- 16 1月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
I regularly get 50 MB - 60 MB files during kernel randconfig builds. These large files mostly contain (many repeats of; e.g., 124,594): In file included from ../include/linux/string.h:6:0, from ../include/linux/uuid.h:20, from ../include/linux/mod_devicetable.h:13, from ../scripts/mod/devicetable-offsets.c:3: ../include/linux/compiler.h:64:4: warning: '______f' is static but declared in inline function 'strcpy' which is not static [enabled by default] ______f = { \ ^ ../include/linux/compiler.h:56:23: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if' ^ ../include/linux/string.h:425:2: note: in expansion of macro 'if' if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) ^ This only happens when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES=y, so prevent PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES if FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9199446b-a141-c0c3-9678-a3f9107f2750@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
Commit 1a149d7d ("ring-buffer: Rewrite trace_recursive_(un)lock() to be simpler") replaced the context level recursion checks with a simple counter. This would prevent the ring buffer code from recursively calling itself more than the max number of contexts that exist (Normal, softirq, irq, nmi). But this change caused a lockup in a specific case, which was during suspend and resume using a global clock. Adding a stack dump to see where this occurred, the issue was in the trace global clock itself: trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x1c/0x50 __trace_graph_entry+0x2d/0x90 trace_graph_entry+0xe8/0x200 prepare_ftrace_return+0x69/0xc0 ftrace_graph_caller+0x78/0xa8 queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x5/0x1d0 trace_clock_global+0xb0/0xc0 ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0xf9/0x390 The function graph tracer traced queued_spin_lock_slowpath that was called by trace_clock_global. This pointed out that the trace_clock_global() is not reentrant, as it takes a spin lock. It depended on the ring buffer recursive lock from letting that happen. By removing the context detection and adding just a max number of allowable recursions, it allowed the trace_clock_global() to be entered again and try to retake the spinlock it already held, causing a deadlock. Fixes: 1a149d7d ("ring-buffer: Rewrite trace_recursive_(un)lock() to be simpler") Reported-by: NDavid Weinehall <david.weinehall@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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- 15 1月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
When the timer base is checked for expired timers then the deferrable base must be checked as well. This was missed when making the deferrable base independent of base::nohz_active. Fixes: ced6d5c1 ("timers: Use deferrable base independent of base::nohz_active") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: rt@linutronix.de
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由 Li Jinyue 提交于
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18 signed integer overflow: 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int' Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue. Signed-off-by: NLi Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario: waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter) futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2, timeout=[N ms]) futex_wait_requeue_pi() futex_wait_queue_me() freezable_schedule() <scheduled out> futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2, 1, 0) /* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */ futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2) wake_futex_pi() cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter) wake_up_q() <woken by waker> <hrtimer_wakeup() fires, clears sleeper->task> futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */ rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer) <preempted> <scheduled in> rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() __rt_mutex_slowlock() try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */ if (timeout && !timeout->task) return -ETIMEDOUT; fixup_owner() /* lock wasn't acquired, so, fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */ return -ETIMEDOUT; /* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the * futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has * stealer as the owner */ futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2) -> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner. And suggested that what commit: 73d786bd ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state") removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like commit: 16ffa12d ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock") changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence: - if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) { - locked = 1; - goto out; - } - raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); - owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex); - if (!owner) - owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex); - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); - ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner); already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look at next_owner. So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks. Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once we have the wait_lock. Fixes: 73d786bd ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state") Reported-by: NJulia Cartwright <julia@ni.com> Reported-by: NGratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NJulia Cartwright <julia@ni.com> Tested-by: NGratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
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- 14 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
