- 05 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
crypto_poly1305_final() no longer requires a cra_alignmask, and nothing else in the x86 poly1305-simd implementation does either. So remove the cra_alignmask so that the crypto API does not have to unnecessarily align the buffers. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 28 12月, 2017 3 次提交
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由 Junaid Shahid 提交于
The aesni_gcm_enc/dec functions can access memory after the end of the AAD buffer if the AAD length is not a multiple of 4 bytes. It didn't matter with rfc4106-gcm-aesni as in that case the AAD was always followed by the 8 byte IV, but that is no longer the case with generic-gcm-aesni. This can potentially result in accessing a page that is not mapped and thus causing the machine to crash. This patch fixes that by reading the last <16 byte block of the AAD byte-by-byte and optionally via an 8-byte load if the block was at least 8 bytes. Fixes: 0487ccac ("crypto: aesni - make non-AVX AES-GCM work with any aadlen") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJunaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Junaid Shahid 提交于
The aesni_gcm_enc/dec functions can access memory before the start of the data buffer if the length of the data buffer is less than 16 bytes. This is because they perform the read via a single 16-byte load. This can potentially result in accessing a page that is not mapped and thus causing the machine to crash. This patch fixes that by reading the partial block byte-by-byte and optionally an via 8-byte load if the block was at least 8 bytes. Fixes: 0487ccac ("crypto: aesni - make non-AVX AES-GCM work with any aadlen") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJunaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Using %rbp as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. In twofish-3way, we can't simply replace %rbp with another register because there are none available. Instead, we use the stack to hold the values that %rbp, %r11, and %r12 were holding previously. Each of these values represents the half of the output from the previous Feistel round that is being passed on unchanged to the following round. They are only used once per round, when they are exchanged with %rax, %rbx, and %rcx. As a result, we free up 3 registers (one per block) and can reassign them so that %rbp is not used, and additionally %r14 and %r15 are not used so they do not need to be saved/restored. There may be a small overhead caused by replacing 'xchg REG, REG' with the needed sequence 'mov MEM, REG; mov REG, MEM; mov REG, REG' once per round. But, counterintuitively, when I tested "ctr-twofish-3way" on a Haswell processor, the new version was actually about 2% faster. (Perhaps 'xchg' is not as well optimized as plain moves.) Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 12月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
When I added generic-gcm-aes I didn't add a wrapper like the one provided for rfc4106(gcm(aes)). We need to add a cryptd wrapper to fall back on in case the FPU is not available, otherwise we might corrupt the FPU state. Fixes: cce2ea8d ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: NIlya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
generic_gcmaes_decrypt needs to use generic_gcmaes_ctx, not aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. This is actually harmless because the fields in struct generic_gcmaes_ctx share the layout of the same fields in aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. Fixes: cce2ea8d ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 29 11月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Now that the generic ChaCha20 implementation no longer needs a cra_alignmask, the x86 one doesn't either -- given that the x86 implementation doesn't need the alignment itself. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13eb ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 03 11月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
struct sha1_ctx_mgr allocated in sha1_mb_mod_init() via kzalloc() and later passed in sha1_mb_flusher_mgr_flush_avx2() function where instructions vmovdqa used to access the struct. vmovdqa requires 16-bytes aligned argument, but nothing guarantees that struct sha1_ctx_mgr will have that alignment. Unaligned vmovdqa will generate GP fault. Fix this by replacing vmovdqa with vmovdqu which doesn't have alignment requirements. Fixes: 2249cbb5 ("crypto: sha-mb - SHA1 multibuffer submit and flush routines for AVX2") Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
struct sha256_ctx_mgr allocated in sha256_mb_mod_init() via kzalloc() and later passed in sha256_mb_flusher_mgr_flush_avx2() function where instructions vmovdqa used to access the struct. vmovdqa requires 16-bytes aligned argument, but nothing guarantees that struct sha256_ctx_mgr will have that alignment. Unaligned vmovdqa will generate GP fault. Fix this by replacing vmovdqa with vmovdqu which doesn't have alignment requirements. Fixes: a377c6b1 ("crypto: sha256-mb - submit/flush routines for AVX2") Reported-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 12 10月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于
The new stack validator in objdump doesn't like directly assigning r11 to rsp, warning with something like: warning: objtool: chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3()+0xa: unsupported stack pointer realignment warning: objtool: chacha20_8block_xor_avx2()+0x6: unsupported stack pointer realignment This fixes things up to use code similar to gcc's DRAP register, so that objdump remains happy. Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Fixes: baa41469 ("objtool: Implement stack validation 2.0") Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 07 10月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Mikulas Patocka 提交于
In 32-bit mode, the x86 architecture can hold full 32-bit pointers. Therefore, the code that copies the current address to the %ecx register and uses %ecx-relative addressing is useless, we could just use absolute addressing. The processors have a stack of return addresses for branch prediction. If we use a call instruction and pop the return address, it desynchronizes the return stack and causes branch prediction misses. This patch also moves the data to the .rodata section. Signed-off-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 9月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Corentin LABBE 提交于
This patch replace GCM IV size value by their constant name. Signed-off-by: NCorentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Colin Ian King 提交于
