Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>

Minor cleanup of some sparse warnings (including a few misc
endian fixes for the new smb3 rdma code)
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

Since IPC now has a tcon object, the caller can just pass it. This
allows domain-based DFS requests to work with smb2+.

Link: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12917
Fixes: 9d49640a ("CIFS: implement get_dfs_refer for SMB2+")
Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

* Remove ses->ipc_tid.
* Make IPC$ regular tcon.
* Add a direct pointer to it in ses->tcon_ipc.
* Distinguish PIPE tcon from IPC tcon by adding a tcon->pipe flag. All
  IPC tcons are pipes but not all pipes are IPC.
* All TreeConnect functions now cannot take a NULL tcon object.

The IPC tcon has the same lifetime as the session it belongs to. It is
created when the session is created and destroyed when the session is
destroyed.

Since no mounts directly refer to the IPC tcon, its refcount should
always be set to initialisation value (1). Thus we make sure
cifs_put_tcon() skips it.

If the mount request resulting in a new session being created requires
encryption, try to require it too for IPC.

* set SERVER_NAME_LENGTH to serverName actual size

The maximum length of an ipv6 string representation is defined in
INET6_ADDRSTRLEN as 45+1 for null but lets keep what we know works.
Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Autonegotiation gives a security settings mismatch error if the SMB
server selects an SMBv3 dialect that isn't SMB3.02. The exact error is
"protocol revalidation - security settings mismatch".
This can be tested using Samba v4.2 or by setting the global Samba
setting max protocol = SMB3_00.

The check that fails in smb3_validate_negotiate is the dialect
verification of the negotiate info response. This is because it tries
to verify against the protocol_id in the global smbdefault_values. The
protocol_id in smbdefault_values is SMB3.02.
In SMB2_negotiate the protocol_id in smbdefault_values isn't updated,
it is global so it probably shouldn't be, but server->dialect is.

This patch changes the check in smb3_validate_negotiate to use
server->dialect instead of server->vals->protocol_id. The patch works
with autonegotiate and when using a specific version in the vers mount
option.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel N Pettersson <danielnp@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>

Currently the CIFS SMB Direct implementation (experimental) doesn't properly
support signing. Disable it when SMB Direct is in use for transport.

Signing will be enabled in future after it is implemented.
Signed-off-by: NLong Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

If I/O size is larger than rdma_readwrite_threshold, use RDMA write for
SMB read by specifying channel SMB2_CHANNEL_RDMA_V1 or
SMB2_CHANNEL_RDMA_V1_INVALIDATE in the SMB packet, depending on SMB dialect
used. Append a smbd_buffer_descriptor_v1 to the end of the SMB packet and fill
in other values to indicate this SMB read uses RDMA write.

There is no need to read from the transport for incoming payload. At the time
SMB read response comes back, the data is already transferred and placed in the
pages by RDMA hardware.

When SMB read is finished, deregister the memory regions if RDMA write is used
for this SMB read. smbd_deregister_mr may need to do local invalidation and
sleep, if server remote invalidation is not used.

There are situations where the MID may not be created on I/O failure, under
which memory region is deregistered when read data context is released.
Signed-off-by: NLong Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

When sending I/O, if size is larger than rdma_readwrite_threshold we prepare
to send SMB write packet for a RDMA read via memory registration. The actual
I/O is done by remote peer through local RDMA hardware. Modify the relevant
fields in the packet accordingly, and append a smbd_buffer_descriptor_v1 to
the end of the SMB write packet.

On write I/O finish, deregister the memory region if this was for a RDMA read.
If remote invalidation is not used, the call to smbd_deregister_mr will do
local invalidation and possibly wait. Memory region is normally deregistered
in MID callback as soon as it's used. There are situations where the MID may
not be created on I/O failure, under which memory region is deregistered when
write data context is released.
Signed-off-by: NLong Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

This patch is for preparing upper layer for doing SMB read via RDMA write.

When we assemble the SMB read packet header, we need to know the I/O layout
if this request is to use a RDMA write. rdata has all the information we need
for memory registration. Add rdata to smb2_new_read_req.
Signed-off-by: NLong Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber.redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

According to MS-SMB2 3.2.55 validate_negotiate request must
always be signed. Some Windows can fail the request if you send it unsigned

See kernel bugzilla bug 197311

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber.redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

An undersize validate negotiate info server response causes the client
to use uninitialised memory for struct validate_negotiate_info_rsp
comparisons of Dialect, SecurityMode and/or Capabilities members.

Link: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13092
Fixes: 7db0a6ef ("SMB3: Work around mount failure when using SMB3 dialect to Macs")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Fixes: ff1c038a ("Check SMB3 dialects against downgrade attacks")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

If SendReceive2() fails rsp is set to NULL but is dereferenced in the
error handling code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

query_info() doesn't use the InputBuffer field of the QUERY_INFO
request, therefore according to [MS-SMB2] it must:

a) set the InputBufferOffset to 0
b) send a zero-length InputBuffer

Doing a) is trivial but b) is a bit more tricky.

The packet is allocated according to it's StructureSize, which takes
into account an extra 1 byte buffer which we don't need
here. StructureSize fields must have constant values no matter the
actual length of the whole packet so we can't just edit that constant.

Both the NetBIOS-over-TCP message length ("rfc1002 length") L and the
iovec length L' have to be updated. Since L' is computed from L we
just update L by decrementing it by one.
Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Update reading the EA using increasingly larger buffer sizes
until the response will fit in the buffer, or we exceed the
(arbitrary) maximum set to 64kb.

Without this change, a user is able to add more and more EAs using
setfattr until the point where the total space of all EAs exceed 2kb
at which point the user can no longer list the EAs at all
and getfattr will abort with an error.

The same issue still exists for EAs in SMB1.
Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NXiaoli Feng <xifeng@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

As long as signing is supported (ie not a guest user connection) and
connection is SMB3 or SMB3.02, then validate negotiate (protect
against man in the middle downgrade attacks).  We had been doing this
only when signing was required, not when signing was just enabled,
but this more closely matches recommended SMB3 behavior and is
better security.  Suggested by Metze.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Acked-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>

It can be confusing if user ends up authenticated as guest but they
requested signing (server will return error validating signed packets)
so add log message for this.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>

Multi-dialect negotiate patch had a minor endian error.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+

Samba rejects SMB3.1.1 dialect (vers=3.1.1) negotiate requests from
the kernel client due to the two byte pad at the end of the negotiate
contexts.

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

With the need to discourage use of less secure dialect, SMB1 (CIFS),
we temporarily upgraded the dialect to SMB3 in 4.13, but since there
are various servers which only support SMB2.1 (2.1 is more secure
than CIFS/SMB1) but not optimal for a default dialect - add support
for multidialect negotiation.  cifs.ko will now request SMB2.1
or later (ie SMB2.1 or SMB3.0, SMB3.02) and the server will
pick the latest most secure one it can support.

In addition since we are sending multidialect negotiate, add
support for secure negotiate to validate that a man in the
middle didn't downgrade us.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+