Depending on configuration mem_section can now be an array or a pointer to an array allocated dynamically. In most cases, we can continue to refer to it as 'mem_section' regardless of what it is. But there's one exception: '&mem_section' means "address of the array" if mem_section is an array, but if mem_section is a pointer, it would mean "address of the pointer". We've stepped onto this in kdump code. VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section) writes down address of pointer into vmcoreinfo, not array as we wanted. Let's introduce VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY() that would handle the situation correctly for both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180112162532.35896-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 83e3c487 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y") Acked-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 11 1月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns, and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots. However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case. Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used, since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable. This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers. Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning in BPF interpreter: 0: (18) r0 = 0x0 2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0 3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0 4: (95) exit Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X} generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time being. Fixes: 17a52670 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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由 Colin Ian King 提交于
Trivial fix to spelling mistake in error message text. Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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- 10 1月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于
smp_call_function_many() requires disabling preemption around the call. Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Cc: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maged Michael <maged.michael@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215192310.25293-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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- 09 1月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于
Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus, memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel. To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area. Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries are not rounded to power of 2 for root user. When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes the same 'index & index_mask' operation. If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index); with if (index >= max_entries) { index &= map->index_mask; bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index); } (along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation. There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary. Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array) cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there. That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on all architectures with and without JIT. v2->v3: Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well. Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
There's two cross-release leftover facilities: - the crossrelease_hist_*() irq-tracing callbacks (NOPs currently) - the complete_release_commit() callback (NOP as well) Remove them. Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 07 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 John Fastabend 提交于
Add psock NULL check to handle a racing sock event that can get the sk_callback_lock before this case but after xchg happens causing the refcnt to hit zero and sock user data (psock) to be null and queued for garbage collection. Also add a comment in the code because this is a bit subtle and not obvious in my opinion. Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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- 06 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Descriptor table is a shared object; it's not a place where you can stick temporary references to files, especially when we don't need an opened file at all. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14 Fixes: 98589a09 ("netfilter: xt_bpf: Fix XT_BPF_MODE_FD_PINNED mode of 'xt_bpf_info_v1'") Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 05 1月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Andrew Morton 提交于
gcc -fisolate-erroneous-paths-dereference can generate calls to abort() from modular code too. [arnd@arndb.de: drop duplicate exports of abort()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102103311.706364-1-arnd@arndb.deReported-by: NVineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1@synopsys.com> Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Alexey Brodkin <Alexey.Brodkin@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
As Tsukada explains, the time_is_before_jiffies(acct->needcheck) check is very wrong, we need time_is_after_jiffies() to make sys_acct() work. Ignoring the overflows, the code should "goto out" if needcheck > jiffies, while currently it checks "needcheck < jiffies" and thus in the likely case check_free_space() does nothing until jiffies overflow. In particular this means that sys_acct() is simply broken, acct_on() sets acct->needcheck = jiffies and expects that check_free_space() should set acct->active = 1 after the free-space check, but this won't happen if jiffies increments in between. This was broken by commit 32dc7308 ("get rid of timer in kern/acct.c") in 2011, then another (correct) commit 795a2f22 ("acct() should honour the limits from the very beginning") made the problem more visible. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213133940.GA6554@redhat.com Fixes: 32dc7308 ("get rid of timer in kern/acct.c") Reported-by: NTSUKADA Koutaro <tsukada@ascade.co.jp> Suggested-by: NTSUKADA Koutaro <tsukada@ascade.co.jp> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 30 12月, 2017 8 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The timer start debug function is called before the proper timer base is set. As a consequence the trace data contains the stale CPU and flags values. Call the debug function after setting the new base and flags. Fixes: 500462a9 ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: rt@linutronix.de Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222145337.792907137@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The conditions in irq_exit() to invoke tick_nohz_irq_exit() which subsequently invokes tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() are: if ((idle_cpu(cpu) && !need_resched()) || tick_nohz_full_cpu(cpu)) If need_resched() is not set, but a timer softirq is pending then this is an indication that the softirq code punted and delegated the execution to softirqd. need_resched() is not true because the current interrupted task takes precedence over softirqd. Invoking tick_nohz_irq_exit() in this case can cause an endless loop of timer interrupts because the timer wheel contains an expired timer, but softirqs are not yet executed. So it returns an immediate expiry request, which causes the timer to fire immediately again. Lather, rinse and repeat.... Prevent that by adding a check for a pending timer soft interrupt to the conditions in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() which avoid calling get_next_timer_interrupt(). That keeps the tick sched timer on the tick and prevents a repetitive programming of an already expired timer. Reported-by: NSebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.d> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712272156050.2431@nanos
