issue: it overall looks superfluous as the manager can
check for -ENOSPC in the background transfer:

	if (mmget_not_zero(ctx->mm)) {
[..]
	} else {
		return -ENOSPC;
	}

It's safer to roll it back and re-introduce it later if at all.

[rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com: documentation fixup after removal of UFFD_EVENT_EXIT]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488345437-4364-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170224181957.19736-2-aarcange@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:

  overide||override

While we are here, fix the doubled "address" in the touched line
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/ti-abb-regulator.txt.

Also, fix the comment block style in the touched hunks in
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/drx39xyj/drx_driver.h.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-21-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:

  disble||disable
  disbled||disabled

I kept the TSL2563_INT_DISBLED in /drivers/iio/light/tsl2563.c
untouched.  The macro is not referenced at all, but this commit is
touching only comment blocks just in case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-20-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>