Arrays aesni_simd_skciphers and aesni_simd_skciphers2 are local to the source and do not need to be in global scope, so make them static. Cleans up sparse warnings: symbol 'aesni_simd_skciphers' was not declared. Should it be static? symbol 'aesni_simd_skciphers2' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 20 9月, 2017 12 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R13 instead of RBP. Both are callee-saved registers, so the substitution is straightforward. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Mix things up a little bit to get rid of the RBP usage, without hurting performance too much. Use RDI instead of RBP for the TBL pointer. That will clobber CTX, so spill CTX onto the stack and use R12 to read it in the outer loop. R12 is used as a non-persistent temporary variable elsewhere, so it's safe to use. Also remove the unused y4 variable. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Swap the usages of R12 and RBP. Use R12 for the TBL register, and use RBP to store the pre-aligned stack pointer. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. There's no need to use RBP as a temporary register for the TBL value, because it always stores the same value: the address of the K256 table. Instead just reference the address of K256 directly. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Swap the usages of R12 and RBP. Use R12 for the TBL register, and use RBP to store the pre-aligned stack pointer. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Swap the usages of R12 and RBP. Use R12 for the REG_D register, and use RBP to store the pre-aligned stack pointer. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R11 instead of RBP. Since R11 isn't a callee-saved register, it doesn't need to be saved and restored on the stack. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use RSI instead of RBP for RT1. Since RSI is also used as a the 'dst' function argument, it needs to be saved on the stack until the argument is needed. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R15 instead of RBP. R15 can't be used as the RID1 register because of x86 instruction encoding limitations. So use R15 for CTX and RDI for CTX. This means that CTX is no longer an implicit function argument. Instead it needs to be explicitly copied from RDI. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R15 instead of RBP. R15 can't be used as the RID1 register because of x86 instruction encoding limitations. So use R15 for CTX and RDI for CTX. This means that CTX is no longer an implicit function argument. Instead it needs to be explicitly copied from RDI. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R12 instead of RBP. Both are callee-saved registers, so the substitution is straightforward. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
Using RBP as a temporary register breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Use R12 instead of RBP. R12 can't be used as the RT0 register because of x86 instruction encoding limitations. So use R12 for CTX and RDI for CTX. This means that CTX is no longer an implicit function argument. Instead it needs to be explicitly copied from RDI. Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 09 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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It was reported that the sha1 AVX2 function(sha1_transform_avx2) is reading ahead beyond its intended data, and causing a crash if the next block is beyond page boundary: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=149373371023377 This patch makes sure that there is no overflow for any buffer length. It passes the tests written by Jan Stancek that revealed this problem: https://github.com/jstancek/sha1-avx2-crash I have re-enabled sha1-avx2 by reverting commit b82ce244 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: b82ce244 ("crypto: sha1-ssse3 - Disable avx2") Originally-by: NIlya Albrekht <ilya.albrekht@intel.com> Tested-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NMegha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 04 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
There are quite a number of occurrences in the kernel of the pattern if (dst != src) memcpy(dst, src, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); crypto_xor(dst, final, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); or crypto_xor(keystream, src, nbytes); memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes); where crypto_xor() is preceded or followed by a memcpy() invocation that is only there because crypto_xor() uses its output parameter as one of the inputs. To avoid having to add new instances of this pattern in the arm64 code, which will be refactored to implement non-SIMD fallbacks, add an alternative implementation called crypto_xor_cpy(), taking separate input and output arguments. This removes the need for the separate memcpy(). Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 05 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Herbert Xu 提交于
It has been reported that sha1-avx2 can cause page faults by reading beyond the end of the input. This patch disables it until it can be fixed. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 7c1da8d0 ("crypto: sha - SHA1 transform x86_64 AVX2") Reported-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 30 6月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
In preparation for an objtool rewrite which will have broader checks, whitelist functions and files which cause problems because they do unusual things with the stack. These whitelists serve as a TODO list for which functions and files don't yet have undwarf unwinder coverage. Eventually most of the whitelists can be removed in favor of manual CFI hint annotations or objtool improvements. Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7f934a5d707a574bda33ea282e9478e627fb1829.1498659915.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 19 6月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
We checked (nbytes < bsize) inside the loops so it's not possible to hit the "goto done;" here. This code is cut and paste from other slightly different loops where we don't have the check inside the loop. Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 23 5月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 18 5月, 2017 7 次提交
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
Now that the asm side of things can support all the valid lengths of ICV and all lengths of associated data, provide the glue code to expose a generic gcm(aes) crypto algorithm. Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
This is the first step to make the aesni AES-GCM implementation generic. The current code was written for rfc4106, so it handles only some specific sizes of associated data. Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
This is the first step to make the aesni AES-GCM implementation generic. The current code was written for rfc4106, so it handles only some specific sizes of associated data. Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Sabrina Dubroca 提交于
This is the first step to make the aesni AES-GCM implementation generic. The current code was written for rfc4106, so it handles only some specific sizes of associated data. Signed-off-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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