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The timer wheel bases are not (re)initialized on CPU hotplug. That leaves them with a potentially stale clk and next_expiry valuem, which can cause trouble then the CPU is plugged. Add a prepare callback which forwards the clock, sets next_expiry to far in the future and reset the control flags to a known state. Set base->must_forward_clk so the first timer which is queued will try to forward the clock to current jiffies. Fixes: 500462a9 ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel") Reported-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712272152200.2431@nanos
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由 Anna-Maria Gleixner 提交于
During boot and before base::nohz_active is set in the timer bases, deferrable timers are enqueued into the standard timer base. This works correctly as long as base::nohz_active is false. Once it base::nohz_active is set and a timer which was enqueued before that is accessed the lock selector code choses the lock of the deferred base. This causes unlocked access to the standard base and in case the timer is removed it does not clear the pending flag in the standard base bitmap which causes get_next_timer_interrupt() to return bogus values. To prevent that, the deferrable timers must be enqueued in the deferrable base, even when base::nohz_active is not set. Those deferrable timers also need to be expired unconditional. Fixes: 500462a9 ("timers: Switch to a non-cascading wheel") Signed-off-by: NAnna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: rt@linutronix.de Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222145337.633328378@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The new reservation mode for interrupts assigns a dummy vector when the interrupt is allocated and assigns a real vector when the interrupt is requested. The reservation mode prevents vector pressure when devices with a large amount of queues/interrupts are initialized, but only a minimal subset of those queues/interrupts is actually used. This mode has an issue with MSI interrupts which cannot be masked. If the driver is not careful or the hardware emits an interrupt before the device irq is requestd by the driver then the interrupt ends up on the dummy vector as a spurious interrupt which can cause malfunction of the device or in the worst case a lockup of the machine. Change the logic for the reservation mode so that the early activation of MSI interrupts checks whether: - the device is a PCI/MSI device - the reservation mode of the underlying irqdomain is activated - PCI/MSI masking is globally enabled - the PCI/MSI device uses either MSI-X, which supports masking, or MSI with the maskbit supported. If one of those conditions is false, then clear the reservation mode flag in the irq data of the interrupt and invoke irq_domain_activate_irq() with the reserve argument cleared. In the x86 vector code, clear the can_reserve flag in the vector allocation data so a subsequent free_irq() won't create the same situation again. The interrupt stays assigned to a real vector until pci_disable_msi() is invoked and all allocations are undone. Fixes: 4900be83 ("x86/vector/msi: Switch to global reservation mode") Reported-by: NAlexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com> Reported-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NAlexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com> Tested-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com> Cc: Mihai Costache <v-micos@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Simon Xiao <sixiao@microsoft.com> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@intel.com>, Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712291406420.1899@nanos Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1712291409460.1899@nanos
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The 'early' argument of irq_domain_activate_irq() is actually used to denote reservation mode. To avoid confusion, rename it before abuse happens. No functional change. Fixes: 72491643 ("genirq/irqdomain: Update irq_domain_ops.activate() signature") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com> Cc: Mihai Costache <v-micos@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Simon Xiao <sixiao@microsoft.com> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@intel.com>, Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Add a new flag to mark interrupts which can use reservation mode. This is going to be used in subsequent patches to disable reservation mode for a certain class of MSI devices. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NAlexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com> Tested-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com> Cc: Mihai Costache <v-micos@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Simon Xiao <sixiao@microsoft.com> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@intel.com>, Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
When analyzing the fallout of the x86 vector allocation rework it turned out that the error handling in msi_domain_alloc_irqs() is broken. If MSI_FLAG_MUST_REACTIVATE is set for a MSI domain then it clears the activation flag for a successfully initialized msi descriptor. If a subsequent initialization fails then the error handling code path does not deactivate the interrupt because the activation flag got cleared. Move the clearing of the activation flag outside of the initialization loop so that an eventual failure can be cleaned up correctly. Fixes: 22d0b12f ("genirq/irqdomain: Add force reactivation flag to irq domains") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NAlexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com> Tested-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com> Cc: Mihai Costache <v-micos@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Simon Xiao <sixiao@microsoft.com> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@intel.com>, Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
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- 28 12月, 2017 9 次提交
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由 Guenter Roeck 提交于
An interrupt storm on a bad interrupt will cause the kernel log to be clogged. [ 60.089234] ->handle_irq(): ffffffffbe2f803f, [ 60.090455] 0xffffffffbf2af380 [ 60.090510] handle_bad_irq+0x0/0x2e5 [ 60.090522] ->irq_data.chip(): ffffffffbf2af380, [ 60.090553] IRQ_NOPROBE set [ 60.090584] ->handle_irq(): ffffffffbe2f803f, [ 60.090590] handle_bad_irq+0x0/0x2e5 [ 60.090596] ->irq_data.chip(): ffffffffbf2af380, [ 60.090602] 0xffffffffbf2af380 [ 60.090608] ->action(): (null) [ 60.090779] handle_bad_irq+0x0/0x2e5 This was seen when running an upstream kernel on Acer Chromebook R11. The system was unstable as result. Guard the log message with __printk_ratelimit to reduce the impact. This won't prevent the interrupt storm from happening, but at least the system remains stable. Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@chromium.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197953 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512234784-21038-1-git-send-email-linux@roeck-us.net
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由 Joel Fernandes 提交于
Since the recent remote cpufreq callback work, its possible that a cpufreq update is triggered from a remote CPU. For single policies however, the current code uses the local CPU when trying to determine if the remote sg_cpu entered idle or is busy. This is incorrect. To remedy this, compare with the nohz tick idle_calls counter of the remote CPU. Fixes: 674e7541 (sched: cpufreq: Allow remote cpufreq callbacks) Acked-by: NViresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NJoel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: 4.14+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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由 Andrew Lunn 提交于
The IRQ code already has support for lockdep class for the lock mutex in an interrupt descriptor. Extend this to add a second class for the request mutex in the descriptor. Not having a class is resulting in false positive splats in some code paths. Signed-off-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: linus.walleij@linaro.org Cc: grygorii.strashko@ti.com Cc: f.fainelli@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512234664-21555-1-git-send-email-andrew@lunn.ch
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
Jing Xia and Chunyan Zhang reported that on failing to allocate part of the tracing buffer, memory is freed, but the pointers that point to them are not initialized back to NULL, and later paths may try to free the freed memory again. Jing and Chunyan fixed one of the locations that does this, but missed a spot. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 737223fb ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code") Reported-by: NJing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com> Reported-by: NChunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com> Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Jing Xia 提交于
Double free of the ring buffer happens when it fails to alloc new ring buffer instance for max_buffer if TRACER_MAX_TRACE is configured. The root cause is that the pointer is not set to NULL after the buffer is freed in allocate_trace_buffers(), and the freeing of the ring buffer is invoked again later if the pointer is not equal to Null, as: instance_mkdir() |-allocate_trace_buffers() |-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->trace_buffer...) |-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->max_buffer...) // allocate fail(-ENOMEM),first free // and the buffer pointer is not set to null |-ring_buffer_free(tr->trace_buffer.buffer) // out_free_tr |-free_trace_buffers() |-free_trace_buffer(&tr->trace_buffer); //if trace_buffer is not null, free again |-ring_buffer_free(buf->buffer) |-rb_free_cpu_buffer(buffer->buffers[cpu]) // ring_buffer_per_cpu is null, and // crash in ring_buffer_per_cpu->pages Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 737223fb ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code") Signed-off-by: NJing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com> Signed-off-by: NChunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com> Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
To free the reader page that is allocated with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(), ring_buffer_free_read_page() must be called. For faster performance, this page can be reused by the ring buffer to avoid having to free and allocate new pages. The issue arises when the page is used with a splice pipe into the networking code. The networking code may up the page counter for the page, and keep it active while sending it is queued to go to the network. The incrementing of the page ref does not prevent it from being reused in the ring buffer, and this can cause the page that is being sent out to the network to be modified before it is sent by reading new data. Add a check to the page ref counter, and only reuse the page if it is not being used anywhere else. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 73a757e6 ("ring-buffer: Return reader page back into existing ring buffer") Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
The ring_buffer_read_page() takes care of zeroing out any extra data in the page that it returns. There's no need to zero it out again from the consumer. It was removed from one consumer of this function, but read_buffers_splice_read() did not remove it, and worse, it contained a nasty bug because of it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2711ca23 ("ring-buffer: Move zeroing out excess in page to ring buffer code") Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
Two info bits were added to the "commit" part of the ring buffer data page when returned to be consumed. This was to inform the user space readers that events have been missed, and that the count may be stored at the end of the page. What wasn't handled, was the splice code that actually called a function to return the length of the data in order to zero out the rest of the page before sending it up to user space. These data bits were returned with the length making the value negative, and that negative value was not checked. It was compared to PAGE_SIZE, and only used if the size was less than PAGE_SIZE. Luckily PAGE_SIZE is unsigned long which made the compare an unsigned compare, meaning the negative size value did not end up causing a large portion of memory to be randomly zeroed out. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 66a8cb95 ("ring-buffer: Add place holder recording of dropped events") Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Mathieu Malaterre 提交于
Fix non-fatal warnings such as: kernel/cpu.c:95:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration] static void inline cpuhp_lock_release(bool bringup) { } ^~~~~~ Signed-off-by: NMathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226140855.16583-1-malat@debian.org
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- 24 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
With the replacement of the pid bitmap and hashtable with an idr in alloc_pid started occassionally failing when allocating the first pid in a pid namespace. Things were not completely reset resulting in the first allocated pid getting the number 2 (not 1). Which further resulted in ns->proc_mnt not getting set and eventually causing an oops in proc_flush_task. Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 6743 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc4-think+ #2 RIP: 0010:proc_flush_task+0x8e/0x1b0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000bbffc40 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00000000fffffffb RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000bbffc50 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000bbffc63 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffffc9000bbffb70 R11: ffffc9000bbffc64 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff8804c10d7840 FS: 00007f7cb8965700(0000) GS:ffff88050a200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000003e21ae003 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 00007fb1d6c22000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ? release_task+0xaf/0x680 release_task+0xd2/0x680 ? wait_consider_task+0xb82/0xce0 wait_consider_task+0xbe9/0xce0 ? do_wait+0xe1/0x330 do_wait+0x151/0x330 kernel_wait4+0x8d/0x150 ? task_stopped_code+0x50/0x50 SYSC_wait4+0x95/0xa0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6c/0x80 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x2d7/0x340 ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:0x7f7cb82603aa RSP: 002b:00007ffd60770bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7cb6cd4000 RCX: 00007f7cb82603aa RDX: 000000000000000b RSI: 00007ffd60770bd0 RDI: 0000000000007cca RBP: 0000000000007cca R08: 00007f7cb8965700 R09: 00007ffd607c7080 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd60770bd0 R14: 00007f7cb6cd4058 R15: 00000000cccccccd Code: c1 e2 04 44 8b 60 30 48 8b 40 38 44 8b 34 11 48 c7 c2 60 3a f5 81 44 89 e1 4c 8b 68 58 e8 4b b4 77 00 89 44 24 14 48 8d 74 24 10 <49> 8b 7d 00 e8 b9 6a f9 ff 48 85 c0 74 1a 48 89 c7 48 89 44 24 RIP: proc_flush_task+0x8e/0x1b0 RSP: ffffc9000bbffc40 CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 53d67a6481059862 ]--- Improve the quality of the implementation by resetting the place to start allocating pids on failure to allocate the first pid. As improving the quality of the implementation is the goal remove the now unnecesarry disable_pid_allocations call when we fail to mount proc. Fixes: 95846ecf ("pid: replace pid bitmap implementation with IDR API") Fixes: 8ef047aa ("pid namespaces: make alloc_pid(), free_pid() and put_pid() work with struct upid") Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 23 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be allowed to fail. Fix up all instances. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 21 12月, 2017 4 次提交
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由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于
Do not allow root to convert valid pointers into unknown scalars. In particular disallow: ptr &= reg ptr <<= reg ptr += ptr and explicitly allow: ptr -= ptr since pkt_end - pkt == length 1. This minimizes amount of address leaks root can do. In the future may need to further tighten the leaks with kptr_restrict. 2. If program has such pointer math it's likely a user mistake and when verifier complains about it right away instead of many instructions later on invalid memory access it's easier for users to fix their progs. 3. when register holding a pointer cannot change to scalar it allows JITs to optimize better. Like 32-bit archs could use single register for pointers instead of a pair required to hold 64-bit scalars. 4. reduces architecture dependent behavior. Since code: r1 = r10; r1 &= 0xff; if (r1 ...) will behave differently arm64 vs x64 and offloaded vs native. A significant chunk of ptr mangling was allowed by commit f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") yet some of it was allowed even earlier. Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in the verifier: - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access() - `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access() - `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of `reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access() - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary() Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing pointer math with large values. Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking. Fixes: f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Reported-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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由 Jann Horn 提交于
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program rejection. Fixes: f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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由 Jann Horn 提交于
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption of spilled registers, which is exploitable. Fixes: f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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